The brewing Kashmir ‘goulash’
By Shamshad Ahmad
“Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes.” --Oscar Wilde
A BACK-CHANNEL ‘deal’ on Kashmir is said to be in the offing. According to Foreign Minister Kasuri, the ‘confrontational mode’ of the subcontinent is being `rolled back’ in the face of what he describes as the ground realities of today’s turbulent world.
It seems, after Pakistan’s post-9/11 “turnaround,” we are in an unremitting business of ground reality-driven roll-backs. Kashmir might be our next rollback.
For nearly three years now, we have been hearing about what our leadership calls “flexible options” in pursuit of an “out of box” solution through a “no-borders-plus” approach as its preferred choice for what it likes to believe will be a win-win situation for all the parties to the dispute. President Musharraf has been throwing proposals here and there, at Iftar parties, in hotel lobbies and on TV screens to bring an end to the long-standing Kashmir dispute.
Musharraf’s personal vision of variable options represents an unprecedented “softening and flexibility” and a paradigm shift in Pakistan’s traditional Kashmir policy. In a controversial move, he has even offered to withdraw Pakistan’s demand for plebiscite as envisaged under the UN Security Council resolutions. His proposal for dividing Kashmir in ethnic regions which should be demilitarised and made autonomous entities with a semblance of joint supervision has not only evoked no response from India but has also deepened confusion over the Kashmir issue.
While India has yet to match Musharraf’s gestures of flexibility in any visible measure, its leaders keep repeating the claim that Kashmir is an integral part of India and have ruled out any “redrawing of boundaries” on the basis of religion. They also keep insisting that a solution to the dispute has to be found within the Indian constitution.
This could mean an outright rejection of the proposed `joint supervision’ of the disputed region unless Musharraf is seeking a cosmetic joint dispensation which would have no powers and no juridical status. As regards `demilitarisation’, one should not forget that this has been the crux of the issue and perhaps the sole major obstacle in implementing the UN Security Council resolutions. The issue would have been resolved long ago had the two countries implemented the UN Security Council’s call for demilitarisation.
Given India’s aversion to giving up its “constitutional” claim over Kashmir, any plan for demilitarisation or joint control over any region of Kashmir would appear impractical in the present circumstances. No Indian leader has so far reacted publicly to President Musharraf's Kashmir "self-governance" formula. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has only said that all these matters could be discussed at the appropriate forums. He was obviously alluding to the desirability of an institutional approach in addressing any new ideas that could help resolve the Kashmir dispute.
Privately, Indian officials have been saying that Pakistan’s changed position on Kashmir notwithstanding; there is considerable ground to be covered before any realistic and long-term solution can be found. In Pakistan, our readiness to forego our principled position on Kashmir, which is based on UN Security Council resolutions and rooted in a national consensus, is seen as a big “surrender” and a “turnaround” of policies that have over the decades cost Pakistan so heavily in terms of wars and conflicts.
India on its part has been able to maintain a consistency in its policies and priorities while fully exploiting the regional situation to link the Kashmiri struggle to the prevalent global concerns against terrorism, and to deflect the international attention from its own repressive policies in Kashmir by engaging in a fruitless dialogue with Pakistan.
Ironically, after its January 2004 resumption, the India-Pakistan composite dialogue has been focused more on terrorism than on the long-outstanding issues. In terms of the January 6, 2004, Islamabad joint Statement, Pakistan had “solemnly agreed not to allow its territory to be used for any terrorist activity against India.” Since then, India has managed to link the dialogue process to Paksitan’s ability or otherwise to stop alleged `infiltration’ from across its territory.
We also agreed under pressure from India after the Mumbai blasts and as a follow-up to the Havana “breakthrough” to the creation of a new but totally superfluous joint “anti-terror mechanism” with a mandate already covered in the existing mechanism of the India-Pakistan composite dialogue. The two countries already have a joint working group headed by their respective interior secretaries to address the issue of terrorism and drug trafficking.
How would the new set-up which is headed only at the level of additional secretaries in the foreign affairs ministries make the difference? It is obvious that India had made the new set-up a prerequisite for resumption of dialogue only to highlight Pakistan’s “terrorism-related” regional role and relevance and to divert the world attention from Kashmir issue to cross-border “terrorism.”
In its post-9/11 “strategic” policy shift, Pakistan became America’s strategic partner and has been engaged in a full-scale “war on terror” within its own territory and against its own people. It has apparently now joined India as its undeclared “strategic partner” in fighting another war on its behalf against its own people or those whom it has always acclaimed as legitimate `Kashmiri freedom fighters’.
It seems the future rounds of the composite dialogue will now be exclusively devoted to exchanging and disputing the lists of wanted or unwanted persons from each side. The lists of India’s violation of human rights will be of little relevance in the newly formatted peace process. Cross-border terrorism, not Kashmir will now be the main issue in this process.
In its inexplicable anxiety to sustain the dialogue with India, Pakistan is now assuming the onerous responsibility of ensuring an end to “violence, hostility and terrorism” in India. This is an impossible task for a government which has not been able to free its own country of recurring acts of terrorism and senseless violence.
Pakistan is the only country in the world which is now fighting a war against its own people. It has no sovereign control over its borders, and in a controversial move is now planning to `mine and fence’ its border with Afghanistan. It is today the “ground zero” of America’s war on terror and is paying a huge cost in terms of ever-mounting collateral damage in this on-going operation.
The biggest casualty, however, is Pakistan’s own credibility. It has staked everything in this proxy war, and has killed or “Guantanamoed” hundreds of its own people, yet it is being blamed for “not doing enough.” Meanwhile, the `faceless’ monster of terrorism is no longer confined to the wilderness of Waziristan and is out on our streets with vengeance, exploding bombs for random killings, spreading panic and challenging the government authority.
It is no less than a joke now that Pakistan, itself a victim of recurring terrorist acts and senseless violence should be guaranteeing “terrorism-free” borders with India or for that matter with Afghanistan. What is however painful is that in this murky environment of violence and suspicion, Kashmir is no longer the “core issue” involving the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. Instead, it has become only an issue of “cross-border infiltration” and terrorism.
For understandable reasons, the people in both Pakistan and Kashmir are getting worried over the direction of Islamabad’s Kashmir policy. Since the January 6, 2004 Islamabad agreement, we seem to have been progressively drifting away from our principled position on Kashmir. We have abandoned the high moral ground, a constant of our Kashmir policy, rooted in our commitment to the cardinal principle of self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter.
We no longer speak of the UN Security Council resolutions and are instead rambling on half-baked and ad hoc approaches in the name of “pragmatism” and “flexible options.” Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Kasuri, in his resonant way, keeps defending the case for the Kashmir “turnaround” by claiming that it was the only way “ to save the last Kashmiri” from falling to India’s brutal repression. What an argument!
This is not the message that the government and the people of Pakistan flagged while observing the ‘Kashmir Day’ on February 5 this year in solidarity with the people of Kashmir and their just cause. By giving wrong signals, and that too at the highest level, Pakistan is only damaging the Kashmir cause and its own case as a party to this dispute.
While Pakistan’s “back-channel” bonhomie goes on in places of agreeable “ambience,” India spares no effort to reinforce its stranglehold over the Kashmiri people. In fact, we have helped it divide the Kashmiri leadership. The true representatives of the Kashmiri people have lost faith in Pakistan’s commitment to the Kashmir cause while the Kashmiri people themselves also stand totally disillusioned with Pakistan's changing stance. They feel abandoned and let down.
In making a paradigm shift in our Kashmir policy, President Musharraf has apparently taken no one into confidence, not even his handpicked cabinet or the Kashmir Committee in the marginalised parliament. Major political parties remain completely in the dark on Musharraf’s vision of the future of Kashmir. There is no institutional approach whatsoever in his policy initiatives on Kashmir.
He claims that he has the support of the “intelligence, the establishment and the foreign office” in his policies on Kashmir. Aren’t these agencies at his beck and call to support and promote the policies that he dictates to them? None of these entities incidentally have any roots in the people of Pakistan or have any elected status.
What is most worrisome is that after 50-plus years of our independent statehood, our leadership should be seeking to change the course on Kashmir and struggle for a “back-channel” deal on the `status quo’ under the cover of “demilitarisation-cum-self-governance” proposal.
But there is no shortage of variable options on Kashmir. Even on status quo perhaps there could be a more dignified and surely more `legal’ approach.
The writer is a former foreign secretary


