INCONSISTENT and at times contradictory statements in the Urdu- and English-language manifestos of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) for the upcoming general elections eliminate the impression given by some political analysts that the party is taking a more pronounced anti-establishment stance and is struggling to go beyond religion-oriented politics.

The Urdu version of the JUI-F’s manifesto offers few variations on the party’s political objectives and targets as compared to its previous manifestos. The English version, which was distributed by the party to the foreign media and diplomatic missions in Islamabad, appears to be more comprehensive and modern in outlook.

While the Urdu version still contains clauses like compulsory jihad training and conservative views on women and minority rights, the English version carries slogans and phrases that speak of peace, freedom, humanity, and minority rights.

The anomalies in the manifesto could be described as an attempt by the JUI-F leadership to raise its ‘moderate’ credentials in the eyes of the foreign media and international community. They are also a reflection of the growing internal tensions and contradictions within religious parties whose leaderships may realise the implications of changing internal and external political scenarios but who lack the ability and methodology to pass on this realisation to their lower ranks and largely conservative supporters.

Though madressahs have increased their influence in mainland Pakistan, madressah students and teachers mainly come from the peripheries and lack the capacity to influence the local political discourse. In order to effect the required change, a good organisational network and likeminded people among the leadership are needed, and the JUI-F lacks both.

The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) nonetheless qualifies on both counts but it is persisting with its previous path despite the recent changes in the political landscape, and its manifesto reflects that it is still stuck to its traditional ways.

It would not be an easy task for religious political parties to suddenly divert from the traditionalist discourse they have cultivated and strengthened over the last 65 years. This discourse is two-fold: Islamisation and religio-socialisation.

They made early gains on the Islamisation front, by managing to define the ideological discourse of the state through the Objectives Resolution of 1949. Since then, they have remained in the forefront of the ensuing process of Islamisation of politics and the Constitution in Pakistan and gained considerable ground in these areas.

At the same time, they have been promoting a discourse of religious socialisation, or a process of education whereby one can learn to see the world through the lens of religious significance, and that dovetails with their political objectives. On that front too their achievements are significant and the trend of religio-socialisation is becoming increasing visible in society.

The ‘enforcement of divine law’ is the common agenda in the manifestos of all religious political parties. While their primary objectives also include plans for economic, political, constitutional and foreign policy reform, their emphasis is on complete Islamisation of the state and society. Like the JUI-F and JI, many of these parties advocate reforms but remain silent on how these would be translated into policy.

The mainstream political parties also share many objectives of the religious-political parties. The PML-N promises in its manifesto to turn the country into “a modern ideological Islamic state”. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf’s statement of objectives focuses on ways of making Pakistan an ideal Islamic state. The PPP says “Islam is our way”. But if all political parties, excluding those who represent the left-wing side of the ideological spectrum, share the same vision, where is the point of divergence?

First, religious and religious-political organisations engage in multifarious activities, including the religio-socialisation process. On the other hand, religious parties distinguish themselves on the basis of religion and consider themselves the saviours of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology. They are generally suspicious of the country’s political leadership, and believe that it wants to turn Pakistan into a secular state.

The proliferation of religious organisations usually occurs on account of different interpretations of religious teachings along sectarian lines. For instance, when the JUI-F says that no law can be made against the Quran and Sunnah, it seeks to confine legislation within the Hanafi framework. The JUI-F claims that the state must follow the majority’s faith in its legislative function.

Other sects want political protection and endorsement of their respective religious ideas. Most of these religious parties believe that parliament should only identify the areas where Sharia legislation is required. They do not envisage a role for parliament beyond that nor are they clear on what role it will play after Islamisation of the constitution and legislation is accomplished.

In the last two decades, the orthodox religious-political organisations, especially the JUI-F, have gained more from the electoral process and influenced the masses more than the JI has. The JUI-F, the Barelvi Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan and Salafist Markazi Jamiat Ahl-i-Hadith are conservative in this regard and focus on local issues. This despite the fact that the JUI-F had links with the Taliban in Afghanistan and groups affiliated with it engaged in militancy in India-held Kashmir.

On the national level, these organisations share common agendas, but their distinct worldviews make a huge difference to their approach. After 9/11, for instance, the JI mainly focused on global issues to express solidarity with the Muslim ummah.

The party continued to protest against the US even as Pakistan was experiencing severe political and economic crises. More importantly, the JI mobilised its supporters among the urban middle class since they were more attracted to such causes, although their strength has rarely helped the party on the national level.

So far, the religious political discourse is a significant caveat in the way of major electoral success for religious parties. This cannot be removed by manipulating the Urdu and English versions of manifestos. It requires a change in approach, one which must be aligned with ground realities.

The writer is editor of the quarterly research journal Conflict and Peace Studies.

mamirrana@yahoo.com