IT was the closing month of 1971. The Pakistan Television was facing public protests after telecasting some scenes of our army’s surrender in Dhaka. The then information minister, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, told Agha Nasir, PTV’s general manager in Lahore: “Forget that there has been a democratic change of government. Our party got control of the government with the help of the armed forces and nothing offensive to them can be tolerated. (From This is PTV, by Agha Nasir.)

He was referring to the political impasse that had arisen in Pakistan after the general elections of 1970, due to the inability of the two principal parties emerging from them to agree on the kind of political structure to be established in the country. Ultimately, the army used force to cut the Gordian knot. But, apparently, not all knots are Gordian, nor are all the wielders of the sword Alexanders.

East Pakistan, the home of the majority of the Pakistani people, had been kept effectively away from power since 1953, while the civil-military bureaucracy from West Pakistan ruled the country. The general elections of 1970, held under the military regime in order to restore democracy, appear to have created new problems. They were on the basis of universal franchise which gave East Pakistan an absolute majority in the new national assembly. And the army authorities further gave the assembly the task of framing a new constitution instead of simply reviving that of 1956, which had been passed by the first constituent assembly unanimously.

The Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, had its entire strength in East Pakistan, which still gave it 54 per cent of the national assembly seats. Its electoral programme envisaged a constitution in which Pakistan would become a confederation of five virtually independent states, four of them in western Pakistan. Bhutto, leading the second biggest party, but drawn entirely from West Pakistan and commanding only 27 per cent of the seats, opposed the scheme. He proposed that the national assembly not be called into session until this problem had been resolved. Mujib, who had little interest in the western wing or even in Pakistan, replied that those four provinces could make any arrangement for themselves they liked. The tensions increased until the rising popular movement in the eastern wing panicked the army leadership into using military force there, unleashing a civil war. Bhutto now wanted to be handed power. The army refused, as the civil war raged.

India, which had been promoting secessionism there for years, invaded East Pakistan with Soviet backing, defeated the Pakistani army, and enabled the wing to secede. The army gave power to Bhutto in the other wing.

Bhutto undertook two tours of Muslim countries in the Middle East to gain their support for Pakistan’s position in the international arena. The most valuable part of Bhutto and the Breakup of Pakistan is the verbatim record of the discussions that Bhutto had with the leaders of these countries in the early 1972.

The closest historians usually get to such information is politicians’ memoirs or the versions participants may reveal. Here we have what these leaders actually said to each other and in what sequence.

Bhutto sought their political support against the machinations of India, backed by the Soviets. He requested specifically that they not recognise Bangladesh until the Pakistani prisoners of war were repatriated, or, at least as long as the Indian troops were occupying Bangladesh. All the leaders he met were sympathetic. There was, of course, the natural sympathy for fellow-Muslims in distress. And as important was the fact that the armed forces of a big country, supported and backed by a super-power, had blatantly crossed the recognised international frontier of a state to break it up.

The hosts were forthcoming on the non-recognition of Bangladesh and many offered material help. They must have been aware of the role played by the West Pakistani ruling class in the crisis of 1971 but saw no point in bringing that up and the discussions with Bhutto were on the basis of the Pakistani leadership’s desire to restore the territorial integrity of the country. Some of the foreign leaders were more sympathetic than others but sympathetic they all were.

Bhutto was brilliant in presenting our case, modifying his discourse in each case to best influence the interlocutor. A minor point here: in almost every meeting, he mentioned the need for reforms in Pakistan. However, he mentioned only the capitalists as the exploiters, never the landed class.

The book is of interest not only as history at close quarters, but especially as the practice of diplomacy from a very weak hand. It shows to what heights our people can rise when required.

Bhutto and the Breakup of Pakistan (HISTORY) By Mohammed Yunus Oxford University Press, Karachi ISBN-978-0-19-906379-6 140pp. Rs595