Given PIA’s recent track record of such near mishaps, this incident too would have passed off unnoticed, had it not been for the fact that the chief justice of Pakistan was travelling by this flight. A cover-up is now not possible.

PIA has been in the news over the last two decades for all the wrong reasons. Delayed flights, near mishaps, overloaded aircraft, pilots reportedly flying in a state of inebriation and crude behaviour by cabin crew have become its hallmark.

The airline is in a financial mess. In three years it accumulated a loss of over a billion rupees. It has developed the habit of coming up with bailout plans, essentially involving injections of cash that would help it buy new aircraft. Ask any PIA apologist for a solution, and like a stuck record, he will come up with the mantra of “more aircraft”.

PIA’s problems are essentially organisational and managerial. Let me explain. First, for reasons that are purely historical, but defy logic, the airline works under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MOD).

This arrangement is not found anywhere in the world, except possibly in some banana republics. Airlines should ideally be autonomous business enterprises, and where a linkage with government becomes necessary, it being a major shareholder, a ministry of aviation or transport should be the supervisor.

Second, the problem is compounded by the fact the airline regulator, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) also works under the same ministry. Resultantly both PIA and CAA are packed with serving and retired officers of the armed forces. In PIA, this exercise is limited to the upper echelons; in the CAA it is all pervasive.

Such an arrangement is bound to create trouble. A conflict of interest is obviously involved. My experience as DG, CAA showed that whenever the regulator tried to take corrective action, the MOD intervened asking the CAA to “go slow”.

In their earlier years, the chief executives of both PIA and CAA were drawn from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). A sense of camaraderie prevailed between PAF colleagues and it was rare for PIA to be disciplined. It was one big happy family, with PIA acting like a spoilt child being endlessly humoured by the MOD. The icing on the cake came when the present regime appointed a serving PIA pilot as head of CAA. How on earth could he ‘regulate’ his parent airline?

Third, PIA thrived as long as it worked in near monopoly conditions. New planes were purchased with no questions asked and the government continued to pour money in regardless. PIA went on a recruitment binge. Today it has a staggering manpower-to-operational aircraft ratio of over 500.

Compare this to Lufthansa (127), British Airways (178) Singapore Airlines (140), United Airlines (119) and Air France (245) and you get an idea of the magnitude of the problem. Fourth, PIA was often saddled with problematic personalities by the MOD. After 1991, an ugly confrontation developed between a succession of chairmen and managing directors. Their duties were clearly not delineated by the MOD and each fancied himself as the chief executive. Two individuals in particular, continued to surface repeatedly like the proverbial bad penny to claim the position of chairman and MD, PIA. Decision-making ground to a halt.

Fifth, the deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi added to PIA’s woes. Foreign airlines (British Airways, Lufthansa, KLM and Air France) wound up operations in Pakistan in quick succession. PIA should have grabbed the opportunity to fill this vacuum, but beset by managerial confusion, it procrastinated. Middle East carriers were more than anxious to come to Pakistan.

As a part of Nawaz Sharif’s open skies policy, I as DG, CAA concluded a number of agreements that opened up Karachi and the northern gateways to Middle East carriers.
This move left PIA very unhappy, but there was no alternative. The unpalatable fact that must be accepted is that PIA just does not have the wherewithal to compete with foreign airlines.

Sixth, as a result of all these factors the area that suffered most was maintenance. Expertise gradually whittled away and standards rapidly fell. The PIA website proudly boasts of an engineering wing that undertakes maintenance of commercial aircraft from foreign airlines. One only wishes that it would pay similar attention to its own fleet. Or is maintenance downgraded to make out a stronger case for periodic purchases of new aircraft?

Seventh, the CAA miserably failed to function as an effective regulator. In the late 1990s, it was downgraded to category II. Its Airworthiness Directorate remained a silent spectator and watched PIA break every rule in the book with impunity.

The MOD preferred to look the other way. In 1999, Nawaz Sharif saw the writing on the wall and created a separate aviation division which he asked me to head. After the coup of October, 1999 Musharraf reversed this decision and we were back to square one.

Eighth, both the PIA and CAA boards are appointed on patronage alone. To an extent this happens everywhere, but some effort should be made to evolve a healthy mix of experts in aviation, finance, management, business practices who would then shepherd the affairs of the airline.

Instead, cronyism is the watchword. Individuals specialising in dairy farming have headed flight replacement committees, party workers, retired bureaucrats with no exposure to the aviation industry, two- and three-star generals find themselves on the PIA and CAA boards.

Can PIA be salvaged? Yes, but only if some difficult decisions are taken. We need a leaner, professionally manned airline run solely on business considerations. The regulator needs to be completely revamped. A ministry of transport should supervise aviation in Pakistan. Failing this, PIA’s woes will continue to fester.

The writer was DG, Civil Aviation Authority.

aminullahc@yahoo.com

Authored by Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja, this landmark judgment held that appointments, removals and promotions be made in accordance with the rules, and discretion if exercised must be so done in a transparent manner; that tenure, posting and transfer must adhere to the rules; that civil servants must not obey illegal orders of superiors; and that officers should not be posted as OSD (officer on special duty) without compelling reasons.

The thrust of the petitioner’s grievance was twofold. First, the standing of the civil service be restored as service of the state and not the regime. Second, political interference should be stopped.

In para nine of the judgment, the learned judge has referred to the civil service and political executive as two limbs of the executive branch of government.

With the greatest of respect, the politician does not see it that way. In his scheme of things, he is charged with the superior task of policy formulation with the civil servant having the subsidiary role of putting such policy into effect. Injecting political overtones into the administration is a natural corollary of such thinking.

Pakistan is said to be a parliamentary form of government with three branches — the judiciary, legislature and executive. The last named is headed by the prime minister who is the chief executive.

The civil service functions under his direct control. He is from a political party with a manifesto that it needs to implement once in power. Failure to deliver would mean a withering away of the party. The civil service is responsible for operational delivery, assisting in policy formulation and implementing programmes and projects.

Pakistan inherited a system of administration from the British in 1947. Built around the ‘steel frame’ of the former ICS it was said to be apolitical, efficient and merit-based.

Unfortunately, the civil service played the role of loyal collaborators to armed forces in the regimes of Gen Ayub (1958-69), Gen Yahya (1969-71), Gen Ziaul Haq (1977-88) and Gen Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). Secure in the belief that they had constitutional protection (till 1973) civil servants treated politicians with disdain.

On assuming power in 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decimated the civil service. Doing away with constitutional guarantees, he introduced organic law to regulate the conduct of civil servants.

A media campaign was launched to demoralise them, with politicians using derisive terms such as ‘naukarshahi’, ‘afsarshahi’ and ‘baboos’ for them. Individuals were publicly humiliated and key positions were given to ‘lateral entrants’ recruited on questionable grounds.

The regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (1988-1999) saw a further ‘politicisation’ of the civil service. Each political party prepared lists of officers who were sympathetic to it as well as a ‘negative’ list. Gen Musharraf was the icing on the cake. He appointed over 1,000 loyalists from his constituency to civil service positions.

Given the limited job opportunities in the country, the vast majority of civil servants adjusted comfortably to playing second fiddle to the armed forces or to politicians depending on who was in power.

They quickly realised that without the necessary political support they would not make it up the slippery slope of the bureaucratic pyramid. Some civil servants may disagree; unfortunately, this is a harsh reality. But is such politicisation a bad thing? Many countries are abandoning the concept of a neutral civil service.

The United States has a ‘spoils system’ in which a change of administration in Washington every four years sees the entire upper tier of government replaced by appointees subscribing to the policy of the incoming president.

Though the Pendleton Act, 1883 and the Hatch Act, 1939 introduced an element of transparency into the selection process and prohibited political activity among civil servants at middle and lower level, the apex is totally politicised.

Britain was said to boast a neutral civil service. Even here things are beginning to change. In June 2012, Francis Maude, the cabinet minister launched a civil service reform initiative aimed at giving contractual positions to the upper tier of the civil service along the lines of the New Zealand model.

As the Guardian observed, “Sir Humphrey [of Yes, Prime Minister fame] is no longer independent.”

Let it be said unambiguously that the orders of the Supreme Court need to be enforced in letter and spirit. The question is whether an initially demoralised and now ‘politicised’ bureaucracy, will undergo a transformation and a change in attitudes.

The civil service is but a means to an end. In the ultimate analysis, the overall objective of creating such an organisation is to serve the people of Pakistan. The party which has assumed power on the basis of a popular vote should in all fairness be allowed to fulfil its commitments to the electorate.

Politicised civil services continue to deliver reasonably well in developed and developing countries. Neutrality does not necessarily result in efficiency.

A bold initiative is called for. I propose that the civil service be bifurcated into two components. At the highest level, appointments should be made by an incoming political government on a contract basis and be valid only for its tenure. The remaining civil servants would pursue their careers in an apolitical, transparent and merit-based environment.

A number of advantages would accrue. First, the bureaucracy would have a sense of commitment for the policy objectives of the government. Second, knowing that they serve at the sufferance of the political machinery, civil servants would no longer sit on the fence. Third, they would have to deliver in a fixed time frame or face the sack.

Fourth, senior civil servants would quickly recognise that they and the political leadership would sink or swim together.

Fifth, middle and lower level civil servants would be free from pressures and be in a position to give honest rule-based advice. The punishment for differing would be a mere transfer. Let us try this option.

The writer is the author of Political Administrators: The Story of the Civil Service of Pakistan.
aminullahc@yahoo.com

Was it pilot error, adverse weather conditions, cockpit management or a defective aging aircraft that resulted in this calamity? Did the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the regulator, fail to ensure that the aircraft carrying the ill-fated passengers was airworthy?

Not surprisingly, the performance of the CAA has attracted adverse comment. Let us see why. Contrary to accepted international practice, our CAA works under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) rather than, say, a ministry of transport. There may be historical reasons for this arrangement, but its consequences are negative.

The CAA is autonomous in name only, as it is kept on a tight leash by the MOD, whose secretary is the chairperson of the CAA board. To complicate matters, PIA also functions under the same ministry.

The CAA is often obstructed in the performance of its regulatory functions by the parent ministry. To aggravate matters further, an active PIA pilot has been appointed DG, CAA. This is a clear case of conflict of interest.

The MOD facilitates the secondment and posting of a substantial number of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officers to the CAA. Competent fighter pilots may not necessarily be efficient regulators of commercial aviation. In such circumstances, how can the CAA be expected to deliver?

Now to the unfortunate crash itself. What could possibly have caused it? There is a widely quoted study which estimates 56 per cent of all air crashes are attributed to pilot error, 17 per cent to mechanical failure, 13 per cent to weather, six per cent to miscellaneous causes, four per cent to maintenance, and four per cent to air traffic control. All these factors would need to be taken into account in a comprehensive investigation.

The CAA is authorised under Rule 282 of the Civil Aviation Rules, 1994 (CAR) to investigate air accidents. In serious cases, the government can constitute a board of inquiry (BOI) which it has now done. It is headed by a retired PAF group captain.

The BOI is another name for the safety investigation board which till recently was an integral part of the CAA. Its administrative control now rests with the MOD. Clearly such a ploy cannot raise its competence level. Its head may have been a qualified fighter pilot but will he be a truly professional accident investigator looking into a commercial airliner’s air accident? Will loyalty to the CAA not cloud his judgment? In other words, will his findings carry credibility?

Just as the board began its work, the prime minister announced the setting up of a judicial commission to take up the same exercise.To complicate matters further, the FIA and the local police have also sprung into action. This surely is a case of too many cooks. The judicial commission is a non-starter. How can judges of the superior courts, PCO or otherwise, be expected to perform an exercise which is highly technical in nature?

If pilot error is ruled out in the Bhoja Air mishap, the investigators must look at other possible causes. On April 20, 2012, the weather around Islamabad was dreadful. There was a heavy cloud cover, gale force winds and bursts of lightning. The meteorological office is said to have issued two severe weather warnings, the first at 15:00hrs — two hours before the flight left Karachi.

Rule 257, CAR, 1994 requires the pilot to take into account the prevailing weather conditions and to plan for alternatives if the flight cannot be completed as planned. Did the pilot consider the possibility of diverting to Lahore or did he take a calculated risk in trying to land in Islamabad?

Another noteworthy grey area relates to a perceived mechanical failure. Was the aircraft airworthy? The DG, CAA is empowered under Rule 18, CAR, 1994 to issue a certificate of airworthiness. Before this is done he must make certain that the engine and airframe meet the required standards.

In addition to the ramp inspections carried out by CAA, the aircraft is checked before each flight by an engineer duly authorised by the authority. It now has to be ascertained if the CAA did actually discharge these responsibilities diligently.

Finally, there are questions raised about the circumstances under which Bhoja Air got an Air Operators Certificate (AOC). Rule 187 of CAR authorises the DG to issue an AOC. Before doing this, he has to ensure that the staffing, equipment and maintenance facilities of the operator are adequate enough to guarantee safe flight operations.

Bhoja Air was given an AOC in 1992 but this certificate was revoked in 2001. It appears that the certificate was renewed recently. The investigators must examine the circumstances under which this power was exercised by the CAA.

Pakistan needs to learn from the experience of developed countries if it is to make its air accident investigations credible. In the United States, a five member National Transportation Safety Board investigates all such accidents. It is an autonomous body, its members nominated by the president and cleared by the Senate.

In the United Kingdom, there is an independent Air Accidents Investigation Board headed by a chief inspector of air accidents who is a qualified commercial pilot.

This was the second major commercial airline disaster in Pakistan within two years. Across the world, such mishaps are investigated by independent and technically qualified bodies. The major thrust of such probes is to identify causes and make safety recommendations to prevent recurrence.

The CAA, as presently constituted, is just not up to this task. We must approach the International Civil Aviation Organisation for technical help in carrying out an investigation. We should also take immediate steps to establish a professional mishap investigation authority. This is the least we can do to honour the memory of the precious lives lost in these two tragedies.

The writer has served as director general, Civil Aviation Authority.

The expanding British rule in central and northwest India resulting from the annexation of Oudh, Punjab, Sindh, the Central Provinces and the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) was the result of campaigns conducted by men like Napier, Edwardes, Nicholson, Jacob, Munro and Sandeman.

Once the non-regulation provinces were functional, these erstwhile military commanders were designated as deputy commissioners. The arrangement was institutionalised with the creation of the Indian Political Service (IPS). Drawing its officers from the armed forces (66 per cent) and the ICS (33 per cent), it was an elite service set up for a specific purpose. It must be emphasised here that no military officers were absorbed in the ICS, the only exception being the War Service appointees of 1944-46 when no ICS examination was conducted.

After independence, a strong military-bureaucratic axis emerged in Pakistan. Its armed forces component naturally demanded a quota in the civil services. The IPS and War Service appointments were cited as precedents. What was conveniently forgotten was that these British schemes were area and time specific. In 1950, after the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was established as a premier service, the cabinet secretariat decided that 10 per cent of the inductions into this cadre would be from amongst armed forces officers. This decision was never put into effect.

After Gen Ayub Khan seized power in 1958, he expressed a desire to promote a horizontal movement from the armed forces to the civil administration. There was no overt resistance from senior civil servants. In Eqbal Ahmad’s words “….at the top level both (civil and military bureaucracy) were manned by the same class … sharing identical interests and outlook”. Ayub revived the 1950 decision of military inductions into the civil service. It was agreed that the defence ministry would send panels of eligible officers to the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) which would finalise selections. Between 1960 and 1963, 14 officers were appointed. After 1963, the scheme was discontinued. Even in this limited recruitment, patronage became self-evident; two of the selectees were sons of generals and one a Sandhurst graduate.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s administrative reforms of 1973 introduced the concept of lateral entry into the civil service. Bypassing the FPSC, selections were largely made on the basis of nepotism and cronyism. In his tenure (1972-1977) Bhutto appointed 83 armed forces officers to the secretariat, foreign affairs, tribal areas and district management groups.

After Gen Ziaul Haq’s coup of 1977, a review of all such appointments was undertaken. Predictably, the military appointments made by Bhutto were not questioned. In fact, Zia went one step further. Under his tutelage, a new arrangement was worked out to assist the entry of junior armed forces officers into the civil service. A pliant establishment division issued an office memorandum in 1980 setting up a Defence Services Officers Selection Board (DSOSB) headed by the defence secretary to process the selections.

While Bhutto’s tactics reeked of favouritsm and outright partiality, Zia’s were crafty and devious. The FPSC was cut out of the loop. Gen Faiz Ali Chishti, Zia’s right-hand man had this to say: “Mr Bhutto was blamed for destroying the institution of the civil service … by recruiting his own party men … and Gen Zia was going to do it. If the PPP was Mr Bhutto’s party, then the armed forces were Gen Zia’s party.” The floodgates were now open and nepotism reigned supreme. Gen Zia’s own ADCs, staff officers of corps commanders, sons and sons-in-law of senior armed forces officers, even army doctors specialising in nuclear medicine were blessed.

Between 1985 and 1999, the political governments did nothing to reverse the trend. In Punjab, then chief minister Nawaz Sharif ‘relaxed’ the relevant rules and appointed two principal staff officers (a colonel and a major), his chief pilot and two majors to the provincial services.

The arrival of Musharraf saw the civil bureaucracy relegated to the role of a junior partner of its military counterpart. The large-scale influx of armed forces officers into the civil service was masterminded by Lt Gen Tanwir Naqvi, the head of the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB).

In May 2000, he spelt out his position unambiguously. “The question is whether the army controls Pakistan or the bureaucracy. The conundrum is that it is not possible to transform the country without the bureaucracy. The army must control both political and administrative power….”

The keyword was no longer ‘patronage’; it was ‘domination’. Musharraf and his henchmen genuinely believed in the superiority of the army. In an interview with Ayesha Siddiqa in 2002, Maj Gen Rashid Qureshi cockily observed that “the average military officer is better qualified and more intelligent than the average civil bureaucrat”.

The Zia and Musharraf eras saw the emergence of a new category of officers who came from the urban and rural middle class.

In the words of Eqbal Ahmad, “…they are prone to viewing the world in straight lines … the regiment would be their model of running the country….” It is this element that both Zia and Musharraf wanted to induct into the civil administration.

Presently, out of roughly 650 DMG officers, around 100 are from the army, air force and navy. Notwithstanding the desire of junior armed forces officers to serve in snug and rewarding civilian assignments, policymakers in the defence establishment need to reassess this programme. Why are men trained in the highly professional environment of the armed forces academies wasted by being sent to a run-of-the-mill civilian set-up? Given the critical security situation in Pakistan, do we not need to utilise each and every armed forces officer to do the job he is specifically trained for? Has anyone bothered to calculate or assess the depletion caused to the quality of officer corps by this efflux?

The writer is a retired civil servant and the author of Political Administrators: The Story of the Civil Service of Pakistan.

aminullahc@yahoo.com