VIOLENT extremism and escalating militancy remained the biggest challenge for Pakistan in 2012. There has been a marked surge in terrorist attacks and sectarian killings after a brief period of relative calm a year before.

A highly radicalised society and weakening of the state authority have created massive spaces for religious extremism and militancy. The twin menace threatens to tear apart the country’s social fabric and its unity.

Defying their proscription, the militant groups continued to operate with impunity, forming an increasingly interconnected web to launch deadly and high-profile terrorist attacks as well as perpetrating a more violent wave of suicide-bombings against civilians.

As militant violence escalated, it grew not only in numbers, but also in sophistication and intensity. The audacious raid on Bannu jail that freed many hardcore militants and the siege of the high-security Kamara airbase showed that the militants have regenerated and reorganised.

The attack by some 300 gunmen on a police station outside Peshawar and the killing, including beheading, of several police officers in October further demonstrated the growing stridency of the Taliban. The raid was a manifestation of a state fast losing its authority.

The barbaric attack on 15-year-old Malala Yousafzai was a grim reminder of militant violence creeping back into Swat district which was believed to have been cleared of the Taliban after the 2009 operation. The despicable incident reinforced the threat that militancy and extremism pose to society.

The year 2012 witnessed a systematic and deliberate pattern of targeting members of minority Muslim and non-Muslim sects by the militant groups. Even mosques, shrines and religious gatherings were spared.

One of the most gruesome acts of sectarian genocide took place in February when armed men ambushed a passenger bus in northwestern Kohistan district and picked up, after checking their identity, 25 Shia passengers, including three children, and shot them dead in cold blood. Similar incidents were reported in Quetta where a predominantly Shia Hazara community was specifically targeted by sectarian militants.

While the Shia community has been the main target, many moderate Sunni clerics also fell victim to the bloody sectarian war. Christians and Ahmedis also suffered, with mobs attacking them for alleged blasphemy.

All these incidents were surely not isolated in nature. Together, they intertwined with the rise of extremism and religious militancy in the country. The perpetrators of sectarian killings and terrorist attacks on security installations are driven by the same radical ideological worldview.

A strong nexus has emerged between the sectarian groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. In many cases, the TTP has directly been involved in the attacks on Shia community.

More worrisome, however, is abdication by the state of its responsibility to enforce rule of law and provide protection to its citizens. Though technically outlawed, the sectarian outfits are free to promote their intolerant and extremist views openly in public rallies, and to spread them through their toxic literature.

The lack of political will and failure of the government to develop a coherent strategy to fight violent extremism have together allowed the militancy to thrive. The terrorist networks have also gained strength by forming alliances with other extremist groups.

Contrary to the claims by American and Pakistani officials that Al Qaeda has been crippled, the network is still deeply entrenched in the tribal areas, presenting a major threat to the regional security. There is a new generation of Al Qaeda in Pakistan, comprising primarily recruits from youth and the educated middle class.

The 2009 military operations had succeeded in driving out the Taliban from Swat and from most of their strongholds in South Waziristan. But the military’s hold remained tentative with most of the insurgent leaders having escaped.

Furthermore, the militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan remain a major challenge for Pakistani state. With a host of militant groups – from Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban to Al Qaeda fugitives based there – the lawless territory is rightly described as the centre of gravity as far as militancy is concerned.

Most of the recent terrorist attacks in Pakistani cities have their roots in the region. Pakistani security officials agree that the war against militancy cannot be won without eliminating terrorist sanctuaries from North Waziristan. But there seems to be no plan for action to initiate a crackdown against them.

Although public opinion seems to have turned against militancy, there is no concerted effort by the state to leverage this as part of evolving a coherent strategy to reverse the tide of violent extremism.

The Malala incident could well have been a turning point in Pakistan’s battle against violent extremism and its toxic creed. But unfortunately that moment seems to have slipped away because of the inability of the political leadership to chart out a clear plan of action.

For sure, security forces have achieved some significant success in fighting Taliban insurgency in the tribal areas, but those gains may turn out to be ephemeral in the absence of effective governance.

If the State of Pakistan has learned any lessons from its follies in 2012 is something that only 2013 will tell.

The writer is an author and journalist.