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KARACHI, April 6: Established in an effort to emulate Lahore’s Mujahid Force, Karachi’s Muhafiz Force is in its eighth month of operation but lags far behind its role model in terms of effectiveness and human/technical resources.
Little can be said of its performance during the past seven months other than the fact that the force made a few arrests and was responsible for the recent killing – the first to its credit – of a bandit and the arrest of his accomplice in an encounter in the New Town area.
The brainchild of former Inspector General (IG) Sindh, Capt (retd) Ziaul Hasan Khan, Muhafiz Force was formally launched on September 18 last year. It is under specific instructions to limit itself to maintaining a physical presence on the city’s streets, the assumption being that this would act as deterrence against crime. “While it may not itself eliminate crime,” observed an officer, “at the very least, the mere presence of a Muhafiz Force vehicle helps shift crime from one place to another.”
Nevertheless, no credible yardstick is available to ascertain the force’s deterrence value and the figures concerning street crimes imply that the deterrence principle is not working.
Unprofessional staff, poor resources
The 600 personnel of the Muhafiz Force were culled from the Sindh Reserve Force with some proportion of the men drawn from various police stations.
Pointing out that the Sindh Reserve Force is notorious for its reputation of being ill-disciplined, sources raised questions about the professionalism of the men comprising the Muhafiz Force. These suspicions were borne out to some extent by the SP of one of Karachi’s 18 towns, who told Dawn on the condition of anonymity that he surrendered his worst men when personnel were being requisitioned at the time of the Muhafiz Force’s formation. There are thus indications that the force comprises a mix of the worst of police station personnel and those of the Sindh Reserve Force.
Sources close to the force complained that a sizeable strength of the Muhafiz personnel was not able to perform their drill correctly. “Some of the men cannot even salute properly and many are unaware of the basics of drill techniques,” they told Dawn. “Whether these men can handle weapons properly is anybody’s guess.”
The efficient functioning of the Muhafiz Force is also hampered by few resources it has at its disposal.
The fuel quota for each of the force’s mobile is merely nine litres a day, within which it must negotiate its movement in the city. When running short of fuel, drivers have little choice but to park their mobile whilst on duty in order to ensure that there will be enough fuel to make it back to the base at the end of the shift, sources pointed out.
While the lack of funds is a compliant often heard from police stations across the country, unlike station house officers and other staff posted at police stations, the personnel of the Muhafiz Force are not in a position to be able to generate finances through their ‘own resources’ as is the practice in police stations. Nevertheless, observed sources, there are always opportunities that can be exploited.
The Muhafiz Force also lacks a dedicated police station and in case of making an arrest, the force’s personnel are supposed to hand the suspect over to the relevant area police station.
Administrative confusion
Meanwhile, there are growing numbers of reports that citizens are becoming confused between the Muhafiz Force mobiles and those of the city district government’s community police, since both types of vehicles are of the same colour and carry a similar logo.
Recently, for example, some citizens put in a complaint at the Muhafiz Force’s base in Hasan Square that one of the force’s vehicles had been involved in a crime.
The force organised an identification parade but the complainants were unable to identify any of the personnel as having been involved in the crime.
“They complained that at the time the crime took place, six personnel had been seated in the rear of the vehicle but the Muhafiz Force seats only three men in the back, accompanied by an officer and driver in the mobile’s cabin,” explained an officer of the Muhafiz Force. “Following an inquiry, it was established that the Muhafiz Force had not been involved in that particular crime,” reported sources.
Since the Muhafiz Force was the brainchild of the former Sindh IG, it may not be on the current provincial police chief’s priority list, said sources, citing the example of the police helpline ‘15’, which is at it lowest ebb following the transfer of Syed Kamal Shah who was involved in its set-up.
The fact nevertheless remains that though Lahore has about one-third the population of Karachi, the Mujahid Force was launched with a 100-mobile strength during the tenure of Ziaul Hasan Khan when he was the Provincial Police Officer (PPO) Punjab.
In Karachi, however, the Muhafiz Force was launched with a 50-mobile strength though a spokesperson for the former IG claimed at the time that the number of vehicles was intended to be increased up to 200. Sources told Dawn that nearly two dozen new mobiles are currently parked idle at the Muhafiz base for the want of manpower.
A senior officer expressed the fear that following the formation of the new provincial government, some of the Muhafiz Force mobiles may end up performing escort duties for politicians. He said that the withdrawal of personnel from politicians in the past government was already proving an uphill task so far.
