Will Ankara accord work?

HAD I been one of the Sherpas charged with preparing for the Musharraf-Karzai meeting in Ankara, I would have regarded the developments of the last few days as “unpropitious”, to say the least. President Musharraf’s interview with the Spanish newspaper in which he lashed out against those who criticised Pakistan while doing nothing themselves to curb terrorism and where he called those who accused the ISI of assisting the Taliban “liars” did not help create a “conducive atmosphere”.

Musharraf was, of course, responding to charges that President Hamid Karzai and other Afghan leaders had been repeating at regular intervals and in increasingly shriller tones. Perhaps it was his view that as part of the preparations for the meeting he had to spell out publicly the limits of Pakistan’s tolerance and to warn Karzai to respect these limits if he wanted any forward movement in the talks.

Pakistan’s leaders have been writhing under the lash of media reports that, in contrast to official statements, call into question the commitment of all sections of the Pakistan establishment to the battle against the Taliban. They term as capitulation the agreements reached with local influentials in the tribal areas and view as diversionary tactics the steps that Pakistan has proposed or taken to close Afghan refugee camps, regulate border crossings and fence those parts of the border that cannot be easily patrolled.

Pakistani officials find it galling that reports of this nature are based mainly on briefings of coalition forces. They believe that the coalition forces are being fed false intelligence by Afghan officials.

Pakistan’s ire is understandable. Such allegations make substantive cooperation difficult and strengthen forces on both sides of the border who do not want peace in south and southeast Afghanistan to which full cooperation between the Pakistan and Afghan authorities can contribute. Articulating this ire on the eve of the Ankara meeting was a worthwhile ploy, however, only if the cessation of the “war of words” was Pakistan’s sole expectation from the Ankara meeting.

In many ways, Afghan behaviour has been even worse. Afghan officials have refused to accept the biometric passes that Pakistan has introduced to regulate cross border traffic, officials in Kabul have falsely claimed that they have torn down the fencing that Pakistan is erecting, and, most ominously, there have been instances of Afghan and Pakistani forces exchanging fire across the border. It would seem that for the Afghans, now in control in Kabul, the war against the Taliban is less important than foiling Pakistan’s so-called evil intentions.

The situation on the ground has also deteriorated. Despite brave words, the most the coalition forces can claim is that they have prevented the Taliban from launching a full-scale spring offensive. They have not been able to prevent the Taliban from taking over whole towns and districts from time to time. While many of these Taliban successes have been reversed it has been at the cost of civilian casualties for which the coalition forces and the Afghan government, more than the Taliban, have been held responsible.

Most recently, hundreds of Afghan villagers gathered on Monday to protest against the civilian casualties caused by Nato’s actions on Friday and Sunday against the Taliban in Herat province’s Zerkoh valley in which they claimed that more than 140 Taliban, including prominent local commanders, were killed. The battle for hearts and minds is being lost not won.

The State Department’s latest report on global terrorism states that in 2006 the number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan went up to 749 as against 491 in 2005 and the number of people killed in these incidents went up from 684 in 2005 to 1,040 in 2006. Other more recent compilations suggest that the rate of terrorist incidents, including suicide attacks, climbed exponentially in the first four months of 2007.

In a recent meeting in Brussels of the German Marshall Fund’s forum, former US ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, lamented the fact that Karzai’s government had “lost momentum” and transparency, and that its erstwhile supporters in Afghanistan were becoming alienated. He said that he was more concerned about the weakening of the Karzai government than the Taliban fighters.

Holbrooke charged that there had been “massive wastage of American and European funding”. As a result, he said, little of the billions of dollars in aid meant for Afghan reconstruction had gone towards the rebuilding of roads, schools and hospitals. Other speakers at the forum spoke of equally grim developments with a former Polish defence minister quoting Polish military commanders in Afghanistan as saying that the city of Kandahar was a “no-go area” for both international and Afghan officials.

In Pakistan, the Taliban infection seems to be spreading with increasing rapidity from the tribal areas to the settled districts. Girls’ schools are being closed. Public bonfires are being lit to throw in videos seized from video shops. Barbers are being threatened with dire consequences if they shave the beards of their clients.

The inexplicable tolerance by the government of the illegal and provocative activities of the Jamia Hafsa vigilantes has now led to other seminary students gathering outside the Karachi Press Club to announce their support for the Jamia Hafsa’s goals and methods. The criticism of the Jamia Hafsa by the religious parties is gradually becoming more muted as they perceive the government’s weakness and are becoming inclined to believe that a religious coup using Hafsa methods against the government is possible.

The attack on Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao’s public meeting in Charsadda is yet another indication of the deteriorating law and order situation and the government’s inability to cope, despite the support of the “silent majority”, with the rising tide of extremism.

It is against this backdrop that one must see the meeting in Ankara and read the Ankara declaration. It should have been a meeting at which both sides agreed that there was a common danger and that a joint political, as much as a military, approach was needed to lessen and eventually eliminate the danger.

Musharraf should have emphasised that he regarded the diehard Taliban, whether Pakistanis or Afghans, as enemies. He should have acknowledged that when the Taliban gathered strength in Afghanistan they garnered more adherents in Pakistan’s border provinces and, as an inevitable corollary, extremism gathered new recruits in other parts of Pakistan. He should have argued that Karzai had to make greater efforts to win over the moderate Taliban and should have offered the good offices of Afghan experts in bringing this about.

He should have emphasised the importance of holding tribal and not national jirgas to bring together the elders of each tribe that straddles the border. At these jirgas, government representatives from Pakistan and Afghanistan could offer monetary and other incentives to persuade the tribes to deny the Taliban the use of their areas.

Karzai could have argued that while he did not think that border fencing or removing refugee camps or introducing biometric passes would resolve the problem of cross-border terrorism, these would help in some measure and that he would not regard them as indicative of Pakistan’s malevolent intentions. He should have reassured Musharraf that he would not let Indian consulates be misused for nefarious purposes and that he would seek the assistance of Nato intelligence to ensure this. He should have sought Musharraf’s assistance in the development of the area and the creation of employment opportunities.

If any of this was done it was not apparent in the Ankara declaration or in the body language of the two leaders. As in Washington, so too in Ankara the media noted that the two leaders did not shake hands nor did they agree to a joint press conference. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer found a more elegant way than his American counterpart of creating the illusion of bonhomie by clasping and raising the hands of both his guests.

Everyone tried to give a positive interpretation of the meeting. President Musharraf spoke of it as a new beginning even while warning that the details had not been worked out. President Sezer expressed the hope that the Ankara declaration would mark a step towards concrete cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A Turkish diplomat, however, put it best when he said “the very fact that they managed to agree to a joint declaration is itself very important.” Unfortunately, in most ways the Ankara declaration is an example of “plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” — or the more things change, the more they remain the same.

We have agreement on “denying sanctuary”, on action to be taken when timely intelligence is provided and we have gratitude for past assistance to the refugees. There is agreement on working together to shift the current refugee camps and on Pakistan hosting the next international Aid to Afghanistan conference. All of this is old hat having figured in countless past agreements between the two sides.

The only noteworthy item is the formation of a tripartite working group to monitor the implementation of the declaration. The Turks are trusted and liked by both the Pakistanis and the Afghans. They have past experience of Afghanistan from the days of the First World War. During the jihad and in the period of internecine war, more particularly during the Taliban era, they maintained close contact with some Afghan leaders notably the notorious Uzbek, Rashid Dostum. The Turks also have had a military contingent in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force and Turkish generals have commanded ISAF for some time. Their association with Pakistan’s military leaders has been of long standing and is of particular value now when Musharraf, a proclaimed admirer of Kemal Ataturk and a Turkish speaker, is at the helm of affairs.

Their efforts to identify the sources of problems and to suggest ways to eliminate them would probably have greater success than those of less trusted intermediaries. If it can be made to work, some genuine advances can be made.

The problem is to devise the mechanism by which the Turks can really play this role. Will the Turks be in a position to place monitors on the ground to investigate Afghan allegations of cross-border infiltration? Will they be able to ensure that only legal movement takes place across the border? Will they be able to monitor the unchecked flow of drugs and a whole host of other contraband goods from Afghanistan into Pakistan? Will they establish contact with the Taliban to see which of them can be persuaded to reconcile their differences with the Karzai government? Will they be able to check out Pakistani allegations of subversive elements entering Pakistan from Afghanistan?

Pakistan and Afghanistan both have reason to be grateful to Turkey for offering their assistance and doing so at a time when Turkey is embroiled in a political crisis of its own. They should be grateful also that Turkey has offered to do more than merely host meetings. However, realistically it must be recognised that this is a problem that the two countries need to work out between themselves and they can do so only if they tackle their internal problems and seek each other’s help in doing so.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

With party permission

THE opposition parties, especially the PPP, keep accusing the ruling regime of endeavouring to contrive a one-party government in the country on the strength of its so-called heavy mandate. For us in Pakistan it is difficult even to imagine what life is like in a one-party state.

Of course, we are international experts in martial law which is one-party government in a way, but a so-called democratic republic, with the ruling party being the sole arbiter of the people’s life and death, is a different proposition altogether.From Harare came the news some years ago that the ruling party of Zimbabwe stopped the burial of a woman because she had not been a card-holder of the party. Her family had to arrange for her ex-post facto membership (or rather her post-mortem membership) from a back date, and after paying the dues and the arrears was able to send her on her last journey.

We are lucky that we are not compelled to enroll ourselves in any party when we are alive, and when we die there is no farewell party. We don’t need a party card, either to depart from this world or to enter the next. We just lay our cards on the table, including our ID card, kick the bucket (that has been conveniently placed at our bedside) and catch the next funeral to the graveyard. That’s all. No formalities, like for that woman in Zimbabwe.

Imagine if there was something like a one-party government in Pakistan. I suppose you wouldn’t be allowed to go on a picnic with your lawfully wedded wife without a permit from the party, or marry off your daughter to a non-card-holding young man, or even give your infant kid food that the party doesn’t approve of.

Then, since it is a national trait with us that every political party is split up into factions, why shouldn’t the ruling party be so divided, with each faction holding sway over a part of the country? Thus if you are in the domain of one faction you would probably have to swear on the heads of your children that you consider the other faction as imposters and kafirs.

I decided to discuss the possibilities of the matter with my friend Muslim L. Khan. He was christened Muslim League Khan when he was born in 1947, but then he adopted the American way of name-writing. Khan is a staunch Leaguer, but the trouble with him is that he believes that the League can only flourish if he is heading it because only he can deliver the goods. He may be right, but then there are hardly any goods left to deliver.

However, the possibility that Khan may become the ultimate party boss seems remote, for why should Mian Nawaz Sharif, the Pir of Pagara, and others, both big and small, standing in the queue give up their respective sinecures in his favour and go into oblivion?

Muslim L. Khan firmly believes that since it was the Muslim League that created Pakistan, only his party has the right and the necessary mandate to decide what to do with it or how to do away with it. If he were to have his way, breakaway factions of the party would only exist in jail. He is a tough political administrator and thinks that only strict discipline under a League government can preserve the country as one entity.

The way he looks at the whole thing, every citizen will become party member the day he or she is born. The party will decide when the boy is to be circumcised, and when the girl can have her ears pierced. Every moment in a citizen’s life would be overseen by the party. So much so that anyone choosing to die without the party’s permission would be severely punished and wouldn’t dare to do it again.

I ventured to submit to Muslim L. Khan that so much control over the daily lives of the people, who have so far had their own way in everything, might be resented. “Let them resent it if they want to,” he replied, “I’ll make sure that none of the resentment reaches my ears. In any case, the people never know what is good for them.”

Citing a possible instance, I asked, “Suppose a father wants his son to become an engineer who is the party to decide otherwise?” Khan dismissed the very idea emphatically and said, “No, the party would know best and might feel that the boy would make a good salesman of state-manufactured devices for family planning. He’ll have to follow the party’s dictates.”

My next question was, “What sort of countrywide administration do you visualise? I mean assemblies and sharing power with the people?” Khan looked at me as if I had said something childish and retorted, “Don’t be stupid. The party hierarchy will look after legislation and all higher national issues.”

“One last question, “I said. “How will the head of state and the boss of the party be elected? You know this has been a ticklish question in Pakistan.”

“My friend,” said Khan in his most patronising manner, “Kindly note that the head of the state and of the party will be elected over my dead body. The contingency will arise only when I decide to die, and I won’t need the party’s permission to do that. Nobody will ever dream of another head of state and of the party in my lifetime. So don’t worry.”

I stopped worrying there and then and recalled that Muslim L. Khan was not the only Pakistani leader to believe that he had all the answers.

Olmert exposed

WHEN Israel launched a 34-day offensive against Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, it justified its action by saying it had no choice in responding to the capture of two Israeli soldiers. On Monday night, a retired Israeli judge, Eliyahu Winograd, produced a coruscating indictment of three men — the prime minister, the defence minister and the former army chief of staff — for launching the war last summer.

A war which killed up to 1,200 Lebanese, the majority civilians, and nearly 160 Israelis was ill thought out. The decision to respond to the capture of Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah on July 12 with an intensive military strike was not based on a detailed military plan. Other options were not considered. Ehud Olmert made up his mind hastily, without consultation outside the army, without studying the problems of the Lebanese front, and without considering alternatives. He then added his own over-ambitious goals and, even once it was clear things were not going as planned, he did not adapt his plans. All this added up to a “serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence”.

The conclusions of the interim report (there is more to follow in the summer) should be enough to spell the end for any serving prime minister. The Israeli army’s impulsive chief of staff, Lt Gen Dan Halutz, has already fallen on his sword. It is widely assumed that the defence minister, Amir Peretz, described as lacking experience, will not survive a leadership battle in the Labour party. Mr Olmert’s days should now also be numbered, except that the prime minister has told cabinet members from his party, Kadima, that he has no intention of going. Mr Olmert is not going to contest the inquiry’s findings. His tactic instead is to spread the blame — as happened in Britain when Lord Butler reported: if everyone is to be criticised, then everyone is to blame and no one should go.

This is at best a shabby evasion of responsibility and will do little to stop the words of the Winograd report gaining resonance as the weeks and months unfold. Mr Olmert is playing on the knowledge that Kadima is not ready for his resignation. His able and cautious foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, is unwilling, for now, to mount a challenge. If a snap election were called, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud leader, would clean up, so Mr Olmert is playing for time. But these are internal calculations. Israel, which has so often justified its refusal to negotiate with the Palestinians on the grounds that there is no one sensible and in power to talk to, now has a leader whose judgment is revealed as fatally flawed. For once, it is the Palestinians who lack a partner for peace.

— The Guardian

Unending violence syndrome

LAST week, the print and the electronic media flashed two images that were striking in their similarity. One was that of the Hafsa Madressah girls draped in black burqas and veils marching in Islamabad and demanding the imposition of the Sharia in the country. The other was the picture of the rally organised by anti-Musharraf lawyers who were protesting against the treatment meted out to Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry.

Many members of both groups waved sticks threateningly in a massive show of strength. These scary images sent a shiver down one’s spine. What was unnerving about this display of force was how the violence syndrome is catching on in Pakistan, so much so that even lawyers, who are supposed to be civilised individuals operating within the ambit of the law by exercising their intellectual power and not their physical prowess, do not mind being seen in public armed with sticks.

Have you noticed how people conduct themselves during talk shows? They constantly interrupt each other as they try to shout each other down. This includes even top comperes whose job is hardly to prove a point. In the slanging match that is conducted on television I have often found ministers to be equally guilty of misconduct.

It is not simply an issue of how we conduct ourselves. It is the resort to violence that is a matter of deep concern.

What is happening is that the ill manners of people are being translated into physical violence. This is affecting the social atmosphere which in turn exposes the majority to a display of violence — thanks to the television. Quite naturally, the people, most of them good people, subtly imbibe this violence. The fact is that, as the psychologists say, if you put “good apples in a bad situation”, the good apples will turn bad.

Philip Zimbardo, a social psychologist living in San Francisco, conducted the Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971. He set up a mock prison in Stanford University and 23 volunteers were randomly divided into two groups. One acted as prisoners while the other played guards. Since the guards were allowed freedom to treat the prisoners as they liked — barring the use of physical force — they resorted to psychological punishment, something they could not believe they were capable of doing in normal circumstances.

Zimbardo concludes that human behaviour is more influenced by things outside of us than inside. In other words, the external environment influences our behaviour more than the inner environment that comprises genes, moral history and ethical values taught to us at home and in school.

Prof Haroon Ahmad, an eminent Pakistani psychiatrist, who has observed the behaviour of people in our society very closely, says that people’s moral values are affected more by the wider social environment — the macro environment as he calls it — than by the immediate family (micro) environment. In a study he had conducted many years ago to determine the influence of the cultural milieu on the delusions of schizophrenic patients, he found that people with magico-religious delusions belonged to families whose religiosity level was quite low and vice versa.

That is why a person who might have imbibed a healthy moral philosophy from his family so easily slips into the evil ways of his environment even when that contradicts the training he may have received at home. What is the message we are conveying to our people, especially the youth, who are at an age when their moral values are being formed?

According to Dr Haroon, the message that is coming through clear and loud is that power comes through the barrel of the gun. If you do not have a gun but have money, don’t worry you can still get what you are looking for. Money allows you to take short cuts.

The lawyers were witness to the antics of the stick-wielding guardians of morality and saw that in spite of the rebukes from the government the Hafsa students could actually kidnap three women, accuse them of running a “vice den” and then get away with it to the point of having their demands met. The lawyers were quick to adopt their ways. The minister found the anchor person on the TV raising his voice and he did the same.

Does this mean that with the environment not very conducive to civilised behaviour, we will go from bad to worse till we hit rock bottom when things cannot get any worse? Dr Haroon Ahmad points out that two key requisites for stable behaviour are missing in our society. One is security — physical, economic and social — which is extremely important for the mental health of people. Given the deteriorating law and order situation and the rising crime graph, how can one expect people to feel secure and, therefore, stable?

The second element, Dr Haroon emphasises, is predictability as well as constancy. Considering the whimsical approach of the administration to matters which are basic to people’s lives — be they running water, power supply and transport — men, women and children are living permanently in a state of uncertainty. They cannot take even the normal day-to-day routine of their life for granted.

Take the example of school holidays announced at 9 pm on television channels and the eleventh hour changes in exam schedules which can be most unsettling for students. Quick changes in financial policies that undermine people’s monetary planning do not create an environment for stable behaviour.

In such circumstances, what can one hope for? Obviously, the change will have to come from the top because those who control power determine the macro atmosphere in society. They are the ones who make the laws, are supposed to enforce them and thus set the pattern of public compliance that is to be the norm.

Regrettably, those who are in a position to change the social environment are not interested in doing it. Since their words do not match their deeds, deception and dishonesty are accepted as the norm. Violence is punishable, they say. But do not punish the perpetrators of violence.

How is this trend to be changed? The onus is on those who wield power and can change the macro environment. While there may be a few islands of virtue in an ocean of evil, they cannot survive for long and are engulfed by the evil in the environment, like the good apples that decay when put with the rotten ones.