THE much-heralded US policy change in Afghanistan has begun with President Obama's announcement to pull out 33,000 troops by September 2012.

That will leave about 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan. Of these, most will be withdrawn by 2014. The president's decision should be seen as a statement of intent rather than a plan for a smooth draw-down.

It is questionable whether Afghanistan deserved retribution for 9/11 in the first place. Of the 19 hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks, 15 were from Saudi Arabia, one was Egyptian, another Lebanese and two were from the UAE. None of them were from either Afghanistan or Pakistan. However, American ire fell primarily on Afghanistan and Iraq, while Pakistan was also deeply affected.

Now, President Obama has said that the withdrawal from Afghanistan is in the best interests of the US in terms of security as well as its economy. It may be pertinent to inquire whether what is being contemplated is also in the best future interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan. How will these countries tackle the fallout of the withdrawal? War was brought to these countries. What were its objectives and have they been fulfilled?

Such questions often do not figure in the calculations of superpowers. The pain and misery suffered by countless men, women and servicemen of these nations, along with the institutional degradation that is the consequence of war, may never be remedied. The total loss suffered by Pakistan as a result of the war stands in excess of $65bn. Its economy is in shambles, while Al Qaeda is more strongly entrenched today in Fata and in Pakistan's cities than it was prior to 9/11. Cables from Kabul

In Afghanistan, meanwhile, government control is tenuous. In his revealing account of Afghanistan, , Sherard Cowper-Coles says that when the then UK foreign secretary David Miliband visited southern Afghanistan, he inquired of some Afghans how long they expected their government to exist in Lashkar Gah after the withdrawal of Western forces. They replied, “Twenty-four hours.”

It is difficult to imagine that the US spent nearly $4trn, according to some estimates, on its Afghan and Iraq campaigns and yet achieved such poor outcomes. After reading many of the important analyses published during the last 10 years, one is perplexed by the poor decision-making regarding both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The tragedy is that in the aftermath of the US withdrawal, and given its current tensions with Pakistan, peace will not return quickly to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

One must sympathise with the Afghan president, sitting as he is atop a time bomb. He has to quickly improvise to resolve the predicament that he is in, or the US exit could end up resembling the circumstances that prevailed in Kabul after the Soviets withdrew in 1989. The move could leave in its wake a powerless president. Recent Afghan history shows that governments last as long as they are subsidised; President Najibullah lasted for three years after the Soviet withdrawal and his government fell after Gorbachev stopped financial assistance. There is a lesson here.

What happened to the poverty stricken people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, who are amongst the most wretched in wake of the violence of various sorts triggered after 9/11, is tragic. Also, if the war in Afghanistan was not based on justice, how then is one to define the sacrifices of so many loyal citizens of different nations who gave their lives for their countries while fighting in Afghanistan? Similarly, what is the justification for the deaths of so many innocent civilians in this war?

The Afghan invasion raises serious concerns about the principles under which the international security system operates through the UN Security Council. Doubts must be raised about whether the principles of the UN Charter are followed in spirit. In some people's view, yet another issue is whether these 21st century wars are the result of the manipulative manoeuvres of powerful corporations and individuals. Could it be that these wars were undertaken for business interests through the machinations of a collusive civil-military elite reminiscent of 18th century imperialism?

Given the above factors, what is the best course to adopt for the troubled nations of Afghanistan and Pakistan? Will the US withdrawal lead to more trouble?

Clearly, peace in Afghanistan will depend on achieving success in reaching an agreement between the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. These groups should negotiate amongst themselves in order to lay down a framework for peace. They need to decide as soon as possible how they wish to manage the state after the withdrawal of foreign forces.

It would appear that this is not a task for Prof. Rabbani's High Peace Council alone but a matter to be considered by the Loya Jirga under Article 110 of the Afghan constitution. This forum is empowered under Article 111 of the constitution to take decisions that involve the supreme national interest of Afghanistan. Today, achieving peace in the country is the most important task. However, after consultation with the Taliban leadership, legal representation for their formal participation in the deliberations will need to be found; currently, the Afghan Taliban are not part of the Loya Jirga. This may require a constitutional amendment that permits them to be included. n

On the Pakistani side, the indicator of success will be to end the influence and presence of Al Qaeda in Pakistani areas, particularly in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in our cities. The military has already begun cleansing its establishment. However, the hope for peace will be stillborn unless the Taliban accept it. In the absence of such a commitment, President Obama's withdrawal strategy will amount to a manoeuvre designed to suit his political needs alone. It is thus essential to get a commitment for peace from the Taliban immediately.

The writer is chairman of the Regional Institute of Policy Research in Peshawar.

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