WORDS alone will not do, especially when nothing new is being said. Presiding over a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet in Islamabad on Wednesday, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani stressed that “all appropriate means” will be employed to stamp out terrorism and eliminate their sanctuaries, adding that the country had entered a “defining phase” in the battle against militancy. The prime minister also expressed his full confidence in the ability of the country's security apparatus to take on the enemy and safeguard national interests. Mr Gilani's words are bound to be met with a measure of scepticism in some circles. For one thing, it could be argued that the defining phase mentioned by the PM came years ago, not in May 2011. Two, if the security agencies are capable of destroying militants' hideouts, why wasn't such action taken earlier? Then there is the not so trifling matter of the public's waning confidence in the state's capacity to gather intelligence and ensure security. For many, the assault on the PNS Mehran airbase, as well as the storming of the army's GHQ in 2009, raises the question: if the security agencies cannot protect their own assets, how is the general public expected to feel safe?

The prime minister did, however, make a pertinent point when he called for revisiting the country's counter-terrorism strategy and developing a national consensus prior to initiating a major offensive against terrorists. But here too some may ask whether Mr Gilani's ostensibly strong words will be backed up by deeds or if they are simply an attempt at damage control following the embarrassing airbase attack. True, a national consensus is needed, as well as a “comprehensive strategy”, and in this context key players representing all spectrums of the political arena ought to make it clear where they stand in the fight against the Taliban and the various militant groups operating under its umbrella. Do they have a soft corner for the Taliban or consider them to be enemies of Pakistan? No consensus can be achieved without coming clean on this count.

Equally if not more significantly, the state too must re-evaluate its current position on the policy of the 1980s which saw Pakistan, along with the US and other allies, extending wholehearted support to the Mujahideen in their conflict with Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It was that policy that ultimately led to the creation of the Taliban and the spurt in extremism and religious intolerance in Pakistan itself. Are we still engaged in the folly of 'strategic depth' and making a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' Taliban? Those are the key questions to ask.