PAKISTAN is seething with anti-Americanism. This public sentiment is constraining the state’s ability to find sensible options to work out the US-Pakistan relationship.

People in the decision-making mix in Islamabad and Rawalpindi are fully aware of this and also realise that a failure to transform the situation could eventually force a complete breakdown of this all-important partnership to Pakistan’s own detriment.

And yet, one sees little in terms of efforts to stem and reverse the tide of anti-Americanism. The state is more interested in portraying itself as being held hostage to this narrative — decision-makers often express helplessness — rather than doing its bit to address the problem.

This is unfortunate as only the Pakistani state can make a difference by correcting the half-truths and misinformation it is guilty of perpetuating about this partnership over the past few years.

Let me list some examples of what may put the Pakistan-US relationship in a slightly different perspective for the Pakistani people, and consequently, allow more space for Islamabad to work things out with Washington in the medium-term future.

Let us take issues that stand out as Pakistan’s pet peeves: drones, US assistance to Pakistan, and Pakistan’s sovereignty and pride.

On drones, could it not be explained that the Pakistan military itself is not entirely in favour of adopting a zero-tolerance stance as parliament has suggested.

The reasons are largely unchanged from the time when the khakis were actively collaborating on the drone strikes: Pakistan was unable or not interested in assigning its troops to fresh ground operations or using its own airpower to take out some of the targets eventually taken out by drones. Drones, even when their accuracy was suspect — it has improved drastically since the initial years of employment — were far more precise than the massive airpower that Pakistan used in Swat and parts of Fata, and this was a much better alternative than any cross-border ground raids by the American forces in Afghanistan, which was at least theoretically the remaining alternative.

Focusing exclusively on the fact that Pakistan’s real problem with the drone is not its use per se but its frequency could begin to turn the public’s view on this. As it is, maximum opposition to the drone lies outside of Fata, not within it. The two sides could then begin to find middle ground on the kind of targets that warrant a drone attack and what role the Pakistani side would have in coordinating it.

On US assistance, it is about time that we own up to our end of the bargain. To be sure, the US assistance to Pakistan is riddled with conceptual and bureaucratic problems and much can be done to improve its rationale, focus and delivery on the US side. But for how long will Pakistanis absolve themselves of any fault for the lack of visible impact of US assistance?

Consider America’s dilemma. When it channels money through the government, it gets blamed for pandering to the interests of Pakistan’s discredited political and/or military elite. Since Pakistanis don’t trust their state apparatus, money poured into the state’s coffers is seen as money wasted. And as the US has sought to counter this by directing funds to NGOs, it has realised that Islamabad-based NGOs that often have the most capacity and are thus most attractive to donors are equally discredited in the eyes of the ordinary Pakistanis.

The Pakistani state would beg and plead for US assistance and happily use it even for basic functions such as budget support. The Pakistani NGOs will actively solicit funds irrespective of their capacity to utilise them but then often refuse to acknowledge US support citing security reasons or end up implementing questionable projects with marginal impact.

The US takes the blame in both cases.

Here is the question though: could the narrative not start emphasising the ways in which US assistance has been critical to Pakistan over the past decade? There are a number of concrete examples of this. Why does the government not take it upon itself to present these facts? Could it also not underscore that the US has nudged multilaterals and other bilaterals to be forthcoming in dishing out payments to Pakistan, and has done so to good effect? And could we not start questioning the Pakistani NGOs if we remain unsatisfied by how they are choosing spending priorities?

Finally, on this business of sovereignty, the state has been outright duplicitous.

That sovereignty has become so important over the past year is no coincidence. It has helped divert attention from real issues, be it the state of democracy and governance, incompetence of the military and civilian government, or the fact that Pakistan needs to get its own house in order rather than blame others for all its ills.

Could the narrative concede that sovereignty never was or is nearly as important to the state as it makes it out to be? At best, it is used selectively. It ignores the thousands of foreign militants on Pakistani soil but chooses to focus on drones, the May 2 raid, etc., almost exclusively. And for all the talk of parliament’s supremacy and the military’s pride, history is filled with instances when Pakistani leaders (both civilian and military) have shamelessly leveraged Washington, Riyadh, Beijing and other outside patrons to undercut their political rivals.

Moreover, why Pakistani pride is not affected by its military persisting with a rentier arrangement in Coalition Support Funds or when its leaders are forced to go around the world with a begging bowl because its elite refuse to pay taxes and raise domestic revenues beats me.

If public sentiment is truly driving Pakistan’s recent stances towards the US, then it is forcing the world’s sole superpower to lose patience with Islamabad and it is quickly isolating Pakistan from the world’s most powerful alliance — Nato.

It is ultimately the state’s responsibility to turn this around. Alas, for this to happen you need a strong government, a political opposition that is judicious in its critique and a military willing to own up to its preferences and choices. Pakistan possesses none of these at the moment.

The writer is South Asia adviser at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.