UNFOLDED by Chairman of the 16-member Parliamentary Committee on National Security, Senator Raza Rabbani, the recommendations on the revision of the terms of engagement with the US are unprecedented in Pakistan’s foreign policy decision-making record.

First, it is rather positive that parliament has ably come up with its inputs in the foreign-policy-making process, which, as history amply demonstrates, has been directed by the military-civil bureaucracy without any major exception.

Furthermore, it is encouraging for another reason: a comprehensive set of contours of our future relationship with the US has been effectively laid down.

This development ought to be seen in a wider perspective. It should be seen in the perspective of future relationship with the US, and not solely as a note on the bygone phase.

In this regard it would, therefore, not be an exaggeration to state that Pakistan will gain the most out of it. In addition, the ‘mistrust’ that has marred the strategic relationship will perhaps wither away.

Besides, it will help strengthen the erstwhile strategic partnership between the two states. The fact is that the mistrust which marred the relationship has primarily been a direct outcome of the absence of an agreed formula. The Raymond David case and its effects on the partnership — and a number of other instances — bear the above argument out.

In the second place, if one looks at the underlying causes of deterioration of relationship, it becomes explicitly clear that most of the factors have been addressed in the 16-point report of the PCNS.

The other issues are of paramount significance in bringing the two allies closer and back to the table.

In a nutshell, the development should neither be understated, nor should it be overstated. Instead, it ought to be agreed upon — though with alterations, if needed.

SYED GOHAR ALTAF Islamabad

A neutral Afghanistan

THIS is apropos of the letter ‘A neutral Afghanistan’ (March 19). While broadly agreeing with the writer’s suggestion that a ‘neutral Afghanistan is in the interest of the region’, I disagree with his overall view which failed to take cognisance of the domestic and international fallout of Pakistan’s Afghan policy during the last few decades.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have a long history of troubled past relations, oscillating between mistrust and stability. Pakistan, after adopting a ‘defensive policy’ vis-à-vis Afghanistan in the initial decades, began to pursue an ambitious strategic agenda in Afghanistan during the course of Afghan Jihad. Brimming with self-confidence in the wake of the Soviet defeat, the military establishment extended support to the Pakhtun Islamists of Afghanistan in order to curb Pakhtun nationalism, train and indoctrinate recruits for the Kashmir jihad, achieve strategic depth, and open up trade route to the resource-rich Central Asia.

It temporarily achieved some of these objectives but at a great national and international cost.

Regionally, Islamabad’s support to the Taliban adversely affected its relations with Iran, Central Asian Republics, Russia and even China.

Internationally, the Taliban’s mediaeval laws, ties with Al Qaeda, repressive gender policies, and very poor human rights record embarrassed Pakistan and increased its isolation.

The changed geopolitical realities of the post-9/11 world provided Pakistan an opportunity to repair its tainted international image and begin a new chapter of cooperative ties with Afghanistan and other regional players. It, however, squandered this opportunity by continuing to maintain links with the Islamic extremists.

In the post-Taliban period, Islamabad, pursuing a two-track policy, kept on providing tacit support to the Afghan Taliban while simultaneously claiming to be pursuing peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, it repeatedly voiced concerns regarding the growing Indo-Afghan nexus. Its concerns were genuine as far as India’s role in fomenting unrest in Balochistan was concerned. But, given its own record of meddling in others’ internal affairs, Pakistan failed to draw assertive international attention to the issue. Besides, Pakistan’s desire for a stable western border and a friendly, or at least neutral, regime in Kabul was entirely understandable and might have evoked international sympathy had Islamabad pursued the right and proper means for achieving it.

Suffice it to say, Pakistan’s unsure Afghan policy has produced extremely undesirable consequences both at home and abroad.

Not only has it hit a blow to Islamabad’s relations with all the important regional and extra-regional players but also left it friendless in Afghanistan where the Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns equally view it with scepticism.

With the end-game approaching, Pakistan needs to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Afghan government, the US, and other regional countries.

Only a policy aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people will ensure a neutral Afghanistan.

RAFIULLAH KAKAR Lahore