'OPERATIONALISE' has become a key concept in the US-Pakistan relationship, mentioned by both the US secretary of state and the Pakistani foreign minister last week. It was used in reference to a number of plans for regional security, but the focus seems to have been on Afghanistan's reconci-liation process. This was confirmed on Tuesday when State Department officials said the next step forward in US-Pakistan relations is to flesh out the operational details of the dialogue. Given the mixed achievements of the Isaf and Afghan military effort next door, this is a welcome move, demonstrating an acceptance that force alone is not going to resolve the power struggle in Afghanistan — at least not before the Americans leave in 2014.

Despite Ms Clinton's claims that the US and Pakistan have agreed on most issues, however, the mechanisms, parameters and goals of the reconciliation process seem to be shrouded in confusion. One example of this is the repeated mention by both sides of the Sept 29 all-party conference resolution as an indication of Pakistan's willingness to support dialogue. That is broadly true, but dialogue with whom? Insofar as it offers specifics, the resolution states Pakistan should talk “with our own people in the tribal areas” and makes no mention of the Haqqani network or the Afghan Taliban, despite the fact that the conference took place in the context of American accusations about Pakis tani support for the former. Second, while not specifically mentioning North Waziristan, it states that defending Pakistan's sovereignty is a “sacred duty” and that “national interests … shall guide Pakistan's policy”. In the context of events at the time, this is effectively an indication that Pakistan will only launch an operation against the Haqqanis if and when it wants to and not under US pressure. How will this be squared with America's recently expressed desire that militants be “squeezed” even as talks are taking place? Can the Haqqani network be brought to the table if Pakistan refuses to go after it?

But relying on the APC resolution only seems to be one potential source of confusion about the reconciliation process. Many questions remain. Will the three countries maintain their own separate dialogues? How will the core group of America, Pakistan and Afghanistan work alongside the bilateral effort that Pakistan and Afghanistan have supposedly been working on? What red lines are in fact workable? Is giving up arms, for example, a realistic precondition given the cultural issues involved? It is about time to start implementing the reconciliation process — or to restart it, rather — but the path forward is not as clear as public diplomacy might suggest.