Turning the wheels

AFTER the national and provincial elections held on October 10, we seem to have a fragmented polity in Pakistan. This is a grim reflection on the three years’ rule of General Musharraf. This is in line with the fragmentation of the political system under Generals Ayub and Zia.

The familiar military strategy is to factionalize political parties and fractionalize the political community. An obvious product of this strategy is the emergency of multiple factions, leaders, ideologies and identities belonging to disparate regions and communities. The military government has been credited with sponsoring client groups and leaders, ranging from Ajmal Khattak’s NAPP and Sherpao’s PPP faction to PML(Q) and National Alliance under Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. All this contributed to decimation of long established political parties such as ANP, electoral debacle of mainstream parties such as PML(N) and containment of the winning potential of parties such as PPP.

Will the PML(Q) with its leading position in the National Assembly seek coalition with the MMA or with the PPPP? Both options carry a tremendous potential for shaping the policy and profile of Pakistan in the coming months and years. The country can either continue to pursue its projected agenda for liberalization of laws, education and foreign policy commitments or move in the direction of Islamic legislation and moral conservatism.

President Musharraf and the PML(Q) would have found it logical to accommodate the MMA in the ruling set-up, given the past experience. However, the times have changed. That option will entail a U-turn in Islamabad’s policy of cooperation with Washington in the latter’s drive against Islamic militancy. After all, the US military operation along the border with Afghanistan was the most immediate cause of the shift of the voting trend in favour of the MMA in the first place.

But coalescing with the PPPP, even without Benazir Bhutto, is also problematic, perhaps less so for President Musharraf but significantly more so for Shujat-Pervez Elahi duo of the PML(Q). The latter is leaderless and clueless, whereas the pattern of leadership in the PPPP is stable and predictable. If there is going to be a coalition between the PPPP and PML(Q), then Makhdoom Amin Fahim would be the natural choice for prime minister. How far can this arrangement be acceptable to the rank file of the PML(Q), especially in the light of electoral understanding between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif during the last few weeks?

That brings us to the question of the fragmented policy. The elections have resulted in regionalization of political trends, in the absence of national parties which would have operated as an integrative force across ethnic and provincial divides. In pursuit of its strategy of elimination of the two potential contenders for power, the Musharraf government weakened civil society. This robbed the nation of truly federal political platforms in the form of the PPP and the PML.

There are three different moods of the nation as represented by the election results. First, there is the mainstream politics, largely but not exclusively represented by Punjab. This province has demonstrated status quo-orientation par excellence. The essence of current politics in Punjab is neither policy, nor ideology, nor issues, nor identity. Instead, this province has projected a localized pattern of voting, based on loyalties of caste, village and factional alliance. The two variables of party identification and charismatic appeal of the party leader were lost on the followers of Nawaz Sharif and his faction of the PML.

But the two factors of party and charisma worked in favour of the PPPP, which made an impressive comeback after its debacle in Punjab in 1997. The official machinery under President Musharraf focussed on discrediting Nawaz Sharif after overthrowing his government. On the other hand, the effect of the vilification campaign against Benazir Bhutto by successive governments was gradually wiped off the public mind. Benazir was considered the natural alternative leader at the national level. The tape scandal, followed by quashing of the Supreme Court verdict against Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari rehabilitated the PPP leadership in a big way. There was more heat than light in anti-Benazir Bhutto propaganda campaign.

Punjab in 2002 represents continuity rather than change. The PPP and the PML, the latter under the new factional leadership, continue to reflect the two large patronage networks operating in various localities. The PMLs of all hues comprise the potential winners who are generally, if not always, willing to follow the military-bureaucratic establishment in terms of policies. For that reason, the military government of President Musharraf can only compliment itself for the PML(Q)’s performance in Punjab.

At the other end, the PPP has been wiling to play the game according to the established rules of the game, treading the chartered path more often than not, and avoiding the no-go areas in foreign and defence policies. It has demonstrated its capacity and willingness to cohabit with the establishment in the 1970s and again in the 1990s. Thus PML(Q) and PPP as the establishment and cohabitation parties, respectively, characterize the mainstream politics, with its epicentre lying in Punjab.

The second major electoral trend is the Islamic politics, represented by the MMA. Islamic parties typically occupied a poor third position in electoral politics for three decades after the 1970 elections, preceded by an even poorer representation in elected assemblies. It has now overtaken ethnic politics by a big margin, and threatens to displace the mainstream politics from its commanding heights. Indeed, ethnic politics of Pakhtoons, Sindhis, Mohajirs and the Baloch had become part of the system during the last decade, inasmuch as ethnic parties became coalition partners of the mainstream parties. Instead, Islamic parties in the MMA represent the change factor from an assertive anti-establishment perspective.

Various factors explain the emergence of MMA as a new and surprising element in electoral politics of Pakistan. First, the two decades of financial, strategic, moral and ideological support of Islamabad finally bore fruit, albeit not necessarily to the liking of the ruling elite. While the Musharraf government fractionalized the mainstream political community, Islamic /sectarian parties moved towards closing of ranks. The results show that the establishment turned wheels around a blind corner, without first taking a good look ahead.

Targeting the relatively liberal mainstream parties for negative propaganda and projecting them as corrupt, inefficient and self-serving entities created a political vacuum. This was filled by the most mobilized political activists on the ground, belonging to Islamic parties. The latter have demonstrated their capacity to outgrow the position of a mere instrument of the official policy and become a political force in their own right.

The third electoral trend is ethnic politics. From the 1930s to 1970s, Pakhtoon nationalism was the most dynamic force in the NWFP. Later, ethnic politics started giving way to the rival source of primary loyalties in the form of Islamic ideology. The two decades-long Afghan war consolidated the new trend. The US war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda was perceived to be essentially anti-Pakhtoon. The recent military operation in the eastern Afghan frontier region completed the scenario. Similarly, Pakhtoons in Balochistan, across the border with the Taliban headquarter in Kandahar, were grossly alienated by seeing their compatriots lose ground, and being hounded and killed.

While Pakhtoons moved from ethnic to Islamic politics, the Mohajirs moved in the reverse direction — from Islamic to ethnic politics in the last quarter of a century. However, the premier Mohajir party, MQM, seems to have lost some ground in the elections. The party leadership had realized the need to expand its political base. It sought to move from Mohajirism to Sindhism and from ethno-linguistic idiom to the demand for provincial autonomy. Its boycott of local bodies elections last year might have robbed it of the political initiative in the metropolis of Karachi. The Washington factor too played its role crucially, though indirectly. There is a common perception that the US put all its eggs in one basket — the Musharraf government — grossly neglecting democratic forces. The pursuit of military operation against Al Qaeda by Washington-Islamabad axis remained without an exit strategy. There was no effort to establish a political base in the NWFP in the post-conflict situation.

The election results point to a fragmented political landscape, with few political currents shared across the federation. The trans-Indus provinces of the NWFP and Balochistan have comprehensively moved towards Islamic politics. The cis-Indus provinces of Punjab and Sindh largely show status quo-orientation. Ethnic politics has suffered a setback. The longer the real political power is withheld from public representatives, the higher will be the level of public alienation from the ruling set-up and greater the challenge to the federation.

After the polls in Kashmir

AS attention in Pakistan was focused on the elections held in the country last Thursday, it was inevitable that the results of the polls held next door in the disputed Indian-occupied Kashmir, which came in the same day, were all but ignored. This was partly because our own electoral exercise was on and left little time and even lesser interest in what was emerging on the political stage across the Line of Control.

But more than that there were the legal niceties which we in Pakistan feel must be taken care of. Since we do not recognize the legitimacy of the government in Srinagar and because India is in unlawful occupation of Kashmir, it is not considered correct to take note of the political developments that take place on the other side of the LoC. Hence, by rejecting the elections in occupied Kashmir as a farce, we tend to treat them as a non-event. It is only the violence in the valley, especially the brutalities of the Indian security forces, which receive considerable coverage in Pakistan’s media.

This is an ostrich-like approach. Taking note of a reality is different from granting it recognition. Even if the elections in Occupied Kashmir were manipulated and the turn-out was low, we should not dismiss them as being of no consequence, just as we have not turned a blind eye to our own elections in spite of the fact that many parties have alleged that they were rigged.

Politically speaking, it cannot be denied that the elections in IHK were no substitute for the right of self-determination which was promised to the Kashmiris by India in 1947. This pledge was reinforced by the UNCIP resolutions, which ended the war in the state in 1949 and also provided for a UN-supervised plebiscite to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future.

But what we must remember is that this happened in 1949 and a lot of water has flowed down the Indus in the last 52 years. True, 11 elections have been held in Indian-occupied Kashmir and the state remains in turmoil. The moot question is: can Pakistan, which became a party to the dispute by virtue of the circumstances attending the Partition of 1947, hope to resolve the dispute by rigidly adhering to the stance it adopted five decades ago? If we were to shed our blinkered approach we might be able to discern the winds of change blowing across the valley.

A lot has been happening in Kashmir in the last few months. This is in addition to the acts of terrorism, which India describes as originating from the Pakistan side. We prefer to term this violence as the outcome of the freedom movement being waged by the indigenous population. There appears to be a grain of truth in both. But the more important fact is that the political scenario in the Indian-held Kashmir is changing. The Indian government has made some tentative moves to which the Kashmiris — not the groups which have been rightly branded as puppets — have responded positively so far.

Does not statesmanship and sagacity demand that Pakistan take note of the political shift that is gradually taking place in the Indian-held state. The elections that took place in four phases in September/October reflect this change. We should take a hard look at the results, which have emerged from the exercise. Turning a blind eye to them will not help, especially when Pakistanis have accepted their own elections which, too, were flawed.

The National Conference (NC), which has ruled the state since 1975 when Sheikh Abdullah entered into a deal with Indira Gandhi, has suffered a severe setback. It is expected to be out of office, even though with 28 out of 87 seats in the assembly the NC is the largest party.

Not only was the NC president Omar Abdullah, the scion of the Abdullah family, routed by his PDP rival, ten ministers also failed to get through.

The People’s Democratic Party led by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, a former Union home minister, is expected to form the government in coalition with the Congress and other smaller parties and independents. With new blood in the seat of power one can hope for innovative approaches to be tried to resolve the issue. Mufti Sayeed participated in the elections but he is on record as having said that the “elections provide no answer to the Kashmir problem”.

Therefore, not surprisingly, the recent elections have not derailed the peace process of sorts which began in August. Its staunch opposition to the polls notwithstanding, the All Party Hurriyat Conference has announced that it will resume talks with the Kashmir Committee later this week. Headed by former Union law minister, Ram Jethmalani, this non-official body of seven members started a low-profile dialogue with the APHC and Shabir Shah, the leader of the Democratic Freedom Party.

Although no substantial progress has been achieved so far, the mere fact that the two sides have managed to keep the talks going is in itself a major achievement. Given the confrontationist climate in the held-state and the armed insurgency there, even little measures amount to much and should be appreciated as such.

Ram Jethmalani has called on the new government which takes office in Srinagar to grant general amnesty to those who lay down arms. He has also suggested the repeal of all repressive and undemocratic laws. More significantly, he has asked Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to hold talks with the “militants” and “separatists” in the state. We will have to wait and see how the government in New Delhi will respond to the new post-election situation in Srinagar. Mr Vajpayee should be mindful of the slide in the BJP’s popularity in the held-state where the party has been left clinging to a lone seat in the Assembly. In fact, its arch-rival, the Congress Party, has fared much better and is expected to be a partner in the government.

The APHC has insisted that Pakistan should be included in the dialogue when it begins in real earnest. At his press conference last week, Professor Abdul Gani Bhat, the Hurriyat chairman, said that though his party stood for a plebiscite in Kashmir, there “may be problems in the way of a plebiscite and then the only way out was a purposeful and positive dialogue between India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir”.

One hopes that the Pakistan government understands the implications of these developments and statements. There are two key aspects, which Islamabad needs to recognize in charting out its future course of action. First, the Kashmiri freedom movement is not a monolithic process. The numerous factions struggling to free themselves from Indian control do not share a common goal and their strategies are also diverse. Thus, the Hizbul Mujahideen, which is headed by Syed Salahuddin, has been critical of the Kashmir Committee and has rejected its dialogue with the APHC. The Hizb stands for an armed struggle.

Gani Bhat, on the other hand, is a politician and wants to adopt a political course. He even declared recently that “politics consists of reconciliation, balancing and interpreting various opinions”. He promised to take ten steps forward if India and Pakistan were to take one.

Meanwhile, there are indications that India is moving towards accepting an American role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Be it as a mediator, as Pakistan terms it, or as a facilitator, as India has now described it, some activity seems likely on the diplomatic front.

How will Pakistan respond at this critical juncture? With the process of government formation in Islamabad so fluid at the moment and the emergence of the pro-jihad religious parties in substantial strength, a rethinking of the Kashmir policy may have become difficult. Nevertheless, policy makers who are empowered to take decisions on foreign policy should opt for a low profile on Kashmir. While Islamabad should seek to disengage from the armed struggle in the disputed state, it should leave it to the APHC to set the tone for it and determine its course.

There are too many contradictions in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy to carry it to a logical and realistic end. It makes little sense to demand, parrot-like, a plebiscite the modalities of which were laid down in the 1949 UN resolutions. These resolutions are no longer implementable. Hence the need is for greater pragmatism. If Prof Abdul Gani Bhat can show it, why not Pakistan?

A Muslim imperialist

LONG ago, when I was a junior officer in Punjab Information, I asked the central (now federal) Interior Secretary whom I knew, what was being done about bringing home the remains of Chaudhry Rehmat Ali, the man who coined the word “Pakistan” as was being vociferously demanded by some people in the country.

“Nothing”, he said, and added, “By the way, are you sure he himself would have approved? You see, he never came to live in Pakistan for he heartily disapproved of it for being contrary to his concept of a Muslim homeland in India, and preferred to pass his days in England. I wonder what he did for a living there.”

This last, more a thought than a question, remained unanswered, for some of us too used to make conjectures in the days when Pakistan was still an idea as to what Rehmat Ali did in Cambridge. But since it was Cambridge, we all thought he was studying for some kind of a doctorate. It is strange that all those who count him among the founders of Pakistan still can’t throw light on what he did there.

I owe it to former columnist Khalid Hasan for reminding me of those days through a newspaper article called “The Quaid’s Detractor.” Actually detractor is a small word, for Rehmat Ali had nothing but contempt for Mr Jinnah whom he took as an agent of the devil himself for not conforming to his (Rehmat Ali’s) idea of Pakistan.

The difference between the two was that one was a practical, democratic, down-to-earth politician, wedded to truth and exactitude, the other, sitting in Cambridge, was a visionary without any sense of reality or sense of history, and if I May add on my own, without any common sense. His only contribution to the making of Pakistan was the name, whereas Pakistan with any other name, would have been equally — whatever it is.

Chaudhry Rehmat Ali has been discussed threadbare by votaries of Pakistan and those who take it upon themselves to determine its heroes, but this aura of heroship has been built up around him as if he had snatched Pakistan from the jaws of the British and the talons of the Hindus. Whereas all that he did was to coin a name, and nothing more. Repeat, nothing more. As for his actual concept of a homeland for Indian Muslims, it was the most hare-brained scheme one could ever come across.

I have called him a Muslim imperialist. If he were alive in 1965 during the September war with India, he would have been one of those who wanted to fly the star and crescent on the Red Fort in Delhi, probably by landing on it by helicopter, for otherwise it was hardly possible. He was a firm believer in the slogan. “Crush India,” and if he could crush Hindu India from Cambridge he would have readily done so.

The dictionary defines imperialism as “Principle or spirit of empire, advocacy of what are held to be imperial interests.” When, in his mind, Rehmat Ali appropriated for the Muslims nearly two-thirds of India, he forgot one important detail: how the new Muslim empire was to be brought about? By force of arms or by persuading the non-Muslims to make-do with a small part of the vast subcontinent to be called Hanoodia? Apparently even this was done in a spirit of generosity, for, in his opinion, the Hindus did not deserve anything better than a ghetto.

Apart from what is today Pakistan (with of course Kashmir and much more added to it) in the west, and Bang-e-Islam comprising Bengal and Assam in the east, the Muslim Indian empire was also to have Osmanistan (Hyderabad Deccan) and Moplahistan on the western coast of south India, and numerous other bits and pieces. Apparently, any area, big or small, that had any connection with Muslim history and culture, had been arbitrarily included, with Rehmat Ali secure in the supreme self-confidence that the Hindus wouldn’t mind despite their overwhelmingly majority.

This was the “great visionary” who, in school textbooks and the country’s postage stamps, is counted among the heroes whose tireless efforts before 1947 led the establishment of Pakistan. As his admirers would have us believe, a crazy notion, howsoever nebulous and impracticable, is preferable as an ideal to the real Pakistan (moth-eaten, in Mr Jinnah’s words) which is too small and too pragmatic to evoke the Mahmud Ghaznavi-style Muslim spirit of imperialism.

What his admirers want in the 20th-21st centuries is empire builders like Muhammad bin Qasim and Salahuddin Ayubi. By the way, the Rehmat Ali Society is very much active in Gujrat, his home town. Left to it, the Quaid’s bones would probably be disinterred from his mausoleum and replaced by its hero’s remains imported from Cambridge which he loved more than Pakistan.

Most of us Muslims are sentimental dreamers and not particularly interested in facts and history, preferring to live with myths or our own making, or half-truths, or even pure fantasy. While Jinnah, with his bad health but millions of Muslims at his beck and call, was labouring day and night to create a homeland for them, Rehmat Ali, ensconced in Cambridge, was spinning grandiose dreams of conquering Hindustan without a single follower to his name. And when the former had achieved his objective, look what the Chaudhry had to say about it.

He said the Quaid had dealt six deadly blows to the millat. I need not recount the six blows; they are too deadly for this column to take. If you are interested you can read the book “Pakistan, Fatherland of the Pak Nation,” published by Book Traders of Lahore, which also contains Rehmat Ali’s original pamphlet “Now or Never” on what Pakistan, the name coined by him, was supposed to consist of as a resuscitated Muslim empire.

Before I close, let me repeat what the Interior Secretary of those days had said in conclusion: “If it were generally known what Rehmat Ali thought of Quaid-e-Azam and what he wrote about him, the box bringing his bones from England might not get an exactly red carpet welcome. So, as we bureaucrats say about matters that don’t need further attention: Please file.”

Closer to the middle

PRESIDENT Bush’s recent address showed an encouraging hint of restraint cloaked in tough declarations about the United States’ new role in the post-9/11 world. As he took his case for confronting Saddam Hussein directly to the American people, Bush also acknowledged that questions about going to war were legitimate, rather than anti-American.

Perhaps most important, Bush emphasized again that he would go through the United Nations first and that any war would be waged “with allies,” presumably meaning more than Britain alone.

Bush emphasized that war was not the first resort of a powerful democracy, even as he warned that waiting too long was “the riskiest of all options.” If Hussein fully complies with whatever demands emerge from a new U.N. Security Council resolution, Bush promised, Iraq can avoid war. Or, he all but said out loud, Iraqis can just deal with Hussein and expect plenty of American help afterward.

The president did not offer any shocking revelations — or even new revelations — about Iraq’s attempts to acquire biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. He did state that Iraq was attempting to rebuild its nuclear weapons programme and that weapons could be funnelled to terrorists or aimed directly at the United States.

Bush conceded that the United States simply did not know how close Hussein was to building a bomb but contended that after 9/11, no U.S. president could afford to wait for a gathering storm from abroad to strike at home. He also seemed to acknowledge that the United States should not go to war alone.

Bush insisted, as he has before, that United Nations inspectors must return to Iraq without any conditions on where they go, when they go and what they look at. Nothing should be off-limits and inspectors should be able to show up unannounced and unimpeded.—Los Angeles Times

Liaquat’s singular contribution

NAWABZADA Liaquat Ali Khan was the prime minister of Pakistan from August 15, 1947, onwards, but it was only in the wake of the Quaid’s demise that his leadership capabilities were put to the test. And it is during the next three years (1948-51) that his multi-faceted and compelling personality emerges the most conspicuously.

To say that Liaquat was the first prime minister of Pakistan means saying a great deal. It means that he enjoyed Jinnah’s confidence to the fullest extent — a no mean achievement in itself. This means that Jinnah had found him sincere, able, hard-working and true to the cause Jinnah espoused. Hence Jinnah’s description of Liaquat as his “right-hand” man and, by implication, his political heir.

The plain fact is that except for the Quaid himself, Liaquat stood foremost in the galaxy of Muslim leadership in India at that point in history. Jinnah had picked up Liaquat in 1936 when he got him elected as general secretary of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) at its Bombay session. This office Liaquat held for eleven years, the most critical period in Muslim India’s history since 1857. He was also the longest serving general secretary of the AIML, even out-serving the legendary Sir Wazir Hasan.

This was, however, only the beginning of his career as an all-India Muslim leader, next only to Jinnah. He would become deputy leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party in the Central Assembly in 1940, member of the Committee of Action in 1943, Chairman of the Central Parliamentary Board in 1945, and leader of the Muslim League bloc in the interim government in October 1946, before being named Pakistan’s prime minister in August 1947.

These were some of the highest offices a Muslim could occupy in pre-partition India. What is remarkable about Liaquat is that he did this with singular success and distinction. The 1937-47 decade was, however, a period of apprenticeship for him — a period when his crisis-management abilities, his intellectual prowess, his integrity, and his steadfastness to the cause of the Muslims were tried and tested. And he come out of it all with flying colours.

That is why Liaquat was catapulted to the highest executive slot in the party. In terms of his political acumen during this apprenticeship period, three major events stand out. First, at the Meerut divisional conference in March 1939, he propounded partition as the most rational solution to India’s constitutional problem. Coming on the heels of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference’s resolution of October 1938, this came as a shot in the arm of the proponents of partition. This because, in a more concrete sense, Liaquat represented Central League’s thinking on India’s daunting constitutional problem. Second, in his interview with Sir Stafford Cripps in December 1939, he proposed three options — the provincial option (i.e., each province be given the option to join in an Indian federation or not), a loose confederation with a limited centre, and outright partition between Hindu and Muslim India. Remarkably though, these three options constituted the basics of the three major British proposals during the 1940s — the Cripps Plan (1942), the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946) and the Mountbatten Plan (1947).

Third, in his talks with Bhulabhai Desai, leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly in 1944, he proposed parity between Congress and the League in any future set-up at the centre. This became the core point in the Desai-Liaquat formula. This was the first time that this cardinal principle which the League had long advocated in any coalitional set-up had been conceded by the Congress at any level. Once lifted beyond the pale of controversy, this key provision became the basis for the quota of seats for Hindus and Muslims — Congress and the League — in the subsequent Wavell Plan (1945) and the Interim Government (1946) proposals. Thus, Liaquat’s contribution, though little appreciated at the time, assumes a milestone status in getting the principle of parity accepted, when evaluated in terms of political developments in the 1940s.

Jinnah was reportedly a little “unhappy” about Liaquat having contracted the Pact behind his back (since he lay ill at Matheran). But since Jinnah was fully alive to both its significance and its long-term implications, he accepted Liaquat’s “explanation” and exonerated him of any “breach of trust”, which Sir Yamin Khan alleges in his ‘Nama-i-Aamal’. This was in sharp contrast to the treatment that Bhulabhai Desai, leader of the Congress Party in the assembly, had received at the hands of his Congress colleagues.

Though blessed by Gandhi in his talks with Liaquat at the time, and despite Desai’s critical contribution in the INA (Indian National Army) trials (1945) and in getting the prosecution charges of “treason” quashed, Bhulabhai Desai was even denied a Congress ticket in the 1945-46 elections. Soon after, Desai, despite his great services to the Congress, died, broken-hearted — unwept, unsung, and unhonoured.

All said and done, the acid test for Liaquat came in the wake of Jinnah’s death in September 1948. Some American circles, for instance, speculated whether the desire for a separate existence among Muslims would survive the catastrophic event. Even George Bernard Shaw wrote to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on September 18, 1948, saying: “I am wondering whether the death of Jinner (Jinnah) will prevent you from coming to London. If he has no competent successor you will have to govern the whole Peninsula.”

Unassuming all his life, never seeking the limelight and content to work behind the scenes under Jinnah’s towering shadow, not many thought that Liaquat could rise up to sort of leadership qualities which he did during Pakistan’s gravest hour caused by Jinnah’s death. But the deft manner in which Liaquat kept the nation’s morale high, tackled problems and consolidated Pakistan surprised almost everyone and won him recognition both at home and abroad.

“No one played more successfully the role of Cavour to his leader’s Mazzini”, remarked The Times of India. “He guided the fortunes of his country with a certainty which amounted to genius”, wrote The Statesman. During the next three years, Pakistan was confronted with some new problems, besides the old ones. First was to belie the assumption that Pakistan would collapse once it had to face the continuing partition problems without the guidance of the Great Leader — the assumption that provoked Dawn to proclaim “Quaid-i-Azam is dead: Long live Pakistan”. Though by no means easy, Liaquat ably filled the vacuum caused by Jinnah’s departure from the scene. Second, Jinnah’s exit emboldened India to go on the offensive in a big way.

Within twelve hours of Jinnah’s burial, it got the invasion of the Hyderabad state mounted, and had it occupied within five days. In September 1949, New Delhi imposed a trade embargo, putting Pakistan in a serious economic situation since India was at that time the largest buyer of Pakistani jute, the country’s premier cash crop. Early in 1950, the Indian prime minister threatened to use “other methods” in East Bengal, and Indian troops were massed within the striking distance of West Pakistan, in order to pressure Pakistan into accepting New Delhi’s diktat on the minorities’ question.

Again, in July 1951, India massed its troops on West Pakistan’s border. Each time Liaquat stood his ground undaunted, took effective measures to counter the Indian moves, showed courage, determination and statesmanship, and galvanized the nation as a solid phalanx, which forced New Delhi eventually to climb down.

Meanwhile, Liaquat consolidated what had been accomplished during Jinnah’s life-time, enlarged upon it and carried forward the process of building Pakistan. Thus, he accomplished a good deal in making Pakistan a going concern and a growing enterprise. Internally, Pakistan was politically stable, and, though still short of resources, economically buoyant.

Simultaneously, he initiated policies designed to enable Pakistan to play its due role in the comity of nations and world forums. He strengthened Pakistan’s still tentative links with several Muslim countries; extended support to liberation movements in Indonesia, Malaya (Malaysia), Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Nigeria; called the first international Islamic conference in early 1951, which was attended by, among others, the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Abdullah Usman of Somalia.

He used diplomatic skills to garner support abroad in Pakistan’s disputes with India, especially on Kashmir. Likewise, he was extremely successful in selling Pakistan’s viewpoint during his crucial official visit to the United States in May 1950.

Thus, internationally Pakistan was able to carve out for itself a place in the comity of nations. It was courted by the big powers, as indicated by Liaquat being invited by both Moscow and Washington for an official visit.

“Three years of Liaquat Ali Khan’s leadership”, said Sir Olaf Caroe, one-time governor of the NWFP, “carried Pakistan through difficulty and crisis to the achievement of a degree of political stability rare in any democratic country ... of economic prosperity beyond her rosiest dreams, and of an honoured place in the affairs of nations.”

The writer was founder-director of the Quaid-i-Azam Academy (1976-89) and is author of ‘Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation’.