Broadening the aim

WITH the agitation over the blasphemous cartoons looking like declining, it is time the opposition got its bearings and thought in terms of long-term goals with a view to consolidating democracy. The cartoons issue rocked not just Pakistan but the entire Muslim world, but in Pakistan it assumed the shape of a campaign that sections of the opposition appeared at times to regard as anti-government as well. Many religious parties also targeted America in their speeches and burnt the US flag, even though the cartoons were published in a Danish newspaper and reproduced in other European papers. The unmistakable impression that emerged was that some parties wanted to make political capital out of the cartoon issue. The beginning was violent, with several people killed and property burnt in Peshawar and Lahore. But thereafter strikes and protests have been peaceful. However, some of the speeches made during the heat of the moment focussed on the present government’s tenure, and at least one important leader said that Gen Pervez Musharraf would no more be in power by March 23.

As Pakistan’s history shows, mass movements that dislodged a civilian government or a general were invariably followed by a period of military dictatorship. The 1968-69 movement against Ayub Khan led to the seizure of power by Gen Yahya Khan, while the PNA movement against Mr Bhutto in 1977 enabled Gen Ziaul Haq to seize power and rule as a ruthless dictator for nearly 11 years. During this long period, Ziaul Haq followed his own agenda; he remained the army chief and president till his death in 1988, and held only one general election in which parties were not allowed to take part. This party-less election accentuated parochial tendencies and led to ethnic violence. At the moment all opposition parties are united on one issue — that Gen Musharraf should choose between the two offices he is holding at present. There is no doubt this is a constitutional monstrosity and is incompatible with the dictates of democracy. But should this alone be the issue?

More than a change of face, the opposition should aim at correcting the system that Gen Musharraf represents. The army is now the most powerful political institution in the country, and this militates against democracy. The army has changed the Constitution, stripping it of much of its parliamentary character, and reincorporating Article 58-2b into the Legal Framework Order to arm the president with the power to sack an elected government and dissolve the National Assembly. He is also head of the National Security Council, which has served to subordinate the elected leadership to the military. All this needs to be scrapped through a democratic process, provided the opposition gears itself to the larger task rather than focussing on an individual. A mere removal of Gen Musharraf through agitation and chaos could lead to the usurpation of power by another general, thus repeating a process that has been the nation’s misfortune to suffer several times. What the opposition should do is to insist on making the Election Commission a truly independent body that will be able to hold fair and free elections and not succumb to governmental pressures. It is a measure of the government’s attitude towards elections that the EC is still headed by an acting commissioner. Besides having a full-fledged commissioner, the election commission should be made responsible to parliament for its conduct. There isn’t much time left to the 2007 general elections, and it is on ensuring that these are free, fair and inclusive that the opposition should be concentrating.

Wishy-washy response

WEEKS into the sugar crisis, and the federal government is still talking of investigations and inquiries. The cabinet’s Economic Coordination Committee met in Islamabad on Friday and “took note of excessive profiteering” by sugar mills, which was still going on. A probe would be launched, it was promised, into this “irrespective of the status of the owners of sugar mills”, who are widely believed to have manipulated the shortage and high prices. A few days before this, a meeting was held with the National Accountability Bureau in attendance, and it was said that NAB would inquire into the crisis, the bureau’s participation clearly indicating suspicions of wrong-doing somewhere. The issue has also been discussed in the cabinet, with its 50 plus ministers, which makes every cabinet meeting look like a public meeting and possibly precludes serious, nitty-gritty discussions. When the crisis hit, a small group of ministers and experts should have been set up that would have gone into all the factors behind the sugar shortage and taken urgent remedial measures. The steps so far ordered have followed the pattern of ad-hoc responses that have become our standard administrative procedure.

It was said by a writer in our weekly Economic and Business Review last month that sugarcane was a “political crop” and the sugar business a “political industry”. Is that the explanation for the wishy-washy way in which the shortage and high price of an essential commodity are being handled? Powerful politicians, including ministers, and other influential people are said to be sugar mill owners. Both millowners and growers form strong pressure groups. No wonder the authorities tread carefully against hoarders and profiteers. The point is that the government’s tardiness in tackling matters affecting the daily lives of ordinary citizens makes it open to charges of being indifferent to the public weal. The support the ruling party gets from some very risqué people creates the impression that it is beholden to groups and cliques. Prompt and transparent action on the sugar issue will lessen such doubts.

Protest fatigue

IN a stern rebuttal to frequent calls for strike by the religious parties, two major trade representative bodies of Lahore have said they will not respond any more to such calls. The Anjuman-i-Tajiran-i-Pakistan and the Qaumi Tajir Ittehad said that the March 3 closure of markets was observed as the final shutdown in protest against the sacrilege committed by certain European newspapers. The decision by traders not to participate in another strike has admittedly been taken to save the trade from becoming a tool in the hands of the religious right, which has now completely politicised its protest. The traders also condemned the violence on Feb 14 and 15 in Lahore and Peshawar in which six people died and the trade community suffered heavy losses. The MMA and the other opposition parties have only themselves to blame for the fatigue setting in among the general public regarding their politically expedient agitation mounted under the cover of religion. Some opposition parties have claimed that the continuing support to protest calls was an indication of a popular vote of no confidence in the government.

Peaceful protest is a basic right of all parties and groups of citizens, but exercising this right in a way that is disruptive of public life serves no one’s interest. Millions of rupees lost in shutter-down strikes, which sometimes have a coercive side to them, is regrettable because they affect economic progress. Coercion begets coercion, as has been the case in Punjab where the opposition is bent on taking out rallies and the government on stopping them. It is the general public and the trade that suffer the most as a result of frequent strikes and rallies at the call of the opposition which seems unmoved by issues such as inflation or lack of good governance which have tormented the people. An end to all this calls for restraint on both sides.

Nothing to gloat over

TROUBLE is, ma-in-law ain’t approved of history yet. Arms-wide-open George Bush and simple-but-hardly-simplistic Manmohan Singh summoned history to witness their alliance. “We have made history today, and I thank you,” Dr Singh told his guest in Delhi. Very coy, very nice. But it isn’t legal yet. Marriage awaits mother-in-law’s approval. Mother-in-law is the Congress of the United States. She is particularly watchful about errant sons who declare victory before she has checked the fine print.

Once upon a time, long long ago, a president of the United States of America offered the president of Pakistan a whole bunch of F-16s, and even collected cash on the deal. Pakistan is still waiting to put those fighters to some historic use.

I don’t want to be a party-pooper at a particularly cosy love-fest, but here are a couple of quotes printed in the March 3 edition of ma-in-law’s favourite newspaper, The Washington Post. Republican Ed Royce, chair of the international relations subcommittee on international terrorism and proliferation, thought the Delhi deal had “implications beyond US-India relations” and that the “goal of curbing nuclear proliferation should be paramount.” Democrat Edward Markey, co-chair of the bipartisan task force on non-proliferation, called the agreement “a historic failure of this president to tackle the real nuclear threats we face.”

When ma-in-law talks from the side of her face she can be a tough old bird. If history is made, then it will be certainly made in one respect: it will be the first time that India will sign an international protocol that has implications for its nuclear programme and nuclear military assets. A series of prime ministers, cutting across party lines, has resisted the most serious pressure to sign on any dotted line.

The potential to build a nuclear weapon was created by Jawaharlal Nehru; the ability to build it was confirmed by Indira Gandhi; the decision to go public was made by Atal Behari Vajpayee. The one thing they, and others in between, knew was that any signature became a commitment that might fetch flexibility in the present but could become a prison in the future.

Since this is the first agreement that India might have to sign, unless the American legislatures sabotage it or the present government in Delhi makes way for a more sceptical successor, I hope those who have drafted it have read every line, checked the top line, bottom line, underline and then checked the little comma hidden in the fine print that discusses the separation of 14 civilian nuclear plants from eight military ones.

This is a marriage built on separation, in more senses than one. The two constituencies, Delhi and Washington, are offering distinctively separate narratives.

Here, in sum, is what the spokesmen of Dr Manmohan Singh will be telling us as they take their message to the country: — This agreement will permit India to produce fissile materials for its nuclear military needs, despite the fact that the recognised nuclear powers have halted, voluntarily, such production. — The fast-breeder reactors, which can make super-grade plutonium when fully operational, will not be under international inspection or safeguards.

— India can now hope to make up to 50 nuclear weapons a year, for the availability of imported uranium frees local supplies for use in military reactors.

— India gets the latest technology long denied to its scientists.

Listen to the narrative on the American side, some of which has already begun to be articulated, even by the extremely sophisticated and persuasive American negotiator, Nicholas Burns:

— India enters the inspection regime, a far better situation than the zero-influence that existed so far. (It needs to be pointed out, of course, that India rose from drawing board to major nuclear power, without indulging in theft, only because of this zero-influence, a status that the Manmohan Singh government is in the process of bartering away.)

— The fast-breeder reactors that India possesses will be isolated, and unable to get new technology, thanks to the inspections regime, ensuring, over time, stagnation or decline. Implication: India has been sold a lemon thanks to a gullible government. — The deal brings India into the American zone of influence, and turns it into a virtual ally with a potential for assistance in American strategic interests (that is code word for American intervention). India’s conventional arms programme now shifts dramatically into the supply chain of the American industrial-military complex. If the Indo-Soviet treaty kept India within the Soviet camp till the Soviet Union collapsed, then this agreement will keep India in the American parlour for the foreseeable future.

— There is a great bonanza to American industry of arms sales (this will be the most persuasive argument in the Senate, because the one thing a legislator does not want to be accused of is preventing jobs). The starting figure, according to Pentagon officials who admittedly have not dealt with Indian bureaucrats so far, is nine billion dollars. That is a lot of dollars. Keep counting, Senator!

— There is no political quid pro quo. The Soviet Union intervened when necessary to protect India’s position on issues like Jammu and Kashmir with a veto in the Security Council. America has given no such commitment. Indeed, Delhi’s leverage with Moscow is reduced with the shift in arms purchases. China will never support India over Pakistan in the Security Council and the West will have the pleasure of balancing Pakistan’s interests with India’s on issues like Kashmir.

With time, the narrative in Washington will doubtless take on other hues, since emerging questions will demand creative answers if the agreement is to be pushed through the Congress. Senator John Kerry publicly worried about fissile material during a visit to Delhi. Others are wondering whether such a reward for a nation that has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not a signal for others to risk going nuclear. And then of course there is the weight of Pakistan’s pressure to which there may not be any immediate give, but which will make its play in the coming months. Pakistan remains a frontline state in Bush’s war on terror.

Such voices may not be consistent, or even necessarily logical, but they will demand to be heard. Some will pick up claims made in Delhi and ask the Bush administration for clarifications, as for instance on the delicate matter of how many nuclear weapons India is capable of making. If Pakistan is truly lucky, it will have the extraordinary good fortune of escaping the Bush embrace. The indications are that Bush will not offer the terms of the deal with India to Pakistan. What does this mean?

It means, first, that while India will sign a limiting commitment on its nuclear programme, Pakistan will sign nothing. Pakistan can, therefore, be held down to nothing. Bush is going to be in power for only another two years, and that as a terribly lame duck. His approval ratings are below freezing point, and his own party is distancing itself from him, raising the question as to whether he has the political capital to push anything through Congress.

What are Pakistan’s options? Pakistan’s nuclear programme has been created with China’s help. China may not have technology as good as America’s, but it isn’t a junkyard either. As a friend, China will be much more reliable than America. This is not because of any character defect. America is a democracy, and therefore always vulnerable to democratic discourse. China is a dictatorship.

China, most crucially, will not be propelled by mere goodwill or friendship; its policy will hinge on self-interest. Since a critical rationale for the Bush shift is to help India become a counterweight to China, Beijing will respond by playing the Pakistan card against India. China has already assured Pakistan three more nuclear reactors, and you never hear of any fuel shortage problems in Islamabad. President Pervez Musharraf has gone on record to say that Pakistan has its options. Is this what he meant?

We may never know what the complete truth is. But keep your ears open when the mother-in-law starts asking questions on Capitol Hill in Washington.

The writer is editor-in-chief of Asian Age, based in New Delhi.

Immigration confusion

THERE will come a point in the debate over President Bush’s proposed temporary worker programme for immigrants when those who favour the idea in principle will have to ask themselves whether a bad bill is better than none at all.

The bill on the table, a proposal put together by Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter, R-Pa., is not all bad. The bill would create a new temporary work visa. Those who obtained the visa could enter the country to do jobs that employers could not find Americans to fill, and they could remain for up to six years. The bill would also allow the 11 million undocumented immigrants already in the country to apply for temporary residency status after paying a fee and undergoing background and employment checks.

But the devil is in the details, and the details, unfortunately, are worrisome. In particular, we’re concerned that in its current form, Mr Specter’s proposal could create a huge class of permanent guest workers: Neither current illegal residents, nor future holders of the temporary work visa, would in practice be able to acquire green cards or citizenship if this bill became law, no matter how long they remained here. Still worse are the impractical enforcement measures that Mr Specter has included.

These put huge new responsibilities on local and state law enforcement agencies for arresting and deporting illegal immigrants.

Unfortunately, it’s far from clear that the bill will be improved, either by the Judiciary Committee or by the Senate as a whole. Some committee members will propose changes; others are readying lists of amendments that would make the bill even worse. If no compromise is reached, it’s hard to see how this bill is even worth passing.

— The Washington Post