IMMEDIATELY after Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s recent visit to Islamabad, which focused on making joint efforts to contact the Afghan Taliban, there has been a sudden eruption of claims and counter-claims regarding talks with the militia, bringing into focus the reconciliation process with the Taliban.

Mr Karzai himself made the first public disclosure of US-Taliban direct contacts following the UN decision of splitting the sanction regime separating the Taliban from Al Qaeda. He said that talks with the Taliban had started and that foreign forces, especially the United States, were carrying out the talks themselves. The Taliban, as usual, denied any sort of contact with the US.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, acknowledging contacts with the militia, said these were at a ‘very preliminary’ stage. The UK also confirmed contacts with the Taliban. However, a closer reading of President Karzai’s statement reveals the Afghan leader’s irritation with America’s direct approach towards the Taliban, which contradicts Washington’s own policy of supporting Afghan-led reconciliation.

US President Barack Obama, while recently announcing the US troops’ drawdown, said that America will join peace initiatives that reconcile Afghan people, including the Taliban. He indicated that these initiatives must be led by the Afghan government.

However, Obama created some confusion when he reiterated the need for preconditions for talks with the Taliban: “Those who want to be part of [a] peaceful Afghanistan must break from Al Qaeda, abandon violence and abide by the Afghan constitution,” he said.

This contradicts earlier reports attributed to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who said that the US would no longer insist on such preconditions, adding that such declarations could be made after a deal had been reached.

President Karzai feels more confident after getting assurances from the Pakistani leadership to help his government reach out to Taliban leaders such as Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Network. Observers believe Karzai’s visit to Islamabad brought some perceptional changes in Kabul’s attitude regarding Pakistan’s role in a future Afghan settlement.

Reaching Kabul, the president gave the impression of being convinced — this time — of Pakistan’s seriousness in supporting peace initiatives, raising the expectations of Afghans believing it to be Pakistan’s responsibility to ‘compel’ the Taliban leadership to sit with the government for negotiations.

The situation in Afghanistan is quite complicated, particularly for Pakistan. Faced with increasing deterioration in the internal law and order situation, organised attacks on border villages from Afghanistan and mounting pressure from the US, Pakistan, no doubt, is ready to go the extra mile to support Karzai’s initiative to end the insurgency.

But prior to making any commitment on behalf of the Taliban, Pakistan needs to undertake a thorough study of the situation in Afghanistan. Today, Pakistan stands demonised in the eyes of common Afghans, thanks to the efforts of the incumbent Afghan regime and its international backers. Again, after exhausting all options of eliminating the Taliban over the last 10 years, the US and the Afghan government have successfully shifted the blame for their collective failure to Pakistan, convincing Afghans that Pakistan is providing safe havens and training facilities to the Taliban across the border.

In Islamabad, President Karzai pressed Pakistan hard to arrange meetings with Taliban leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani.

Washington is against any official Afghan contact with Haqqani — a fact known to both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Interestingly, Pakistan has agreed with the Afghan president to jointly convince the US not to oppose Pakistan-facilitated contacts with the Haqqani Network.

Likewise, Pakistan also needs to understand the mindset of the Taliban, particularly its reclusive leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, who will never negotiate any peace pact with the Karzai regime. The Taliban are convinced Karzai is a weak man, totally dependent on the US and unable to take independent decisions. This fact is evident from the performance of the High Council for Peace that has failed to establish contact with the Taliban.

Also, Pakistan does not enjoy past prestige in the eyes of the Taliban because of its perceived betrayals of the militia. This time, the Taliban will not do Pakistan’s bidding so easily. In the prevailing circumstances, if the Taliban ever want to participate in any peace process, they will prefer to do that directly with the US.

Then, there are people in the Karzai administration that ascended the ladder of power overnight in post-Taliban Kabul. This group, comprising former Pakhtun warlords and ethnic Tajiks, is against any power-sharing with the Taliban. Facing tough opposition from within, the weak and indecisive Hamid Karzai will never choose to share power with his Popalzai cousin, Mullah Omar.

The Karzai regime fears that in case of any rapprochement, the US and international forces will leave Afghanistan while the Taliban will stay back with an exalted sense of victory over the sole superpower.

Pakistan should wait and observe how others i.e. the Taliban, the US and the Afghan government, are repositioning themselves in the emerging scenario. There are some noticeable changes in US policy towards the Taliban, such as referring to the militia by its name and not ‘terrorists’ or ‘insurgents’. This gives the impression of acceptance as a future political force.

Washington has also shown further seriousness in a political settlement to the conflict when, after the death of Richard Holbrooke, Mark Grossman — known as ‘Mr Reconciliation’ — was appointed as special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan and brought changes in the administration by replacing the hard-line ambassador to Kabul, Gen Karl W. Eikenberry, with a much more amiable Ryan C. Crocker.

The Karzai government has also realised, though late, that the policy of ‘reintegration’ of the Taliban’s lower cadres is wrong and needs to be discarded. It has now decided to focus on making direct contacts with the real leadership of the Taliban.

Pakistan also needs to study cautiously the extraordinary rush of the US and President Karzai towards Islamabad for approaching the Taliban. Both Washington and Kabul believe that following Osama bin Laden’s elimination inside Pakistan, Islamabad is under tremendous pressure and they can extract more from it.

Moreover, the US and President Karzai want to finish the job as early as possible. Obama wants to cash it in for the upcoming presidential elections, while Karzai wants the job done before 2014, when his second term in office expires.

On the contrary, there is no rush on part of the Taliban. They are giving a persistently tough fight to the war-weary US and international forces. Currently, the Taliban are riding high and bringing them to the table to negotiate is a tough task indeed.

The writer is director news and current affairs, Khyber TV Islamabad.

hasan.khyber@gmail.com