Tribal violence & state’s writ

IN the din of condemnation by the opposition and false hopes held out by the government, the only distinct and unanimous voice heard (the prime minister being the sole dissenter) is about the grave threat to the security of the country.

And the threat this time round is not external — not from India but from within, a part of our own country.

The situation in the north-west tribal belt and its adjoining areas is getting worse with every passing day of the new democratic government. And yet no one in authority at the centre or in the Frontier province is prepared to say when, if at all, it will get better. Our own and Afghanistan’s ‘Islamic’ warriors, joined by mercenaries from other parts of the world, have been a source of this threat for almost a quarter of a century now.

The International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) based in Afghanistan has served only to raise the level of that threat. Ironically enough, the force that America assembled to rid Afghanistan of terrorists — seen failing in that task — is now increasingly aiming its rockets at their suspected hideouts in Pakistan’s tribal territory.

Prime Minister Gilani’s comforting words for his countrymen that “Pakistan is a sovereign, independent state and no one will be allowed to strike inside its territory” sound more like a cruel joke. Isaf didn’t seek his permission before bombing tribal hamlets in Mohmand, Waziristan and Bajaur, terrorising and killing unwary inhabitants. Nor surely will it in the future if foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s meeting with Condoleezza Rice in Washington is any indication. Qureshi’s public comment after that meeting was typical of subcontinental verbosity. The talks, he said, were “frank, candid, honest and realistic.” Rice’s was terse: “there’s no meeting of minds.”

Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising that while the US has regretted the loss of civilian lives it has not apologised for intrusions into Pakistan’s territory nor has it promised greater caution in the future. On the other hand, instead of saying it themselves the Americans have made their protégé Hamid Karzai say, and say it belligerently, that the retreating terrorists will be chased and killed wherever found in Pakistan. For his threat he relies on the right of hot pursuit in war, forgetting that the two countries are not at war but waging war together, so to say, against a common enemy.

Pakistan indeed is a sovereign state — an undisputed fact that the prime minister needlessly stressed. But it is equally undisputed that Pakistan’s rule over the tribal region has always been qualified and indirect. The tribes falling on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line (demarcated in the last decade of the nineteenth century), under the terms of various treaties, by tradition and for convenience, are administered by political agents through tribal councils better known as jirgas. The tribal hierarchy has elders but no chieftains.

Through a slow, calculated process the influence of the government has been expanding but still few laws apply. Development of communications and economic stake of tribesmen in farmland, commerce and services in the settled area had, however, made some agencies more orderly and peaceful than the districts. But that was till the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan waged jihad to expel them. The emergence of the Taliban in the wake of the Soviet retreat and the events that followed have had the effect of shattering the tribal society on both sides of the border. Then, as a double whammy, came Musharraf’s reforms to shatter the tribal administration as well. Though the political agent — unlike his settled area counterpart, the deputy commissioner — has survived the reforms his authority has been severely impaired in the absence of the backing of a powerful civil service cadre. In a state of commotion the military and paramilitary commanders assumed a role that belonged to the political agent. Force thus replaced persuasion.

In a chronic war-like situation the tribal hierarchy and political administration both have all but broken down. The warriors and armed clerics with hordes of radicalised followers — local and foreign — freely roam the area and spill over into the settled districts at will.

The question now is not of enforcing the writ of the government as the politicians of Islamabad assert they will one day. The writ of the government, in the sense it is normally understood, didn’t run in the tribal territory even in the best of times. Mutual recognition of the rights of the tribes and authority of the political agent is the historical basis and still can be the only workable basis of administering the tribes.

The war on terror is an extraordinary, hopefully short-lived, activity. The normal administration of the tribes should not become a casualty to it. All that can be demanded of the tribal councils and maliks is not to harbour fighters who are not from among them.

To keep the tribes out of the war on terror, it would help if their administration were to be made a responsibility of the provincial government. The tribal agencies and the adjoining settled districts are inhabited by people who speak the same dialect, belong to the same clans and share each others’ joy and grief. The recommendation of a forum organised by an NGO (Dawn, July 16) that the tribal areas should have a council of their own (implying a legislative body) has unseen and dangerous implications. Tribal members should sit in the provincial assembly with members from the settled area. The members from Hangu district, for instance, should not be raising their concerns about lawlessness in one assembly and of the neighbouring Kurram Agency in another.

The war on terror can be won only if the unhindered movement of armed fighters across the international border is checked. The border is long, rugged and unguarded but the crossing stretches are well identified. The Americans should fence and guard them on the Afghan side. India has fenced the line of control in Kashmir. It has also fenced its border with Pakistan in Rajasthan.

Investment in fencing and attention to the welfare of the people in course of time will put an end to terror. Blaming or threatening Pakistan, inciting the clerics or putting up stooges as leaders of the Afghans will not.

kunwaridris@hotmail.com

Want of accountability

PRICES of oil, gas, electricity, food and many other items of daily consumption have risen enormously. Millions of people are going hungry, and there are reports every day of persons killing themselves and their families because they had nothing to eat.

The economy is languishing and workers are losing jobs. The ‘common man’ is being asked to tighten his belt.

But those calling for the tightening of belts are doing nothing of the kind in their own domains. On July 7 Prime Minister Gilani journeyed to Malaysia to attend a conference of eight developing Muslim countries called the D8. It was all right for him to show up there but it was something else to have taken with him an entourage of 55 persons, including numerous parliamentarians.

The conference passed resolutions in the nature of pious platitudes. It resolved to meet global challenges through “innovative cooperation”. Participants cautioned the world that food shortage could pose a threat to its peace and good order. They favoured collaboration, including joint ventures, between members to increase food production and identify and develop renewable sources of energy including the nuclear variety. They resolved to increase intra-regional trade, allow movement of labour and the protection of migrant workers’ rights. They would “harness the potential of Islamic banking and finance”. Prime Minister Gilani appealed to the D8 members and the world at large to help Pakistan’s fight against extremism and militancy.

These resolutions were statements of good intentions placed on record. How seriously they were meant and whether any of them will actually be carried out only time will tell. Their articulation could not possibly have required any significant amount of intellectual ingenuity or exertion. There was then no call for the 55 Pakistani dignitaries to make a contribution to the work of this conference, because it did no work to speak of.

The cost of their travel, hotel accommodation, food and drink, local transportation and daily allowance would add up to several million rupees that the Pakistani taxpayer had to pay. He got nothing in return, for these gentlemen brought back nothing (except perhaps stories of their exploits in Kuala Lumpur). And he has no way of holding them accountable.

While Mr Gilani was still in Kuala Lumpur, Asif Zardari asked him to stop over at Dubai for consultation about the status of their party’s coalition with the PML-N and other matters. Mr Zardari had also summoned several federal ministers to Dubai to help him get ready for his forthcoming talks with Nawaz Sharif in London.

The prime minister and his cabinet colleagues are functionaries of the state, and if they had gone to Dubai on government business they could have justly charged their expenses to the treasury. But they went to see Mr Zardari who holds no public office. He may be their party boss but in the reckoning of the Auditor General of Pakistan he is a private citizen. It follows that the ministers’ visit to Dubai was their private business, the costs of which should have been met out of their personal funds. But it is lawlessness if they were paid out of the treasury.

Mr Zardari’s present connection with the government is not only extra-legal but also gross. If it cannot be terminated, a way should be found to legitimise it. He might be given some kind of a post in the state apparatus: roving ambassador, minister without portfolio, adviser-in-chief?

He is not the only party chief who summons associates to meetings requiring travel within Pakistan and abroad. Benazir Bhutto used to call her party elders to Dubai, London and at times even New York. Nawaz Sharif did the same with his party notables. One may want to know who paid their travel and related costs: each one of them personally, the party chief, or the party?

There is not much for us to say in the first two cases. Interesting questions do arise if the money comes from the party coffers. I happen to have on hand approximate figures (in rupees) of income and expenditure that several parties reported to the Election Commission for the fiscal year 2003-04. The MQM collected and spent nearly Rs4m; the PML-Q collected Rs256,000 and spent nearly Rs6m; the JI received Rs3m and spent a little less; the PML-N collected and spent a little less than Rs2m; the JUI-F collected and spent exactly the same amount which was Rs1,138,408 (this exactitude being surely a thing of wonder). The PPP parliamentarians opened and closed the year with a cash balance of Rs1,000, collected nothing and spent nothing (also an enigma).

If four PML-N notables made three trips to London to confer with Nawaz Sharif, travelled first (or even business) class and stayed in a decent hotel, they would pretty much exhaust the party’s kitty (Rs2m in 2003-04). Note that Mr Sharif asked his associates to travel to London several times during his stay there. The same would hold for other parties such as the MQM and PPP.

Consider also that parties have other expenses such as those relating to workers’ compensation, organisation of election campaigns, public meetings, rallies and demonstrations. We must conclude then that the reports filed with the Election Commission were incomplete or false, and that the parties have additional funds tucked away in hidden places.

It is possible that the better-known persons in the major parties are independently wealthy and capable of bearing their travel costs, in which case we have the paradox of the wealthy managing a party, such as the PPP, that claims to be the party of the poor and the deprived.

It may be assumed that parties have bank accounts in which their declared funds are kept. It remains to be asked if there is a unit in each party that approves its budget and authorises disbursements, and to which the designated disbursing officer renders an accounting. If that is not the case, are we to assume that the party president or chairman is the keeper of its funds and disburses them as he deems fit? Needless to say, the latter situation does not provide for accountability. It may then be said that the party chooses to operate on the basis of a personality cult, and that it has little interest in converting itself into an institution.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts.

anwarsyed@cox.net

P for positive, N for negative?

UNTIL the embattled Pakistan pacer came up with another gift, this time from his involvement in the Indian Premier League, people of this land had lost all hope of an Asif ever delivering something positive to them.

They were so depressed by a series of blows ascribed to Senator Asif Ali Zardari that the news of Mohammad Asif having been caught using banned drugs to enhance his performance during IPL games did not worry them too much. Instead they were clamouring for Mr Zardari to resort to some performance-enhancing potions of his own. The hope of a Pakistan People’s Party-led government rising from the slump was surely common to those who failed to draw any pleasure from the collapse of the government and the party.

The first few months of the famous coalition formed after the perfect election of Feb 18 have added to the past public images of the coalition partners. The only noticeable change may be a slightly more assertive role that Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam has chosen to play in ending the strife in the north-west. The challenges the JUI is faced with in its peace drive indicate that the party needs to re-lobby and reinvest in its traditional support bank — a task in which it may be aided by the existing friction in the fundamentalist ranks in the Frontier and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata).

Before the conflict within came to the fore, it looked unlikely that the current leadership of the JUI had the intent or the ability to play the mediator between any two parties. It could well be that prior to the infighting, the venerable Maulana Fazl never felt the need to act as the referee. He did stop in his tracks after initially announcing that he was rushing to Islamabad to help resolve the dispute between the Lal Masjid clerics and the state last summer.

The JUI’s long-standing rival for Pakhtun sympathy, the Awami National Party, has held fast to the noble demand for peace through talks and has stuck to its nationalism without having to hit out at the Americans who appear to be in a menacing mood. Like the Pakistan Muslim League-N, which on its part stays loyal to its right-wing base, the ANP has more or less chosen to remain silent on the issue of American intervention in its own backyard.

The JUI’s view is taken with a pinch of salt because of its ideological leaning towards the current band of militants and the explanations offered by the PPP do not quite serve the purpose given its interests at the centre as also its rather recent links with the United States. Does the link extend to the ANP as well? The party has so far managed to strike a balance between the American war and local calls for a dialogue which, significantly, are backed by the Pakistan Army. Circumstances could compel the ANP to run counter to the US advances.

Asif Zardari’s PPP has to be the entity whose reputation has been enhanced the most in the last few months. The office routine is once again proving too much for the party which is at its best out of the office contributing to the country’s cultural milieu.

PPP supporters speak of a perception that has been created against them and they are right. They are also precise with their assessment that the confusion that prevails in the land right now is an attempt, as deliberate as attempts are, of not allowing the party’s government to settle down.

But as soon as they try to elaborate the party’s stance on the restoration of the judiciary they make it known that politics is nothing without its expediencies and its partisans. There are already voices which suggest that if this is what Mr Zardari had to run into he should have seized Punjab after the February polls.

The PPP could have bid for the government in the biggest province by allying itself with the Pakistan Muslim League-Q. It decided not to since it ‘respected’ the mandate given to the PML-N in Punjab and since it believed in ‘reconciliation’. Mr Zardari has been conceding ground to the Sharifs, so much so that he didn’t even mumble a protest after it was reported that the PML-N, with help from Leaguers in certain other factions, had stolen a few by-elections from the PPP.This was a small loss compared to the price the PPP has paid for its own sluggishness and for having partners who are in the habit of keeping mum at crucial moments and deflecting all blame on the struggling coalition leader. They are the same people who in the words of a PPP leader have never felt the need to condemn a suicide attack but are quick at picking holes in the current strategy to combat terror. They are the ones who had sent their representative to approve the provision of 29 judges in the finance bill for the year 2008-09 while they themselves cried foul of Mr Zardari’s double standards.

Mr Zardari has so far tested negative on the judges front and while he rules by remote control from Dubai, his people right from Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to Information Minister Sherry Rehman to People’s Labour Bureau head Chaudhry Manzoor are fielding tough questions from specific groups and of course from the general public on law and order, on price hikes and the federal government’s treatment of protesters in Islamabad and Karachi. The masterstroke that the PPP co-chairman had supposedly been perfecting behind his smile is yet to materialise. He would be far better off getting rid of the master and striking now.