Where force is not a solution
By Tariq Fatemi
WITH its huge territory, sparse population and proven reserves of oil, gas and minerals, managing Balochistan would require great skill and acumen, even in the best of times. However, in a situation where the local population has long suffered from an overwhelming sense of neglect, bordering on contempt, the issue becomes more complicated and highly explosive.
The discovery of massive gas reserves in Balochistan in the mid-50s, should have brought about a perceptible change in the economic life of the region. Sadly, the revenues accruing from these discoveries hardly had any impact on the lives of the people. Most remained dirt-poor and the few that ventured out learned that while gas from their province was bringing prosperity and comfort to millions of people in the other three provinces, the Baloch continued to shiver during the long winter months.
When confronted with evidence of growing unhappiness in Balochistan, especially amongst the youth, Mr Bhutto’s initial reaction was to seek a political resolution. But soon thereafter, he abandoned the path of negotiations and opted for military confrontation. The mainstream Baloch leaders were accused of treason and jailed, while the army was let loose to hunt down the nationalists.
Not surprisingly, one of the first things that the army did after seizing power in 1977 was to declare an end to all operations and to release unconditionally the leaders of the so-called insurgency. The nation heaved a sigh of relief, but more importantly, the government was able to ensure that the Baloch would not succumb to the inducements that came their way from Kabul and Moscow during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Regrettably, the current military regime appears not to have learnt any lesson from the past. It may be right when it claims that many sardars are opposed to education and development for it would dilute their hold over the poor peasants and farmers. But it is the refusal of the Baloch urban youth to acquiesce in the unaccounted exploitation of their natural resources, without any benefits coming their way, that has provided real ammunition to the nationalists.
Ministers and government officials repeatedly allege that “a foreign hand” is trying to take advantage of the current turmoil in the province, but to those of us who have lived through the shame and ignominy of the East Pakistan crisis, there is a frightening sense of deja vu. Political dialogue appears to have met a premature death. Whatever happened to the reports submitted by the committees headed by Wasim Sajjad and Mushahid Hussain? Even a partial implementation of the recommendations contained in these would have reduced tensions and permitted dialogue to resume. Nothing has come of this exercise and the bloody confrontation is likely to continue for long.
It would be a monumental folly for our rulers if they were to forget that in this time and age, military action against one’s own civilian population, is no longer condoned by the international community, as evidenced by reaction to similar developments elsewhere.
Moreover, the hilly terrain in Balochistan and its sparse population, used to living in small, inaccessible, self-contained hamlets, make it an ideal ground for guerilla operations. No force, even a foreign occupation army, could survive in the hostile environment where the locals would not hesitate to disrupt the lines of communication and interdict supplies of fuel, food and ammunition. In any case, no national political, social or economic goal can be achieved through a brutal and oppressive policy.
Given its strategic location and the tremendous natural resources that the province possesses, it is no surprise that the current situation there should be a matter of interest to neighbouring countries, as well as to the major powers. Even as far back as the 1960s, the Soviets had tasked the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow to devote special attention to the province and to examine how its ethnic composition could be exploited. It was at this time that Professor Yuri Gankovsky, who I got to know well during my many years in Moscow, came to be recognised as a leading scholar on the nationalities’ issue in Pakistan.
I recall that when President Bhutto travelled to Moscow in March 1972, he took along Sardar Akbar Bugti with him. But when the Pakistani leader was returning home, he was surprised to learn that the Soviets had arranged an elaborate programme for Bugti during the course of which they tried to convince him of their interest in the wellbeing of the Baloch people and what they could do for his province.
The Americans, too, have always maintained a strong interest in Balochistan. This is likely to have increased greatly since the Bush administration has put renewed emphasis on securing control over all energy-rich areas. American scholars have not shied away from writing extensively on this subject, with writer and political analyst Selig Harrison, credited with championing the nationalities issue in Pakistan, with a focus on the Baloch demand for independence.
As if the domestic situation were not complicated enough, the foreign powers, both in our immediate vicinity, as well as in more distant lands, have started to take a much closer interest in the current turmoil. The comments of the Indian foreign office spokesman Sharma, expressing concern over the situation and counselling Islamabad to “address the grievances of the people of Balochistan” should not have surprised us.
Anti-Pakistan lobbies in Delhi have not hesitated to characterise disturbances in Balochistan as “the struggle for an independent Balochistan” calling it “part of the unfinished agenda of the partition”. In fact, the South Asian Analysts Group has called upon Delhi “to draw attention of the international community to the ruthless massacre of Baloch nationalists by the Pakistan army”. Major newspapers, journals and prestigious think-tanks in Europe and the United States, too, have been drawing attention to what is being increasingly described as a nationalist movement.
Apart from the advantage of keeping its neighbour and rival off balance, Delhi is convinced that continued disturbances in Balochistan would contribute to India’s strategic advantage by delaying, if not denying, the natural resources of the province to Pakistan, and discouraging growing Chinese investment in its economic development. As is well-known, the Indians have been favouring the development of the north-south economic and energy corridor. It is in this context that the Indians have been supporting the proposal for the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Iran highway that could become a strategic road project linking Tajikistan with the port of Shahbahar in Iran, via Afghanistan.
New Delhi has always aspired to be a major player in Central Asia and to have a stake in the region’s tremendous energy resources. To this end, the Indians have been expanding their military presence in, and defence cooperation with, the Central Asian republics. Only recently, India succeeded in establishing its first overseas military base in Tajikistan. It has always followed developments in Balochistan with keen interest, as evidenced by the then Indian foreign minister Natwar Singh’s loaded remark, questioning how Pakistan could ensure the safety of the proposed IPI gas pipeline when it was unable to protect its gas installations in Balochistan.
Pakistan’s economic development is greatly dependent on the manner in which it is able to take advantage of the tremendous economic and trade potential of energy-rich Central Asia. Balochistan is a vital link in this chain as well as in China’s desire to move into the Gulf and the Middle East, as evidenced by Beijing’s strategic decision to involve itself in the construction of the Gwadar port. But all this would be dependent on ensuring peace and order in the province.
For this to take place, the government must immediately end all military operations, declare a general amnesty and initiate a dialogue to address the genuine grievances of the people of Balochistan. If the locals have reservations to some of the mega projects proposed for their province, the government must take concrete and visible steps to remove the sense of alienation by bringing Baloch nationalists into mainstream politics. They must have a stake that is equal to, if not bigger, than those of the non-Baloch.
Most independent observers are of the view that the problem of Balochistan is primarily political. The Baloch nationalists want power to make decisions in their province and a fair share in what the centre obtains from there. This is only legitimate and fair.
Lest the rulers in Islamabad forget, Pakistan is a federation, with many ethnic and linguistic groups. Unlike a unitary state, with one single or dominant ethnic community (Bangladesh or China), a federation is a far more delicate entity, that needs careful and cautious nurturing by genuinely elected representatives, so that all federating units develop a belief in and commitment to the federation.
It can only become politically stable and economically progressive when the federating units have a genuine sense of participation in the affairs of the state and are convinced that their well-being and progress is synonymous with that of the federation. If that were to be the case, Islamabad would not have to worry about the machinations of any foreign power. This, sadly, is not the case where Balochistan is concerned.
The writer is a former ambassador.


