Talking with the Indians
THE impulse to write this Op-Ed piece has come from some readers of my article ‘Negotiating with America’ (Dawn, April 24) who suggested that it be followed up with ‘Negotiating with India’. India has often talked to Pakistan but hardly ever negotiated issues that bedevil relations. In fact, the negotiating habits of both the states have produced cyclical conversations with little forward movement.
Evidence for the dialogue in hand is, however, mixed. The two countries may work out mutually profitable economic and commercial relations. On the other hand, reports that India has actually hardened its position on the long-awaited disengagement in Siachen after the heartrending tragedy at Gayari suggest stasis in negotiating postures. Sceptics argue that India is interested in the former because it gains much while it blocks the latter as any successful outcome would dilute its grip on Siachen.
There are widely different perceptions in India and Pakistan why the bilateral dialogue — now on, now off — remains unproductive. In an objective analysis, some reasons hark back to the Partition of 1947 while others attained salience in the post-independence conflicts. I propose to write two articles to focus on these deep-rooted factors.
India was divided largely because of triangular interaction involving the paramount colonial power exhausted by the Second World War, the Congress, a powerful political organisation for decades, and the Muslim League that assumed comparable leverage only after the great mobilisation of Muslims for the last general election in undivided India. For the Congress and its allies, there was already an India, united or divided, with a time-tested apparatus of the state.
Its key provinces had more democratic experience than the provinces constituting Pakistan. Its leaders had a vision, an idea, of India notwithstanding the tussle between Mahatma Gandhi and Subash Chandra Bose, the revolutionary from Bengal; and, notwithstanding the incipient conflict between the scholarly Abul Kalam Azad so emotionally attached to the civilisational symbiosis of India as to accept the trifurcating zonal scheme to prevent outright partition and others like Vallabhbhai Patel who secretly preferred a surgical division to win the battle for the soul of their postcolonial state.
The fact that India already existed made for well-considered decisions backed by force; it gave India a most advantageous time lead over Pakistan. A coalition of seasoned political leaders and a functioning executive authority guided by V.P. Menon enabled India to act strongly on issues concerning Pakistan. Having made substantive initial gains, India became a status quo power; its Pakistan diplomacy geared to defending that status quo. Frustrated by entrenched Indian positions, Pakistan occasionally resorted to dangerous actions in the vain hope of changing the pattern.
Pakistan was being shaped and configured in those fateful early years while being literally on the road. The author Philip Oldenburg (India, Pakistan and democracy) speaks of Pakistan as “an insufficiently imagined place”, a telling phrase crafted by Salman Rushdie. In reality, ‘imagining’ the new nation was not just insufficient; it was also a contested process.
I was a member of a small committee under Yahya Bakhtiar tasked in 1990 to open the Jinnah papers locked away by Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah as too personal. Jottings made by the Quaid in a loose sheaf folder, mostly at odd hours of sleepless nights, contained amazing insights. There was an entry about asking Liaquat Ali Khan to speak to Nehru about retaining common customs despite the mayhem of Partition. There was a painful record of Jinnah’s growing disappointment with the parochial politics of a number of leading Leaguers.
Ayesha Jalal’s memorable description of him as ‘the sole spokesman’ has strengthened the view that the Quaid was an unquestioned guide and decision-maker. The fact of the matter was that the grip of the terminally ill leader was progressively loosening.
A rough and ready example was Kashmir. India went through an elaborate political process to overcome the Maharaja’s procrastination and then mounted a well-planned military intervention. Pakistan’s contacts with Sheikh Abdullah and others in Kashmir were amateurish; the military component of the effort was a chaotic tribal incursion. The contrast reflected a gap not only in strategic comprehension but also in the quality of available administrative machinery.
Again, Nehru had a firmer grasp of the idea of national sovereignty and the realpolitik with which to assert it. He had not obstructed the plan for three zones, accepted briefly by both the Congress and the Muslim League. But then, in a moment that changed the course of history, he brought about its precipitous collapse by declaring that an independent and sovereign India would be free to change the arrangements then being made.
As Mountbatten rushed the transfer of power and threw his weight behind India in implementing the plan for Partition, imagining Pakistan with precision became even more difficult.
Later, when Pakistan joined western military pacts, Nehru rubbished the UN resolution for a plebiscite in Kashmir by treating the Pakistani decision as an affront to the imagined sanctity, inviolability and sovereignty of the subcontinent; he reassured Sheikh Abdullah there would be no plebiscite.
One can cavil at Nehru’s flawed political morality. The fact is that he successfully outmanoeuvred Pakistani leadership in statecraft and realpolitik and pioneered an enduring diplomatic approach to Pakistan: talk from a position of strength, create and defend new ground realities, concede nothing and impose political attrition.
Pakistan’s internal inadequacies, perceived existential threat from India and its international alliances rapidly led to a bureaucratic-military ethos. Its consequences for Pakistan’s India policy were enormous. India continues to harp on it even though Pakistan’s military establishment is now ready for accommodation.
Admittedly, it remains apprehensive of politicians who may go overboard in ‘appeasing’ the Indian interlocutors who have arguably no intention of seeking equitable solutions and closures even in the ‘doable’ segments of the bilateral agenda.
This brings us straight to the question if old negotiating tactics are being given up. It is a complex issue that should await the next future-focused article.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
selective memories and selective histories, thus shall be known the saga of Pakistan.
Pakistani politicians & administrators have always projected that Indian positions are unreasonable. What "Hardening" on Siachen is being talked about. India always maintained that troops can only be withdrawn only when "AGPL" is authenticated on maps by Pakistan, which Pakistan has refused to do it.
My question to all Indian readers who instead of acknowledging Pakistani point of view started bashing here as well. Why Indian state is not serious about resolving issues; First and and foremost being kashmir. Kashmir issue is most important and internationally acknowledged. Most important, kashmiri people are at stake from 60 years,more than 60000 kashmiris has died so far. What is stopping you to address it? On one side India make tall claims of being a greatest democratic country. How ironical is it ???
Secondly Siachin; when pakistan is showing willingness why isn't India taking a stand?
Dragging such core issues where people's sentiments are attached will always produce crooks/terrorists who will do inhuman things.
Why don't we address the issue instead of its repercussions.
Dawn is censoring the comments. I was the first person to comment on this biased article. My comments does not have any vulgar or bad words but it was still not posted. Not expected from Dawn as I consider it to be one of the best newspaper in South Asia.
It happens to me all the time!!
:)
It is inappropriate to compare Pakistans failure against Indian success. Pakistan's failure is not an isloated story but a part of the failure of larger Islamic world to the challenges of modernity. India went far ahead of Pakistan not because of its leaders but inspite of its leaders. Indian progress and Pakistan's decline has been aptly encapsulated by M J Akbar as “The idea of India is stronger than the Indian
Excellent analysis that should be read both sides of the border. It is said that Mr.Jinnah wanted the Hindu state to be called Hindustan so that both nations could continue their India heritage. Nehru would not have it and insisted that to maintain a secular identity his half should remain India. It is not clear though why as an avowed secularist and scholar of history he agreed in the first place to the partition of India on religious lines. Surely he should have known that divisions based on religion always lead to conflct. Further what has not been emphasised by the author is the role of Churchill and the British establishment in favor of a Pakistan which would serve western interests in the impending cold war with the Soviets in preference to a united India led by leaders like Nehru whom they did not trust.
I enjoyed reading this article. For fellow Indians complaining of bias…this is the Pakistani perspective. We are not expected to view Indo-Pak relationship in the same way as our brothers from across the border.
When the author quoted that " Military establishment" is in an accommodating mode, I want to ask the author "where was the Military Establishment" when Bombay was being burnt with a few radicals trained and funded by the same institution just a couple of years ago? Where is the Military establishment when the radical religious leaders exhort their communities with virulent speeches against India to benefit from the people's weaknesses? Why is it the culprits cannot be prosecuted and punished until now? How do I and we in India believe that the same mentality for the last 60 years which never changed has changed now suddenly? If so, is it for their own self-help? or is it a favor to India? Not on Siachen.
Well said! Everyone learns from their experiences! Do you think America will ever let its guard down because 9-11 incident happened a long long time ago??? So, are Indians. They have learned their lessons in a hard way. There is no need to show any sincerity with Pakistan. Let they start the process sincerely and we will reciprocate sincerely. The ball is in their court. It is not difficult to handover mumbai masterminds to India. Is it? No, then why not? Indians would be foolish to trade with pakistan until they act on them…
Everyone seems to have forgotten the tragedy! What a shame!
A deep and unbiased reading of the history of the parttion of the Sub-continent will explain the fact as to how things led to the divisioin. . Jaswant Singh had also endavoured in his book to bring some hard and undeniable facts to the notice of thepresent day readers.
While I agree with most of the content of the article, the statement about Indian leadership " have arguably no intention of seeking equitable solutions and closures" says it all. Its the Indian way. One only needs to look at India's dealings with its other neighbors. Dispute between India and Nepal involves Kalapani, where China, India, and Nepal meet. Aksayqin dispute with China is almost 50 years old now. My point is that the reason Indian leadership is not serious about resolving dispute with Pakistan, has nothing to do with Pakistan's current economic downturn, but rather the bullying mindset that prevails in Indian leadership.
Where is this notion of bullying comes from? As far as resolving dispute is concerned, both sides want the solution to be 100% in their favor? Is that not correct? Tell me which part of your position are you ready to compromise on? Please provide a list of issues that common Pakistanis would be ready to concede in favor of India? There are none. Then how fair is it to blame only India? Its always – you win some you lose some. you can't have everything.
An absolute piece of Biased and well drafted misinformation,, trying to portrait Indian leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru as master mind behind all that happened in Kashmir and putting the Kashmir situation as a well planned military intrusion just proves it.
The author links the everchanging geopolitic with some interesting historical insights. The logic posed as such is flawed due to ''all the water that has flowed in either directions''. Nevertheless the point to moot here is the inescapable feeling of victimization…..a psyche ..as such…sad.
The author is being a bit disingenious in accusing India by writing that "India went through an elaborate political process to overcome the Maharajas procrastination and then mounted a well-planned military intervention" and implying India took the military initiative first ignoring chronology of events.