Dispute over resource sharing

ONCE again the provinces and the centre are at loggerheads over the question of resource sharing. This time they are not fighting over who would share how much from the divisible pool, because that has already been settled for the time being. What is at issue today is whether or not the provinces qualify for allocations from the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) after their share in the divisible pool has been increased. The federal government claims that the provinces had agreed to give up their PSDP shares as a trade-off for the increase in their share from the divisible pool. The provinces dispute this claim. Indeed, the claim does not appear to hold water when viewed against the situation on the ground. How could the provinces have agreed to trade off Rs 68 billion (the current year’s allocation from the PSDP) for Rs 52 billion, the increase in their share from the divisible pool? It appears as if the centre by turning off the PSDP tap is trying to take back from the provinces more than what it has given to them by way of an increase in their share from the divisible pool.

The federal government raises and administers revenues of the state to the tune of 95 per cent and the provinces less than five per cent. At the same time, it exercises power and authority over some 47 subjects under the concurrent list of the Constitution, thereby severely undermining the principle of federalism. Recognising this structural imbalance, the president had himself come out with a statement on February 22, 2005, advising the federal government to transfer the subjects included in the concurrent list to the provinces and to share resources on a fifty-fifty basis. But when the award was announced this structural imbalance in the power and rights of the provinces and the federal government was not taken into account.

Not only this, the centre by not resolving other contentious issues like the sharing of gas development surcharge (GDS) in the case of Balochistan and the hydro-power profit in the case of the Frontier has also kept these two economically underdeveloped provinces poor, making them live on subventions and overdrafts. The formula given by Senator Dilawar Abbas for sharing of GDS equally by the provinces producing gas had received universal acceptance, but it has remained confined to files creating doubts among the people of Balochistan as to the sincerity of the federal government in conceding to the province its legitimate share.

On the other hand, Justice Ajmal Mian’s committee which had been assigned the task of reinterpreting the A.G.N. Kazi formula of sharing of hydro-power profit is taking a long time to finalise its report forcing the NWFP to continue to live on borrowed money. In the meantime, the federal government could have come up with an interim award pending the final report of the committee in order to ease the financial burdens of the province. All this has heightened provincial disharmony and given rise to an acute sense of deprivation in the smaller provinces. The sooner these problems are resolved in accordance with the principle of equity the better it would be all around. Or else, the problem of disparity could widen, creating strains between the centre and the provinces and among the provinces themselves.

Danger in Palestine

IT would be another tragedy for Palestine if the Hamas government were to collapse. There are two reasons that could cause this. One is the highly negative attitude adopted by Israel, the US and the European Union towards the government led by Mr Ismail Haniye. Tel Aviv and Washington have stopped all contact with the Palestinian Authority, while the EU has decided to freeze all funds meant for the PA. On instruction, western banks have decided not to transfer to the PA even the money donated by Arab states. President Mahmoud Abbas has now appealed to the donors to send money direct to him by ship and not to Hamas. Israel is even threatening to reoccupy Gaza and kill some Hamas ministers. While the threat is unlikely to make Hamas bend, the denial of funds could have serious repercussions. The PA has a bureaucracy of over 150,000, and their salaries support over one million people. The denial of salaries has already led to protests, with people keeping away from work, sparking fears that this could lead to the Hamas government’s collapse.

The other reason — perhaps more lethal — is internal and stems from the armed marches and war of words between Fatah and Hamas over the weekend. Both sides are wrong and seem to be giving preference to partisan interests over the welfare of the Palestinian people. Fatah, evidently, has not reconciled itself to loss of power. The prime minister may not be a Fatah man, but Mr Abbas is there as president, and that acts as a check on Hamas. Mr Haniye does not seem to realise that Hamas is no more in opposition and must, therefore, show the responsibility expected of a party in power. Its insistence that it will have a militia of its own is clearly untenable. A separate militia for a ruling party will arouse the suspicion of other factions, especially Fatah, and that is a sure recipe for civil war. In the face of the foreign powers’ determination to dethrone the Hamas government, both Hamas and Fatah need to exercise care and wisdom to ensure that they do not advance Israel’s cause by fighting among themselves.

Doing without mega projects

KARACHI’s nazim has spoken of the ‘unique’ mega projects being undertaken by his government that would make all major thoroughfares signal-free and add to the beauty of the city. This sounds like a fairy-tale approach to Karachi’s complex traffic problems. The fact is that the mega projects for traffic management that have been implemented so far have been done without adequate planning, resulting in immense inconvenience to commuters while the work was in progress. Worse still, many of the projects have failed to provide any relief from the traffic jams that were meant to be eased thereby, while new problems of a different kind have been created. The signal-free zone on Sharea Faisal from the JPMC crossing to Tipu Sultan Road is almost as crowded as before during peak hours while numerous pedestrians have been knocked down and killed when trying to cross the road. Strangely, it was not considered necessary to have pedestrian bridges for them. The Schon Circle underpass in Clifton has not significantly eased the traffic congestion in the area either.

The point is that our city planners have failed to identify the real cause of various traffic problems and have opted for expensive eye-catching projects that have questionable utility and aesthetics. The first priority of the city planners should be to streamline the traffic management and ensure enforcement of the rules that are there. For this it is essential that the police perform their traffic management responsibilities efficiently and honestly. Once the drivers of vehicles observe the road rules — especially those relating to driving on the designated lanes, speed limits, right of way, overtaking and turning at signals — and the police make no concessions to violators, it will be found that only a few flyovers/underpasses are actually needed. These can be imaginatively planned and constructed to facilitate the flow of traffic in areas where they are needed.

America’s changed stance

PRESIDENT George Bush’s trip to South Asia last month has been the subject of the Pakistani, Indian, and American news media and security analysts for a while now. In Pakistan, the editorials and opinion makers have focused on what appears to be the beginning of another case of the classic US about-face on Pakistan, to which we have become so accustomed by now.

The country’s security analysts and general public are cringing over the unceremonious manner in which Pakistan has fallen from grace. Musharraf’s days of glory in western capitals, many say, are virtually over.

For our eastern neighbours however, Bush’s visit to South Asia brought about a welcome and much anticipated strengthening of the US-India strategic relationship. Basking in the high praise bestowed upon their country, the Indian media has hailed the visit as historic and ground-breaking in many ways — most notably because of the signing of the controversial civilian nuclear deal which essentially gives the much sought after legitimacy to India’s decades-old, not-so-clandestine, military nuclear programme.

While the potential strategic implications of the Indian nuclear deal and the about-face on Pakistan have been closely scrutinised by the media and political commentators on both sides of the fence, nobody in Pakistan has tried to shed light on what brought this about in the first place. Thoughtful self-reflection is not in ample supply in Islamabad. Using the current US about-face as a case study, this article is dedicated to examining some of the reasons why we might have just lost yet another opportunity to substantively engage the United States in a manner that would safeguard the country’s long-term interests in Washington.

Throughout its history and leading up to 9/11, Pakistan has been at risk of being isolated and marginalised in the world. Emergency fire-fighting, rather than strategic planning and foresight, has been the hallmark of Pakistan’s foreign policy for much of its history. A policy reversal on Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 — although probably the right thing to do — was undertaken not as a result of a proactive and realistic assessment of Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives and the Afghan situation but as a reaction to severe pressure from Washington. This is the latest case of reactive fire-fighting in our history. While there have been periods when the country has gained some respectability in the West, primarily because of the temporary alignment of interests of Pakistan’s various military rulers and certain western politicians — these instances have been largely fleeting and have failed to build a solid foundation for the continuation of this strategic alignment. Bush’s recent amiable relations with Musharraf are clearly another one of these transitory alignments of interests and likely to be as fleeting as other similar periods in the past. The writing is already on the wall.

Pakistan’s policy reversal post-9/11 gave the government some breathing space not only to avoid becoming a direct target of America’s wrath but also to develop a true understanding of its needs and limitations and a genuine basis for a long-term strategic partnership with the US. Unfortunately, the country’s political leadership chose not to fully take advantage of this opportunity. To be fair, though, the United States, for reasons lying somewhere between paranoia and a strategic calculation of costs and benefits is equally to be faulted. But then, a superficial engagement with Pakistan serves America’s interests much more than it serves Pakistan’s, or so it seems.

For the Bush administration, the rationale for not wanting to develop a foundation for a sustained relationship is quite straightforward. This is a diplomatic philosophy that the United States has successfully implemented in the past and continues to do so in much of the Islamic world. Engaging with and solving real issues requires empathy with each others’ viewpoints. It requires hard work and, at times, considerable sacrifice. Building a long-lasting understanding between countries also requires a long-lasting understanding between the people inhabiting those countries. All this can be avoided if one can deal with military or civilian dictators who are willing to “control” their people and keep them in line with US objectives.

As long as the US gets a steady stream of Al Qaeda suspects apprehended and whisked off to its bases in Afghanistan and Guantanamo, why would anyone care what the Pakistani people think about the absence of a proper process and the infringement of their territorial integrity? This is a line of argument that tends to serve the short-term interests of the United States but may have significant long-term, unintended consequences, especially for how the United States is perceived by people around the world.

While the decision is most likely to come back to haunt the US policymakers some day — as the decision to train and use Islamic fundamentalists to fight the proxy war with Soviet Union in Afghanistan — one can at least make a case that, if one’s intention is to avoid doing the necessary hard work to build and understanding and strong relation, the current modus operandi at least provides a way to safeguard America’s short-term interests.

What about the motives and aspirations of the Pakistani leadership? Why would Pakistan not want to engage with the United States in a more meaningful manner? Why has it not undertaken the steps necessary to deepen its relationship and influence with Washington? Here, the situation is much more complex and multi-faceted. Several reasons can be advanced for why the country’s ruling junta has failed to capture the opportunity we had post-9/11 to ensure that we were never put in the position to make that dreadful choice again.

The easy answer to the above questions hovers around the issues of inability and incompetence. The argument would go something like this. Pakistan’s foreign policy establishment has simply failed to see the importance of putting together the foundations of a deeper relationship with Washington. Worse still, one might argue that they do not have the slightest clue of how to put such a relationship together.

One can cite several pieces of evidence to support this hypothesis. Washington watchers amongst us are aware of how little effort in terms of strategy not tactical methods — the Pakistani government and foreign policy apparatus has put in since 9/11. Sometimes one wonders whether Pakistani’s foreign policy establishment even understands how things work in Washington. At other times, it almost seems like they are resigned to the fact that they will forever remain what they are and do not even make the slightest attempt to change the status, quo.

One can add to this mix the various half-hearted and inadequately funded efforts by Pakistani American political organisations like PADF, AOPP,COPAA, Pak PAC etc, but the situation remains virtually the same. The well-meaning individuals running these organizations try to do their best but have failed to make any significant dent in Pakistan’s stature in Washington. No wonder then that Pakistan’s alliance with Washington today remains fragile.

One may argue that a broad-based relationship between Islamabad and Washington is not in the best interest of the current ruling elite in Islamabad. Limiting the countries’ alliance to a mere personal dependency between Bush and Musharraf serves the latter’s interest as it perpetuates the false impression that Musharraf is indispensable to the current geo-strategic alignment and hence is the only candidate available for the position of Pakistan’s saviour-in-chief and hence the protector of Washington’s interests in the region.

This hypothesis is very much in line with Musharraf’s refusal to hang up his military boots and put the country on the path to a civilian leadership.

The message this sends to Washington’s policymakers and political elite, and subsequently to the general US population, is that Pakistan is an unreliable partner in peace, that Pakistanis are an undependable people, and that the only way to “tame” the country is to continue supporting military rule. Not only do the general and his men promote this viewpoint in Washington, but a vast majority of prominent Pakistani Americans and their political organisations have unfortunately bought this philosophy. No wonder that Washington’s attitude towards Pakistan fluctuates so dramatically with the change of the political-military guard in Islamabad.

What would a more sincere and visionary leadership have done instead? It would have used the time afforded to us in the aftermath of 9/11 to translate the personal chemistry between the leaders into a permanent alliance between their countries. We could have spent the last five years reaching out to the American leaders, and directly to the American people to impress upon them that Pakistani people are as normal, likeable, and peace-loving as any other people on the earth and that, given a certain level of reciprocity from the US, Pakistan can be depended upon as a long-term US ally.

This could have been a much more powerful message than saying that America’s only bet is to keep Musharraf in power because the day he goes Pakistan is going to disintegrate into chaos. We all know that’s not true but that’s precisely the message being delivered by our political leadership in Washington.

Sustained partnerships and friendships between countries are never built on the personal chemistry of leaders alone. Instead, they are built on principles and on mutual understanding between their peoples. We have all but lost an opportunity to build one.

The writer is a public policy analyst based in Santa Monica, US. Email: athar.osama@gmail.com