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AFGHAN President Hamid Karzai lashed out at the foreign media recently for painting a gloomy picture of Afghanistan after the pullout of Western troops. It appears that anxiety and frustration are increasing across regional and important Western capitals regarding the future of the country.
The media is expected to portray precisely what happens in the country but the real pessimism on Afghanistan appears to emanate from recent reports and analyses by US think tanks. Conversely, optimism is growing in the Taliban camp. Although the balance seems to be in favour of these ‘optimists’ a big question mark remains on their ability to sustain it. The shift is certainly not in favour of Afghans, Pakistan or the wider region.
Policy papers appearing in recent months indicate three major factors behind this pessimism: the post-withdrawal Afghan security situation, reconciliation with the Taliban and India vs Pakistan as stabilising or destabilising agents in the region.
Although most analyses cover other internal and external factors — mainly sustainability of the political and economic set-up, governance and role of other regional actors — they fail to connect with policy options. Understandably, the scope of these studies is limited to pre- and post-withdrawal scenarios, which ultimately creates constraints in the framework.
Although US security think tanks including Rand Corporation see mixed success on the military front, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a renowned US think tank, in its recent report titled Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan, paints a bleak picture of the country. The Carnegie report does not see any clear future plan. The withdrawal will leave the country worse off than it was before 2001 in some respects. Among other recommendations, the think tank endorses talks with the Taliban and urges Washington not to further compromise its ability to open negotiations with the Taliban.
Other leading US think tanks express concern that peace overtures towards the Taliban might empower them again and hand them a victory of sorts, but these think tanks lack other workable alternatives. They are more concerned about Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours and see them as spoilers. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in its fresh assessment, stated that “these states’ interests will not always coincide with Afghan and Western interests for the region”.
Obviously, that is US policy input coming from the intellectuals but one critical aspect, which is absent in most assessments, is the Taliban position. The Taliban seem to be clever players in the game and have kept their cards close to their chest.
The authors of a recent and creative study titled Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation by the London-based Royal United Services Institute have brought the Taliban perspective into the debate. They note that the Taliban are open to negotiating a ceasefire and, most importantly, deeply regret their past association with Al Qaeda. The report is based on interviews of four former senior Taliban leaders. The authors have come up with a bold statement that “the Taliban are willing to accept long-term US military presence and bases as long as they do not constrain Afghan independence and Islamic jurisprudence”.
The Taliban have denounced such claims and issued clarification in their official mouthpiece monthly Shariat, stating that former Taliban Shura member Agha Jan Mutasim was removed from office in 2010 and that he must not be considered a representative of the Taliban and further that there is no change in their policy or stance that had often been shared with the media by senior Taliban. The denials notwithstanding, the report is significant as it demonstrates a change in the viewpoints of some Taliban leaders who had recently detached themselves from the movement. It highlights differences within Taliban ranks.
Understanding the composition of relations between the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups remains a struggle in Western policy discourse. At least clarity is increasing on the level of Pakistan’s relationship with the insurgents. Robert Grenier, a leading expert on the Haqqani network and its nexus with Pakistan, has stated that while Pakistan tried to influence them it certainly did not control the Haqqanis.
The most important contribution in understanding the dynamics of the nexus among insurgents comes from Gretchen Peters. In her well-researched report Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry, she traces how a militant group transformed into a mafia controlled by a few individuals, developed its own economy and defined its relations with state and non-state actors. Protecting their own interests would be their priority. Their stake in the conflict economy has increased the prospects for their reconcilability, compared with the Quetta Shura and the Hizb-i-Islami that are mainly in the political power game.
Al Qaeda is in the ideological driving seat and denouncing them would be counterproductive for the Haqqanis and the Taliban and they cannot afford to lose their ideological legitimacy.
The concern in policy and intellectual circles in Kabul is because the response from the Taliban is quite frustrating as they have not come up with specific demands nor shown flexibility towards accepting any solution within the Afghan constitution or one that is compatible with traditional standards of reconciliation.
Lack of transparency, clear mechanisms and strategy in the reconciliation process are other major causes of concern for them. But optimists in the Afghan capital see strategic agreement as a tool in the hands of President Karzai, which he is using quite effectively. They see it as a balancing act, but how it would be effective in reconciliation with the Taliban and other insurgents remains to be seen.
The key lesson that can be drawn from the intellectual exercise is that everyone sees the future of Afghanistan through the prism of their own state’s strategic interests. The Afghan leadership has opted for an outward-looking approach to cope with internal challenges. It is safe to suggest that it would be quite some time before anyone looks at Afghanistan without the help of such strategic prisms.
The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.
