Outsourcing security

THE lashkars in the tribal areas are being touted as a great military plan to counter the Taliban. The governor of the Frontier province, Owais Ghani, for instance, was of the view that the lashkars would create minimal social disturbance, because the battle would appear to be waged by the local population rather than foreign forces.

The plan has been endorsed by Centcom commander Gen Petraeus who probably views this strategy as workable. Since it is being used in Iraq, it is being employed in Pakistan’s tribal areas as well.

The idea is to temporarily arm a select group of people to fight the Taliban and then disarm them after the job is done. The plan didn’t really take off because Taliban attacks on jirgas also killed people involved with the lashkars. However, there is a larger problem with this plan. Its continuation will gradually disempower the Pakistan Army and result in even greater chaos. Having lashkars is tantamount to outsourcing security operations that the US military might be comfortable with but which is hardly required in the context of Pakistan’s armed forces.

The erroneous supposition is that such outsourcing can be controlled and manipulated at a later stage according to the wishes of governments, especially the one in Islamabad. The outsourcing of security has not worked in the case of the Taliban nor has it borne fruit in the case of the private contractors deployed all over the world by the US. This is about militaries and governments missing the wood for the trees. The concerned authorities use non-state actors purely for tactical purposes, and they always spiral out of control.

Three examples of this relate to India, US and Pakistan. Indira Gandhi’s use of non-state actors in East Punjab for tactical political gains cost her dearly at a strategic level. Similarly, the US forces’ tactical use of private security contractors resulted in great embarrassment and the expansion of the conflict in Iraq and other places where non-state actors were employed. Finally, Pakistan’s dependence on the Taliban, starting in the 1990s, to establish Islamabad’s control over Afghanistan expanded the threat rather than helped the country achieve its goal.

The lashkars will not prove worth the effort. An example of how such small private armies go out of control pertains to the ‘Pratikar Samiti’ (retaliation groups) in Nepal. These forces were established to fight the Maoist forces but then went out of control and became part of the smuggling mafias. Reports began to filter in around 2004 regarding the exigencies of these private armies especially in the two districts of Nawalparasi and Kapilvastu. In Nepal, the Samitis were not only linked to violence but were a cause of increased corruption in the Royal Nepal Army.

Let’s not believe that the results would be very different in Pakistan’s case. Establishing lashkars means that the government has subcontracted the fighting and has indirectly ceded control of part of its territory to non-state actors to fight another group of non-state actors. Once this formula begins to work in the short term, there will be increasing dependence on this methodology. The lashkars will then become a nuisance exactly the way the Taliban have turned into one. The government troops, as has happened in the case of American forces in Iraq, will begin to depend on these lashkars even for intelligence which means that information could be manipulated thus posing a greater risk to the state.

In very simple terms, the Taliban problem in Afghanistan and the tribal areas cannot be solved through such short-term tactical manoeuvres. Such measures are likely to prove ineffective even in countering the American pressure. In fact, drone attacks will continue mainly because of the credibility gap between Islamabad and Washington.

Obviously, people in Pakistan are upset with the drone attacks, especially as they attribute the creation of the Taliban to the Americans. However, there are two facts which must be taken into consideration. First, the Taliban are different from the Afghan warlords. While the US was involved in preparing the warlords, often hosted by the Reagan administration, the more definitive stamp on the Taliban, dating back to the 1990s, is that of the Pakistani GHQ. This, in any case, was a different generation of warriors who had their own political agenda and were difficult to play ball with in contrast to the warlords who are still offering to talk directly to Washington by undercutting their former Pakistani hosts. This difference has to be kept in mind.

Second, even during the 1980s when the US was in favour of outsourcing military operations to Afghan warlords and jihadis, the deal between the CIA and the Pakistani intelligence was that all funding and communication would be routed through the latter. There are several narratives including the famous book The Bear Trap by former ISI officer Mohammad Yusuf who explains how his organisation was at the forefront of creating and interacting with Afghan warlords.

The American objective then was to defeat archrival USSR. Once the objective was fulfilled there was no purpose to hang on to the non-state actors. It was criminal that the US did not venture to disarm these warriors and pulled back from Afghanistan allowing Pakistan’s GHQ to conceive and activate its Monroe doctrine on its western borders. Rawalpindi saw Afghanistan as its sphere of influence for which the theory of strategic depth was also cooked up.

The problem now is that the superpower has taken another policy turn and wants the Taliban abandoned completely. Washington’s frustration is due to what is seen as its inability to convince its junior partner Pakistan to abandon the Taliban despite the fact that the US has paid billions of dollars in military and economic assistance to Islamabad. Although Gen Pervez Musharraf argues that Pakistan wasn’t paid enough, the assessment of how much Islamabad was worth is very subjective. After years of a patron-client relationship, Washington had its own calculation of how much it would take for Pakistani generals and politicians to deliver on Afghanistan.

The fact that the Taliban problem has not been resolved as yet is a reflection of how outsourcing of security creates problems at different levels. The Americans initially outsourced the war to the Pakistani intelligence and Afghan warlords and couldn’t roll them back. The Pakistanis subcontracted security work to the Taliban and the ball never returned to the GHQ’s court. In Pakistan’s case, it is more problematic because there have been fears that the military has not completely dumped the Taliban, an example of what happens when security is outsourced to non-state actors. The lashkars will be no different.

The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.

ayesha.ibd@gmail.com

Yes, together we can

MANY years ago, there was an earthquake in Mexico. Hundreds of people died and a large number of houses were destroyed. It was a disastrous scenario.

Yet, one peddler was shouting at the top of his voice: “Buy anti-earthquake pills.” Overwhelmed by the tragedy, some people began beating him up. In his defence he said: “Tell me, what is the alternative?”

Such was the feeling when a team of peace-seekers from Pakistan met their counterparts in New Delhi some days ago. When relations between India and Pakistan lay in ruins and when talks between the two countries were not even on the horizon, it was indeed a brave effort to pick up the thread from where they had left off before the terrorist attack on Mumbai.

The peacemakers had made substantial progress. People-to-people contact was increasing despite the rigours of the visa restrictions. The contact for the last two decades had developed enough strength not to evaporate with the carnage, although the Mumbai attack caused maximum damage. Conservative elements have always stalled peace efforts but the liberals in both countries have shown a spirited response.

The Pakistani team, which included parliamentarians, human rights activists and top journalists, was somewhat jolted by the anger that it found in Indian civil society. It patiently listened to harsh critics who said that Pakistan was merely going over the exercise and doing little to bring to justice the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage.

Basically, there was a feeling of mistrust because India or, for that matter, the world is not sure whether the steps taken — the arrests made and the offices of the Jamaatud Dawa sealed — were genuine. The critics said that the Pakistan government was perverting the issue of terrorism and converting it into yet another dispute between the two countries.

The team justified India’s rage and condemned unequivocally the terrorist attack. But it also appealed to society — later through a prepared statement — that the two countries must not allow the terrorists to hijack the peace agenda and must resume the composite dialogue process. This courageous lot of peace-seekers wanted to impress upon India that whatever the limitations of Pakistani civil society, the latter was fighting for the same values: a free society and good neighbourliness.

That the team members undertook the visit when the wounds of Mumbai were raw spoke volumes for their determination and doggedness. They heard harsh words but presented their case without rancour. What surprised them was that the people’s understanding and affection had not been exhausted. Probably, left to themselves and unencumbered by bureaucratic machinations, the people would find that the destinies of the two countries are intertwined. Yet the army, which calls the shots in Pakistan, will not allow the normalisation of ties because the people in Pakistan can turn back and demand a reduction in the force. There is, however, a possibility that the army will control the jihadis now that there is an outcry against them all over the world.

It is former President Pervez Musharraf who has given a bad name to Pakistan. He encouraged terrorists on one hand and staged ‘action’ against them on the other. Now he has admitted that the terrorists operated from Pakistan. But his plea was that their camps were located in a difficult terrain which handicapped their dismantling. A person who could use all methods to curb the nationalists in Balochistan should not be surprised if his word is not trusted.

The team promised to convey the feelings to the top. But does the civilian top have the clout? People in India do not generally buy the argument that Pakistan’s weak democracy should be helped at any cost. My firm belief after following events for years is that the establishment on both sides has developed a vested interest to keep people distant.

Islamabad does it because anti-India sentiment keeps the country united. As far as New Delhi is concerned, it has developed an enemy phobia. China which continues to occupy 35,000 square miles of Indian territory after giving it a bloody nose in 1962 is too big and too powerful to be challenged. Hapless Pakistan comes in handy to feed the phobia.

I do not condone what Pakistani governments have done to indoctrinate the nation, from teaching hatred through textbooks to allegedly training and arming terrorists. But this is what happens in a country which loses the ballot box. Pakistan has had no real democracy for nearly five decades. Most of the leaders who came on the plank of democracy built up their own assets and personal followings, and not the environment that would protect the people’s right to voice their opinion. The army cashed in on the lack of unity in the country to defend such values.

How do we move forward in the atmosphere of mistrust between the two countries, one that goes back to the days of partition? But, first things first: Pakistan has to make sure that its soil is not used by terrorists. Therefore, their elimination is a must. America cannot preach on the subject and threaten to bomb the interior of Pakistan. It is America which is responsible for the birth of terrorism. It constituted a force of fanatics and armed it to bleed the Soviet Union.

True, America won the Cold War but it lost most of Afghanistan to the fanatics called the Taliban. They are now a menace for the entire world. They cannot be defeated only by bombs hurled from unmanned planes. In fact, it appears that the indiscriminate bombing is evoking more and more sympathy for the Taliban in Pakistan.

India is suffering from the worst fallout. A new tribe of Hindu Taliban has appeared on the scene. It attacked girls at a pub in Mangalore, Karnataka and calls itself the Sri Ram Sena, a brigade to enforce standards of morality, as the Taliban are doing in the northern parts of Pakistan. Another terrifying phenomenon is that of Hindu extremists who were responsible for bomb blasts outside a mosque in Malegaon, Maharashtra. They want to take over the country and establish a Hindu rashtra. This is also a goal of the Sangh Parivar, including the Bharatiya Janata Party. A serving military intelligence officer, Lt Col Purohit, now in jail, has already confessed his role in terrorism.

While terrorism is hard to fight, if liberals in India and Pakistan were to join hands to combat it together they might be able to roll back Talibanisation and the religious bias that is spreading in both countries. Pakistan has a bigger problem because part of its territory is already under the Taliban who are using it to act against women in particular. Ultimately, it is the liberals who will have to strive harder than before. Timid souls do not know anything like victory or defeat.

The writer is a leading journalist based in Delhi.

Politics as usual

FOR a while, the possibility of a clash between the PPP and the PML-N was The Thing That Must Not Be Spoken Of. To do so would jinx Pakistan’s new set-up and invite bad karma. But that was yesterday. Now the clash of the titans is all anyone can talk about.

That seemingly long, long time ago beginning in February, when the transition was underway and democracy had another chance to grow, the dream team of the PPP and the PML-N cast a spell over the people and skilfully dispatched the weakened dictator Musharraf. Sceptics, however, wondered whether it was simply a prelude to the real thing, a way of clearing the decks before resuming the bitterness of the ’90s. After all, wipe away the Musharraf years and the civilian pattern is miserably clear: PPP, PML, PPP, PML — and now PPP.

Logically then, this fight was written in the stars.

How will it play out? Either the PPP will shove the PML-N out of Punjab to save itself in Islamabad or the PML-N will shove the PPP out of Islamabad to save its government in Punjab. We don’t know the winner yet, but the signs are neither is playing for a draw.

Who’s to blame? Some of them protagonists, all of them, none of them — the system, the stars? Probably all of the above.

Start with the obvious: Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari. The problem may be bigger, and older, than them, but they have contributed to the coming storm with their cynicism.

Look at Sharif, defying the superior judiciary at every turn, dismissing them contemptuously, ready to suffer his own disqualification to stand up for his principles. Except it’s all a charade.

If Nawaz Sharif really wanted to go all out to bring CJ Iftikhar back, he has a formidable weapon in his arsenal: order the Punjab government — his government — to stop dealing with the courts. Imagine the turmoil, the constitutional crisis, the make-or-break scenario if the country’s largest and most powerful province rejects the courts and demands the reinstatement of CJ Iftikhar.

But Sharif makes a strange distinction: the courts are personally unacceptable, however, they are acceptable when it comes to the business of the Punjab government. Sharif will argue the usual defences: public interest, can’t make the people suffer for the presidency’s wrongdoing, the greater good.

You can’t blame Zardari for being sceptical. CJ Iftikhar was adopted by the PML-N to make it look good in comparison to the status quo. The status quo used to be headlined by Musharraf, and now by Zardari.

Yet, Zardari has done more than his fair share to contribute to the current tension. He may be the accidental president but, accidental or not, the PML-N must eye him with a great deal of suspicion, for Zardari, by virtue of his constitutional position, has become the arbiter of many important things for the Sharifs.

Dismiss a Sharif government in Islamabad? Zardari can do it. Dismiss the younger Sharif’s government in Punjab? Zardari can do it by proxy, the nit-picking, garrulous Governor Taseer. Stuff the judiciary with favourites? Zardari can do it.

But more than what Zardari can do, it’s what Nawaz Sharif can’t do that will trouble him: Sharif can’t dislodge Zardari from office through any normal constitutional process. The impeachment numbers simply don’t add up, and probably never will, in the current assemblies. It’s a bit like India having a nuclear weapon and Pakistan fighting with rusty tanks — such asymmetry in constitutional power, one player decidedly, dangerously, superior to the other, will inevitably lead to a desperate attack by the other.

Yet, what if Zardari and Sharif had steered clear of provocations that aggravated suspicion on either side? Fact is, the most honest thing uttered by a politician perhaps ever was Zardari’s admission that political agreements are not sacred texts. As tokens of goodwill, Zardari and Sharif could have come up with peace offerings that may have eased things along temporarily. However, what they ultimately must do as party leaders is also shaped, and constrained, by the system they operate in.

The February elections threw up a result that virtually guaranteed the PPP and PML-N would not just circle each other warily, but be tempted to attack — or else risk being attacked by the other first. And nobody’s signature on any dotted line would change that reality.

The returns of the two parties were similar enough to make each consider it equal to the other, a recipe for instability. But the real problem, and Musharraf’s last laugh at his bete noires’ expense, was the returns of the PML-Q. The Q-league has enough seats in the Punjab and national assemblies to allow either the PPP or the PML-N to pull comfortably ahead of the other. Rivals who are numerically evenly matched, with the possibility of a decisive addition to their seat count: it’s enough to tempt even a saint. And there aren’t many likely claims to sainthood around here.

Of course, there is a possibility that everyone will back off for now and March won’t be a month of change. But, for a structural reason, that will be a short-lived position.

Other than the personalities and the February electoral results, a key instability built into the system is Punjab. Simply put, in electoral terms, it’s too big a province. When one party, such as the PML-N, dominates Punjab, it will always be tempted to take over in Islamabad since the numbers add up. With 148 seats out of the 272 directly elected National Assembly seats, Punjab has a simple majority. Even if a couple of dozen seats are lost, the dominant Punjab party can quickly line up smaller parties and independents from the other provinces to form a government in Islamabad.

This is something everyone knows: the PPP, the PML-N, the smaller parties and the independents. So, given the lie of the land in Punjab at the moment, the PML-N will be tempted to strike while its popularity is through the roof, an anxious PPP will be looking to other parties for support, and the rest will be looking to cut deals that convert a small parliamentary presence into rich pickings. Look no further than the swelling cabinet in Islamabad for evidence of some of this.

Change is in the air, except no one can honestly tell what, where and when. The real surprise — and a good one, at that — would be if the status quo prevails until the next scheduled election. But Pakistan isn’t a land of pleasant surprises and there’s no obvious reason to expect one this time round either.

cyril.a@gmail.com

Thaw in US-Iran relations?

OBAMA administration officials have drafted a letter to Iran from the president aimed at unfreezing US-Iranian relations and opening the way for face-to-face talks, according to senior sources.

The US State Department has been working on drafts of the letter since Obama was elected on Nov 4. It would be in reply to a lengthy letter of congratulations sent by the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on

Nov 6. Diplomats say Obama’s letter would be a symbolic gesture to mark a change in tone from the hostile one adopted by the Bush administration, which portrayed Iran as part of an “axis of evil”.

It would be intended to allay the suspicions of Iran’s leaders and pave the way for Obama to engage them directly, a break with past policy.

State Department officials have written at least three drafts of the letter, which gives assurances that Washington does not want to overthrow the Islamic regime but merely seeks a change in its behaviour. The letter would be addressed to the Iranian people and sent directly to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or released as an open letter.

One draft proposal suggests Iran should compare its relatively low standard of living with that of some of its more prosperous neighbours and contemplate the benefits of losing its pariah status in the West. Although the tone is conciliatory, it also calls on Iran to end what the US calls state sponsorship of terrorism.

The letter is being considered by the new secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, as part of a sweeping review of US policy on Iran. A decision on sending it is not expected until the review is complete.

In an interview on Monday with al-Arabiya television network, Obama hinted at a more friendly approach towards Iran.

The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said on Wednesday that he was waiting patiently to see what the Obama administration would come up with. “We will listen to the statements closely, we will carefully study their actions and if there are real changes, we will welcome it,” he said.

Ahmadinejad, who confirmed he would stand for election again in June, said it was unclear whether the Obama administration was intent on just a shift in tactics or seeking fundamental change. He called on the US to apologise for its actions against Iran over the past 60 years, including US support for a 1953 coup that ousted the democratically elected government and the US shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in 1988.

US concern about Iran mainly centres on its uranium enrichment programme, which Washington claims is intended to provide the country with a nuclear weapons capability. Diplomatic moves are given increased urgency by fears that Israel might take unilateral action to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities.

The State Department refused to comment on the options under review. John Sullivan, a State Department spokesman, said Obama was taking the lead on Iran policy and that it was too early to say what that policy would be. “I cannot comment on policy planning stages. We are still looking at all the options on the table and figuring out the best way forward,” Sullivan said.

But diplomatic sources said many options were under review about how to signal to the Iranians that there was a change in attitude in Washington, and that Obama was looking for direct talks.

One of the chief Iranian concerns revolves around suspicion that the US is engaged in covert actions aimed at regime change, including support for separatist groups in areas such as Kurdistan, Sistan-Balochistan and Khuzestan. The State Department has repeatedly denied there is any US support for such groups.

In its dying days, the Bush administration was planning to open a US interests section in the Iranian capital Tehran, one step down from an embassy. The idea has resurfaced but if there are direct talks with Iran, it may be decided that a diplomatic presence would obviate the need for a diplomatic mission in Tehran, at least in the short term.

While Obama is taking the lead on Iran policy, the administration will shortly announce that Dennis Ross will become a special envoy to Iran, following the appointments last week of George Mitchell, the veteran US mediator, as special envoy to the Middle East and Richard Holbrooke, who helped broker the Bosnia peace agreement, as special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

— The Guardian, London