The drumbeats of war

Hardly had the sound of the bugles played at President Bush's inauguration ceremony died down, when we began to hear the drumbeats of war echo from the corridors of power in Washington.

It would be recalled that President Bush had made it clear, in his first press conference, that he considered his victory in the presidential election in November as not only an endorsement of his policies but also as a mandate to further expand and enlarge on those policies.

He warned that he had built up a "credit" with the people that he intended to use, to undertake measures that may upset some people, but were nevertheless close to his heart.

In other words, the post-invasion problems that had arisen first in Afghanistan, and now on a much larger scale in Iraq, would not be allowed to dampen the spirit that had led him to undertake these missions.

In fact, in his inaugural address, the president further whetted the appetite of the neocons when he spoke of his commitment to spread the gospel of freedom and democracy all over the world.

President Bush also made it clear that, contrary to the expectations of his critics, both at home and abroad (particularly in Europe), his appetite for further aggrandizement had not been satiated, just because the Iraq adventure had gone sour.

The first evidence of this was the polite but firm hint dropped to secretary Colin Powell that there was now no room in the cabinet for a person of his suspect views. Powell's replacement was his close confidante and personal adviser, Condoleezza Rice.

More recently, the appointment of Chertoff, Gonzales and Negroponte, to critically important positions in the new administration while retaining known loyalists such as Cheney and Rumsfeld, all of whom have publicly pronounced hawkish views, is clear evidence, if any was required, that the president would not sit back on his laurels, but in fact, undertake other major initiatives to further advance the neocon agenda.

The death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat was, as Bush admitted unabashedly, a great opportunity to resurrect his plans for the Middle East. The election of Abu Mazen, long a favourite of the Americans and the Israelis, was another significant "opportunity", as can be seen from the renewed American interest in pushing the Israeli agenda on a battered and demoralized Palestinian polity.

The stage appears set for the new Palestinian leadership to "accept" the cosmetic Israeli gestures as major steps in the direction of a settlement of the Palestinian problem. But it has been only in the past few days that the scope and dimension of the American plans have been unveiled. No quarter is to be given and no mercy shown. It is a two pronged move - strategic and breathtaking in its audacity. The Syrian Baath regime has long been a major impediment to the success of the Zionist plans.

The late president Hafez al-Assad could neither be bribed nor browbeaten. His son, too, proved no less stubborn in resisting American demands. Syria had to be sorted out. After all, the doyen of the American foreign policy establishment - Dr Henry Kissinger - had said decades ago that there could be no war in the Middle East without Egypt and no peace in the region without the support of Syria.

So, first the United Nations Security Council was persuaded to pass a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, even though they are there at the invitation of the government in Beirut. But the Syrians refused to budge. It was at this stage when another "opportunity" dropped into Americans hands. This was the gruesome murder of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri.

How very convenient that he should be killed weeks after calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian troops. This allowed the Bush administration to go into overdrive. Within hours, the UNSC passed a resolution calling for an inquiry into Hariri's death. How many times has the UN called for an inquiry into the death of a former national leader?

The effort clearly is to bring about the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon, which would not only discredit the Assad regime at home, but also deny Damascus an important pressure point on Israel.

Thereafter, Beirut will be asked to rid itself of the Hezbollah, the hard-line Palestinian factions and the pro-Iranian elements. Thus will be achieved a very important Israeli strategic objective - weakening the Syrians and ousting the Iranians from the region.

Simultaneously, the other half of the American strategy for the region has been unveiled - the destruction of the current government in Iran. It has been accused of having a nuclear weapon programme, its denials notwithstanding, and though no evidence provided to substantiate the American charges, demands have already been made that the programme be dismantled.

The Americans have raised the stakes further by not ruling out military action and by speaking publicly of the likelihood of an Israeli air strike, similar to that carried out against Osirak, thus giving this idea their blessings.

If Tehran were to agree to abandon its nuclear programme, it would lose all credibility at home. If it decides to remain firm, it opens itself to American-sponsored sanctions and reprisals. Tehran, thus, is caught in a classic catch-22 situation.

At the same time, major American newspapers have carried reports of increased serial surveillance of Iran and the financing, training and arming of Iranian dissidents, who could spearhead an American-sponsored action to bring about a regime change in Tehran. After all, no country is without its Karzais and Alawis.

At this critical moment in Iran's history and possibly that of the Islamic world, the visit of the Pakistan prime minister to Tehran assumes great importance. What Iran needs is not for us to use our influence with the leadership in Tehran to urge that it give in to American blackmail.

The Iranians will, in fact, expect us to stand by them, not by joining in a battle with the Americans - happily we neither have the will, nor the capability to undertake such foolish ventures - but to assure the Iranians that we will not allow our land or air space to be used by the Americans, and further that we will use our influence - however limited it may be - to urge moderation and the path of dialogue, on the Bush administration. That will the least we can do for a neighbour, that also happens to be a close friend and ally.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Truth about Israeli nukes

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was recently in Pakistan where he expressed satisfaction at the defusing of tension between Pakistan and India and at the progress of the composite dialogue. But his remark about Israel was quite surprising.

He said that it would be the last country in the world that would dismantle its nuclear capability, the reason being that Israel is threatened by the Arab states. Here it must be noted that Straw is the first leader of the Coalition of the Willing who has acknowledged that Israel has a nuclear arsenal.

Jack Straw remembers Arab threats to Israel but has clearly forgotten that Israel has been invading Arab lands again and again. He does not even remember that once Israel invaded Egypt (Suez) in collusion with France and Britain.

The birth of the Israeli state is an interesting and instructive story. The Jewish diaspora carved out a trading niche for itself in feudal Europe. At that time, the European nobility looked down on trade.

They left it to the Jews. However, traders fulfilled a necessary social purpose. The Shy locks may have been "circumcised dogs", but they could advance loans to gentlemen like Antonio and Bassanio. Subsequently, when Europeans learned trade and industry, they grudged the Jews the business space they occupied. The anti-Jewish sentiment was European, not German.

To get rid of the Jews, Hitler unleashed the Holocaust where gas chambers were used to eliminate them. Russia and Poland had their own anti-Jewish pogroms. The British had shown more sophistication.

They dangled the carrot of a Jewish state in Palestine, (holy to the Jews) to lure them away from Europe, and implant them in oil-rich West Asia, where they could be an asset.

The Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917, two decades before Hitler arrived on the scene. The Muslims traditionally had friendly relations with the Jews, 126 million of whom lived in the Arab lands up to 1948, the year Israel was created.

No one expected West Asia to stagnate. China and the region of South Asia, one above the rib of the Himalayas and the other below it, have registered much progress. Southeast Asia has spectacularly moved ahead.

But the glorious lands of the Tigris, Euphrates and the Nile, the lands of Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut and Tehran have had many troubles, the chief of which is the deadly Israeli wedge driven in the very heart of the Arab world.

When reminded by the media that Britain had spoilt the broth for Pakistan by providing India with land access to Kashmir in 1947, Jack Straw excused himself by saying that he was a toddler then. But now, half a century later, he is at the height of his powers, as Arthur James Balfour, one-time British prime minister and later foreign secretary, must have been at his time. Straw can play a constructive role now.

Oil is a precious commodity but the bulk of it is no more in British hands. Europe, on Britain's initiative, solved its Jewish problem at the cost of West Asia. Israel has not only usurped Palestinian land with western help, it also has an army that is stronger than all the Arab armies combined.

The West has turned a blind eye to its nuclear capability. It is the only member of the United Nations that has no demarcated boundaries. It is the most virulent theocracy in the world. However, it has come to stay. The question is not to abolish it, but to contain it, to encourage it to live at peace with its neighbours, to urge it to give up its expansionist designs.

Israel is mainly responsible for the stagnation of West Asia, which creates problems not only for the people concerned but for the world at large. Stagnation has led to terrorism that is deplored by everyone. West Asia as ill-prepared to absorb the after effects of stagnation.

At the moment, the Arab world is experiencing a "youth bulge". More than 50 per cent of Arabs are under the age of 25. The politics of young men and women is that of protest.

France had a "youth bulge" before its revolution of 1789, and Iran before its Islamic revolution of 1979. A social scientist has pointed out that if all men and women between the age of 15 and 25 were locked up, violent crime would drop by more than 95 per cent. Three quarters of the population of Saudi Arabia is under the age of 30. It is not surprising that among the 19 hijackers of 9/11, 15 were Saudi nationals.

West Asians have been disillusioned by socialism and secularism, while democracy and liberalism are out of their reach. They have thus turned to an extreme form of Islam. Otherwise also, an unfocused mind is the devil's workshop. Stagnation in West Asia has led its youth to protests, crime and terrorism.

It is important to remember that of the 22 members of the Arab League, not one is a democracy, and that those who prop these unpopular regimes suffer from a terrorist backlash.

The Palestinians have been pragmatic and have accepted the entity of Israel. They are trying to live with this reality. The British foreign secretary can accelerate the process of acceptance and of ensuring their rights. West Asia may be stagnant at the moment owing to several factors going against it. But it is bound to bounce back. It has not only a history but also a future.

The future of democracy

With Pakistan entering the fifth year of the new millennium, the three overarching issues that preoccupied heads of state in the past are still with us. The first relates to the appropriate economic strategy for the years immediately ahead.

The second is the clash between the requirements of political stability and the growing demand for greater openness. And the third broad issue is how the country will relate to its neighbours and to outside powers, particularly the United States of America.

Pakistan's economic strategy was decided in the early stages of the country's history when Ayub Khan was presented two options by Dr Hjahmar Schacht, Hitler's former minister of finance, who acted as consultant.

There was the socialist approach with its single-minded concentration of human and material resources upon industrialization, employing centralized command tactics and rigid political controls that showed major quantitative advances.

This was the big push strategy which produced significant initial gains, albeit unevenly, and represented a viable method of catching up with societies which had taken a more leisurely course.

The problem with this system was that small cracks had already started to appear in the industrial firmament in the Soviet Union and its satellites. At certain points in the production and distribution process diminishing returns had set in.

The innate structure and low evolutionary potential insinuated themselves into the weak initiatives, low productivity, waste of resources and manpower and inferior quality that were the hallmarks of the autarkic system. These observations had already been made by the Pakistani economists that surrounded the soldier-president.

Predictably, Ayub Khan opted for the laissez faire system practised by the western democracies. His choice was a logical corollary of the imperial system introduced by the British.

His reign is of historic interest as it focused on its relationship with the international capitalist system and gained some degree of political legitimacy from the West after allying Pakistan with the United States.

There is a charming story about the time President Eisenhower, anxious to make as many friends for his country as he could, asked both Pandit Nehru and Ayub Khan to specify in what way America could be of assistance to the two South Asian neighbours.

Nehru, an educated man with strong leftist leanings, and acutely conscious of the need and importance of advanced learning, asked Eisenhower if the United States could help set up an Indian institute of technology similar to MIT.

Ayub Khan, a pragmatist with strong rightist leanings, and acutely aware of the constant need to defend his homeland, preferred to ask the American president for some Patton tanks and help in building a cantonment in Kharian.

In continuing with the laissez-faire system, Ayub Khan established the financial predominance of the "22 families" who ended up owning two-thirds of Pakistan's industry and nearly all assets in the banking and insurance sector.

The influence they wielded was admirably sketched in the book Who owns Pakistan? by Shahid-ur-Rahman in which the author refers to the new captains of industry and commerce as robber barons.

A few of the 22 families have disappeared in the institutional sense, leaving behind just a name and fond memories of a life of luxury, extravagance and overwhelming hospitality.

Others are no longer enjoying the commanding position they once did and have watched with trepidation and undisguised envy how a new crop of rich moguls has surfaced in the recent past and replaced them in the top most column of the rich man's directory.

The clash between the requirements of political stability and the growing demand for greater openness appears to favour a strong un elected leadership. The old cliche that the political history of Pakistan can be summed up as one long extension of military rule, interrupted by occasional bouts of what passes for democracy in this part of the world, is borne out by the considerably long innings that the two former military dictators spent at the crease.

The question that the analysts are now asking is whether or not President Musharraf will be able to demonstrate the same gubernatorial longevity which was displayed by his predecessors Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq.

He made a statement on February 26 that the country would have to decide on who should replace him in the event a terrorist decided to end his temporal existence, and that he would not nominate a successor.

It was a meaningless statement, the kind that politicians slip in when addressing illiterate masses in rural Sindh at election time. If a terrorist did succeed in snuffing him out, the nation would have no option but to decide on the identity of his successor. There was no word, however, on when he was going to step down.

Leadership will, nevertheless, remain a critical variable in the current political equation. The dispute over his wearing two hats notwithstanding, President Musharraf has displayed considerable maturity in his dealings with local politicians and foreign heads of state, and the nagging issue of India's insistence on the prerogatives of a major state in South Asia, which remains a constant irritant to policymakers in this country.

However, an analysis of the degree of openness that can be expected in Pakistan in the future must take into consideration two factors which have remained decisive - Islam and the army, in collaboration with the civilian bureaucracy and the feudal aristocracy.

In fact, during the last five decades a small privileged minority, the feudal aristocracy, strengthened by the induction of retired army officers and civilian bureaucrats reaped the benefits of better education, economic prosperity and political participation and ensured that the illiterate masses remained virtually disenfranchised.

The two well-entrenched institutions of the establishment, the military and civilian bureaucracy, which form part of the hierarchical system established in Pakistan, benefit from their close relations with their benefactor, the United States. Both are closely related and inter-connected in their ideological and political properties. But while one is pointing an accusing finger at the various power groups that have militated against the growth of openness, the political parties must also share much of the blame.

The two main players in the political seesaw of the last decade, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, haven't left much of a legacy. In fact, during their four bites at the national cherry, the drill was the same.

The party out of power, instead of docilely sitting in the opposition, forming a shadow cabinet and trying to make the best of a bad job, would spend all its energies devising ways to oust their political opponents, even if it meant conniving with weak-willed civilian presidents and soliciting the help of the army.

Pakistan has a strong growth record with current estimates hovering around the eight per cent figure, though there are major regional disparities. But in contrast to India's secularism, Pakistan has a powerful religious foundation and a bent towards authoritarianism is therefore inevitable.

Moreover, embedded in the tribal culture is a pervasive military tradition - one which the British found useful to cultivate. Nevertheless, the contest between military rule and openness, authoritarianism and parliamentarianism continues ceaselessly with fluctuating trends.

In Pakistan, as elsewhere, military leaders pledge greater democracy, and on occasion try to "civilianize" themselves, thereby contributing to a course they continue to regard with ambivalence. But while they orchestrate their tirade against unscrupulous politicians, they continue to swallow up top jobs reserved essentially for civilians, and subtly and almost subliminally impose their presence through banking, industry, insurance and landmarks which betray warlike themes. It is this paradox that so graphically epitomizes the quasi-authoritarian state.

On the diplomatic front Pakistan's options are limited. In spite of President Musharraf's brief flirtation with Russia in 2003, and the fact that between him and the prime minister they must have covered every capital, the war on terror has pushed the country into a position from which it cannot extricate itself. It's rather like the Zugzwang the great Aaron Nimzovitch inflicted on his chess opponent in a match in Carlsbad. Make a move and you lose a piece.

One does, however, wish that the next time an American senator calls on Pakistan's head of state, he shows a little more respect than the official who accompanied Hilary Clinton to Islamabad last week and turned up tie-less, in jeans and combat jacket. Perhaps the Americans could learn a thing or two about protocol from the Chinese.

Facing up to WTO challenges

A expected, the World Trade Organization (WTO) took a crucial turn in 2005 and ushered in a new era for which so many rounds of talks were held in the past. The time-bound Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), signed in 1994, giving fixed quotas for textiles and clothing under the multi-fibre agreement to the developing countries has come to an end and the textile and clothing manufacturers are now exposed to fiercely competitive forces. Despite the WTO meltdown at Cancun and several hiccups in subsequent months the quota-free regime is now with us.

The name of the game now is "survival of the fittest." Only those exporters will survive and manage to enhance their market share whose costs, quality of product, packaging and delivery exceed or match the very best in the world market. Our chief competitors in the textiles and clothing arena will be China and India.

It is true that in the last four years, Pakistanis entrepreneurs in the clothing and textile sector have invested $4 billion or so in balancing, modernization and rehabilitation (BMR) processes, but most of this has occurred in the large-scale manufacturing (LSM) units in order to help them cope with the challenges they were expected to face in 2005. However it is also reported that about 80 per cent of the exporters are either small or medium exporters (SMEs) and they are most vulnerable to the harsh competitive pressures unleashed in 2005.

The manufacturing sector in Pakistan has to contend with a number of federal and provincial levies, such as social security, old age benefits and other charges, but the relative burden of these on the SMEs is rather harsh and heavy.

They also have to meet social and security compliance standards set by the buyers and stipulated in various conventions we have signed. To meet these demands, SMEs need huge investments and management skills that they do not posses.

Our government also does not have cost effective and efficient strategies to handle many tasks on behalf of SMEs such as the disposal and treatment of industrial waste and lab tests of various kinds. All of this adds to the cost of individual units rather heavily.

By contrast, China and India - our toughest competitors - are reported to be well-poised to cope with the new WTO regime. China is fast emerging as the production-capital of the world and India has leaped ahead many competitors, especially in information technology and technology-embodied engineering products.

Quite a few officials and analysts have argued that while the SMEs in Pakistan have to face all the above-mentioned hurdles that shrink their competitive capability, the high production of raw cotton at home may give them an edge over their competitors. In practice this assumption has been proven wrong.

The island nation of Japan with no iron-ore or coal became one of the most efficient steel exporters in the world. South Korea, with no raw rubber, became a far larger exporter of rubber products than Malaysia, the largest producer of raw rubber in the world.

Similarly, Bangladesh with absolutely no production of raw cotton of its own out-classed Pakistan in garment and clothing business. The underlying strength comes from a high and rising level of labour and total factor productivity which we do not have, and is not easy to acquire.

On the crucial question of productivity let me quote the relevant conclusions of the world-famous author, Professor Michael Porter of Harvard University, presented in his 855-page book entitled, "The Competitive Advantage of Nations."

I will try to summarize them in just a few paragraphs Prof. Porter has researched this topic in 10 leading countries with the help of premier institutions and their well-reputed scholars in those countries.

Prof. Porter challenges the widespread thinking that bountiful natural resources, abundant labour, cheep interest rates, economies of scale, etc., are the driving forces behind productivity growth.

His major conclusion is that the competitive strength of a nation depends on the capacity of its firms and industries to innovate and continuously upgrade their products, processes and services.

Innovation is the name of the game. Innovation, in turn, has to be viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomena manifesting itself in new product designs, a new production process, a new packaging and marketing approach or a new way of conducting training and inspiring workers.

Information, science and technical progress, vocational training and skill development play an important role in the process of innovation and improvement. If the innovation process ceases, the company becomes stagnant and vulnerable to the aggressive competitors assaults both at home and in the international marketplace.

Let me, at this stage, furnish a few stunning statistics to reinforce the point that we have a lot of catching-up to do to survive and flourish in the new WTO regime. The

World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report, 2004-2005 shows that with respect to: (i) Technological readiness, India's rank is 26, Pakistan's 84; (ii) Firm-level technology absorption, India is listed at 18, Pakistan at 44; and (iii) Quality of scientific research readiness, India is placed at 17, Pakistan at 94. In terms of the availability of scientists and engineers. India tops the list and Pakistan is down at 61.

In Pakistan we have been discussing the appropriate role of the government in preparing industries for an increasingly competitive business world. According to Prof. Porter, the government's proper role is that of a catalyst. A classical example of that is the Japanese government.

By stimulating early domestic demand for advanced level products, convincing industries with the need to pioneer frontiers of technology, establishing practices that reward quality, encouraging clusters of competitive industries that are usually linked together through vertical (buyer-seller) and horizontal (common customers and technology) relationships, the government of Japan succeeded in grooming and accelerating the innovation behaviour.

Let me now turn to a case of clearly blurred vision on the part of our policy-makers. Pakistan has yet to table initial offers in the ongoing WTO negotiations in the service-sector. More than 72 of the WTO member countries have already fulfilled this obligation.

In Pakistan the ministry of commerce (MoC), Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) and other relevant authorities have not drawn up the final list of offers (to the outside service sector suppliers) and requests (to obtain access to foreign markets for our own service exports). This sluggishness in the face of our gross under-performance in the service sector is puzzling.

According to the World Development Indicators, 2004, Pakistan's export of commercial services amounted to $1.5 billion in 2002. In the same year other countries exports were as follows: India, $25 billion; Korea, $27 billion; Singapore, $30 billion; Japan, $65 billion; UK, $123 billion; and USA, $272 billion.

Even forgetting advanced and emerging East-Asia countries' export of commercial services such exports from Egypt at $9 billion and Morocco, $4 billion were far higher than what we have achieved in this field. Even countries like Congo Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea were ahead of us in this area.

In spite of all this, we have yet to discuss it with all the stakeholders in the public sector ministries/agencies and the key private sector players; get the final position approved by the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) and submit our position paper to the WTO authorities.

The State Bank of Pakistan's quarterly report has sounded a note of warning that for the next year the country's textile exports might shrink. This warning should have come many years ago. But despite this wake-up call most officials and some analysts still believe that the country will benefit from the new trade regime because of the availability of cotton, cheap labour and investment in the sector over the past few years.

The State Bank report also informs us that the European Union (EU) would withdraw its "zero duty access" to Pakistan's textiles during 2005. Instead, the EU would be imposing a duty at an average rate of 12.5 per cent.

It is reported that the MoC and the EPB have not even calculated the impact of the new EU laws on the exports of Pakistan's textiles, let alone devising strategies to successfully tackle the new challenges.

In view of the fact that India's exports to the EU would enjoy a concessionary duty rate and Bangladesh's woven exports will be subject to a zero-rate of duty, how can our exporters be competitive? As if this is not enough, we are also informed of the possible imposition of anti-dumping duties. (we already face such duties on our bed-wear exports with adverse consequences).

Is there any credible government study that has systematically identified the many daunting challenges Pakistan is facing in the new WTO regime and our strategies to tackle them? It was known for years that a new trading regime will emerge as of January 1, 2005, but there is hardly any well-thought country response to the emerging challenges.

The fact that the textile exports constitute about two-thirds of the country's total exports, the new WTO regime's implications for our export earnings, industrial employment and profitability as well as workers' income are simply mind-boggling. The time is not on our side. Any further drift towards wishful thinking would be disastrous.

The writer is a former senior adviser to the World Bank.

A culture of brutalization

Stanley Kubrick's film "Full Metal Jacket" must rank as one of the grimmest portrayals of the Vietnam war. A leading character, dubbed "Joker", is asked why he volunteered; he replies: "(I) wanted to meet interesting, stimulating people from an ancient land ... and kill them."

Confronted with the harrowing photographic evidence of abuse by British soldiers in Iraq, it is tempting to add the phrase "humiliate, sexually abuse, and torture" to this admission. We seem to have moved a long way from the promise of restoring democracy to the Iraqi people.

Part of the war has been conducted at a court martial in the ancient German city of Osnabruck, where two soldiers of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers have been found guilty of abusing civilian prisoners. A third soldier had already pleaded guilty to assault, after he was photographed standing on an Iraqi prisoner. It is not only these men who stood trial, but the British army itself. And for many people around the world, the British people also bear some responsibility.

Even before these convictions, the militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been linked to Al Qaeda, claimed that suicide attacks were "in response to the harm inflicted by British occupation forces on our brothers in prison".

Given our army's record of abuse and torture in Malaya, Kenya, Aden, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland (to name just a few), is it any wonder that many people might react cynically to claims that justice has been done?

The evidence of abuse on British army premises in Iraq that was revealed during the trial indicates that something is seriously wrong with our armed forces. Rituals involving physical and psychological humiliation, as well as sexual abuse, are not confined to overseas operations, but are also present "at home".

A survey carried out by the Ministry of Defence in 2002 found that more than 40% of British soldiers believed the army had a problem with bullying, sexual discrimination and harassment.

More recently, an official study claims that almost half the women serving in the RAF have been sexually harassed at some point in their career. And only on Thursday, the Sun published photographs of members of the Queen's Guard apparently ritually humiliating a new recruit by tying him naked to a fence and pouring what appears to be manure over his head.

In addition, the claims of ritual humiliation and sexual abuse at Deepcut training camp, in Surrey, are profoundly disturbing. A police report into the barracks contained more than 100 allegations of serious abuse.

The fact that the army was aware of the repeated violent, predatory behaviour of men such as Lance Corporal Leslie Skinner (convicted in 2004 of a series of sexual attacks on young recruits) and Lance Corporal David Atkinson (who murdered Cambridge student Sally Geeson on New Year's Day), is another indictment of the institution.

The army insists that these are aberrations - a few "bad apples". But it is plausible to assume that bullying and abuse are more widespread than senior officers wish to admit.

Within the barracks, a culture of silence prevails. Leslie Skinner's victims, for instance, said nothing for years. The reason for their reticence was that Skinner was "rank" and in the army "you do what you are told".

Unquestioning obedience is inculcated into every recruit. Basic training, from the donning of a uniform to being subjected to a relentless series of drills and chants, induces a lessening of self-awareness.

Such a process of de-individuation can lead to the weakening of restraints against prohibited forms of behaviour. This is coupled with the fact that positive military values include aggression, dominance and overt displays of physical prowess. Sensitivity, understanding and compassion are routinely derided.

The "macho" culture in training barracks is shared by female soldiers too, many of whom become obsessed with the need to trounce the boys. And despite their enthusiasm, "GI Janes" often become targets of abuse.

During the Gulf war, much was made of the fact that two US servicewomen taken prisoner had been raped. What was less publicised was that 24 US servicewomen reported being raped or sexually assaulted by colleagues during the withdrawal of forces. Similarly, 29% of American women who served in Vietnam were victims of actual or attempted sexual assault.

Clearly, ethical and moral codes change in the conditions of military life. These altered standards, together with isolation from family and civilian networks, favour brutalisation.

So, too, does the general ambience of preparing for war. In the Falklands war of 1982, for instance, British soldiers on troop ships were shown violent pornographic films as a way of stimulating their aggression prior to battle.

Young male recruits in particular were terrified of being derided as "queer" and "chicken". Those who refused to participate in "raggings" or group abuse were regarded as lacking loyalty. Ostracism was dreaded: it denied recruits what little comfort could be grasped in an often alienating environment.-Dawn / Guardian Service

The writer is professor of history at Birkbeck College, London, and the author of "Fear: A Cultural History".