PRESIDENT George Bush’s trip to South Asia last month has been the subject of the Pakistani, Indian, and American news media and security analysts for a while now. In Pakistan, the editorials and opinion makers have focused on what appears to be the beginning of another case of the classic US about-face on Pakistan, to which we have become so accustomed by now.

The country’s security analysts and general public are cringing over the unceremonious manner in which Pakistan has fallen from grace. Musharraf’s days of glory in western capitals, many say, are virtually over.

For our eastern neighbours however, Bush’s visit to South Asia brought about a welcome and much anticipated strengthening of the US-India strategic relationship. Basking in the high praise bestowed upon their country, the Indian media has hailed the visit as historic and ground-breaking in many ways — most notably because of the signing of the controversial civilian nuclear deal which essentially gives the much sought after legitimacy to India’s decades-old, not-so-clandestine, military nuclear programme.

While the potential strategic implications of the Indian nuclear deal and the about-face on Pakistan have been closely scrutinised by the media and political commentators on both sides of the fence, nobody in Pakistan has tried to shed light on what brought this about in the first place. Thoughtful self-reflection is not in ample supply in Islamabad. Using the current US about-face as a case study, this article is dedicated to examining some of the reasons why we might have just lost yet another opportunity to substantively engage the United States in a manner that would safeguard the country’s long-term interests in Washington.

Throughout its history and leading up to 9/11, Pakistan has been at risk of being isolated and marginalised in the world. Emergency fire-fighting, rather than strategic planning and foresight, has been the hallmark of Pakistan’s foreign policy for much of its history. A policy reversal on Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 — although probably the right thing to do — was undertaken not as a result of a proactive and realistic assessment of Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives and the Afghan situation but as a reaction to severe pressure from Washington. This is the latest case of reactive fire-fighting in our history. While there have been periods when the country has gained some respectability in the West, primarily because of the temporary alignment of interests of Pakistan’s various military rulers and certain western politicians — these instances have been largely fleeting and have failed to build a solid foundation for the continuation of this strategic alignment. Bush’s recent amiable relations with Musharraf are clearly another one of these transitory alignments of interests and likely to be as fleeting as other similar periods in the past. The writing is already on the wall.

Pakistan’s policy reversal post-9/11 gave the government some breathing space not only to avoid becoming a direct target of America’s wrath but also to develop a true understanding of its needs and limitations and a genuine basis for a long-term strategic partnership with the US. Unfortunately, the country’s political leadership chose not to fully take advantage of this opportunity. To be fair, though, the United States, for reasons lying somewhere between paranoia and a strategic calculation of costs and benefits is equally to be faulted. But then, a superficial engagement with Pakistan serves America’s interests much more than it serves Pakistan’s, or so it seems.

For the Bush administration, the rationale for not wanting to develop a foundation for a sustained relationship is quite straightforward. This is a diplomatic philosophy that the United States has successfully implemented in the past and continues to do so in much of the Islamic world. Engaging with and solving real issues requires empathy with each others’ viewpoints. It requires hard work and, at times, considerable sacrifice. Building a long-lasting understanding between countries also requires a long-lasting understanding between the people inhabiting those countries. All this can be avoided if one can deal with military or civilian dictators who are willing to “control” their people and keep them in line with US objectives.

As long as the US gets a steady stream of Al Qaeda suspects apprehended and whisked off to its bases in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, why would anyone care what the Pakistani people think about the absence of a proper process and the infringement of their territorial integrity? This is a line of argument that tends to serve the short-term interests of the United States but may have significant long-term, unintended consequences, especially for how the United States is perceived by people around the world.

While the decision is most likely to come back to haunt the US policymakers some day — as the decision to train and use Islamic fundamentalists to fight the proxy war with Soviet Union in Afghanistan — one can at least make a case that, if one’s intention is to avoid doing the necessary hard work to build and understanding and strong relation, the current modus operandi at least provides a way to safeguard America’s short-term interests.

What about the motives and aspirations of the Pakistani leadership? Why would Pakistan not want to engage with the United States in a more meaningful manner? Why has it not undertaken the steps necessary to deepen its relationship and influence with Washington? Here, the situation is much more complex and multi-faceted. Several reasons can be advanced for why the country’s ruling junta has failed to capture the opportunity we had post-9/11 to ensure that we were never put in the position to make that dreadful choice again.

The easy answer to the above questions hovers around the issues of inability and incompetence. The argument would go something like this. Pakistan’s foreign policy establishment has simply failed to see the importance of putting together the foundations of a deeper relationship with Washington. Worse still, one might argue that they do not have the slightest clue of how to put such a relationship together.

One can cite several pieces of evidence to support this hypothesis. Washington watchers amongst us are aware of how little effort in terms of strategy not tactical methods — the Pakistani government and foreign policy apparatus has put in since 9/11. Sometimes one wonders whether Pakistani’s foreign policy establishment even understands how things work in Washington. At other times, it almost seems like they are resigned to the fact that they will forever remain what they are and do not even make the slightest attempt to change the status, quo.

One can add to this mix the various half-hearted and inadequately funded efforts by Pakistani American political organisations like PADF, AOPP,COPAA, Pak PAC etc, but the situation remains virtually the same. The well-meaning individuals running these organizations try to do their best but have failed to make any significant dent in Pakistan’s stature in Washington. No wonder then that Pakistan’s alliance with Washington today remains fragile.

One may argue that a broad-based relationship between Islamabad and Washington is not in the best interest of the current ruling elite in Islamabad. Limiting the countries’ alliance to a mere personal dependency between Bush and Musharraf serves the latter’s interest as it perpetuates the false impression that Musharraf is indispensable to the current geo-strategic alignment and hence is the only candidate available for the position of Pakistan’s saviour-in-chief and hence the protector of Washington’s interests in the region.

This hypothesis is very much in line with Musharraf’s refusal to hang up his military boots and put the country on the path to a civilian leadership.

The message this sends to Washington’s policymakers and political elite, and subsequently to the general US population, is that Pakistan is an unreliable partner in peace, that Pakistanis are an undependable people, and that the only way to “tame” the country is to continue supporting military rule. Not only do the general and his men promote this viewpoint in Washington, but a vast majority of prominent Pakistani Americans and their political organisations have unfortunately bought this philosophy. No wonder that Washington’s attitude towards Pakistan fluctuates so dramatically with the change of the political-military guard in Islamabad.

What would a more sincere and visionary leadership have done instead? It would have used the time afforded to us in the aftermath of 9/11 to translate the personal chemistry between the leaders into a permanent alliance between their countries. We could have spent the last five years reaching out to the American leaders, and directly to the American people to impress upon them that Pakistani people are as normal, likeable, and peace-loving as any other people on the earth and that, given a certain level of reciprocity from the US, Pakistan can be depended upon as a long-term US ally.

This could have been a much more powerful message than saying that America’s only bet is to keep Musharraf in power because the day he goes Pakistan is going to disintegrate into chaos. We all know that’s not true but that’s precisely the message being delivered by our political leadership in Washington.

Sustained partnerships and friendships between countries are never built on the personal chemistry of leaders alone. Instead, they are built on principles and on mutual understanding between their peoples. We have all but lost an opportunity to build one.

The writer is a public policy analyst based in Santa Monica, US. Email: athar.osama@gmail.com