DURING US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent trip to Islamabad, Clinton confirmed the US has been reaching out to the Taliban and Haqqani network to “test their willingness” to participate in talks.

Clinton also stated the US belief that Pakistan could “encourage, push, squeeze” these actors to the negotiating table. Does the US have what it takes to usher the parties through meaningful and sustainable negotiations?

In peace negotiations like this, the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate, wherein both parties recognise they are at an impasse, can help push parties to the negotiating table. The US has recognised this logic and its ‘fight-talk’ strategy, whereby it fights militant groups to the negotiating table, has been a hallmark of its approach.

However, at this point, the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups do not perceive themselves to be at a stalemate. Coalition fatalities for 2011 are near 2009 levels and recent events like the assault on the US embassy in Kabul and the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani served as reminders of the asymmetric nature of this conflict.

The US ability to continue to fight the Taliban to the table is in jeopardy due to the planned 2012 surge drawdown and the 2014 deadline to transition to the ill-equipped Afghan National Forces. Moreover, as Clinton said, Pakistan disagrees with ‘fight-talk’ and wants a ceasefire as a precondition for talks.

The US also has limited leverage regarding one of the major players (some would say spoiler) in this negotiation — Pakistan. Pakistan has made no secret that its national security strategy depends on a friendly regime on its western border.

The recent announcement of an Afghan-India strategic partnership does little to assuage Pakistani concerns. The recent meetings served as acknowledgment, finally, that Pakistan could not be bypassed in the negotiations. However, this comes a bit late and at a period when the trust deficit between the two countries is at an all-time low.

While the US demands much of its strategic partnership with Pakistan, there is a huge gap between the assurances the US gives Pakistan and its actions on the ground. From the Raymond Davis incident, to the operation to capture Osama bin Laden, to the recent accusations by (now retired) Adm Mullen of Pakistani links to the US embassy attack in Kabul, the US has applied a short-term lens where it needs a long-term one.

Mitigating negative Pakistani influence requires shifting the Pakistani strategic calculus away from seeing India as an eternal enemy. The US cannot hope to have any role in fostering this if its strategy is geared towards short-term goals which continue to feed the trust deficit.

If pushing actors to the table will not work, the US will need to make the dramatic shift towards developing enticing offers that will serve to pull the various parties to the table. Regarding the Taliban, this could include the expansion of disarming, demobilisation and reintegration operations for the low and mid-level cadre.

Bringing high-level Taliban officials to the table may require power-sharing incentives. The problem with this is it would require the Taliban placing trust in the Afghan government which consists of anti-Taliban forces as well as former warlords that opposed them militarily.

While the Pakhtuns are the majority population in Afghanistan, they have been underrepresented in the post-Taliban government and security forces. Thus, the Taliban would have a strong interest in maintaining itself as a cohesive unit to further its interests.

The US will also have to focus on pull factors with Pakistan, which may include allowing a more robust role for Pakistan in brokering negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups.

When/if there are formal negotiations, a much overlooked yet critical factor that will require focus is justice for victims of violence. This is a critical element to ensure the relevance and permanence of a negotiated peace. Reintegration of militants will most directly affect the communities into which these fighters are reintegrated. Afghans will have to apply the most appropriate type of justice for their circumstance.

Some may consider negotiations a signal that the end is near. But those of us who work in and study conflict-affected societies know this is only the beginning.

If the US and its partners want to do it right, it will be a costly, years-long process. It is an important moment, and a solemn one, wherein each actor needs to do hard thinking about the contours of their strategic partnerships. We see this happening in real time, through examples like the evolving Pakistan-China relations and emerging Afghan-India partnership.

Indeed, the modern iteration of the geopolitical balance in the region is in a formative stage and this generation of conflict will have an indelible mark on how the chips fall.

The writer is a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She can be reached at b.gleixner.hayat@gmail.com