SOME things we take for granted. Since the 1940s, the world had come to expect that trade and tariff barriers would fall continuously. It was only natural to believe so as liberalisation had generated large-scale growth for the world economy.

Twelve sets of trade negotiations had ended with agreements, opening markets in ever-larger numbers of countries. The Doha Round has been the troubling exception. Launched in 2001, it is near its 10th anniversary with negotiations struggling. The WTO director general sees the gaps as too big to bridge soon and is looking for a way to salvage the talks. If it is premature to write an obituary for the Doha Round, it is time for us to ask whether to commission a requiem — and why.

What has changed? Growth in world trade brought about by successive trade rounds has been a win-all, underpinning globalisation and bringing firms closer to their customers and suppliers. Average tariffs have dropped — in Pakistan`s case from 46 to 9.5 per cent and from five to two per cent in the United States. Accompanied by financial deregulation, the communications revolution and improved logistics, even small and medium enterprises, have started to think globally. Helped by foreign direct investment, some developing countries have emerged as economic powerhouses.

The Uruguay Round, for example, ended with agreements on investment, inclusion of agriculture in multilateral rules and phasing out of textile quotas. Pakistan has used the end of textile quotas to double its exports from $6bn to $12bn since 2000, and put millions of young people to work. Clear lines of causation are hard to draw, but the many decades of trade liberalisation have witnessed the fastest reduction in world poverty ever measured.Doha could certainly build upon this.

Why then the deadlock? Thoughts that it reflected acrimony among individual trade ministers have faded as new governments in major players take office. Nor has it reflected a problem with procedures: within the constraints of a single undertaking, Doha has experimented with a number of negotiating platforms, at various times constituting the `Group of Seven` and a `Group of Four`. But throughout, negotiations have only hardened already fixed positions, and individual country or regional priorities have trumped any vision of shared good.

A more fundamental challenge is the fact that each of the WTO`s 153 members wants trade liberalisation by others, but worries about politics at home. To an extent, this was also true in earlier rounds. This time most major players view the Doha Round as one in which only others are to make concessions.

This attitude can be traced to the Round`s launch in 2001, when the Doha Round started life as the Doha Development Agenda. Developing countries assumed immediately an ambitious Round aligned completely with their perceived interests. Industrial economies thought otherwise. Their view has been that fast-growing giants such as China, India and Brazil — as the principal beneficiaries of the trading system — would open their markets.

Given such expectations, the outcome has been an impasse.

Other developments may also have reduced the perceived urgency of a multilateral agreement. As globalisation progressed, countries that hitherto believed in import substitution liberalised voluntarily. Such reduction of barriers, often beyond World Trade Organisation commitments, reduced the bargaining power of developing economies. Also, the European Union`s success brought about a burst of regional and bilateral trade agreements, allowing big countries to concentrate on agreements with smaller economies and work around tricky issues like farm subsidies. These too compromised commitment to a multilateral agreement.

In this regard, Pakistan has been a victim as a country without FTA (Free Trade Agreements) relationships in Europe, the United States or East Asia. Relying on textile exports for much of the nation`s foreign exchange and high-quality urban employment, the country faces very high tariffs in its major markets, up to 32 per cent in the case of the United States.

All of these have made conclusion of Doha difficult, with negotiations languishing and deadlines fixed only to be postponed. This in turn has led to a perceptible drift in policy. Even obviously protectionist measures by industrial and emerging economies in the wake of the global financial crisis went with little comment.

The obvious question is whether there is a way to revive the larger vision of Doha and the global trading system. This calls for wisdom and political risk-taking that few members have displayed so far — but it is worth the effort, and perhaps they can find this wisdom when they must. Estimates of benefits from Doha vary greatly though these are uniformly large. The numbers one may contest. The greatest loss would be weakened confidence in the multilateral trading system and the fear that protectionism could rear its menacing head anytime. It is incumbent on world leaders to save world trade from uncertainty and a possible repeat of the kind of protectionism that caused the Great Depression 80 years ago.Calls to `save WTO from Doha` have not so far come with an alternative agenda, let alone one with value comparable to that of a multilateral round. If the WTO is to avoid the risk of evolving into a talking shop comparable to another UN General Assembly or simply left to resolve disputes, world leaders must decide that they — not the line negotiators — own the talks and put political weight behind them.

Meanwhile, members must deliberate on evolving new modalities for negotiations that would make an agreement likely. They may also deliberate new areas of possible congruence of interest among members. Likewise, countries and companies that have benefited so much from world trade must commit themselves to further liberalisation. An enlarged trading pie will benefit all, including those that do not perceive immediate gains for themselves.

The few voices left in support of multilateral trade agreements must not give up.

Ashraf Hayat is a former civil servant currently with NUST and COMSATS, Islamabad. Edward Gresser is director at the Global Works Foundation, Washington DC and teaches at Johns Hopkins University.