Energy cooperation prospects
By Najmuddin A. Shaikh
THE dispute between the Ukraine and Russia on the pricing of gas supplied by Russia to the Ukraine was settled early this year after causing some anxiety in Europe about the reliability of Russia as a supplier.
The solution found to the problem — a quadrupling of the gas price demanded by Russia in apparent violation of an agreement that the price of gas would be maintained at $50 per 1,000 cubic metres (mcm) until 2009 — was the setting up by Russia of a company that would supply the Ukraine with gas derived both from Russian and Central Asian sources.
Central Asian gas, primarily Turkmen but with a small Uzbek input, was priced at about $50 per mcm and given the mix would reduce the price the Ukraine would be required to pay from $230 per mcm to about $95. In Europe, the important question was how reliable the Russians would be as suppliers in the future. The Energy Charter Secretariat estimates that the share of gas in Europe’s total energy consumption, currently 40 per cent, will rise to as much as 90 per cent between 2020 and 2030 and that Russia’s share in providing this gas may rise to as much as 50 per cent since the alternative — import of LNG — would be both expensive and possibly unreliable.
Russia’s Gazprom, the largest gas producer and supplier, has seen its production plateau at about 550 billion cubic metres of gas (bcm) per day and has at the same time seen domestic de mand rise from 258 bcm in 2004 to 325 bcm in 2005. Gazprom has the choice of either increasing its own production by tapping the vast reserves that are known to exist in the Arctic fields or to use its existing pipelines to import more gas from Central Asia.
Press reports indicate that Gazprom plans to buy 9 bcm from Uzbekistan and 30 bcm from Turkmenistan in 2006. Gazprom intends increasing its purchases from Turkmenistan to 70-80 bcm a year by 2007-08. To handle this increased requirement, Gazprom is planning to expand the capacity of the Central Asia Centre pipeline, which links Turkmenistan and Russia through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, from the current levels of 42 bcm/year to 55 bcm/year, and is considering another project linking Central Asia and Russia with throughput capacity of 30 bcm/year.
In the meanwhile, President Niyazov of Turkmenistan has announced that he intends raising the price of gas from the current level of $65 per mcm to $100 this autumn. It is likely that even if Uzbekistan abides by the negotiated price of $60 for the current year it will ask Gazprom to pay a higher price from 2007 onwards. Gazprom has committed itself to an investment of $1.5 billion in the Uzbek energy sector and these may make Uzbekistan a much more important player in the Central Asian energy picture than it is now.
China is also looking to Central Asia to meet its burgeoning energy needs. It has made deals with Kazakhstan for an oil pipeline and will be looking to it also for further supplies both of oil and gas. Of relevance to South Asia, however, is the fact that during President Niyazov’s recent visit to China (April 2-7) a framework agreement was signed under which both sides would start work on the construction of a pipeline that would be commissioned in 2009 and transport annually 30 bcm of Turkmen gas to China.
Most importantly from the Turkmen perspective Article 4 of the agreement states that “the price for natural gas will be set at reasonable levels and on a fair basis, proceeding from the comparable international market price,” a vast improvement on the sort of deal that Turkmenistan has been getting from Russia and the Ukraine. Matching the Russian interest in Uzbekistan, China, too, has promised an investment of $600 million in exploring and exploiting energy resources.
In the pre-independence years, Turkmenistan used to produce about 90 bcm of gas annually. The latest figures indicate that in 2005 its production amounted to 63 bcm of which about 45 bcm were exported. The drop in production is due partly to the depletion of old fields but largely to the inability of the Turkmens to make fresh investments to maximize the exploitation of resources.
Turkmenistan still continues to be recognized as having the fourth largest gas deposits in the world. It is generally accepted that if adequate investment were forthcoming and if consistent policies were followed by President Niyazov, Turkmenistan could easily increase its annual output to about 150 bcm a year — enough to meet the current Russian demand, the Chinese demand and the projected South Asian demand.
What will this mean for the future and for the prospects of South Asia being able to import energy supplies from Central Asia? When the Turkmenistan-Pakistan-India pipeline was first talked about in 1991 Turkmenistan was getting $28 per mcm from the Ukraine and Russia with 50 per cent of the payment being in cash and the rest in goods. A deal with Pakistan which promised a price of $75 per mcm or more was phenomenally attractive. The Argentine company Bridas, which was seeking to develop and exploit the Daulatabad gas field, made a determined effort to push the deal through and managed to secure first from President Rabbani’s government and subsequently from the Taliban, permission for the transit through Afghanistan.
Bridas was replaced by Unocal, a US company which offered terms attractive enough to persuade President Niyazov to cancel the concession granted to Bridas and to transfer this to Unocal that expended a great deal of effort and money in order to secure Taliban permission for the transit pipeline. By all accounts an agreement was reached. Ultimately, the deal foundered because of the horrendous image the Taliban acquired but even more importantly because Bridas won a case in an American court which termed illegal the transfer of concession rights in the Daulatabad field from Bridas to Unocal.
Now the TAPS talks are continuing between the Turkmens, the Afghans and the Pakistanis with the Indians participating as observers but the situation is vastly different from the one that prevailed earlier. These countries are no longer in a buyer’s market able to take advantage of a landlocked state’s inability to market its principal resource to an international market. The international market has now moved, in a sense, to Turkmenistan’s doorstep and all the South Asians can hope for is that the Turkmens will agree to demand no more as a wellhead price than they are asking Russia to pay. This would mean that the landed price of gas (including pipeline costs and royalty payments to Afghanistan) in Pakistan would probably be about $4.5 per thousand cubic feet.
It is against this backdrop that ongoing negotiations between Iran, India and Pakistan will proceed on the pricing of Iranian gas for the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. It is, of course, unfortunate that so far neither the Indians nor the Pakistanis have been able to make the talks conditional on Iran’s commitment to a reasonable price for the gas.
Latest reports suggest that Indian efforts to link the price of natural gas to the price they have agreed to pay for LNG have been unsuccessful. There are rumours that since the LNG purchase deal has not yet been ratified by the Iranian Majlis, the Iranians are now hinting at a renegotiation of this price to bring it in line with international prices. Similarly, Pakistani efforts to suggest that the Iranian price in order to be affordable had to match the price Pakistan paid to foreign investors in its gas sector have been equally unsuccessful.
I had earlier suggested that the price should be between $2 and $2.15 per 1,000 cft when it reaches consumers in Pakistan and below $3 when it reaches consumers in India. Now it seems that the Iranians are demanding a price of $8 per 1,000 cft. The price Iran is demanding is the same that the Europeans with their vastly more developed economies are paying to the Russians and other suppliers. It can be justified on the ground that this is what the play of free market forces demands. But the truth of the matter is that free market forces are also influenced by other factors.
For the foreseeable future, Iran has little chance of accessing the lucrative European market. Its one foray in that direction has been the pipeline to Turkey. There the contracted price is believed to be $3 per mcft but the actual price paid has been about $2.05. Its other foray, a gas pipeline to Armenia which could then be used to supply Iranian gas to other Caucasian countries, has also probably been checkmated by the Russian insistence that Armenia hand over operational control of this pipeline to Gazprom in exchange for a continued supply of Russian gas at relatively subsidised prices.
Pakistan and India must continue to insist in negotiations with the Iranians and with Qatar that the benchmark wellhead price for piped gas should be no more than what Turkmenistan is now demanding from Russia — $100 per mcm or $3 per mcft with the pipeline transportation and royalty costs being added on. The range for the pipeline costs and for the royalty should be determined by what is being paid by the Dolphin pipeline for transit through the UAE to Oman.
There is resentment in Iran against India and, to a lesser extent, Europe about the manner in which the nuclear issue has been handled.
In the meanwhile, the Turkmenistan and Qatar pipelines must be pursued with greater vigour. The demand pattern in South Asia, primarily in India since I believe that Pakistan will be self-sufficient at least till 2020, suggests that three pipelines, each with a capacity of 3 bcft a day, could be easily accommodated.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.


