FOR those of us who spend time analysing the US and Pakistani outlooks towards the so-called ‘endgame’ in Afghanistan, the picture looks quite murky. There has been a lot of thinking and a flurry of analysis by various think tanks, experts and the relevant officialdoms on this issue. As seen in Pakistan, a common thread that cuts across all of these with regard to US policy is confusion.

The most cynical of Pakistani voices argues that there is some grand design and planning behind this. Washington is deliberately hiding its actual strategy — such voices would have us believe it is a nefarious strategy — the argument goes. For someone who has some insight into the workings of Washington, these views are too conspiratorial. In reality, the perceived lack of clarity is an outcome of the genuine but inconclusive debate in the US on the Afghan conundrum. The confusion stems from the inability of a truly democratic — at times chaotically so — decision-making process to readily agree on what is essentially a sub-optimal end-state from Washington’s perspective. Hardly surprising, various institutional, ideological and political interests are at play as each stakeholder seeks to safeguard its position vis-à-vis the other. There are those who want the military surge to be given more time, others who want reconciliation to be the foremost focus, yet others who simply want out of the situation, and perhaps some who do not consider the status quo as all that bad.

The status quo has given an advantage to some views over others as far as the operational US policy on the ground is concerned but none has won out completely. And thus what you get as an external partner or independent observer are mixed, and sometimes even contradictory signals emanate from Washington. Interestingly, since Washingtonians are so used to this process, they are not nearly as sensitive as they should be to how directly this perceived confusion impacts on the calculus of other stakeholders.

No surprise then that Pakistani officialdom and the broader policy community has continuously pointed to this lack of clarity in Washington as a major impediment to devising a workable plan for the endgame in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s own policy has been reactive and Rawalpindi is reluctant to show its cards until it knows what Washington really wants.

This dynamic is problematic. It is keeping the two most important external parties in the Afghan conundrum in a holding pattern at a time when proactive conflict-resolution efforts are required. The danger: if they don’t urgently work out the specifics of a future game plan, they may simply run out of time.

The mainstream Pakistani view focuses on only one part of this calculus, i.e. if the US can’t decide what it wants to do, it is destined to fail in Afghanistan. From Pakistan’s perspective, more important though ought to be another realisation: Pakistan will hurt immensely if the US fails and Afghanistan descends into chaos.

My obvious suggestion at this point should be to urge Washington to work through its internal debates and lay out a clear policy path. While this is much needed and a line I would wholeheartedly push in Washington, signalling this as a possibility Pakistani policymakers should bank on will be disingenuous and misleading.

The fact is that between now and 2014, Pakistani policymakers will have to accept the lack of clarity in Washington’s position as a fait accompli. And yet, for Pakistan’s own sake, they must find a way to work through the partnership to give the Afghan endgame a fair chance to succeed.

The perceived lack of clarity in Washington is likely to remain intact for several reasons.

First, interagency coordination in Washington is unlikely to improve astronomically any time soon. The structures are fairly entrenched; the various institutions that provide input to formulate what is ultimately seen as US foreign policy will continue to radiate a sense of confusion and competing interests on what is truly a divisive issue with extremely high stakes.

Moreover, since there are multiple channels for official US-Pakistan meetings (and too many messengers), Islamabad will find more than enough difference of opinion in the various meetings to remain suspicious of Washington’s real intent. The deep-seated and ever-growing mistrust between the two sides will always push Pakistani minds to focus on the most cynical of views from the other side.

Next, the US and Pakistan are constantly trying to balance vis-à-vis other regional actors, and given competing interests in the region, both are bound to give different messages to different partners. Their statements in various regional capitals will never add up and will continue to raise eyebrows.

Finally, the US has just entered its election cycle and one can expect serious criticism against Pakistan in public pronouncements given Islamabad’s extremely negative perception in the US. This will run parallel to US government efforts to keep Pakistan constructively engaged on the Afghan endgame. On the face of it, there will be an obvious contradiction in this behaviour; politically motivated statements will irk Pakistanis and they will continue questioning US sincerity towards their country.

Moving forward, it will be critical for Pakistani policymakers to contextualise public statements from Washington and to be able to decipher just which ones are worthy of policy attention. The Pakistani embassy in Washington, analysts who understand Washington, and unofficial interlocutors will have a key role in helping the state ensure this.

Even tougher, Pakistani decision-makers will have to avoid getting affected by the anti-American sentiment on the Pakistani street which is certain to grow if the politicking in Washington plays out as I have predicted.

Finally, dare I say that the respective officialdoms will have to start giving each other the benefit of the doubt and trusting the other’s intent to give peace a real chance in Afghanistan. Closed-door meetings can’t be about signalling anymore. They have to be candid, bold and honest. Neither side has the luxury to keep going round in circles any more.

The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.