“To talk about independence is a cruel joke on the people of Pakistan. Its rulers have reduced the country to the lowest form of slavery.”

— Zia Sarhadi, Muslimedia.

PAKISTAN pawned away its independence to the United States just about a fortnight after it became ‘independent’. The move was purely voluntary like Faust going to Mephistopheles to ask his favours.

Curiously, instead of the foreign minister or the defence minister, it was the then finance minister, Ghulam Mohammad, who met the US charge d’affaires in Karachi in Sept 1947 and asked for military assistance. According to the latter’s signal to the secretary of state, George Marshall, the next day, Ghulam Mohammad spun a lot of rigmarole such as that the onus was on Pakistan now to defend India against an expected Soviet onslaught!

Since then, Pakistan has slid ever deeper into the bottomless pit of dependence. The inventory is very well known. Cento, Seato, Badaber, the claim of being the ‘most allied ally’, fighting a proxy war against the USSR, earning the remark “I’m sure the people over there will turn in their mothers for $20,000, let alone two million dollars” from Aimal Kasi’s prosecutor Robert Horan, and the dog cartoon in the Washington Times complimenting the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and other American preys are just a few examples of Pakistan’s voluntary surrender of its independence.

Where is sovereignty when US drones and even ground troops ravage the sanctity of our soil every other day? Where is independence when even Pakistan’s domestic policy has to be tailored to US wishes, although following its dictates has led to a civil war-like situation in part of the country? Pakistani troops are pitted against their own brethren. Their deaths in America’s phony war on terror have been second in number only to America’s. Yet Pakistan does not enjoy the second place of honour which, instead, goes to its Anglo-Saxon cousin, Britain. The poodle is coddled; the Rottweiler, who actually delivers, is kicked.

The US agrees that economic development in the tribal areas is essential to wean terrorists away from crime. It is also axiomatic that peace is a pre-requisite for any economic uplift. Yet, when the new government, elected with massive popular mandate, decided to engage with the militants in order to restore peace, America got jittery, saying it was ‘concerned’. To sabotage peace negotiations, the US even carried out a missile attack on Pakistani territory last month.

Ambassador Anne Patterson flutters frenetically between Zardari and Sharif; kibitzing, admonishing, advising Gen Petraeus, who is to take over the Centcom command shortly, the other day “endorsed a US intelligence assessment that the next 9/11-type attack on US soil would come from Al Qaeda bases in Pakistan’s tribal region…” at a Senate Armed Committee briefing.

And Daniel Markey, a former US State Department specialist on South Asia, gloated in an interview about the current negotiations between the Pakistan government and militants: “One of the differences is that this time the Pakistani army has really moved into the area in force and enforced an economic blockade against Mehsud tribes before starting negotiations,” adding, “It has inflicted various punishments on some of the tribal villages to demonstrate that the army, in fact, has the upper hand.”

Americans may write the most outrageous things against President Bush. The Canadians may call them names. Yet, when Dr Shireen Mazari wrote a couple of articles critical of Uncle Sam she was abruptly removed from her office as director of strategic studies at one quiet signal from the latter.

What is true of the country is also true of its judiciary. Therefore, when deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry said the other day while addressing Karachi lawyers, “We would not have seen this day had our judiciary not supported unconstitutional steps taken by dictatorial regimes in the Zafar Ali Shah case and on other occasions,” he was stating the obvious.

The rot started with Chief Justice Munir, when he validated Ghulam Mohammad’s arbitrary dismissal of Khwaja Nazimuddin. It was a case of voluntary abdication of judicial independence, because, GM was not a military dictator. Nor was there any evidence that he had exercised pressure on the chief justice.

These examples are proof simplicitur that independence is a state of mind. Iftikhar Chaudhry exercised it. Others abdicated or willingly compromised it. Although they legitimised coups etc., they could have taken action in other fields to protect national interests and give relief to the helpless like Mr Chaudhry did.

Seen in this context, the ongoing agitation about an ‘independent judiciary’ would appear totally misleading. That Mr Chaudhry’s reinstatement deserves unqualified support is, of course, beyond question, because his removal was a case of blatant abuse of authority by Gen Musharraf. But to treat it as synonymous with judicial independence is sheer hokum and a cruel joke.

Mr Chaudhry may be an exemplar of judicial independence. But, first, the attitude is personal to him. There is no guarantee that all judges would henceforward cast themselves into his mould. History is witness that not even the greatest leaders, prophets included — have been followed literally by their disciples.

Second, Mr Chaudhry’s display of ‘independence’ has been Musharraf-specific. The big question is, will he, (indeed, can he) demonstrate the same ‘independence’ vis-à-vis Nawaz Sharif, who has staked his political power to resurrect him and who can send ruffians to chase a too-independent chief justice out of office?

The plain truth, therefore, is that the current agitation is actually not so much for ‘judicial independence’ as it is a vent for the seething anger against Musharraf. It is a fig leaf for vendetta. And it is not Nawaz Sharif only who is obsessed with settling scores. There are others as well, equally aggrieved. Even the media is after him, tooth and claw, to avenge the draconian restrictions he imposed on its freedom on Nov 3.

THE neocons backed the decision to invade Iraq, depose Saddam Hussein and unfurl American political values and systems over the Arab world. Five years later, their failure is nothing short of spectacular. Most neocons have been swept into oblivion.

The stalwarts of yesterday include Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Paul Bremer who were in the heart of the Bush administration. Behind them are the fallen intellectuals who egged them on, such as Normon Podhoretz, William Kristol, Robert Kagan and Charles Krauthammer.

Only one neocon has been left standing: Francis Fukuyama who teaches at Johns Hopkins University. His career began at Rand where he penned an analytical report about the Soviet-Afghan war based on a field visit to the NWFP.

Fukuyama rose to prominence in 1992 with a book that extolled the end of communism, The End of History and the Last Man. Two years ago, he wrote America at the Crossroads. In this masterpiece, he shows that the Iraq war betrayed neocon principles.

The war was fought on seven false premises. First, Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Second, Iraq was connected with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Third, it posed an existential threat to the US. Fourth, that US troop levels would be reduced to 60,000 in six months after the invasion.

Because of the hype created by the victory over Saddam Hussein’s ragtag army, President Bush appeared atop the floating deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln in May 2003 under a big ‘Mission Accomplished’ banner. Vice President Dick Cheney went on the talk show circuit to say that US troops would be greeted as liberators by the Iraqis, evoking the imagery of Allied troops being greeted with flowers and kisses by Parisians in 1945.

The fifth premise was that the transition to post-Saddam Iraq would be relatively painless, like that in Japan and Germany after the Second World War. In the heat of advocacy, the neocons forgot that a fundamental tenet of their movement was that social engineering was a high-risk endeavour. Japan and Germany had viable political institutions before the dictatorial interventions that plunged them into war. Iraq had none.

Sixth, radical Islam posed a serious threat to world peace and the best place to decimate it was in Iraq, which was claimed to be the central battleground in the war on terror. The Bush administration conflated the jihadis, who were a post-Gulf War creation, with Arab nationalists like Saddam Hussein who were a post-colonial creation.

The neocons theorised that the terrorist problem was due to religion or culture. This was plain wrong and glossed over important political, sectarian and social distinctions within the Muslim world.

Fukuyama argues that the West is fighting a relatively small number of fanatics sheltering behind a larger group of sympathisers in a counterinsurgency that has spread around the globe. Thus, as argued by others such as Sir Michael Howard, an exclusively military response to this challenge is inappropriate, “since counterinsurgency wars are deeply political and dependent on winning the hearts and minds of the broader population from the beginning”.Seventh, the world would accept the preventive war doctrine on which the invasion of Iraq was predicated. When it became obvious that world opinion was strongly opposed to the war, they dismissed it as misguided and irrelevant.

Not surprisingly, the world was appalled that the US had given itself a right that it was unwilling to grant other nations. It was not simply asserting a right to engage in a pre-emptive war to ward off an imminent attack but a right to engage in a war against a threat that had not yet materialised from a remote corner of the globe.

In the 19th century, the great German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had dismissed the notion of a preventive war, saying its logic was on a par with “committing suicide for fear of death”.

Looking at the future, Fukuyama calls for a radical change in American foreign policy. The new approach would dispense with the rhetoric about the Fourth World War and the global war on terror which overstates the problem and suggests that the US is taking on the entire Muslim world.

He notes, “Before the Iraq War, there were probably a few thousand jihadis willing to cause nihilistic damage to the US.” Now there are several times that number.

He does not call upon the US to withdraw from world affairs. As the world’s richest and most powerful nation, the US cannot walk away from helping the world solve its political and economic problems. It should care about what happens inside other states. However, it should not expect instant results.

The new focus should be on the development of institutions which takes time and requires patience. Moreover, it is not possible to achieve reform from the outside. To be sustainable, it has to originate from the inside.

Fukuyama’s advice is spot-on for future US policy towards pivotal states such as Pakistan. Since 1954, the US has spent billions on the Pakistani military and almost nothing on the development of civilian institutions. The failure is evident for all to see.

Fukuyama has clearly distanced himself from the rest of the neocons who continue to blind the White House from reality. Speaking to 17,000 troops at Fort Bragg last week, President Bush said, “The terrorists and extremists are on the run, and we are on our way to victory.” And presumptive Republican presidential nominee, John McCain, has forecast that victory will be achieved in the year 2013.

Strategic myopia is writ large on the apocalyptic vision of the neocons. If they had digested Fukuyama’s sage counsel, they would not have stayed on the same disastrous course two years later.

When a new administration takes over the White House in January, it should tell the world that the hubris-laden doctrine of American Exceptionalism has been put to rest. America will no longer set itself on a higher plane from all other nations and call itself exempt from the international laws that apply to other countries.

Just as the US constitution calls for checks and balances in the exercise of power domestically, the smooth flowing of order around the globe also calls for a similar system of checks and balances. If unbridled power is corrupting domestically, why would it not be corrupting internationally?

The writer is an associate of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford.

faruqui@pacbell.net

THE refrain that we hear ad nauseum from representatives of the previous government is that the primary reasons for the persistently high rate of domestic inflation are exogenous — and hence beyond the control of the government.

Inflation has crossed 17 per cent overall in recent weeks (with food inflation touching 30 per cent for the lowest income groups). It has been attributed mainly to the relentless climb in the international price of oil and commodities (particularly food grains).

While the fast-changing international environment is a major factor underlying the rapid increase in prices at home, the above claim is only a partial reflection of the truth. The global scene coincidentally provides a convenient camouflage for the huge contribution to inflation of unrepentant government profligacy, well beyond the resources available to it to finance its spending spree.

We find ourselves in these dire straits largely because of the last four years of outlandish extravagance, particularly on less, if not non-productive, activities, operations and schemes, and not simply because of the low tax to GDP ratio as is being widely argued. The best illustration of this is the $1.2bn spent on Swedish AWACS while the rest of the country was trying to come to grips with the havoc and human tragedy caused by the earthquake in 2005.

It is important to understand this since the full impact of, for instance, the oil price rise has not been passed on to the consumers. And when petrol prices are revised upwards sharply, the first round effects are going to be politically arduous to handle as they take a heavy toll on the purchasing capacity of consumer households.

Federal government expenditures have been rattling along at more than 23 per cent per annum since 2004 compared with a much more subdued growth in tax revenues at 13 per cent per annum. A mammoth chunk of this gap has been financed by direct borrowings at zero rates of interest from the State Bank. This is akin to printing money, the most inflationary way of spending more than one’s earnings and easily the worst form of taxing the poor who have no assets to shield them from the ensuing inflation. These direct borrowings from the State Bank for this year have now crossed Rs500bn.

The financing of the government’s budgetary deficit, the excess private consumption demand (beyond domestic productive capacity) and the enormous gap of 33 per cent between domestic investment and domestic savings, that was earlier being financed from relatively cheap foreign funds and privatisation proceeds, is now reflecting itself in the massive size of the external trade deficit. This is close to $17bn and is getting translated into an external current account deficit of $12bn. This gap has become so large that this year, with fewer sources to bridge it, there has been a drawdown of reserves rendering them barely able to finance three months’ imports, prompting capital flight and putting the rupee under additional stress.

Fiscal dominance has been the key contributor to the loose monetary policy followed by the State Bank for far too long. This is now extracting a colossal price in the shape of inflation that has made deep inroads into the buying power of households and the mileage that they can extract from their disposable incomes.

So how do we address these seemingly insurmountable imbalances? The set of measures required will have to be aimed essentially at reducing demand to bridge the gaps referred to above, and will have to be adhered to with dogged determination as the growth rate will be lower over this period of adjustment, resulting in the creation of fewer employment opportunities. This will put the political will to severe test over the next two years, especially when it comes to tackling the highly vocal urban middle and upper income groups.

a) The administrative measures to discourage/curtail the import bill could include:

(i) a regulatory duty on imports (ranging from 10 per cent for most general imports to 30 per cent on luxury items) for a period of six to eight months before complaints to the WTO force us to roll them back.

(ii) L/C related margins (the State Bank has already stepped in by invoking the requirement for a 35 per cent margin).

b) Arranging financing of three to five billion dollars to shore up foreign exchange reserves. This is required essentially to discourage capital flight and check, say, those withholding export receipts in anticipation of a further drop in the value of the rupee.

c) Sharply trimming the budget deficit mainly through expenditure reduction and controls and some resource mobilisation (relying much more strongly on more effective enforcement). The cuts in expenditure need to come from i) a thorough review of the development programme and its pruning; ii) reduction in defence expenditure (now $34 per capita as against only $23 per capita on education and health combined); and iii) the phasing out of subsidies (more quickly for the higher income groups) on electricity, air travel (PIA), oil, research and development grants for industry and fertilisers. Meanwhile, additional tax revenues should be mobilised by the withdrawal of income tax and general sales tax exemptions presently available to some sectors (services still outside the sales tax net) or sources of income (agriculture) and the imposition of, say, capital gains taxes or increase in taxes on transactions in properties and quoted shares.

The reduction in the deficit and thereby in government borrowings will gradually bring down interest rates and the cost of funds for the private sector, stimulating investment and economic growth.

This will have to be combined with further monetary tightening — an increase in interest rates beyond the too little, too late effort of the State Bank last week. This will unfortunately dampen the economy’s growth in the short to medium term, but then, there is a price to be paid for this unbridled recklessness.

This unavoidable strategy for achieving macroeconomic stability will certainly test the political resolve of the government to distribute the associated pain fairly among different segments of the population, based on their ability to bear it. Especially as the general subsidies on petrol and electricity are phased out — the latter, say, by eliminating the subsidies on consumers of more units quicker, while simultaneously raising the lifeline units consumed by the less well-to-do, who would be eligible for the subsidy for the next two years or so.

In the meanwhile, given the urgency of the situation, there is a need to develop instruments and mechanisms for at least Rs100bn to be spent on the protection and support of the poorest 10m households living below or hovering around the poverty line, whose mere survival has become difficult with the rise in the cost of food, energy and transportation. The approach adopted on how, and the pace at which, to burden the different income groups with the cost of adjustment would be critical if the already frayed social harmony is not to be disrupted further.

GAZING briefly at the Eurovision song contest this week I could not rid my mind of a quite different image, that of Nato’s multilateral force headquarters in Kabul.

There was the same flag-waving and confusion of purpose, the same small-state rivalry and cynical balancing of interests. There was the same belief that, simply by being international, a so-called community of nations was forged.

Today the word “international” suggests tailored suits, tax-free salaries, white Land Cruisers and Geneva. The Eurovision contest is run by the European Broadcasting Union with 400 staff in Switzerland, with no risk of oversight or reform.

It may seem crude to leap from such mundane activities to world peace, but the ruling assumption is the same, that internationalism legitimises itself. It rises above (never below) the nation state and its rulemakers owe allegiance only to an ideal of global community, which means whatever they choose. The ever-more numerous world bodies to which nations subscribe need never pass the eye of any national audit Office.

It was only when America briefly withdrew from Unesco and capped its contribution to the UN that steps were taken to curb that organisation’s waste and corruption, which culminated in Kofi Annan’s obscene 2000 “poverty summit”. The only good thing to emerge from the warped brain of America’s former UN ambassador, John Bolton, was his reform package, and he blew it. Nor can Europe talk. The EU still cannot get its accounts past any reputable auditor nor control the outrageous expenses of its parliamentarians.

This laxity turned to ghoulishness when Save the Children last week revealed the atrocities against women and children committed by UN peacekeeping troops in Africa. Soldiers thought that the sacred carapace of the blue beret put them beyond ordinary jurisdiction.

We are all still hardwired to treat international as a good thing. In the process we have abandoned the constitutionalism and accountability that should govern any form of government if it is not to run amok.

It took the UN three weeks just to visit Burma, despite the clear threat to humanity of the regime’s response to the cyclone. Meanwhile an American relief convoy is still sitting inert offshore.

In the London-based Guardian earlier this week, the former UN undersecretary, Shashi Tharoor, rang an alarm over the emergence in America of a demand for a “league of democracies,” substituting for the UN’s globalised inertia. Proposed, by left and right alike, is a coalition of the voting classes, somehow defined and clearly under the leadership of America, to stand out against the half of the world still in the grip of authoritarianism.

Tharoor argued cogently that this would be a regressive move. Excluding China and Russia and polarising the world into goodies and baddies was not the way to get things done.

A league of democracies would soon turn into another G8, Council of Europe or Nato political committee.

The Americans are right, that if you want something done in the world, get a nation to do it, not an inter-nation. I may be opposed to both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is a significant difference between them noticeable to any visitor to their capitals. In Baghdad, America is unmistakably in charge and the world follows. There is a clear line of command that leads, however misguidedly, to Washington. Things get done.

Afghanistan is the opposite, the embodiment of Tharoor’s globalism in practice. Some 30 nations piled into Kabul after 2001, under the banners of Nato and the UN. There was and remains no coherence. Yet because the “international community” has given Afghanistan its blessing, the intervention must be benign. It is the ultimate feelgood war.

Some of the best people I know have struggled to do good abroad. Thus there are worthy campaigners for a global rule of law, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, but they are let down by the longwinded international court in The Hague.

No organisation has a right to live forever purely for being international. Yet such are the bureaucrats who crowd Geneva’s nameplate-land, with no more accountability than their neighbours, the Swiss banks. And they grow incessantly.

Until internationalism can acquire a more robust accountability, there will be more Burmas and more Iraqs.

—The Guardian, London