Wounds heal, scars remain

IT was a conflagration — the emergency imposed by Mrs Indira Gandhi in June 33 years ago. In 19 months, the period for which it lasted, every institution got scarred.

The constitution was mutilated. Personal freedom was forfeited. The press was gagged. The judiciary was shackled. Parliament had its tenure extended. The largest democracy in the world put more than 100,000 people under detention without trial. And, as the then attorney general said, the state could kill anyone with impunity.

The institutions have regained their health but the scars are still visible. What has probably been lost for ever is the people’s sensitivity. They do not react to the abuse of power. I thought that those brutalities would never revisit the country. I see all of them coming back with a vengeance: false encounter killings, custodial deaths, kidnappings, violations of human rights and detentions under the security law.

What has probably happened to the people is that once Mrs Gandhi wiped out the thin line dividing right from wrong, moral from immoral they do not mind or feel where they stand. There is no compunction in hitting below the belt or committing even the gravest wrong. In fact, the wrong itself has undergone a change in meaning. It has become a relative term.

The Manmohan Singh government has five ministers whose hands are tainted with the excesses committed during the emergency. They are: Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Commerce Minister Kamal Nath, Law Minister H.R. Bhardwaj, Minister for Heavy Industries Santosh Mohan Dev and Tourism Minister Ambika Soni. They should quit giving face to morality and ethics.

The judiciary has been the biggest casualty. Mrs Gandhi transferred 16 judges. President Pervez Musharraf when he clamped the emergency in Pakistan dismissed some 60 of them. But there had to be a difference between a military dictator and a civil dictator. Judges in India were restored to their positions. But in Pakistan the dismissed judges have become victims to the politics of behind-the-scenes bargains.

The Shah Commission which went into the excesses during the emergency in India warned: “The state owes it to the nation to assure that this vital limb (the judiciary) of the government will not be subjected to strains which might even indirectly operate as punitive.” But this has had little effect. Chief justices in India are vying with each other to oblige the government on transfers or, for that matter, appointments. Judgments are generally at the asking. The highfalutin phrases like the independence of the judiciary are primarily on paper. Corruption was inevitable once the standards came to be compromised.

Mrs Gandhi regretted ‘certain mistakes’, but never the emergency and brought back the officers who were instruments of tyranny during her rule. Not only did she punish those who had pursued cases of excesses against her and her son Sanjay Gandhi, who was an extra-constitutional authority, she divided the bureaucracy into ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’. The civil service is now a set of sycophants and supplicants who allow themselves to be used by politicians. There was one Sanjay Gandhi at the centre then. Now every state has a chief minister’s son or a nephew emulating him.

And it was no surprise that she threw out even the recommendations by the National Police Commission to reform the force because the police were used by her indiscriminately. She preferred to stay with the Indian police system, structured on an Act of 1861 and rejected the draft bill which the Police Commission had recommended to release the force from the stranglehold of politicians.

Since the baby was thrown out with the bathtub, even the recommendations to make police accountable were not implemented. The Supreme Court has picked up the thread and made it obligatory for states to implement the recommendations. The states have not done so. What is seen in Kashmir, the northeast or elsewhere in the country is a cumulative effect of unbridled authority given to the force. It does not know, much less cares about normal, acceptable methods to deal with a situation.

The IB and CBI are loaded with assignments which are not really theirs. Keeping track of opposition leaders and critics of the government, intercepting their mail and taping their telephones is not what the two agencies should be doing.

The worst fallout of the emergency has been that the public servants have invariably become an instrument in the hands of ministers at the centre and in the states. The ethical considerations inherent in public behaviour have become generally dim and in many cases beyond the mental grasp of many of the public functionaries. Desire for self-preservation has become the sole motivation for their action and behaviour.

Manmohan Singh who has been a top civil servant should have devised some steps to retrieve them. Anxiety to survive at any cost forms the keynote of approach to the problems that come before public servants. The training academies live in an ivory tower because their elitist approach makes them too distant from the aam aadmi (common man). It should be obligatory for the trainees to work with NGOs at the grassroots. They may learn, if not imbibe, the qualities of humility which officials lack.

And there has to be a mechanism to punish the errant civil servants. None was even demoted or sacked for deliberately flouting laws and harassing those who were against the emergency. Some of them occupy key positions today: N.K. Chawla, the hatchet man and Lt. Governor Kishen Chand is a member of the Union Election Commission.

The journalists’ role was pathetic. They were afraid to join issue with the government. L.K. Advani said aptly: You were asked to bend and you began to crawl. In contrast, the Pakistani media came out on the streets when restrictions were imposed on the telecast of the lawyers’ agitation.

True, at present, there is no visible dictation in India. But it looks as if it is not necessary. The different pieces are beginning to fall into place without anyone making an effort. Already there is a tendency to go along and not to question. If without the emergency people start ‘behaving’ there is something wrong with the system. Once the desire to act according to what is right goes, there may be no realisation of what is wrong. This is precisely what is happening.

The writer is a leading journalist based in Delhi.

Is it transparent now?

THE new government has made the defence budget relatively transparent. The new defence budget now discloses expenditure on personnel, operations and assets. It also contains service-wise breakup.

Although the disclosure is still not perfect and a lot of people expect more details, the availability of some information as compared to the one-line budget of the past is an essential first step.

It shows that the new military leadership had realised that it could not improve the organisation’s image without making some basic concessions including relative transparency of its spending.

How far the appetite for greater information will be satisfied will depend on this — and the successive — government’s ability to capitalise upon this opportunity to expand its power vis-à-vis the armed forces.

Broadly speaking, there are two patterns of transparency in military expenditure. The first relates to the Nato definition of defence spending which clearly specifies that it would include all activities, even those in the civilian sector and by para-military forces, which are designed to strengthen the military’s capability.

The Nato classification includes pension, defence industry, special projects and all other defence related spending.

The other pattern relates to the Indian definition of the defence budget that provides certain amount of details but does not meet the Nato definition. The Indian budget gives breakdowns for the three services and also figures of annual capital expenditure versus operations spending. Since there is no hard and fast rule about what each country will reveal, Pakistan seems to have followed the latter approach. This pattern represents the via media between civilian demand for greater information and

the military’s sensitivity for some amount of secrecy.

It could be argued that it is not impossible to follow the US and British pattern of disclosure of defence estimates, but given the colonial nature of the military institution, the figures which have been provided now are better than the complete opacity of the past.

This transparency is a historic milestone on, hopefully, what will turn out to be a road to greater transparency and better civilian control of the defence sector. Improved civilian authority over the armed forces is a corollary of greater transparency and vice versa.

A more confident civilian government means the one which makes the military and the country at large confident of its ability to deliver and govern the state. In Pakistan’s historical context, the military is a political force to reckon with and it would have to be convinced of the ability of the political dispensation to govern the country to cooperate more.

A glance at the recently released budgetary figure of Rs295.306bn shows that the armed forces are spending 34 per cent on personnel, 28 per cent on operations, 4.1 per cent on travel, 29.7 percent on physical assets (meaning weapons), 8.7 per cent on civil works and 23.9 per cent goes on general expenditure.

The service-wise breakdown is 43 per cent is the army’s share, 24 per cent is for the air force, and 9.8 per cent for the navy and 22.5 per cent goes to inter-services and defence production institutions. The teeth-to-tail ratio appears negative.

The defence budget does not include approximately Rs45bn in military pensions nor does it necessarily disclose off-budget financing. There are definitional issues as well such as where to classify retired military personnel that continue to work in civilian departments whose pay and personnel cost is not charged to the defence budget. Then there are other expenses incurred by the civilian local governments on behalf of military establishments or in cantonment areas which does not show up as part of military expenditure.

One could go on and on with details of where the lines between military and civilian spending are fuzzy. Tabulating all such figures we could reach a total of Rs350-360bn. This does not mention the spending on the nuclear programme, not all of which can be found in this more transparent defence budgetary figure.

But let’s not complain about the current level of transparency. The greater problem is with the other claim regarding the possible reduction of defence spending which cannot happen due to the following reasons. First, the current configuration of the military does not allow for a substantial reduction of the military’s long-term liabilities such as personnel cost. A noticeable reduction can happen in two situations: (a) a unilateral decision by Pakistan (within a regional arms control framework) to disarm and (b) change the structure of the military by making it less labour intensive and more capital intensive.

These are serious political decisions which cannot be taken until the government is stable and the Defence Cabinet Committee of the Parliament (DCC) is strong enough to make such decisions.

Second, currently the DCC depends upon the military for input. The 22 parliamentary committees, which were formed during the 1970s as a result of ‘higher defence re-organisation’ of the Bhutto days, do not have a system whereby independent opinion is sought to corroborate the information provided by the military intelligence services and the service headquarters.

For example, during the 1980s, the air and naval headquarters had played up external threat to force the government to allow the services to buy a certain category of French missiles. Since the government then did not have an alternative source of information, it gave in to the demands. The present parliament could either encourage a system of lobbying by various stakeholders as happens in the US or allow for the streamlining of the defence bureaucracy for better information.

This brings me to the third issue of the lack of capacity of the existing Ministry of Defence (MoD). Over the years, the MoD has become impotent due to its militarisation and lack of expertise. The MoD should be manned by experts who know management of defence. This means training of bureaucrats and bringing in outside experts. The Pakistani civilian bureaucrats, especially of the MoD, are no comparison to their more powerful counterparts in India.

The appointment of military officers in key positions in the ministry has completely weakened the ability of the civilian bureaucrats to deliver. An under-capacitated MoD bureaucracy cannot reduce the wastage in the defence budget which is estimated to be over 20 per cent. This means that we cannot have reduction in the short or medium terms.

Fourth, accountability is a crucial factor. There are structural flaws in the military’s accounting and auditing system which currently encourages wastage.

Finally, given the military’s existing plans to carry out military modernisation, it does not seem that immediate defence burden will reduce substantially in the short to medium term. Thus, a short-term suggestion one could offer the existing parliament is to hold a conference of experts on military expenditure and defence accountability in which international and national experts could apprise the government about how to go about its business of dealing with the defence burden. If the cat is to be belled, let it be done properly.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

A nation imprisoned

THIS month marks the 41st year of Israel’s continued occupation of the Palestinian territories. For ordinary Palestinians the occupation has turned Gaza and the West Bank into a giant prison. “[This] occupation put[s] you in a cage, a cage on your life and on your mind so you never feel safe,” says Mahmoud, an activist with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

“I’m tired of this life. People ask why I don’t smile anymore. Some say just enjoy life. One person said I’m boring because I’m always thinking about [conditions in the refugee] camps and [for] prisoners.”

One of the most under-reported features of the occupation is Israel’s widespread imprisonment of Palestinian men. Israeli officials claim that imprisonment has reduced terrorist attacks against Israel but most prisoners are never charged. Imprisonment instead acts to intimidate and paralyse Palestinian society. According to Addameer, the Palestinian prisoner rights organisation, around 40 per cent of all Palestinian men and some women have spent time in detention. The Israeli human rights organisation B’tselem reports that most Palestinian prisoners are abused before or during their detention.

“They arrested me, hit me and ordered me to take my clothes off,” recalls Rami, an English teacher from Jenin who is not involved with any political or militant organisations. “Then they handcuffed and blindfolded me, threw me in a field [and] some soldiers [started] kicking me…. They took me to a military court and I asked [the judge] what I’ve been charged with? And he said ‘I cannot tell you, it is secret.’ [After six months] I went [sic] to the court again and I got another six months [and so on].” Rami spent nearly four years in jail and was never charged.

It is striking that militants share the same experiences as civilians. “No one can describe the experience [adequately] because prison is prison,” says Faraz, a policeman who joined Islamic Jihad during an Israeli invasion of his Jenin refugee camp in September 2003. He was involved in a number of skirmishes and was eventually caught by an Israeli army dog. “The dog grabbed [sic] my arm with his jaw. I realised it would kill me so I tried to control it and get out of the house… when I left the house, [Israeli] soldiers pointed guns at me. I was bleeding a lot. Then they threw me on the ground and dragged me to another house on the street and started beating me, kicking me until I could not [sic] move…. A doctor was called because I was bleeding a lot.”

“The whole time my hands were tied behind my back, my eyes covered, legs were [also] tied together. When we arrived at the hospital the soldiers noticed their shoe marks on my shirt, on my clothes and cigarette [burns] on [my] shirt and chest so they quickly tried to clean it. I spent four hours waiting for the doctor, my hands [tied] behind me, still bleeding. They were hitting me on the face, kicking me inside the hospital, stepping on my feet. If I shouted they would [sic] beat me again [and] tell me to shut up or ‘we will keep beating you.’” Faraz spent three years in prison including 108 days in solitary confinement without ever being charged.

I recently met militants from Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. I had expected to meet firebrands but instead I encountered broken men. Most of them had spent lengthy periods in Israeli prisons. All were now seeking qualifications or employment but, with a depressed economy and no medical treatment for their trauma, a normal life is difficult.

Mohammed, a senior member of Islamic Jihad, is studying Arabic and media studies at a local university. “After jail this idea came to my mind, to join the media. This is a way of struggling too, to bring our ideas to the world, and explain our point of view.” But he cannot go to university on most days because he has no money and fears arrest at one of the checkpoints, which he must cross to reach the campus.

Palestinian militancy has greatly reduced since an unofficial ceasefire was reached with the Israeli army in 2005. According to the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, an organisation closely linked to the Israeli government, the reduction is largely due to ‘successful counterterrorist activities of the Israeli security forces’ that include the widespread detention of Palestinian men.

The centre nevertheless warns, in an article entitled ‘Anti-Israel Terrorism’, that the “motivation to carry out such attacks has been increasing.” But Israel’s characterisation of all armed actions by Palestinians as terrorism obfuscates the reality that much of it is a response to Israeli army invasions of cities or refugee camps.

“I remember the first time they invaded the camp, it was a big change for me,” says Obeid, a youthful man who had never held a gun until Israel conducted a massive invasion of Jenin in 2002. “My best friend was killed and I saw many other people die, friends and family. [Israeli] soldiers [were] roaming around the camp, destroying houses. It changed me a lot. I got affected by all [of] these things. I had to defend my home.” Obeid was 18 when he was captured and spent the next five years in prison. Due to abuse and the unhygienic prison conditions he now suffers from a stomach disease and an infection of the groin.

Even today the Israeli army invades cities like Nablus and Jenin around twice a week. The attacks typically commence when armoured Israeli vehicles penetrate deep into Palestinian neighbourhoods that are far from Israeli settlements. The invasions aim to demonstrate Israeli military muscle and intimidate the population.

“Always I am worried, I do not sleep properly,” says Ramadan, a Nablus policeman and former member of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Although no longer listed by Israel as a wanted militant, Ramadan is adamant that his life is in danger. “I could be killed or kidnapped any day, even now. One person speaks about you in the jail and they catch you.” Just two months earlier, one of Ramadan’s colleagues was assassinated by Israeli special forces at the local police department.

‘Philistini’ (not his real name), another fighter in hiding, shares Ramadan’s fears. “I am tired of this life because my kids want me at home. I need a lot of things but there is no money. I don’t know what the future holds.” His may be a sentiment shared by most Palestinians still reeling under 41 years of Israeli occupation.

Danger of conflict

THE killing of eleven Pakistani soldiers by US air and artillery strikes last week shows just how quickly the American-led war in Afghanistan is spreading into Pakistan. It also shows Washington’s growing readiness to attack old ally Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military branded the air attack ‘unprovoked and cowardly.’ However, the unstable PPP-led government, which depends on large infusions of US aid, later softened its protests. The US, which used a B-1 heavy bomber and F-15 strike aircraft in the attacks, called its action, ‘self-defence.’

In recent months, attacks by US aircraft, Predator hunter-killer drones, US Special Forces and CIA teams have been increasing steadily inside Pakistan’s Fata. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has been openly advocating major ground and air attacks by US forces into Pakistan. Pro-Israel neoconservatives in the Bush administration have been denouncing Pakistan as a ‘rogue state’ and a ‘sponsor of international terrorism,’ and are calling for US air and missile strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and reactors.

But instead of intimidating the pro-Taliban Pakistani Pashtun, limited US air strikes have ignited a firestorm of anti-western fury among Fata’s warlike tribesmen and increased their support for Taliban.

The US is emulating Britain’s colonial divide and rule tactics by offering up to $500,000 to local Pashtun tribal leaders to get them to fight pro-Taliban elements, causing more chaos in the already turbulent region, and stoking tribal rivalries. The US is using this same tactic in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Last week’s deadly US attacks again illustrate the fact that the 60,000 US and Nato ground troops in Afghanistan are incapable of even holding off Taliban and its allies, even though the Afghan resistance has nothing but small arms to battle the West’s high-tech arsenal. US air power is almost always called in when there are clashes. In fact, the US and Nato infantry’s main function is to draw Taliban into battle so the Afghan mujahidin can be bombed from the air.

Without the round the clock overhead presence of US airpower, which can respond in minutes, western forces in Afghanistan would be quickly isolated, cut off from supplies, and defeated.

But these air strikes, as we have seen in recent weeks, are blunt instruments. They kill more civilians than Taliban fighters. Mighty US B-1 bombers are not going to win the hearts and minds of Afghans. Each bombed village and massacred caravan wins new recruits to Taliban and its allies.

Now, the US and its Nato allies are edging ever closer to open warfare against Pakistan at a time when they are unable to defeat Taliban fighters due to lack of combat troops. The outgoing commander of the US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, US Gen. Dan McNeill, recently admitted he would need 400,000 soldiers to pacify that nation.

‘We just need to occupy Pakistan’s tribal territory,’ insists the Pentagon, ‘to stop its Pashtun tribes from supporting and sheltering Taliban.’ But a US-led invasion of Fata will simply push pro-Taliban Pashtun militants further into Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, drawing western troops ever deeper into Pakistan. Already overextended Western forces will be stretched even thinner, their supply lines will become more vulnerable, and clashes with Pakistan’s tough regular army may be inevitable.

Widening the Afghan war into Pakistan is military stupidity on a grand scale and political madness. But Washington and its obedient allies seem hell-bent on charging into a wider regional war that no number of heavy bombers will win. Unfortunately, the PPP-led government in Islamabad seems unable, or unwilling, to warn Washington to avoid a conflict with Pakistan that would be a disaster for both sides.

—Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2008