Revisiting ’98 nuclear tests

LAST week marked the eighth anniversary of the nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan in May 1998. This important occasion passed off in strange silence, as if the government did not wish to recall it. What was even more surprising was that the event did not even figure in the media or academic circles. Lest our rulers have forgotten, Pakistan’s nuclear programme has always enjoyed bipartisan support. It was possibly the only issue on which all political parties held near identical views.

When India carried out its first nuclear test (referred to as the Smiling Buddha) in May 1974, Pakistan immediately comprehended its dangerous implications and recognised that the test bestowed on India a major strategic advantage. It understood that it had no choice but to match the Indian action.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was, of course, engaging in hyperbole when he stated that the people of Pakistan would eat grass rather than give up the quest for parity with India in the nuclear field. He was, nevertheless, echoing the innermost sentiments of the Pakistani nation, which was deeply alarmed by this development, especially as it struggled to recover from the humiliation of losing half the country because of the actions of the Indian army.

Bhutto may have had his shortcomings but it would be a great disservice to him not to recognise the skill with which he initiated the nuclear programme and the determination with which he pursued it. No amount of pressure from the US, or the perfidy of the French (who buckled under US pressure and cancelled a deal to supply Pakistan with a reprocessing plant) could weaken the resolve and passion with which he nurtured and protected the nuclear programme. Even the manner in which he recognised the talents of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and gave him a virtual carte blanche to run the Engineering (later A.Q. Khan) Research Laboratories, which were critical to the success of the programme, testifies to the personal interest that he took in it. Many others too, such as Munir Khan and Dr Ishfaq Ahmad, came into their own under Bhutto’s inspiration.

There is now no shortage of those who are willing to join our foreign detractors in casting stones at the tragic figure of Dr Khan, but having dealt with the Americans, in various capacities, for over two decades, I can vouch for the fact that US agencies were keeping a close eye on him and his organisation. They knew only too well that the success or failure of his actions would be critical to the country’s nuclear programme.

Thereafter, we have to acknowledge our debt to General Ziaul Haq. He may have committed many sins, but surely without his intelligence and acumen, Pakistan would not have been able to protect its nuclear programme. It needs to be recalled that one of the reasons advanced by the Reagan administration for the provision of the five-year $3.2 billion package in 1982 was to discourage Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear weapons programme. But Ziaul Haq was able to keep the Americans focused on their Afghan adventure, rather than on our nuclear programme. A US congressional aide was not too wide off the mark when he remarked that Zia may have been one of the very few Third World leaders, who succeeded in eating the American cake and having it too.

We then come to the nineties, when Pakistan had frequent changes of government. Though all the leaders were under constant pressure from Washington to shut down the enrichment activity at Kahuta, it goes to their credit that they were able to resist the American carrots, as well as the occasional stick. Even a secret briefing arranged for Benazir Bhutto during her first official visit to Washington in 1989 failed to convince her that the programme had to be slowed down.

When India carried out its tests in May 1998, the Pakistani leadership recognised that the strategic parity between the two countries had been shattered and that Pakistan would have to respond to it soon, if India was to be prevented from establishing its hegemony over the region. Within hours of the Indian tests, the Americans had mounted a tremendous international campaign, not to punish India or to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons, but to warn Pakistan of the folly of emulating the Indians.

As the then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, appreciated that to be successful in his mission he would have to carry with him his cabinet and parliament; and indeed the entire country. His critics now are many, but as a witness to the prime minister’s meetings and exchanges on this issue, including the many telephone calls from President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair, this writer can recall the skill and resolve with which he was able to fend off the increasingly unbearable pressures.

In his quiet, dignified manner and with disarming simplicity, he responded to both the pleas and the pressure with equanimity. He always reminded his interlocutors that the focus of their concern should be India and not Pakistan. He would also add, invariably, that as a democratically elected leader, he had to respect the wishes of the people.

The Americans were, however, not satisfied with merely rushing special envoys to Islamabad and phoning virtually every night. They got other world leaders to join them in warning the Pakistani leadership of the extremely serious consequences of carrying out the tests. The US embassy in Islamabad, too, went into overdrive, canvassing among its admirers in the country, to speak out against the tests. However, the prime minister remained steadfast in his resolve to ensure that Pakistan was able to acquire minimum credible deterrence against a larger and more powerful neighbour.

Of course, there is no shortage of those who criticise Pakistan’s nuclear tests on grounds that may appear genuine but are actually based on false assumptions. Some spoke strongly in favour of opting for the “high moral ground”, instead of carrying out the tests, but this demonstrated an absence of any understanding of “realpolitik”. States, especially those that live in the shadow of large, inimical powers, do not enjoy the luxury of risking their independence and sovereignty on the presumed goodwill of others.

Assuming the “high moral ground” is an attractive idea but we live in a world, where what matters is national cohesion, economic prowess and military strength. Incidentally, the Indian leadership, which never tires of lecturing the world on the virtues of Gandhian non-violence, recognised very early on the tremendous advantages flowing from the possession of nuclear weapons. As has now been so well-documented by George Perkovich, in his book on the Indian bomb, Pandit Nehru was already assembling his team of scientists to work on a nuclear programme, even before India had gained independence.

As we are aware, the United States, while remaining irrevocably opposed to nuclear proliferation by others, continues to possess the largest nuclear stockpile in the world. According to the American Arms Control Association, it is currently estimated to consist of 11,000 warheads, including 7,000 deployed strategic warheads. The current Russian nuclear stockpile is less than half this number, but this has not prevented the US from conducting research aimed at greater sophistication and miniaturisation of its nuclear weapons.

Then we have had critics who claim that since the country’s expenditure on conventional weapons systems was not reduced after the tests, as was expected, it nullifies one of the reasons advanced in favour of the nuclear programme. To confuse the issue of defence expenditure with any one weapons system, however strategic in nature, is wrong. Budgetary allocation for defence is a highly complex matter. The factors going into it are many, both domestic and foreign. I recall a veteran Pakistani diplomat explaining to an American audience why Pakistan’s defence budget was formulated in Delhi, not Islamabad.

There are others who claim that the tests brought about US sanctions, conveniently forgetting that the US had ended virtually all assistance to Pakistan from October 1, 1990, when President Bush refused to provide the certification required under the Pressler Amendment to allow for aid to flow to Pakistan. In any case, it was not the US sanctions but the highly ill-advised freeze on foreign currency accounts that was responsible for our financial predicament.

Finally, we have those who claim that the Kargil episode proves that it was the possession of nuclear weapons that created a false sense of security, encouraging us to launch the ill-fated adventure. The background and reasons for Kargil are still surrounded in mystery, but suffice it is to say that the foreign policy establishment had warned, both verbally and in writing, that with Pakistan having acquired nuclear weapons, it would need henceforth to follow a far more mature, restrained and responsible policy.

In fact, the argument can be made that one of the reasons that prevented Kargil from escalating into an all-out war was the sober realisation in both capitals that with their nuclearisation, they had no option but to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. The same applies in the case of the 2002 military stand-off between the two countries. The international community did play a helpful role in both cases, but had Pakistan not been in possession of nuclear weapons, the major powers would not have been as concerned with the situation as they were.

The international community may wish to condemn Pakistan’s overt nuclearisation, but it should appreciate how this has helped in restraining India’s ambitions and ensuring peace and stability in the region. The question worth considering is whether South Asia would have been safer and more secure had India alone been in possession of weapons of mass destruction.

Of course, the two countries must continue to make serious efforts to establish the necessary mechanisms and institutions that will form the basis, hopefully soon, for them to conclude something akin to what Pakistan proposed after the tests, namely a “strategic restraint regime”.

In the meanwhile, what Pakistan needs to do is to make its command and control structure transparent, reliable, secure and sustainable and remain engaged in research and development, to ensure that these weapons systems remain credible and reliable. Genuine normalisation of ties between India and Pakistan can proceed only when there is strategic parity between them.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Charting a new course?

WHETHER or not the optimism exuded by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif is misplaced is yet to be tested. But both political leaders, whom I met in London a few days ago, are brimming with confidence.

On their arrival in Pakistan, they are expecting a countrywide response, similar to the recent one in Nepal when thousands of people came out on the streets to defy bullets and batons wielded by the army and police.

The two leaders have not yet decided when they will go to Pakistan. But they are determined to be there before the 2007 election which, they think, will be “free and fair”. They are pinning their hopes mostly on America which seems to have assured them on this count. Benazir Bhutto still fears that the military’s “mechanisations” would endanger the success of the candidates in her Pakistan People’s Party “at the counting stage,” as was done the last time by “changing the ballot boxes.” In comparison, Nawaz Sharif is less worried. It’s not that he does not anticipate the “manipulation.” But he looks like a person who is prepared for a long, bitter haul.

Benazir Bhutto is also worried about her security. “They may kill me,” she said repeatedly. In the same breath, she talked about the safety of Sheikh Hasina, chief of the Awami League in Bangladesh. Benazir Bhutto realises that many attempts have been made on Sheikh Hasina’s life. She sees some similarity with Pakistan. The politics of violence makes Benazir Bhutto concerned about democracy and she regrets that violence is spreading all over.

The “charter of democracy” that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif have signed in London specifically states that “terrorism and militancy are by-products of military dictatorship, negation of democracy” and that they “are strongly condemned, and will be vigorously confronted.” It is a well-considered document and has the stamp of intellectuals in Pakistan. I believe it was revised many times before it was finalised. Certain features can be copied by India. For example, the Concurrent List of the Constitution is sought to be abolished to assure autonomy to the provinces. When I asked Benazir Bhutto about the Balochistan-like situation, she said, “We propose to abolish the Concurrent List.”

The charter proposes to have a new procedure for appointments to top positions. Members of the election commission, like judges in superior judiciary, will be confirmed “through a transparent public hearing process.” The charter states that all senior postings in defence and security would be made with the approval of the government through the respective ministries. What is really striking is the unequivocal stand on the military.

The charter says: “We shall not join a military regime or any military-sponsored government. No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power or to dislodge a democratic government.” The two leaders will appoint a commission to examine military coups and the removal of civilian governments from 1996. The same commission will also identify the causes of and fix responsibility “for incidences such as Kargil.”

While talking to me, both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif said, separately, that the military would have no role in the government. Both want the military to follow the Indian example to stay apolitical and defend the country. I checked with Benazir Bhutto whether the military was in touch with her directly or indirectly. She responded in the negative. “How can the military be in touch with me when President General Pervez Musharraf has instituted a large number of bogus cases against me?” Again, she categorically said “no” when I asked whether she favoured the Turkish pattern which allowed the military to intervene unilaterally whenever it felt that “the constitution had been derailed”.

In fact, she is critical of India for having a dialogue with the military regime in Islamabad. “You give credibility to General Musharraf and his regime when you talk to them,” she said. She does not buy the argument that India has to engage with him if it wants to discuss confidence-building measures between the two countries.

Although friendly off and on in the past, I have never found the two so keen to bury the hatchet with India as I did in London this time. Both advocate a “borderless” subcontinent without visas. They are in favour of a South Asian common market on the lines of the European Union, with no restriction on travel, trade or business.

Their priority to have friendly relations with India is the main reason why the two have separated the “Kashmir dispute” from normalisation with New Delhi. In the charter, the paragraphs on India and Kashmir are different. The seventeenth paragraph says that “peaceful relations with India and Afghanistan will be pursued without prejudice to outstanding disputes.” The next paragraph reads that the “Kashmir dispute should be settled in accordance with the UN resolutions and the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.”

The formulation on Kashmir may not be to New Delhi’s liking but there is no mention of words like “the core issue,” in the charter. Nor did they talk in that vein during their address to the media. Specific references to the Shimla agreement or the Lahore declaration have been deleted from the charter’s final draft to shorten its length.

The press and electronic media will, understandably, be free. But the words the charter has used are unsavoury. It says that the media will be “allowed its independence.” It is probably the background of the two leaders that makes them employ such phraseology. In democracy, the fourth estate is like parliament, the executive or the judiciary which sustain the structure. All of them are equal in importance. Independence of one is not dependent on the other.

What the charter lacks is the assurance on correcting Pakistan’s history which begins with the advent of Muslim rule in India. This lapse is probably meant to placate the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a combination of six religious parties, which has assured its support to the two. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif will be failing Pakistan if they combine religion with the state, the idea which Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah denounced in his very first speech to the constituent assembly. When I pointed out the history angle to Nawaz Sharif, he said that perhaps they could add an annexure to the charter to “correct this lapse.”

Back in India, I found a statement by General Musharraf, asserting that constitutionally the existing parliament is privileged to re-elect him for a second term. This is probably true. But when both leaders of the main political parties are looking forward to participating in the 2007 polls, it would appear more credible if General Musharraf were to throw his hat in the ring after the election.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Right move on a risky path

GEORGE BUSH has finally done the right thing in agreeing to hold direct talks with Iran about its nuclear programme. The old division of labour under which the Europeans negotiated with Tehran while Washington held its nose and looked the other way is no longer tenable.

With all due respect to the EU’s ambition to play a bigger global role, the relationship that really matters is the one between the world’s only superpower and the country it has struggled to deal with since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Europe, represented by Britain, France and Germany, cannot deliver what is needed to resolve this potentially grave crisis. Far bigger carrots, and perhaps sticks, are required.

Excitement at Wednesday’s announcement of this significant policy shift by Condoleezza Rice gave way to a more sober mood when Iran insisted it would not halt uranium enrichment. It is entitled to do this for the declared purpose of generating energy, but as the US, Europeans, Arabs and Israelis all warn (pointing to 18 years of concealment) it can also be used for weapons production. Complicating matters, there are sharply differing assessments about when Iran might acquire a military nuclear capability.

But it would be wrong to read too much into what sounds like a ritual re-assertion of a core position. There have been enough nuanced signals from Iranian officials to suggest that there is indeed something to talk about. Iran’s UN ambassador, for example, said only last week that enrichment could be capped at a level below what is required to produce a weapon. And Iran did suspend its enrichment during earlier talks with the EU. Still, pragmatic and moderate messages have often been contradicted by the fundamentalist president, Mohammed Ahmadinejad. Western attempts to encourage his rivals have not been successful.

Mr Ahmadinejad and his colleagues should think carefully about what they want to happen. The reason Mr Bush took the domestically risky step of engaging conditionally with Tehran was that he could not count on the support of Russia and China for punitive action against a non-compliant Iran.

—The Guardian, London