Democracy, not absolutism

I HAVE recently come across two high-sounding observations concerning democracy and related matters, coming from well-placed sources, which deserve to be examined. Before proceeding further, I should like to emphasise that I prefer democracy to any other system of government, but the reasons for my preference are different from those to be examined below, and I shall state them later in this article.

An eminent jurist in Pakistan has recently declared (May 6) that “history shows that nations and states cannot survive under dictatorship”, and that without democracy, rule of law and observance of fundamental rights they are destroyed. This declaration would pass if it had come from a polemicist or a publicist, but it has been made by a judge, whose profession requires careful use of words to the effect of precision and exactitude. In these respects, it is wanting.

The author of this assertion would be on safe ground if he spoke of the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law with reference to recent times. But his learning in the law does not justify the assumption that he is, ipso facto, also learned in the humanities and social sciences. The wiser course for him would be to stay away from “ex cathedra” pronouncements on subjects in which he has no known expertise.

He says history shows that nations and states living under dictatorship will cease to exist. Not true; history tells us no such thing. In most places in the world kings ruled for many centuries. They did not hold themselves accountable to the governed. They felt free to do whatever they wished. In the terminology then current they were “despots.”

It may be said that in our modern terms they were dictators. It is entirely untenable to say that their kingdoms perished, if they did, because they were absolute rulers, that is, dictators. Indeed, the regimes of some of them had great longevity.

Elizabeth I in England and Akbar the Great in India (contemporaries) each ruled for almost 50 years. Nor can it be said that their realms were barren of intellectual and cultural advancement. Catherine the Great ruled Russia for 34 years to that country’s greater glory. Many a king lost his kingdom but that had nothing to do with his absolutism; he was replaced by another absolute ruler. Their comings and goings did not affect the “state” or “nation” they ruled.

The Abbasid kings in Baghdad were likewise absolute rulers, but for about 200 years (during their 500-year rule), arts and letters, philosophy and sciences flourished, as they did under Umayyad rule (equally non-democratic) in Spain.

In our more recent times Stalin in the Soviet Union, Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, Franco in Spain, Salazar in Portugal, and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran, all of them dictators, ruled for extended stretches of time. If Hitler had not initiated war in Europe, he and Mussolini might have ruled even longer. In none of these cases did the “nation” cease to exist, and if as a result of defeat in war the “state” did, it re-emerged stronger and better.

In an interview with Dawn (May 4) Mr Nawaz Sharif maintained that a powerful prime minister, functioning under the 1973 Constitution (as it stood on October 12, 1999), could meet all of the challenges confronting the country, including the menace of extremism. “Democracy,” he said, “is the answer to all these issues.” He believed the extremist elements would become part of the democratic process within a couple of years of its restoration. He expected that the people of Pakistan would soon rise in revolt against the tyranny of a military dictator.

Two questions need to be asked here: how powerful is powerful enough, and what are the challenges we face? There is first the model contained in the 1973 Constitution in its original version under which the executive power of the federation vests in the prime minister, and the president can do nothing without his concurrence. But this is not what Mr Sharif wants. He wants a subsequent version of the Constitution.

Then there is the Ziaul Haq model contained in the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution under which the president has considerable discretionary authority, especially in the matter of certain key appointments in the armed forces and elsewhere in the government, in addition to the authority to dismiss the prime minister by dissolving the National Assembly (58-2B). Some of Ziaul Haq’s additions and alterations were reversed in an amendment adopted during Mr Nawaz Sharif’s second term as prime minister. Article 58-2B was repealed and the president made more dependent on the prime minister’s advice.

This is the version that Mr Sharif wants to be restored. It allows the prime minister and his cabinet to make such decisions and take action as they might deem fit, according to their lights and preferences.

The prime minister’s “power” does not derive exclusively from constitutional provisions. It depends also on the support he commands in parliament and on the cohesiveness of his cabinet. It should be kept in mind that it is the cabinet, not the prime minister alone, that makes for parliamentary government.

All of these sources favoured Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: he had virtually total control of his party, unquestioning loyalty of his cabinet, and a huge majority in the National Assembly. He was undoubtedly the most powerful prime minister in this country’s history. Mr Nawaz Sharif in his second term appeared to be powerful enough even though neither his cabinet nor his party was cohesive.

A prime minister’s ability to meet challenges and problems depends not only on the prescribed scope of his authority but also on his wisdom, will, competence, and philosophy (if he has one).

Mr Bhutto damaged vital national interests by his impetuous decision making, and his ill-conceived nationalisation of educational institutions, medium-sized industries (cooking oils, wheat flour and rice-husking mills), and banking and insurance. He dismissed an elected government in Balochistan which gave rise to a massive uprising that lasted more than four years. His administration visited unspeakable atrocities on political opponents.

During Mr Nawaz Sharif’s second term, when he was powerful enough, some fine roads were built, but corruption, extremism, sectarian killings and ethnic strife increased. In spite of his background in commerce and industry, the economy remained sluggish. Persecution of political opponents went on unabated.

His government made no significant improvement in any segment of national life, because it had neither the requisite vision nor the will. Like some of its predecessors it chose to play games with Islam.

Let us now ask what the “challenges” facing the country are and whether democracy has any relevance to their resolution.

Let it first be noted that some of the problems facing any country are complex and intractable, and they do not lend themselves to quick resolution regardless of its political system. It would be naïve to think that western democracies, India or Japan did not have vexing problems that lingered either because they were difficult to handle or because those in powers did not wish to handle them.

There are problems in Pakistan which democracy might mitigate. Take, for instance, the widespread alienation in Sindh or the disaffection and civil strife in Balochistan.

They arise partly from the absence of democracy and genuine political participation that goes with it. But democracy in a highly centralised state will not help. It must be accompanied by a large measure of provincial autonomy. Democracy will also help the implementation of developmental plans which require mass support.

Democracy may or may not be relevant to the alleviation of poverty or the spread of education, depending upon where a government places its priorities. No noteworthy improvement in these areas took place during the “democratic” regimes of Mr Nawaz Sharif and Ms Benazir Bhutto or during the earlier periods of democratic government.

Democracy has no obvious or immediate improving effect on extremism or ethnic and sectarian conflicts. These have become chronic conditions and no government can eradicate them all in one sweep. They require long-term cure, which in turn requires resolve, patience, and perseverance on the part of governments and various organs of civil society.

The same holds for the population explosion, environmental degradation, and the acute water and energy shortages, which become severer with each passing day.

If we cannot be certain that democracy will solve even the more troublesome of our problems, why bother with it? One may want democracy not because it will make life trouble free. He/she may want it partly as a matter of belief and partly because it will bring certain satisfactions, which he/she values.

I, for one, believe with Thomas Jefferson (opening paragraph of the American Declaration of Independence) that all men are created equal, that no one has any inherent right to govern others, and that “Nature and Nature’s God” entitle all of us to be governed only by our consent, which we may freely give. Living by democracy is thus one of our “inalienable” rights.

Now to the satisfactions that democracy may bring. I like to be able to speak my mind, which no system other than democracy is obligated to allow. Democracy is a civilising experience in that it requires us to resolve issues through discussion and debate, show respect and listen to each other in the process, tolerate diversity of beliefs and opinions, concede merit where it is to be found even if it be in an opponent’s position, engage in give and take in settling matters, and settle them without resort to force.

Absolutism has no place in democracy, which allows doubt, scepticism, disagreements, and freedom of enquiry without which no advance in knowledge and civilisation is possible. Democracy and man’s progress to higher levels of productive and humane living would seem to go together.

That is why I cherish democracy, not because it can be relied upon to solve all of the world’s problems.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, US.
E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

Apostasy law and its hazards

A MATRIMONIAL drama revolving around religious belief was recently played out in a Peshawar court when a husband renounced his Christian faith to become a Muslim to win back his runaway wife and a mother of two.

She too was a Christian but had converted to Islam earlier to elope with a Muslim youth, reasoning that she no longer found it possible to live with a non-Muslim. The marriage vows were instantly exchanged the Islamic way in the courtroom to reunite Christian Rani and Emmanuel as Muslim Fatima and Abdullah.

During the proceedings, as reported in this paper, the counsel for the jilted husband conceded, and the presiding judge approved, that it was “his (Emmanuel’s) fundamental right to adopt a religion of his choice and if he wished to embrace Islam nobody could stop him from doing that.”

Now, imagine for a moment that the actors in this drama were Muslims renouncing their faith to become Christians and if the doctrinaire movers of the apostasy bill – Qazi Husain Ahmad and Maulana Fazlur Rehman – had their way, the couple instead of celebrating their reunion would have been awaiting execution in a death cell.

The Peshawar courtroom drama has raised some issues relating to individual belief which our clerics and lawmakers must earnestly contemplate. When Emmanuel told the court that he was instantly willing to become a Muslim, whispers must have gone round the courtroom, and those reading the news report later also must have tended to believe, that he was converting not because the truth of the Islamic faith had suddenly dawned on him but to get back his wife. And his wife Rani too had earlier renounced Christianity and declared herself a Muslim only to marry a Muslim youth she fancied.

The judge deserves a lot of kudos for not questioning the sincerity of intention or honesty of Emmanuel in converting to Islam, for that was beyond his authority and lay in the domain of God alone. This principle fundamental to faith was underlined by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) himself when Usama bin Zaid, while chasing a maurading tribe of infidels, overpowered one of them and slew him despite his reciting aloud La Iillaha Ilallah – no one is worthy of worship but Allah.

On return to Madina when Usama narrated his feat to the Holy Prophet he disapproved the killing of the man after he had pronounced belief in the oneness of God. When Usama submitted that it was the fear of death and not genuine conviction that had prompted the infidel, the Holy Prophet’s observation laid down a rule of faith for all times to come.

He said and repeated it more than once in anguish that Usama couldn’t be the judge of what was in the heart of the dying man. The authenticity of this incident and decree of the Holy Prophet implying that Usama should have believed what the dying man had said and spared his life is borne out both by the Bukhari and Muslim texts.

The second, and more fundamental, principle concerning religious belief that the Peshawar court proceedings highlighted is well set out in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”

Pakistan is a signatory to this declaration and thus is bound to honour it. But this is just a worldly commitment which can be flouted and many countries indeed do. In the Holy Quran which is a comprehensive guide for all of mankind for all times there is no text, no verse nor a single word that suggests secular punishment – political or administrative – for repudiating Islam, called apostasy, which is the subject matter of the bill now lying with the National Assembly’s select committee.

The apostates were indeed punished in the times of the Holy Prophet and after him but for murder or armed rebellion which they would have been even if there had been no question of apostasy. The duty that the Quran assigns to the Holy Prophet is to preach and deliver the divine message to those who go astray or “turn away”. Punishing them is a divine prerogative.

This principle is set out in Sura Yunus: “Say, O people, the Truth has indeed come to you from your Lord; so whoever goes aright, goes aright only for the good of his own soul; and whoever errs, errs only against it. And I am not a custodian over you.” And again in Sura Kahf: “Say, the Truth is from your Lord. Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it): For the wrongdoers We have prepared a Fire---”. So are there many more verses.

Islam being a religion in perfect accord with human nature establishes ideal standards of freedom of conscience and belief which impose no compulsion nor permit any. It is the business of man to tread along that path of his own free will or to turn away.

There is, and has always been, a school of thought which going by its own interpretation of the Quranic text and opinion of some latter day jurists insists that the Muslims who adjure their faith must die. Those who are born Muslim are not free to change their religion nor can the converts return to their original faith. Thus if Abdullah and Fatima were now to retract their penalty would be death.

The religious leaders in Pakistan’s parliament who have sponsored the apostasy bill, quite obviously, belong to this school but their motive is seemingly political. The instances of Muslims changing their religion are very rare and certainly there is no trend that death penalty may have to be legislated to check it.

As the elections approach, the religious parties are indeed keen to increase their vote bank beyond the present 10 per cent by appearing as defenders of Islam when they find their constituency shrinking under pressure of the growing modernist class on the one side and, on the other, the combative clerics (the Lal Masjid variety) and armed lashkars in the tribal area disowning not just the authority of the government but the laws of parliament as well.

The general body of the country’s legislators realising the grave risks inherent in the apostasy bill must unite to oppose it cutting across party lines. The bill should not even be debated leave alone enacted into law. The provisions of this bill would be open to much greater abuse than the blasphemy law has been. It would give the police and the clergy an instrument to persecute liberal thinkers and dissenters to deprive them of their liberty and livelihood.

Since apostasy as such is not a problem, all arguments and laws in the course of time are bound to relapse into ‘takfir’, or the declaration of judgment of ‘kufr’, which has been and continues to be a favourite pastime of our clerics. They will revel in it all the more but at the cost of lives lost to sectarian violence and the savage image of the country.