Was PM’s Kabul trip useful?
By Amir Usman
THE success or failure of a high-level visit is determined by its outcome. Has Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s recent visit to Kabul resulted in strengthening the existing relationship between the two countries? How many substantive agreements were signed? Was an identity of approach on bilateral, regional and international issues achieved during the visit? If answers to these questions are in the affirmative, the visit could be considered a success, otherwise it can at best be termed a tourist jaunt or a private pilgrimage.
In order to achieve these objectives, extensive negotiations are necessary at the diplomatic level before the visit as well as meticulous arrangements for the visit. The need for such measures becomes even more urgent if relations between the two countries are somewhat sour or not very friendly. Results can be disappointing and at times even counterproductive if high-level visits are undertaken in a haphazard manner. Whether these prerequisites were finalised before the prime minister’s recent visit to Kabul and did he achieve the objectives for which the visit was undertaken are the subject of this discussion.
Normally, the foretaste of a high-level visit is contained in an official statement announcing the date and other details of the visit. The bland statement issued before the prime minister’s visit did not give many details. It only described relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan as “unique” and the frequent interaction between the leaders of the two countries as a “hallmark” of this relationship. With a view to improving the existing relationship all aspects were to be discussed during the visit, the statement added.
A well-informed journalist with access to government sources said in a comment that the visit was arranged in the “shortest possible time” and both governments had agreed to create a conducive atmosphere for the success of the prime minister’s visit. It was also indicated by press reports that the question of fencing and mining the Pak-Afghan border, on which acute differences had surfaced between the two countries, would be discussed. A significant feature of the visit was that the influential and vocal information minister, Muhammad Ali Durrani, was sent to Kabul ahead of the prime minister’s arrival to pave the way for some positive results.
Whether any of the objectives mentioned above were achieved during the visit is hotly contested between pro-government elements and neutral observers. The government apologists consider the visit highly successful (like every visit of a Pakistani leader abroad) and quote the agreement on the repatriation of the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and the naming of a Pakistan commission to arrange (along with its Afghan counterpart) joint jirgas as a positive outcome. But in supporting their viewpoint, critics cite the failure of the two sides to come to an understanding on substantive issues such as the fencing and mining of the border and the failure of the Afghan side to appreciate and acknowledge the efforts of the Pakistani leadership to minimise terrorist activities across the border.
Instead, President Karzai accused Pakistan of many unfriendly actions, including patronising the Taliban militants to destabilise his government and the killing of Afghan children and bombing of schools by pro-Pakistan elements. The most surprising aspect of Mr Karzai’s statement at the joint press conference, in the presence of the Pakistani, Afghan and international media, was his decrying of high-level visits between the two countries (and there have been many — in fact too many — in the recent past) as, according to him, these bore little fruit. Mr Karzai also accused Pakistan of mistrust and predicted an increase in the already existing “gap” in relations.
Besides the hot words, the gestures, the body language and the finger-pointing were enough to gauge the mood at the joint press conference. (The front-page picture of the event published in this newspaper is indeed very telling). The public display of resentment by Mr Karzai against a visiting head of government raises many questions about diplomatic propriety and its impact on relations between the two countries. While these are important questions and will be discussed for a long time in many capitals of the world, I want to analyse the gains that President Karzai wanted to achieve from his public outburst.
There is no doubt that the Afghan president is in deep trouble both at home and abroad. Domestically, he is dubbed as a weak leader who has not been able to extend his writ beyond Kabul. Even in the capital he is heavily dependent on the help and protection of the foreign occupying forces — an anathema for all Afghans. He is accused of collaborating with the erstwhile warlords who wield considerable power and influence in his administration. He has not been able to control corruption, which has increased considerably since the Taliban days.
The law and order situation has deteriorated and no one feels safe. Internationally, he is no more considered a panacea for all Afghan ills by his patrons and mentors. In fact, some of them regard him as part of the problem. The manifold increase in the cultivation of poppy has aggravated the worries of western governments. What then is Mr Karzai supposed to do in this situation? As he is not in a position to do much to improve the domestic situation, he has to find a scapegoat to shift the blame from himself. And Pakistan is that convenient scapegoat.
According to his line of argument, he cannot protect the innocent Afghan masses from the attacks of the American and other foreign forces stationed in his country because Pakistan is behind the insurgency. He cannot confront the Taliban because Pakistan is supporting them with arms and money and provides them safe sanctuary on its side of the border.
He is siding with the warlords because they control the area from where they come and have organised forces which can confront the Taliban — supposedly Pakistan’s proteges. In fact, name any ill that is infesting Afghanistan these days and it will be attributed by the Afghan president to the so-called unfriendly and non-cooperative Pakistan.
One singular success of Mr Karzai is that he has been able to convince the Afghan people that Pakistan is constantly and persistently interfering in Afghan affairs and wants to have a government of its own choice in Kabul. Because of this constant propaganda and some of our own follies, Pakistan is perhaps the most disliked country in Afghanistan. Pakistan has singularly failed to dispel this negative impression or to create a positive image of itself in the minds of the Afghan masses.
So what is Pakistan to do in this unfriendly situation vis-a-vis Afghanistan?
First of all, Pakistan should tone down its enthusiasm about Afghanistan till it is assured of a friendly and responsible response from the other side. For the present, Pakistan should stop talking of a Marshall plan or holding of a donor conference on its soil. Its dignitaries should also give up the habit of announcing additional grants for the Karzai government during every visit to Kabul or as a response to an unfriendly remark by the Afghan president. Hastily arranged and improperly organised visits should be avoided at all cost.
All such gestures have so far been taken as a sign of weakness on the part of Pakistan and presented before the Afghan public in a negative manner. Pakistan should conduct its relations with Afghanistan in a normal and proper diplomatic manner as done with other countries of the world. While there is no need to be strident or overbearing, complacency and a cringing attitude is also not desirable.
The writer is a former ambassador to Afghanistan.

