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Altaf Hussain’s press conference has among other things reignited the debate over MQM and its relationship with the military establishment. What on earth was the MQM head honcho hinting at when he suggested that the army, the ISI and the MQM join hands?
Predictably, many seized on his statement to predict – for the umpteenth time – that the army is about to jump into Karachi.
Tired of the shenanigans of the politicians (writers and columnists have done to death the cliché about our politicians being Nero’s fiddling as Karachi burned) the army provoked Zulfikar Mirza to attack MQM and Rehman Malik; scuttled the MQM-PPP talks and is now building the momentum for an operation in Karachi. The joint investigation reports widely available on the web, in this theory, were leaked to have the same impact as the footage of the flogging of the girl in Swat — create national outrage that will then lead to support for the use of state violence.
But how plausible is this?
The military, which is grappling with American pressure, an insurgency in its backyard and a poor image, is going to go into Karachi for operation clean up?
It has already dealt with this unpleasant task once.
This is not Swat or Bajaur where the worst aspects of an operation can easily be hidden from the general public. In a place such as Karachi more people will witness the human rights violations and more people will report it — journalists, human rights groups and the international observers. As a result there will be a bigger outcry and a bigger reaction.
The military, bruised after its recent international and domestic encounter, is not going to risk all this.
Then how does one explain the bizarre set of events that has been set off by Zulfiqar Mirza’s and Altaf’s trend setting press conferences.
The parallels for this can be found not in Swat but the fracas that we witnessed over the restoration of the judiciary; the protest over the Kerry Lugar Bill and the striking down of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO).
Take the NRO. The law was passed by General (retd) Musharraf at a time when he was at his loneliest. There were few supporters and takers for him or his desperate measures then. But he still passed the law to cling on to power.
After his departure and the judiciary’s restoration, the SC took up the case again. At about the same time, the media as well the political parties also decided the law had to be critiqued. Soon afterwards, political parties joined in. The MQM, which was then the most loyal of allies, suddenly spoke out against the bill. Within a matter of days the PPP government had decided to not support the bill in the Court and it was struck down at the end of 2009.
A similar phenomenon was witnessed over the Kerry Lugar bill. It was in the pipeline from the time of the Bush Administration. But when it finally became a reality, the nation suddenly woke up to its downsides. No one was willing to be charitable. And dropping its defence of the bill, the PPP government backed down and sent then foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi to the US to register its ‘reservations’. The WikiLeaks cables now make it clear that the military had been opposed to the Kerry Lugar Bill.
Since the PPP has come into powers this script has played out time and again. Each time the government has taken a certain stand ‘deemed inappropriate’ it has faced pressure – from various quarters including the courts, the media and the military. Add to the mix, rumours about the impending departure of the government and the PPP has backed down.
Karachi is no different.
The political wrangling in the city has been has been intensifying since the 2008 elections. It initially started with a face off between two ethnic groups’ seamier elements. In 2009 whenever violence brought the city to a halt, the interior minister would rush to the city and meet MQM and ANP leaders and the situation would return to normal.
By the time 2010 rolled around, Lyari entered the fray. Nonetheless, the three allies still managed to curb the killing sprees after a few days of mayhem.
By this year, however, the violence had become more frequent and the peaceful interludes shorter. The parties were no longer in the mood to control their violent elements.
But outside of the parties, the situation was becoming unacceptable. Public opinion was turning against their politicking: people as well as the business sector were suffering far too much.
The military was concerned — not just because it sees itself as a check on the politicians but also because it now realises the importance of a flourishing economy. If the country does well economically, there is bigger pie to go around of which a significant portion goes to the uniformed boys.
By last month, the military was becoming edgy; a Corps Commanders’ conference in mid August was followed by an ISPR press release expressing concern over Karachi. In the first week of September DG ISPR took it upon himself to express how the operation in Karachi should be carried out. For once he didn’t say that this was a political issue that didn’t concern his bosses.
Just days earlier on August 28, Mirza had held the media enthralled with his frenzied talk at the Karachi press club. (His press conference was reminiscent of the one by Shah Mehmood Qureshi in which he had declared that Raymond Davis did not have diplomatic immunity; the same day the Foreign Office, reportedly, was about to announce that Raymond enjoyed immunity).
Days before Mirza held forth, a website had appeared making public purportedly the same documents that he flashed. The last week of August was also when the Supreme Court decided to hold a hearing on the Karachi situation.
These seemingly unconnected events had one effect. The PPP and the MQM came under pressure.
The violence in Karachi slowed down. The Rangers got some leeway to conduct an operation away from the pressure of the political parties.
It is too early to know if these various acts were a coincidence or orchestrated. But there is no doubt that had they not taken place, the government in Sindh would continued to sacrifice lives and security at the alter of political expediency. The parties would have let people die as they thrashed out their bilateral relations.
In addition, the Karach crisis revealed or highlighted once again the existing civil military divide — a divide that is there even though no longer can we expect governments to be sacked or mid term elections held or coups to happen.
This is why now brinkmanship and psy-ops operations are used to make sure that politicians do not stray too far from the ‘right’ path. This is what Mirza became a part of and what Hussain realised when he appealed to the military in his speech. And we may just see more of this in the future too.
Arifa Noor is Dawn’s resident editor in Islamabad.
