Meeting the challenge

SOME observations made by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz at the inaugural ceremony of Comstech’s General Assembly are most appropriate and deserve to be taken note of. It also makes sense that these remarks were made at a forum which brings together OIC members on the science and technology platform. While rejecting the clash of civilizations theory, Mr Aziz observed that the blasphemous cartoons printed in a Danish newspaper were an attempt by the West to make this clash inevitable. This he attributed partly to ignorance about the true teachings of Islam and partly to the objective of demonizing Islam. What is most upsetting about the cartoon episode is the helplessness of the Muslim world to challenge this “insensitivity towards our beliefs”. True, the protests have rung out loud and clear — so much so that lives have been lost because some people reacted so violently. There have also been demands from the highest quarters in the OIC for the West to institute a code of ethics and invoke the existing laws prohibiting the publication of offensive material. But as pointed out by the prime minister, Muslims face the threat of marginalization at the global level.

The need of the hour is for the Muslim world to strengthen itself to confront today’s challenges. It may be pointed out here that military power is not what is needed to save the Islamic bloc. The bigger threat to its existence comes from its poverty, intellectual backwardness, economic underdevelopment and lack of education. Mr Shaukat Aziz was candid in pointing out that 24 per cent of the world’s Muslim population earned less than a dollar a day and an average of 39 per cent lived below the poverty line. While Muslim countries possess 70 per cent of the world’s energy resources and 40 per cent of the raw material, their share in the global trade is a measly six to seven per cent. Mr Shaukat Aziz could also have added that in the Islamic world more than a third of the population is illiterate. Over and above this, the absence of democracy, economic equity and social justice in these countries has contributed greatly to the unrest and volatility that marks their societies. As a result, the greatest danger the Muslim world faces today comes from within it rather than from confrontation with the non-Muslim world.

For Europe and America, where the cartoon issue is being made out to be symbolic of their right to freedom of speech and expression, the danger comes from the Muslim world’s inability to sustain itself and ensure its survival. Given the growing interdependence of the world in this age of globalization, the need is for the two sides to forge a measure of understanding and harmony between them. There is need for an interfaith dialogue among the leaders of opinion on both sides so that they realize that hurting each other’s feelings does not help. There is also the need for the moderate and enlightened leaders of opinions on each side to try to bring the hardliners and extremists amidst them round to their moderate viewpoint. To produce meaningful results, the two sides will have to rein in their own hotheads and hardliners who would be happy to push things towards a clash of civilizations — a possibility that Mr Shaukat Aziz chooses to deny. Wisdom and realism demand that they are the ones who should be marginalized.

David Irving’s predicament

AT a time when European countries are aggressively defending the right to freedom of speech, the sentencing to three years in prison of British historian David Irving in Austria for speeches he made in 1989 in which he denied the authenticity of the Holocaust, is bound to open a debate on western double standards. Nowhere will this be felt more than the Muslim world still reeling from the aftershock of the Danish cartoons demonizing the Holy Prophet (PBUH), an act that has been defended not just by the editors of the publications that chose to print them but by organizations like the EU which attaches a great deal of importance to the freedom of expression but criminalizes any denial of the Holocaust. Since Mr Irving first questioned the existence of gas chambers and even went so far as to say that Adolf Hitler protected European Jews, he was accused of ignoring access to more documents rebutting his contentions. Mr Irving’s admission of the mistake was, however, ignored by the trial judge, which is where questions of freedom of speech arise. As a result, there are several European voices which are calling for a review of the Holocaust-related period laws.

If Europe is sincere about defending its societies’ right to freedom of speech, it must also concede the right to question the veracity of historical experiences, however uncomfortable it may make society feel in some cases. The Holocaust was a tragic event but any study or analysis of it cannot be hampered by laws that do not allow an honest exploration of the events surrounding it. Mr Irving may have been discredited as a Holocaust denier in 2000 but he nonetheless rose to international fame when he was refused the right to lecture on it in several countries. His being banned in countries like Germany and Australia questions the very ideals that these nations profess to uphold. If the Muslim world has to learn to respect ideals that go against its beliefs and convictions, the same must be true of Europeans. People must be allowed to hear all views and come to their own conclusions.

A welcome decision

THE government’s decision to allow banks to again sell savings certificates is good news for savers. At the very least, it will make life easier for the elderly and the pensioners, who make up a majority of those who purchase savings certificates. Currently, 320 branches of the Central Directorate of National Savings (CDNS) sell certificates but that should rise with banks being given permission to sell NSCs. This should help ease the rush often seen any day of the week at the savings centres. The plan to allow banks to sell these financial instruments is part of a larger scheme to convert the CDNS into an autonomous organization to make it run along the lines of institutions in the private sector.

However, the real benefit to savers can come in the form of the rate of return offered by the government. Some years back this was in the region of 15-16 per cent and provided senior citizens a steady and substantial source of income in their retirement. Unfortunately, it fell sharply over the years, mainly because of the overall policy followed by the government to lower interest rates in an effort to bolster GDP growth by freeing up liquidity for investment purposes. Rates were also lowered to discourage savings in the NSC since the government wanted to reduce its own debt obligations. While the rate of return has been increased somewhat recently, with the highest level reserved for senior citizens, investing in savings certificates is not as attractive an option compared to what it used to be in the past. But since the government guarantees the return, it still is a relatively risk-free investment to make and for that reason it tends to attract thousands of senior citizens and other small investors. The government needs to keep this in mind and offer a higher rate of return on savings schemes.

Future of US-Pakistan relations

AS President Bush heads for South Asia, a look at the strategic direction of US relations with India and Pakistan will be timely. In Pakistan, our self-image and worldview has been anchored in a belief that the rest of the world should look at India through our eyes.

For years we have measured others’ friendship on a scale of their relations with India. The fact is India has a place in the world, and its growing ties with the US only reflect this reality which we must not resent.

As for our own relations with the United States, while Washington may have loomed large in our foreign policy the reverse is not true and cannot be. Relations between a big power and a small country are always imbalanced, and those between Pakistan and the US have been particularly so, for many reasons.

Firstly, US-Pakistan engagements have been single issue relationships that have prospered in the neglect of some of their other vital interests. Secondly, being a weaker party, Pakistan’s loss has been heavier. Pakistan did not get the best value for its services as much of the US help was non-monetary by way of political support to military regimes which was no doubt priced into the deal. In more ways than one, the legitimacy for such regimes thus came at the country’s expense.

It is not a good idea to concentrate political power and determination of national interests and priorities in a single institution with a legitimacy problem. President Musharraf is to be commended for bringing a modicum of stability to the country and igniting a debate on the need for reforms. But this does not obscure the fact that while people may welcome, and indeed tolerate, for some time, military interventions in national affairs for damage control and stabilization, they would not endorse its long-term appropriation of political power.

Serious problems of the country require a fully fledged and autonomous political process, however imperfect, and also policies that rely on national effort at issue solving rather than on external help that may force us to make flawed compromises on our vital interests.

There has been another problem in the US Pakistan relationship. Pakistan has traditionally responded to regional impulses, and the United States to global dynamics. As a superpower it has also been neither compelling nor easy for the United States to harmonize its strategic and tactical goals, short- and long-term agenda, and global and regional interests.

As a consequence, US Pakistan ties have lacked continuity, a larger conceptual framework, and a broad shared vision. It is no wonder, then, that as soon as the United States achieved its objectives vis-‘-vis Pakistan in past engagements, US Pakistan policy consensus would break down.

The current US engagement with Pakistan shares some of the past weaknesses. But South Asia has changed due to the post Cold War world, globalization and the war on terrorism, and so has the basis of US relations with it. In the past, the region was the focus of US interest because of the threat from outside to inside. The threat now is from inside to outside to which, as the US sees it, Pakistan has contributed significantly both with its internal dynamics and external behaviour.

An unstable Pakistan fosters militancy, endangers its nuclear assets, raises the potential for conflict with India over Kashmir, and threatens its own internal cohesion. But India compels attention with the projection of its military power, marked economic and technological achievement and potential, its democratic structure, aspirations for a big power status, and as the likely balancer to a resurgent China and a factor of stability in South Asia and its periphery. It thus offers US great strategic and economic opportunities.

There are not only strategic incentives but compulsions as well for the US to woo India. America may have become the sole superpower but its grip over its allies has loosened. Europe has become too autonomous, and the Middle East is in the grip of a religious based revisionism making its future relations with the US uncertain.

If America is looking for a back-up sphere of influence and source of energy now, why not go to a country and a region that is seeking US help and patronage — India in realizing its big power ambitions, Pakistan in its salvation from chronic weaknesses and consequences of a profligate living, and Central Asia in balancing the weight and influence of China and Russia? The object may well be not only to facilitate the emergence of a Central and South Asian integrated market that will enhance the potential for US trade and investment but also pursue a policy of benign encirclement of China and containment of Russia by courting countries on their periphery.

But regrettably, Pakistan and Afghanistan are an impediment as potential source of instability and extremism that not only impact on global security but also threaten India, the centrepiece of future US policies, in the region.

For more than five decades, Pakistan has figured in US foreign policy in various forms — a staunch ally, a troublesome friend or a threat. Now, for the first time, it is all of these things. While India presents to the US a great opportunity, Pakistan is a big challenge. While India is an asset, Pakistan is a liability. Pakistan diminishes the prospects of US strategic interests in the region, and along with Afghanistan, it is at the root of policy issues the US faces in the region.

Afghanistan and Pakistan occupy a pivotal place in America’s war on terrorism specially the part aimed at the decimation of Al Qaeda and emasculation of the Taliban. The United States is doing so directly in Afghanistan but indirectly in Pakistan. Contrary to public perceptions of any American unhappiness with Pakistan’s support in the war on terrorism and Pakistan’s “anger” at incidents such as Bajaur, the two sides have so far been comfortable with the existing perimeters of their cooperation.

Statements to the contrary are for domestic consumption on both sides and meant as a pressure tactic. Pakistan is cooperating but may not want to know everything so as to retain the option of plausible deniability. But future troubles cannot be ruled out.

There will be other problems to come. Since US Pakistan relations have merged with Pakistan’s own reform effort, America’s evolving economic and strategic relationship with the region, the war on terrorism, nuclear proliferation and Iran, many variables have come to play on Pakistan, and may affect the country’s future.

The war on terrorism, for instance, has created as many problems for us as it has solved. Firstly, Pakistan may be played out of Afghanistan strategically. Secondly, it is clear the US is trying to create a new balance of power in Afghanistan unduly weighted against the Pashtuns, being seen as prone to extremist influences and more tolerant of the Taliban and, by virtue of their presence on both sides of the border, providing a sanctuary to them in Pakistan.

The tribal areas in Pakistan are already being treated by the Taliban as their alternative power base and they are radicalizing its culture by evoking religion, sub nationalism and anti-Americanism, to enlist their support for their continued resistance in Afghanistan. All this presents serious challenges for Pakistan. Apart from inflaming regional feelings in Pakistan it has incited tensions with the US-backed regime in Afghanistan which may have made common cause with Iran and India to exploit the Balochistan situation for their own purposes. The US plans for the region thus may be getting undermined by its own allies and by Iran which opposes the American fiat anyway.

As for India-Pakistan relations, India is pursuing a policy of maximum benefit at a minimum cost thanks to Pakistan’s self-restraint and US influence. India’s hope is that in time the so-called CBMs between the two countries will become their own reward, and that perhaps with increased economic and commercial exchanges, cultural interplay, and trends toward moderation in Pakistan, Pakistanis will develop a different perception of India and Kashmir.

India also hopes that other critical issues, such as energy, sharing of water resources, security, and good neighbourly relations, may eventually take precedence over Kashmir in defining the countries’ relationship, freeing India to find an internal solution to the dispute, facilitated by Pakistan’s diminished leverage and unforced concessions. There might be gains for Pakistan in the relationship with India, but not in Kashmir, whose centrality to India-Pakistan relations will have gradually eroded.

But if Pakistanis feel let down by continued lack of progress on the Kashmir dispute, the public, or at least the Islamist hardliners, may end up blaming Musharraf of a sell-out and America for weakening Pakistan’s hand in Kashmir. This might cause problems for US-Pakistan ties. If the US launches any military strike against Iran that will be another wild card and may well spell the end of US-Pakistan engagement.

The future of US-Pakistan relations is thus hostage to much uncertainty. To avoid damage, the US needs to be sensitive to Pakistan’s internal dynamics and larger strategic interests in the region. Pakistan will also need greater support for its economy and help with its educational reforms.

The present status of the relationship will of course look good when the Bush visit takes place. It is essentially a visit to India with Pakistan stop being an unavoidable obligation. In India, the visit will be a great draw even though the nuclear deal is not going anywhere as it does not have support in the Congress yet. But even without the nuclear deal the relationship should mean a lot to India.

Pakistan may end up signing the agreements in the fields of investment science and technology, education, container security and preferential access to goods produced in designated industrial zones, but there will be no movement on the free trade agreement. President Bush will of course say nice things about Islam and the Muslim world. The outcome of the visit to Pakistan may not look all that unimpressive, but there is little doubt that India will be the star of the show.

The writer is a former ambassador. E-mail: thussain@gwu.edu