REPORTS from Kabul, Islamabad, Washington and New York indicate that peace talks between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban are inching ahead. This was confirmed by President Hamid Karzai who said on Saturday that peace talks with the Taliban were going on.

On the same day, the UN Security Council meeting in New York separated the '1267' joint list of names of members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This will permit the Taliban leadership to come in from the cold. It may be noted that both Gen Ashfaq Kayani and Gen Shuja Pasha representing the ISI are actively working with Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Afghan High Peace Council, who is leading the peace talks. Pakistan reportedly facilitated a meeting between Siraj Haqqani and the Afghan president a few days ago. Yet, it is still too early to be optimistic.

At the same time, the US has put forth its terms for negotiations. These were expressed by the State Department's spokesperson Mark Toner who said that “They [the Taliban] must renounce violence; they must abandon their alliance with Al Qaeda; and they must abide by the constitution of Afghanistan; this is the price for reaching a political resolution and bringing an end to the military actions….”

The response of the Taliban was equally swift. On Saturday, two suicide bombers blew themselves up outside a police station in Kabul; three police officers, one intelligence agent and five civilians were killed in this assault. Clearly, the Taliban do not subscribe to the US red lines and perceive the US as a spent force on the decline. It is evident that as time passes, the US will become peripheral to the peace talks and as such Pakistan has the opportunity to play a constructive role and Mr Karzai realises it.

It will thus be more opportune for the US defence and military elite to recognise that with the passage of time the US will lose the capacity to shape future outcomes in these negotiations; thus it is now, more than before, that the US needs Pakistan's help to exit in a respectable manner from Afghanistan. This can only be provided by a friendly and a strong Pakistan. Its continuous rubbishing in the US is shortsighted.

The above discussion highlights the factors that will shape Pakistan. What the latter lacks at present is an agreed policy towards these negotiations. Long after the US and the others have left, we will remain in the same neighbourhood. So what are the risks that we should guard against and the results that we should seek as a final outcome of the Afghan peace talks?

After the death of Osama bin Laden, the new leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri doesn't have much love lost for Pakistan. As a matter of fact, he has been propagating since 2007 that Pakistan must be targeted since it is an 'apostate' state in league with the US; he defined the 'near enemy', (Pakistan) as a more dangerous threat to achieving ideological goals than the US.

Secondly, Al Qaeda has taken over the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and transformed it to fight the country. In 2008, Al-Zawahiri was the force that combined all the Pakistani militant splinter groups to form the TTP. -

The creation of a jihadist front in Waziristan and later in Bajaur and Swat was a part of Al Qaeda's policy to disperse the Pakistani forces, so that their passage to attack Isaf forces in Afghanistan was clear. It was only Maulvi Nazir in Wana and Siraj Haqqani in North Waziristan who stood against Al-Zawahiri's designs. Both Maulvi Nazir and Haqqani have refused to fight the Pakistan military. In order to neutralise the Haqqanis and Maulvi Nazir, AlZawahiri has used the TTP, the Uzbeks and the Kashmiri militants to challenge their remit.

This was what compelled Maulvi Nazir to massacre Uzbeks in Wana in 2007, who had virtually imprisoned him near Wana. The Haqqanis have since the 1980s relied upon Pakistanis from southern Punjab to do their fighting; it is for this reason that there are so many Punjabi families settled in North Waziristan. shura

To neutralise Haqqani's fighters and to drive a wedge in their (Punjabi Taliban) ranks Al Qaeda succeeded in winning the support of an outstanding Kashmiri militant Ilyas Kashmiri. He not only transferred his loyalties but was found so capable that he was made a member of Al Qaeda's inner and given command of its feared 313 Brigade. Ilyas Kashmiri's recent reported death in a drone strike has upset Al Qaeda's plans to subvert the Punjabi Taliban under Haqqani's command. The irony is that in this way the US has helped its arch foes the Haqqanis.

The equation described indicates clearly that Pakistan needs to protect its own self-interest in the restructuring that is bound to take place after the start of the peace talks. It is not certain that the peace talks with the Taliban will succeed. Whatever the final outcome, the following is essential from the point of view of Pakistan's own national interest: firstly, it must initiate a comprehensive rehabilitation, reintegration and reconciliation programme for militants that is fully budgeted with national legislation covering it.

Secondly, there must a crafting of robust civil-military institutional arrangements to take the process of de-radicalisation, reintegration and reconciliation forward. Thirdly, the military must disengage from handling civilian detainees — it is the police's job; dealing with detainees causes feelings of ill will and vendettas against the military. Lastly, this process must be led by the civilian political leadership.

If these policies are successfully implemented they will go a long way in bringing peace to our troubled land. We have reached a historical junction and should not be found wanting.

The writer is chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research in Peshawar.

azizkhalid@gmail.com