Inaccuracies in memoirs

B.H. LIDDEL Hart in his book Why Don’t We Learn from History? narrates an event that occurred in 1918.

He writes about a French general who came to a certain army corps headquarter and “there majestically dictated orders giving the line on which the troops would stand that night and start their counterattack [sic] in the morning”. After reading these instructions with some perplexity the corps commander exclaimed: “But the line is behind the German front and you lost it yesterday.” Thereupon the great commander remarked with a knowing smile: “C’est pour l’histoire!” (This is for history!)

When Churchill’s book World Crisis was published after the First World War, Balfour, then foreign minister of Britain, observed in his review of the book that Churchill had written a good book for himself but had chosen the wrong title.

These remarks lead us to ask the question: why do people write memoirs? Perhaps to project their own personality and earn a venerable place in history for themselves. Maybe they want to help readers discover such aspects of history which were not generally known publicly. By recording them these writers attempt to complete what they see as unfinished history. Or they do not want to tell the truth but wish to distort or hide facts in order to straighten their own dishonourable records.

If one reads these memoirs, it becomes evident that some writers intentionally try to hide facts, especially if they were participants in some act of conspiracy, fraud, or corruption. By writing their memoirs, they absolve themselves of all crimes and attempt to prove their innocence.

When individuals start to write memoirs they keep in mind how people judge an event and what opinion they have formed about it. If the author had played an active role in the event, he tries to project himself as honest and a man of integrity by presenting the account in a way that justifies his actions. In rare cases he apologises for his mistakes or misdeeds. After writing their memoirs, some believe that they have not only corrected the past but have improved it to the satisfaction of the people. Therefore, their main motive behind memoir-writing is to reconstruct the past from a specific perspective in order to make other people believe that truth lies only in their version of history.

Different types of people write memoirs. They are often poets, writers, artists, musicians, politicians, bureaucrats, generals and rulers. Sometimes common people also narrate the experiences of their lives in the form of memoirs. The difference is that when politicians, generals and rulers write their memoirs, their motive is to highlight their achievements and eulogise their role in history. They look at the historical process from their personal point of view. That is why there is too much subjectivity in their writing which is interspersed with attempts at personal glorification.

What their narration lacks is an analysis of the impact of social, cultural and political forces on the making and shaping of their personalities. Small wonder that doubts are expressed about the veracity of their narration. Distortions and falsification usually mar their presentation of historical events. They always put themselves at the centre of all happenings and assume that everything revolves around them.

It is a generally accepted fact — confirmed by historians and psychologists — that the memory of an individual deteriorates with age. Sometimes one remembers remote details but forgets the most important happenings in one’s life. When he talks or writes about his past, he bases his narration on his memory. As such it becomes difficult for readers to verify events which the author describes without any evidence or source. The irony is that if his description is not challenged, it is often adopted as a part of history.

This raises a question: can we construct the past from memoirs and autobiographies? One school of historians argues that the history of an individual reflects his time, his society, the milieu that he has lived in and the rituals and customs that he adopts and practices. Therefore memoirs should be regarded as an important source of history. Moreover, the past is constructed to fulfil the requirements of the present. Therefore it changes with time. Under these circumstances, memoirs help historians construct a selected past which suits their own times.

Another group of historians rejects memoirs as a source of history because of their subjectivity. Their point of view is that the evidence in memoirs should be accepted only if it is corroborated by other sources.

In Pakistan, the discipline of history is on the decline. In our educational institutions there are no history teachers in the classical sense. We have historians who rely on memoirs. Hardly do we ever find any researched historical publications and, in their absence, the memoirs and autobiographies of generals, bureaucrats and politicians are being published in abundance. What happened in Pakistan during the past 60 years? No army general, bureaucrat or politician is ready to accept the responsibility of our failure and the collapse of our system.

On the contrary, they are writing autobiographies to hide their crimes and absolve themselves of their blunders. They accuse each other of misdeeds but nobody has the courage to recognise his own mistakes. Take the example of the first martial law. In Shahab Nama, Qudratullah Shahab tries to prove his innocence in respect of the actions taken against the Progressive Papers group. The fact is that the author himself had played an active role in banning Progressive Papers and helping martial law authorities accomplish this task. After his retirement, Shahab portrayed himself as a champion of democracy.

Not only Shahab but every bureaucrat who was in the active service of dictators and tyrants has emerged as a fighter for human rights and democracy in his memoirs. Take another example, that of the separation of East Pakistan. Those generals and bureaucrats who were involved in the 1971 repression are trying to prove in their memoirs that they were not responsible for it. The same is the case with politicians who are cleansing their conscience by distorting history.

Currently we have plenty of such untruthful books in the market. Unfortunately, there is no historian who could analyse these accounts and identify the lies in them. I am afraid that with these records going unchallenged, crimes and corruption will fade from human memory and future generations will accept the lies recounted in these memoirs as the truth.

A triple crisis

THE transition to a more democratic system is in peril. A triple crisis of politics, militancy and the economy is the battering ram at the door of Pakistan’s government. Each limb of the crisis is feeding off and compounding the other.

While the vultures may be circling, the victim, the government, is prostrate and making it easier for them.Each week brings a new candidate for the leader of the incompetent — our political class. Last weekend the country bumpkin in the PM House staked his claim. So ghastly was the PM’s performance that damage control has overshadowed a speech that was itself meant as an exercise in damage control of the government’s evaporating reputation. The speech itself though wasn’t the problem but a symptom of what is wrong in Islamabad right now.

Let’s start at the beginning. For better or worse, a space has been created for politicians to govern. So far it has been a baptism of fire. Economic turmoil and rampaging militants have challenged the government mightily. But there is no doubt that space for the civilians to govern exists — for now. The political problem boils down to this: Nawaz wants the judges in and Musharraf out; Asif wants the judges out and Musharraf in. Sure, Asif may not — indeed cannot — really care about the judges and Musharraf’s fate more than his own, but political commitments have forced him to hitch his star to their fate. It is what it is.

So now what? Asif’s strategy has been to wait it out in the hope that Musharraf or CJ Iftikhar will do something stupid and make their positions untenable or that Nawaz will yield. Neither has happened so far. The problem is the economic and militancy crises have not stayed still. But this was entirely predictable. What has been disastrous for the transition is a government that has vacillated in response to its problems.

Economically there is not much the government can do at the moment — our plight may have worsened more quickly than should have been the case, but it is driven by international factors that are out of our hands. Yet international weaknesses have nothing to do with local distortions. The oil pricing mechanism in Pakistan is loaded in favour of oil marketing companies and retailers but they are considered too powerful to be taken on. PM Gilani told us that he knows who the wheat hoarders are but no handcuffs have been slapped on anyone. The stock market fundamentals may be weak but small investors are getting a raw deal from the clubby world of market regulators and the big fish. Targeted subsidies to the poor have been promised but the sense of urgency to get food and cash in the hands of the poor is lacking.

These are not economic challenges, they are political and administrative roadblocks that ought to be tackled in times of crisis at least. You don’t keep fumbling for the keys to your house if it is on fire, you break down the door.

The policy to deal with militants acting with impunity across the country is the other failure. The militants rampaging across the country will not be defeated in a week, a month or a year. The problems are too deep, the system too corrupt and the issues too complex for a ready solution. But a week, month or year of drift in Islamabad can cause long-term damage that years of smart strategy will struggle to undo.

The reason is simple: at this moment the militants are in the ascendant and looking to expand their areas of control. Dislodging militants once they have pressed forward has proved notoriously difficult because it is deeply unpopular politically. That does not mean nothing can be done. The government can fight a more effective battle for the hearts and minds of the public. Right now it is on the defensive — a coy, reticent demeanour presented when what is required is the pounding of fists.

The prime minister talks of talks with militants but the details are vague. This is part necessity and part confusion. It is by design because there is no one cause of militancy. Local and Afghan Taliban; sectarian warriors; followers of different schools of Islamic thought; Al Qaeda; and middle eastern, north African and central Asian militants are fighting the Pakistan state, the Afghan government, the Americans, Isaf and each other in overlapping, confusing local and regional conflagrations. The method of dealing with each aspect of this toxic brew of militancy depends on the local resources — political, military and counterinsurgent — of the state and the degree to which a particular area is currently inflamed. There will necessarily be differences between how Mohmand is handled compared to Khyber or how Hangu is treated compared to South Waziristan.

But what is damaging for the government is the muddled articulation of its anti-militancy strategy and its inability to keep the centre, the NWFP government, the army and the political administration of the tribal areas on the same page. Assume Gen Kayani genuinely intends to have his army follow the political leadership’s directions in the war against militants. Policy confusion will encourage him to think twice. Now assume Gen Kayani does not genuinely intend to have his army yield to the civilians. Policy confusion will give his army the excuse it needs to exert wider, and maybe more direct, control. Either way, the transition to civilian, elected rule is in trouble, fuelled by the government’s deficit of trust and confidence.

Politics affects the economy and militancy; the latter affect politics. Right now all are pulling each other down. But if it’s so obvious, why are the politicians behaving so recklessly?

What’s wrong with Pakistan? The answer: clearly plenty. Depending on who you speak to, the diagnosis will range from the triple crisis to poverty and illiteracy and from politicians to the judges and Musharraf. And befitting a nation of talkers, there are plenty of people with a prognosis, gloomy or otherwise.

But, like our reckless politicians, few seem to recognise that often half the solution to a problem lies in asking the right questions. When the coalition leaders meet, the nation will demand answers on the judges, Musharraf and the price of fuel. But before working on those answers, the leaders should reflect on what the right questions are for Pakistan right now. The transition to a more democratic future for Pakistan may depend on which set of questions they choose to address — the obvious one or the important one. n

cyril.a@gmail.com

Obama: fine-tuning the message?

IN early June, Barack Obama emerged as the presumed nominee of the Democratic Party in the US presidential elections.

He was propelled to the top spot by his youthful, charismatic personality, his eloquence and, not least, the enthusiasm and passion he aroused among young college-educated voters, a phenomenon not seen since the days of John Kennedy in the early sixties.

Many were attracted by his refreshing optimism and the clear and sharp contrast he drew between his domestic as well as international policies and those pursued by President Bush for the past seven years. Obama promised to end the war in Iraq and bring American troops back home, and to seek a negotiated solution to the crisis with Iran. The superiority of his campaign organisation translated into unprecedented success in raising huge funds to support the fall election campaign. He raised at least $290m dollars, mostly from small donors and much of it through the Internet.

Having secured the nomination, which required the majority support of mostly liberal and progressive democrats, Obama now needs the vote of independent and moderate Americans — mostly conservative, highly patriotic and strongly religious who generally align with the Republican Party. Similarly, women and working-class white males were not enthusiastic about his candidacy in the primaries. In order to seek their support, he has to modify some of his positions that seemed to work so well in the primaries.

Traditionally, once they get their party’s nomination, candidates, whether on the right or left of the political spectrum, moderate their message to broaden their base and attract the maximum number of voters at the general election. However, such moves have to be calibrated skilfully lest they give the impression that the candidate holds no core beliefs and can alter them conveniently. Four years ago, the Republicans were successful in characterising the Democratic candidate, Senator John Kerry, who opposed President Bush, as a flip-flopper without any bedrock convictions and willing to change his positions to suit the occasion. The Kerry campaign could not counteract the negative stereotyping of their candidate, and the charge stuck.

Similar charges are being currently levelled against Obama. Unlike his Republican opponent, McCain, who has been in politics for a long time, Obama is relatively new to national politics and the public is still struggling to define him and his policies. Despite his repeated denials, for example, some 15 per cent of the public continues to believe that he is a Muslim. He has recently come under attack for changing his positions on several issues. Initially, his signature subject was his opposition to the war in Iraq and his repeated pledge to withdraw forces from that country in 16 months.

In recent days he has nuanced his statement, adding that he would make the final determination about withdrawal after consultation with the military commanders in Iraq and his forthcoming visit to that country, giving himself some flexibility. In a recent op-ed article in The New York Times, however, he reaffirmed his pledge about his timetable for withdrawal. While the policies of the two candidates diverge in respect to Iraq, there is no major disagreement concerning the Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. Obama will redeploy American resources from Iraq to Afghanistan, increasing troop strength by at least two combat brigades and, if necessary, send forces into Pakistan’s tribal areas to flush out the militants.

Few issues in America incite as much passion as the question of US support for Israel. No candidate can hope to win an election without the financial and electoral backing of the highly successful and influential Jewish community which tends to be strongly supportive of Israel. Some commentators have accused Obama of not being sufficiently committed to the security of the Jewish state, reducing his appeal to Jewish voters. To the embarrassment of his campaign staff, a Hamas official in Gaza issued a statement welcoming his candidacy. Obama at least partially addressed this problem in a speech at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a powerful pro-Israel lobbying group, in early June. He promised $30bn in aid to Israel and reassured the audience that Jerusalem would remain the undivided capital of Israel.

The speech, however, provoked a strong protest from the Palestinian Authority and other Arab countries, and the Obama campaign was subsequently obliged to clarify his stand on Jerusalem. They backtracked on his statement, explaining that whatever plan the Palestinians and Israelis agree to would also be acceptable to him.

Two other issues that have also caused problems for Obama relate to the reversal of his position on granting retroactive immunity to those telecommunication companies in America that had participated in wiretapping telephone conversations of ordinary citizens in the aftermath of 9/11 to detect any terrorism-related activities. After initially opposing the immunity, he recently voted for it in the Senate along with 69 other senators.

Some of Obama’s liberal supporters characterised his vote as a repudiation of the principles enunciated early on in the campaign, but Obama defended his decision saying that the resolution had been modified and had become more acceptable to him. On a different issue, his need to entice evangelical Christians to vote for him appears to have diluted his dedication to the principle of separation of religion and the state, making his liberal supporters uneasy. Their disillusionment notwithstanding, it is unlikely that they vote for McCain.

There are nearly four months until the US presidential election in November, and the eventual winner cannot be predicted with confidence. Much will depend on what happens in the intervening period. The most recent Washington Post-ABC News poll shows Obama to be eight percentage points ahead of McCain among registered voters.

The country is currently going through a difficult phase, with the economy faltering, some financial institutions in danger of failing, and fuel prices and inflation both escalating. Worries about the economy and high energy costs have now replaced the Iraq war as areas of top concern. While McCain is credited with having a better knowledge of world affairs, it must be reassuring to the Democrats that a clear majority of the electorate believes that Obama is more qualified than McCain to deal with the acute economic problems the country is facing.

Seeking Omar’s indictment

ALL the opposition groups in Darfur celebrated when the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced on July 14 that he was seeking the indictment of Sudan’s President Omar al Bashir on the charge of genocide, but almost everybody else had a problem with it. They don’t doubt that Bashir is a ruthless dictator who is guilty of ordering many thousands of deaths. They just think that putting him on an international “wanted” list is unwise.

Tanzanian foreign minister Bernard Membe, speaking on behalf of the African Union, said: “We are asking for the ICC to re-examine its decision....If you arrest Bashir, you will create a leadership vacuum in Sudan. The outcome could be equal to that of Iraq.” Membe and many other people fear that the indictment of Bashir, far from ending the conflict in Darfur, could reignite the much bigger civil war between northern and southern Sudan.

Andrew Natsios, the former US special envoy for Sudan, was equally worried that the ICC was playing with fire: “This indictment may well shut off the last remaining hope for a peaceful settlement (for Darfur).” United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon phoned Bashir personally to assure him that the ICC is quite separate from the UN. In Khartoum there was defiance from Bashir personally, but also warnings from opposition leaders that this was not a good idea.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which led the predominantly African and Christian south of the country in the 22-year civil war, was emphatically not for rocking the boat right now. The SPLM spokesman said that “indicting (Omar al-Bashir) has created a dangerous situation in Sudan threatening peace and stability in the country.”

What is at stake, in the SPLM’s view, is the 2005 peace deal that gave the south its autonomy, and promised elections for next year in which the south could choose independence from the mainly Muslim and Arabic-speaking north if it wants. The election might also bring democracy to Sudan (or to the two halves, if they separate), after nineteen years of Bashir’s dictatorship.

An estimated two million people died in the north-south civil war, compared to perhaps 200,000 in the past five years in Darfur. Nobody wants to go back to that, and with oil revenues starting to build up, both the northern and the southern political elites have every incentive to make the deal work.

Sudan is in the midst of a difficult but still promising transition, but it may not succeed if Bashir’s only choices are to live as a hunted criminal facing arrest and trial on genocide charges, or to cling to power forever. More immediately, his indictment could wreck the possibility of a peace deal to end the war in Darfur. So most of the northern opposition parties opposed the ICC’s action, too.

But that is irrelevant to the International Criminal Court, because it is not a political organisation. It is a court, and courts operate by different rules. It may be politically inconvenient to indict Bashir right now, but as the prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo of Argentina, said last week, “I don’t have the luxury to look away. I have the evidence.”

Moreno-Ocampo, and the three judges (Ghanaian, Lithuanian and Brazilian) who must now decide whether or not to indict Bashir, and the whole ICC, are quite rightly barred from taking political considerations into account. They are there to administer the laws.

The law in question is the new international law that seeks to make even senior military and political leaders legally responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Since such people are unlikely to face legal action in their own countries, which are generally tyrannies of one sort or another, it must be done at the international level. Hence the creation of the ICC in 2002.

The most powerful states are always the most reluctant to give up their sovereign powers in the interests of international law, so the rest of the world tends to go ahead without them, on the assumption that they will catch up later. In the meantime, the main problem for those who do support the ICC is to remember that they are trying to build the rule of law in the world, not to solve some local problem.

It is important that Sudan finally gets peace and prosperity, after endless years of war, tyranny and poverty. It is even more important that leaders who commit genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes know that they will have to answer to an international court.

In the end, these two goals are probably not irreconcilable. Or do you really think that Sudan’s political elites are so stupid and supine that they will let their whole future be wrecked in order to protect one brutal, blood-stained general who has long outlived his usefulness?

—Copyright Gwynne Dyer