THE visit to Kabul by Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen along with the 35 ambassadors who participate in the Nato council in Brussels was, from Afghanistan’s perspective, particularly welcome.

A delegation of permanent representatives of the UN Security Council (UNSC) had cancelled a scheduled visit for security reasons shortly after the UNSC authorised the extension of the stay of Nato forces in Afghanistan up to Oct 13, 2013.

There was good reason for concern on the part of the UN delegation. The Taliban are not conquering territory or restoring their writ in areas they have vacated. But they have established through attacks on Camp Bastion and subsequently on another base in eastern Afghanistan that they are capable of launching sophisticated and complex attacks on what were considered to be invulnerable targets.

They have also been able to create the perception that either because of their infiltration or as a consequence of what is termed ‘cultural differences’, a substantial number of Afghan security forces cannot be relied upon to protect their Nato partners and may well attack what they perceive as lucrative targets such as a high-level UN delegation.

There was also good reason for the Nato delegates to come despite the security threat. Rasmussen needed to reassure the Afghans that despite all the news that had been appearing about the US and other Nato countries, Nato was committed to the end-2014 withdrawal timetable.

He also made reassuring noises about Nato being prepared to maintain a presence in Afghanistan and that the latter would not be left alone after 2014.

In answers to questions, however, Rasmussen did concede that if conditions permitted, the withdrawal could come earlier. This has to be read in conjunction with an interview given to the Guardian by the new British ambassador in Kabul who, having acknowledged that there was an ongoing debate about withdrawal, hinted that not only was an early pullout possible but that it was preferable.

What was perhaps of greater importance was Karzai’s assertion that he was quite prepared to handle the situation arising from an earlier withdrawal — the sort of defiant note that has characterised all his recent statements about his Nato allies. This is, to put it mildly, something of a departure from reality given that not one Afghan battalion is graded as capable of handling an operation without assistance.

An International Crisis Group report published a few days ago asserts in this context that only seven per cent of the army and nine per cent of the national police units are considered capable of independent action even with advisers.

To make matters more difficult, the Afghan security forces, particularly the army, are faced with a situation where the annual desertion rate is 33 per cent and 65,000 soldiers have to be recruited every year to fill the ranks.

This means that not only is one-third of the deployed army untrained but that deserters trained only in the use of the gun enter the ranks of the unemployed in an economy which is ill equipped to provide employment opportunities as the gradual drop in Nato spending slows down the economy. Karzai must know that he needs the Nato forces to stay for as long as possible.

As regards the post-2014 residual American presence, Karzai’s office issued a statement highlighting the Afghan president’s remarks to Rasmussen that while the ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ with the US was still to be negotiated the Afghan people “might not permit their government to grant immunity”.

Karzai, of course, knows full well that the Americans withdrew all their forces from Iraq after the Iraqi government refused to grant blanket immunity that the Americans have always demanded for their soldiers they deploy abroad.

If anything, this public stance by Karzai will only reinforce the view of many in the American security establishment, as reflected in the New York Times editorial, which I wrote about last week, that militarily America should cut its losses and get out of Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Lastly, President Karzai used the joint press conference with Rasmussen to make it clear that he would not countenance a foreign presence on the Election Complaints Commission for the presidential elections that are to be held in 2014.

The lower house of the Afghan parliament had recently passed a bill mandating that two foreign experts chosen by the United Nations should sit on the commission to adjudicate allegations of fraud or irregularities etc. In the 2009 election, there had been three foreign members but Karzai had then by decree reduced this to two thus ensuring that the Afghans would be in the majority in the body.

The proposal in the lower house had been reinforced in a list of principles for electoral reform that had been drawn up and signed by some 40 political parties and factions a couple of days earlier. Karzai’s spokesman, however, made it clear in a follow-up to the president’s statement that if the measure approved by the lower house was also passed by the upper house Karzai would use his powers to veto the bill.

So far the State Department and other western official sources have refrained from adverse comment, only stressing that the Afghans themselves want to build the strongest possible electoral system and minimise electoral fraud and that the international community will provide whatever assistance is needed and called for by the Afghans who alone have the responsibility.

Press comments, however, reflect the concern that Karzai is going to bring to his parliament legislation that will permit him to manipulate the electoral process in favour of the candidate he wants. There is no doubt that such a development would further strain relations with his American and Nato partners.

One does not know exactly how much strength the political factions proposing electoral reform can muster but it is certain that even if they cannot match Karzai’s strength they will be able to organise demonstrations and take other public measures to create greater political turbulence and distract from what should be the principal focus — an imaginative move towards reconciliation.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.