RELATIONS between the US and Pakistan are plummeting — again. This time, the attack on the US embassy compound in Kabul and the bombing of a US base in Wardak appear to have driven American officials to a concerted verbal assault against Pakistan. What is highly unusual, though, is the directness of the accusations and the seniority of the officials making the allegations. Adm Mike Mullen may be on the verge of retirement, but he is still the senior-most armed forces official in the US. And yet, the American allegations raise at least two important questions. One, to what extent does Pakistan influence the behaviour of the Haqqani network? Two, even if Pakistan does have serious influence with the Haqqani group, why would it urge them to attack the US embassy compound? Surely, the furious response of American authorities could have been predicted and there would be little to gain by poking the Americans in the eye at this juncture.

Perhaps if the US were to bring into the public domain the 'credible intelligence' it has gathered on Haqqani involvement and Pakistani complicity, the issue could be moved forward some. As long as these issues are argued over in private, the possibility of either side accepting the other's point of view appears to be very slim. At the moment, the army here appears content to thrust the civilians into the foreground to argue Pakistan's case and the civilians are doing it in the only way they know how: matching rhetoric for rhetoric. However, the allegations are too serious to go unanswered directly and, were evidence to be brought into the public domain, the army would need to explicitly state what it will do to address the problem. Pakistan should not want to and simply cannot afford to have its territory used for attacks in this manner; the price in global and regional isolation that this country will have to pay is simply not worth it.

For now, though, the US appears to still understand the need to ultimately keep Pakistan engaged. Adm Mullen may have been direct in his criticism, but his full statement shows signs of understanding the bargain that the US must strike: remain engaged with Pakistan and the US can address some of its interests; disengage and the cost of protecting or pursuing its interests will go up significantly. For Pakistan, too, a similar realisation must come into play: if Pakistan's interests, as defined by the army, and US interests don't always mesh, a rupture in relations would leave Pakistan, as the smaller power, significantly worse off.