AS the commander-in-chief of the British Army in 1838, the Duke of Wellington made a prophetic warning ahead of the expedition that triggered the First Afghan War: “The consequences of crossing the Indus once to settle a government in Afghanistan will be a perennial march into that country.” The expedition cost the British 16,000 lives in the disastrous retreat from Kabul in 1842.

The first three Afghan wars, fought between 1838 and 1919, ended in disaster for the British. The fourth ended in disaster for what was then the Soviet Union, and the fifth Afghan War, now in its 10th year, is heading towards the same end.

A British army officer who served in Helmand in 2007 warned that “Anyone who underestimates the problem is going to come unstuck”. Three years later, the British army’s performance in Helmand was called into question and consequently, the Americans have assumed operational responsibility for the province.

According to leaked diplomatic memos, the European Union president told the American ambassador in Belgium that the EU no longer believes in success in Afghanistan, and that European troops are still there “out of deference to the United States”. “The finest fighting force the world has known,” is how Obama described the US military during his address to the troops at their Bagram airbase. Perhaps he chose to forget that the world first witnessed America’s humiliation in Vietnam, and is now witnessing it in Afghanistan.

Instead of dispassionately analysing the reasons behind this, Americans chose to transfer the blame on to Pakistan, insisting that the insurgents attacking them are operating out of this country. Maybe, but only until 2003. Since then, the insurgents have been operating out of their primary safe havens in the Hindukush, and secondary ones in the villages across the country.

The Taliban are experienced and shrewd fighters. Operating out of Pakistan alone would mean that their movement across the Durand Line would be open to interception. The Taliban know it would be an act of folly to not use the cover of the people in the villages, and the cover of the Hindukush.

If US and Nato forces still believe that the insurgents are operating out of Pakistan, then operational logic dictates that instead of wasting their efforts elsewhere, they place their main effort along the Durand Line to intercept and engage the insurgents. This would not only have the effect of choking the insurgents but also enable US and Nato forces to achieve operational supremacy. Such opportunities rarely present themselves in a counter-insurgency (COIN) war. Yet, it is not inexplicable why they have not seized this opportunity: their claim is manifestly false, made only to cover the inept handling of the war.

Like their predecessors in Vietnam, the generals handling the war in Afghanistan were groomed for conventional war.

They are fighting an unconventional war conventionally, and paying dearly for it.

In conventional warfare, armies employ large forces to create conditions favourable for the decisive battle. Hence, their strategy is characterised by concentration in time and space. In unconventional warfare, insurgent forces employ a large number of small teams to strike in different directions. Hence, their strategy is characterised by dispersion in time and space. The insurgents’ strategy defines the operational environment in which counter-insurgency forces have to operate.

Yet in Afghanistan, instead of transforming their strategy and tactics to conform to the environment, large forces are being employed to secure towns and villages. As a result, the initiative has remained with the Taliban.

‘Uncertainty is the essence of war, surprise its rule’ is a dictum crucial for success in wars both conventional and unconventional. Yet more often than not, it is forgotten while developing strategic and tactical plans. Surprise is the main weapon of all unconventional forces. It is a force multiplier. It generates uncertainty, hence fear of the unknown, in the minds of the soldiers, until they break down and fall victim to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As the war drags on, the number of soldiers who succumb to PTSD grows exponentially.

The fact is that though the Taliban are masters of surprise, this domain is not theirs alone. Enterprising army commanders can also master it.

Their inherent conventional thinking, the uncertain nature of unconventional warfare and the vulnerability of soldiers to PTSD are amongst the challenges that face the generals in Afghanistan. Though tough, the challenges are surmountable as long as the generals are adaptable and enterprising. In order to beat the insurgents at their own game, they would have to develop unpredictable strategies and matching tactics to transfer the fear of the unknown back to the insurgents.

There is no place for orthodoxy and inflexibility in war, least of all in a counter-insurgency war.

Meanwhile, nine years of living in occupied Afghanistan has changed the people’s views. More and more people are now gravitating towards the Taliban, enabling them to extend the battlefield to the north and west of the country.

Things have come to such a pass that reportedly, men who sign up for service in the Afghan army merely to support their families are ostracised in their villages. Resultantly, they approach the Taliban, who accept them after they have proved their loyalty. This they do by killing US and Nato soldiers — just recently six US soldiers were gunned down by an Afghan soldier. Conditions are thus ripe for a countrywide uprising against the invaders, the first signs of which may become visible in the coming year.

The first four Afghan wars established Afghanistan’s reputation as graveyard for invaders. The fifth Afghan war is destined to reinforce that reputation.

The writer is a retired brigadier.