FOR an independent and sovereign country, there cannot be anything more important than national security. Security, both internal and external, is a sine qua non for a people to lead their lives peacefully and under respectable conditions enabling their genius to flower and their potential to develop. Insecurity, on the other hand, can endanger the very existence of a country through loss of independence and internal chaos and disintegration. A nation with external threats to its security can hardly hope to prosper.

One cannot, therefore, dispute the frequent statements made by our ruling establishment that national security must override all other considerations in the management of national affairs. It is, however, the way the concept of national security is defined, interpreted and practised by our ruling elite that is objectionable and has proved to be harmful for the nation’s well-being in the long run.

A close look at the way our policymakers implement the national security policy leads one to the conclusion that their understanding of national security is limited only to its military dimension. In fact, national security is a much wider and a more comprehensive concept than the practice in Pakistan would indicate. It includes, but is not limited to, military means to defend a country.

To begin with, national security has two aspects: external and internal. External security undoubtedly requires as its centrepiece military means — armed forces and armaments — to deter the enemy. To defend the country against external aggression if deterrence fails. However, because of the changed nature of warfare in modern times, defence against external aggression requires not just the military means but also economic and technological strength.

Thus, military means and economic strength are closely intertwined in ensuring security against external aggression. As a general rule, the shorter the war effort, the more important the military means for the purpose of national security. Conversely, the relative importance of economic strength grows correspondingly with the increase in the duration of war. If one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, it can be stated that any long-term contest between two nations would be decided primarily by their relative economic strength.

But there is a third and equally important element of national security and that is internal political stability, cohesion and the unity of a nation, and the quality of its leadership on whose shoulders lies the responsibility of managing the various elements of national security to the maximum advantage of the nation in deterring or fighting external aggression.

Finally, one cannot over-emphasise in any discussion of national security the importance of diplomacy which is basically the art of management of external relations in pursuit of national interests. Its job is to transform the political, security and economic dimensions of a country’s external policy into a coherent whole in the service of national aims and interests. It is with good reason that foreign policy or diplomacy is called the first line of defence of a country.

In short, a nation requires internal political stability and cohesion, economic strength, military muscle and proactive diplomacy in an optimum mix to ensure national security.

While external security is imperative for the independence and survival of a nation, internal security is an indispensable condition for the harmonious functioning of society and state. In fact, the establishment of law and order or internal security is the very raison d’etre of a state. The necessary ingredients of internal security and political stability are a political framework or constitution based on consensus, representative political institutions to manage the affairs of state within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with the wishes of the people, social and economic justice, respect for law and an effective judicial and police system for the enforcement of law.

Let us now briefly examine our historical record in practising the concept of national security in Pakistan. Our most serious failing has been an over-emphasis on the military aspect of national security at the expense of economic development, internal political stability and cohesion, and diplomacy. This over-emphasis on the military at the expense of other elements of national security is hardly surprising considering the preponderant influence of the military establishment in national affairs exercised directly during military rule and indirectly during civilian governments in Pakistan. But it is nonetheless regrettable as it has destabilised our polity and stunted our economic growth. In the process, the country was dismembered in 1971 but we failed to draw the necessary conclusions from this tragedy. Consequently, we have been birching from crisis to crisis.

As any student of economics knows, one of the important tasks that any leadership faces is the choice concerning the relative allocation of national resources to the military and to economic development and welfare. Other things being equal, the higher the allocation of resources to economic development, the higher the rate of economic growth. Conversely, the higher the allocation of resources to the military, the lower the rate of economic growth.

Let us see by way of example what the ‘Economic Survey of Pakistan’ for 2004-05 tells us on the subject. During the 1990s as a whole, defence expenditure accounted for 5.6 per cent of the GDP as against 4.7 per cent recorded for the development expenditure. Since the military takeover of October 1999, the military expenditure has again year after year exceeded the development expenditure which declined to 2.9 per cent of the GDP in 2004-05. The situation would be further skewed in favour of defence expenditure if one were to add military pensions which are no longer shown as part of the former.

It is interesting that in 1980s, development expenditure amounted to 7.3 per cent of the GDP. Thus we see an alarming decline in the development expenditure from 7.3 per cent of GDP in 1980’s to 4.7 per cent in 1990’s and to 2.9 per cent in 2004-05. Similarly, our national saving and investment rates, which are the main determinants of economic growth, have been hovering around the low level of 17 per cent of the GDP whereas the fast growing economies of China and other East Asian countries tend to save and invest about 30 per cent of their GDPs.

Besides the above mentioned macro-economic indicators, another serious weakness of our economy is the abysmally low level of human resource development. Our expenditure on education declined from 2.5 per cent of GNP in 1996-97 to 1.7 per cent in 2002-03. While India spent 4.1 per cent of its GDP on education during the period from 2000-02 according to the UN Human Development Report for 2005, the comparative figure for Pakistan was as low as 1.8 per cent.

The situation is not any better in the health sector. As against 0.8 per cent and 0.7 per cent during 1980s and 1990s respectively, we spent 0.6 per cent of GNP on the health sector in 2004-05. The UN Human Development Report for 2005 ranks Pakistan at the 135th position on its human development index out of 177 countries.

It is unrealistic to expect sustainable rapid economic growth without the development of human resources, especially education, in this knowledge-based world economy. As is true for an individual or a family, a country’s economic progress and prosperity depend primarily on how well-educated and healthy its people are.

This brings me to the next element of national security, that is, internal political stability, cohesion and unity. Unfortunately, our performance as a nation in this area has been even worse than that in the economic sector. Our polity has been badly destabilised by the inefficiency and lack of integrity of our politicians and by the frequent military takeovers on one pretext or the other which have not allowed democracy to take root in our society. The civilian bureaucracy is no less to blame for its role in bringing about the internal rot from which the people of Pakistan have grievously suffered.

It is pathetic that almost 60 years after independence, we are still groping for a political framework for the country based on consensus. While the military supported by a section of our politicians wants to maintain its preponderant role and involvement in national affairs, others would like the military to withdraw to the barracks and focus on its professional duties in accordance with the principle of supremacy of representative institutions which is the hallmark of democracy. This tussle has created serious internal divisions, demoralised the nation, wrecked social cohesion, aggravated provincial disharmony, tarnished the country’s international image, and created uncertainties about the future.

A related but no less serious development is the deterioration in the functioning of the various institutions of the state and in the law and order situation. There is also a widespread feeling in the country of the growing gulf between the people and the ruling elite, particularly because of grinding poverty. Internal problems have been compounded by acts of terrorism which have struck us from time to time and the ongoing conflicts in our tribal areas and in some parts of Balochistan whose roots, admittedly, can be traced not only to our internal failings but also to external factors.

Finally, one has witnessed over past two decades or so the gradual devaluation of diplomacy in dealing with foreign affairs. The security agencies have undoubtedly their own role in foreign affairs but more often than not their comprehension of international affairs is severely circumscribed by the limited experience of their personnel. Giving a predominant role to them in the handling of foreign affairs is likely to spell disaster for the nation as is shown by the adverse internal and external results of our Afghanistan and Kashmir policies pursued during the 1990s.

The advice of the foreign ministry, which is manned by professionals who have spent a lifetime in the art of diplomacy, must, therefore, be one of the most important inputs into the foreign policy formulation process.

Thus, the current state of affairs in Pakistan is far from satisfactory from the point of view of national security. We need to draw appropriate lessons from the dismemberment of our country in 1971 and the demise of the Soviet Union. The USSR was not short of modern and advanced weaponry. It collapsed primarily because its communist system lost the allegiance of its people and its weak economy collapsed under the weight of its super-heavy military structure.

To conclude, national security must be defined in a comprehensive manner covering its military, economic, diplomatic and internal dimensions. To focus exclusively on the military dimension or to over-emphasise it at the expense of other equally important elements of national security can, in fact, endanger national security instead of strengthening it.

Unfortunately, this is precisely what our policymakers have been doing. The result is a heavy and unsustainable military super-structure on weak political and economic foundations. This is a sure recipe for a national disaster. Our policymakers would be well-advised to beware of the dangers of their past and current policies for national security.

The writer is a former ambassador. E-mail: javid_husain@yahoo.com

NEPAL has three power centres: the monarchy, the political parties and the Maoists. The current struggle against the monarchy once reduced the number from three to two. The Maoists joined the seven-party alliance to make a common front against the king. They merged their demand for the abolition of the monarchy and a democratic socialist society with that of the alliance. The latter wanted to make the king a mere figurehead and revive parliament.

The scenario has changed after king Gyanendra has conceded both demands. The alliance heads the government and parliament is in session. Once again, the centres of power have become three. Maoists have returned to their separate entity because they want the constituent assembly and abolition of the monarchy. The king does not recognise them. That was clear when he invited the alliance to name a person for the post of prime minister to run the government. His was the same stance at the time of convening parliament.

Whether the king takes notice of the Maoists or not is of little consequence. The ground reality is that they have almost half of Nepal under their sway. This bothers the alliance as well. It was seen during the movement that the Maoists really inflamed the people’s response. That the public came on the streets at the call of the alliance was true. But the Maoists’ support was crucial.

How the alliance brings the Maoists into the mainstream of democracy is the real challenge before the country. People want both to join hands to establish a democratic polity. Although the Maoists have rejected the revival of parliament, people still believe that a rapprochement would come about because a constituent assembly is being convened.

Both the alliance and the Maoists have been on the opposite side except in their joint fight against the king. In fact, the Maoists raised the red flag in 1999, only after they felt that the alliance’s target of a peaceful, parliamentary way would not bring about a socialist revolution. Can a violent approach fit into a peaceful democratic structure? Unlike the political parties, the Maoists are fighting an ideological battle.

The monarchy is a sticking point. The alliance wants the king to stay as constitutional head. Prime Minister G.P. Koirala, while leading the alliance, said during the movement: “We want continuance of history as we cannot survive without it.” Most people are also emotionally attached to the monarchy. So are the armed forces which remain a stable institution. Nothing will work without their active cooperation and it does not appear that they will jettison the king.

It is obvious that Dr Karan Singh, New Delhi’s envoy who met the king on behalf of the government of India, obtained an assurance from the alliance that the monarchy would continue. New Delhi’s policy, as enunciated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, also wants the king to stay. Manmohan Singh has said that a constitutional monarchy and a multi-party democracy are “the two pillars of Nepal’s polity.” In the face of this, the Maoists’ demand to abolish the monarchy is difficult to meet. On the other hand, if the Maoists are kept out of the settlement, the country may return to the same scenario of unrest and insecurity. Unity of purpose is important for Nepal’s peace and development.

Looking back, sending a former king to meet King Gyanendra was not a good idea. Nepal’s political parties have been close to the socialist leaders in India. The alliance would have preferred an envoy from among them. The Maoists, too, would have liked someone else other than Karan Singh to talk to the king. Their participation in any future set-up is important for peace in Nepal. Their violent methods have, no doubt, scared the people. But they will have to give up their arms. Otherwise, the alliance would be forced to fight them.

India faces a dilemma. No doubt, it has changed its pro-king stand by announcing that it will abide by what the people of Nepal decide. The alliance too is straining every nerve to persuade the Maoists to accept the parliamentary concept of government. Were they to do so, their fear is that they would compromise on the original demand for “overthrowing the bureaucratic capitalist class and monarchy.” They might face the wrath of their own ideologically motivated ranks: an armed struggle to establish a socialist government. They want to overthrow the parliamentary system which they believe is in conflict with Marxist-Leninist teachings.

New Delhi does not want a scenario where the Maoists are lionised. It can visualise the effect on the Naxalites in its own backyard. They have assumed a proportion which is already causing concern. According to official sources, the Naxalites have the upper hand in large areas of India’s countryside, one fourth of 600 districts in 13 out of 28 states. The Naxalites in India and the Maoists in Nepal have also constituted a Saarc-like organisation: the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and organisations of South Asia (Composa). They want a socialist South Asia through an armed struggle.

It is true that the situation in Nepal would not have come to this if the king had listened to New Delhi. It tried its best to persuade him to give up power but failed. It should have been firm earlier. After all, the king yielded to India’s pressure.

Still, New Delhi has not emerged unscathed and is seen on the side of the king. The Nepalese who put their eggs in the Indian basket are disillusioned. They had to come to the streets themselves to face the bullets to get power. At best, India was a sympathetic spectator.

A constituent assembly is probably the best way out of the impasse between the alliance and the Maoists. But the tough job is going to be the selection of its members. No doubt, a free and fair election can throw up the people’s representatives. But how do you hold free and fair elections when the king stays in power, even as constitutional head?

The whole thing is in a mess. The king did not realise the power of the awakened people. New Delhi cannot escape the blame. All countries, except military-ruled Pakistan and communist China, backed India. New Delhi just could not make up its mind on how far to go to put pressure on the king. At one stage, the fear was that Islamabad and Beijing would assist the king if challenged. They could not have done so in the face of the nation’s unity behind the demand for the restoration of democracy.

New Delhi’s problem is that it opts for the line of least resistance. Sometimes it succeeds, sometimes it doesn’t. Nepal is one example where it did not. India may have to pay the price for its mumbling policy.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.