THE recent Nato summit in Lisbon was a major development. It dispelled the impression that the US, Nato and the coalition are eager to wind up sooner rather than later.

Fixing 2014 as the goal to aspire to rather than an actual deadline for the withdrawal of combat forces should be seen in the context of President Karzai's pronouncement. In July, he said that by then the Afghan security forces will be ready to take full responsibility for military and law-enforcement operations.

The December review by the US aimed at recalculating its military presence has further cleared the clouds over the horizon. There were fears that President Obama's administration may begin shifting to a counter-terrorism strategy requiring much fewer troops in Afghanistan, according to a report published prior to the Lisbon summit by a bipartisan task force of 25 prominent analysts and former top foreign policy officials.

But the Lisbon summit set no clear game strategy for Afghanistan. The late Af-Pak Special Representative Richard Holbrooke aptly described the US as having not an exit strategy but a transition strategy. The July 2011 date given by President Obama would be just a symbolic gesture. This date, and that of 2014, is focused mainly on appeasing domestic unease over the continuation of an infinite war. These dates are based on conditions and the ground realities belie the aspirations.

Neither Nato nor President Karzai are telling the whole truth. The mostly illiterate Afghan security forces, recruited and trained on uneven ground and drawn mainly from the ethnic minorities, will not be able to fight without the International Security Assistance Force's active backup. The Afghan security forces are not led by Pakhtun officers, the traditional class of officers, and large-scale desertions are already taking place.

Secondly, the troop surge, initiated with great fanfare and expected to turn around the insurgency, win the war and force the weakened Taliban to negotiate and reintegrate, is not going to succeed. The widespread corruption and poor governance of the Karzai administration also add fuel to the fire of the insurgency.

On the other hand, the rising human and material costs of the counter-insurgency operations are not sustainable indefinitely. The continuation of the current counter-insurgency strategy further swells the ranks of the Taliban and unifies extremist groups. Meanwhile, it threatens the health of the US economy, diverts attention away from other pressing issues and alienates its population.

The consequences of defeat and total withdrawal would be catastrophic for the US, Nato and the coalition, as well as for neighbouring states — primarily Pakistan. Russia, China and India must have heaved a sigh of relief over the Lisbon declaration.

The expansion of military infrastructure in the north and west of Afghanistan, the opening of an alternative rail route passing through Ukraine or Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Mazar-i-Sharif, and the expansion of US embassies in Kabul and Islamabad at the cost of billions of dollars indicate that the US wants to remain engaged for a longer period of time in the region.

In Pakistan we remain victims of the insurgency as well as the counter-insurgency. We have no choice. The US would like to broaden cooperation from the tribal areas to the cities in Pakistan, minimise the role of Pakistan's security forces and deal directly with the insurgents.

Pakistan, however, does not want to give free movement to Americans inside the country. It still pins its hope on some of the Taliban combatants for fear of Indian influence in Afghanistan. But at the same time, the deepening economic crisis that dictates a continuous intake of US military and civilian aid remains our Achilles heel. Besides that, we face insurgency and terrorism on a wider scale.

The longer this war drags on, the more negative consequences Pakistan will face. To believe that the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan will automatically end insurgency and terrorism here in Pakistan amounts to negating history and taking a casual view of the phenomenon. Similarly, to believe that terrorism and insurgency will remain at manageable levels whatever happens in Afghanistan is wishful thinking.

The present counter-insurgency strategy is leading nowhere. The US would like to achieve its goal by different means, such as counter-terrorism conducted with the application of minimal military boots, high-tech weaponry or even by withdrawing from Pakhtun-populated areas in the south and east of Afghanistan. This would be a worst case scenario for Pakistan. The continuation of the present reactive policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan might lead us to more disasters. Our obsession with the India factor might lead us to ignore the existential threat emanating from a situation beyond our control.

The Pakistani establishment must adopt a proactive policy. The world is not going to tolerate a Taliban-led Afghanistan. A negotiated settlement with the Taliban is in our interest, as well as in that of the world. We have the natural clout of geography, history and ethnicity. War or peace in Afghanistan is unthinkable without Pakistan's help.

Instead of repeatedly listening to the US mantra of 'do more', we must take the initiative and shed our past. Whatever clout we have must be used in favour of a settlement. The stakes are high for Pakistan. In order to develop an alternative narrative, we should opt for a paradigm shift. The security doctrine pursued so far does not fit into present-day reality.

This does not mean that we ignore the eastern threat. By adopting a more robust approach, we dispel the widely held impression that Pakistan uses extremism as a foreign policy tool. Ambiguity no longer favours us; the alternatives to COIN are dreadful. Before the US decides to go for a counter-terrorism strategy, we must act decisively.

Pakistan can only force an earlier exit from Afghanistan when it is ready to play the role of an honest facilitator. By making it more difficult for America to stay in Afghanistan, we would actually be imposing an alternative strategy on them — one that would harm Pakistan most. With the passage of time, the space in which to manoeuvre is shrinking for Pakistan.

The writer is an expert on Afghanistan.