Politicians close to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s “supreme leader”, are urging that the veteran cleric be disqualified after he submitted his candidacy in an electrifying move last weekend — just minutes before registration closed.

It had been assumed that Iran’s election would be a closed contest between loyal and officially-approved conservatives. But although much could change before polling day on June 14, there is now growing support for Rafsanjani’s candidacy from followers of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the Green movement leader who claims his 2009 election victory was “stolen” by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

“You should see who is supporting Rafsanjani and who wants him to be a candidate for the election,” warned Gholam Haddad Adel, a pro-Khamenei figure. “The reformists of 2009 are gathering behind Rafsanjani and the truth is that the people who supported Mir Hossein Mousavi in 2009 are now supporting Rafsanjani.”

Green activists are setting up Facebook pages to mobilise support for Rafsanjani’s campaign. Mousavi and fellow reformist Mehdi Karroubi remain under house arrest and are banned from political activity.

Mohammed, Karroubi’s son, said Rafsanjani would now win the support of those who voted for change in 2009 but instead got Ahmadinejad for a second term. “The majority of the Green movement feel they now have a voice in this election,” he told us.

Speaking on Thursday to Tehran University students, Rafsanjani struck a confident note. “I entered the race to perform my religious and national duty given the country’s situation… and its problems at home and abroad,” the Mehr news website reported. “Certain people and movements have resorted to lying and falsification and slurs to discredit others. These people, intentionally or unintentionally, are harming the Islamic revolution.”

Rafsanjani, now 79, is a household name in Iran. He was a confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini and a co-architect of the Islamic Republic who has served as speaker of parliament and president.

Known as “the shark” — a reference to his cunning as well as his unusually sparse beard — Rafsanjani effectively ran the bloody eight-year war against Iraq, launched by Saddam Hussein in 1980 when he believed that the post-revolutionary chaos would prevent Iran from mounting a robust defence.

In 1988 he was credited with having persuaded a reluctant Khomeini to sue for peace with Iraq. It is also believed that he played an important role in the choice of Khamenei as Khomeini’s successor. But the two fell out after Rafsanjani lost to Ahmadinejad in the 2005 election.

Over the years he has acquired a reputation for being canny and pragmatic — as well as very rich from his pistachio-farming family inheritance and later business dealings. In 2003, Forbes estimated Rafsanjani’s own wealth at over $1bn, an astronomical sum in Iran. His reputation has suffered from widespread allegations of corruption, which he denies.

The US and other western governments will be watching for any evidence that he might take a softer line on the contentious issue of Iran’s nuclear programme — the cause of the harsh sanctions that are exacerbating the country’s structural economic problems.Until last weekend Rafsanjani had said he would only stand with the permission of Khamenei and he reportedly went ahead after receiving a call from the supreme leader’s office. That, and his position as head of the expediency council, which mediates between parliament and the Guardian Council, means that the latter body — charged with vetting the candidates — is unlikely to disqualify him.

In a country where rumour and labyrinthine conspiracy theories are the stuff of political discourse, some believe he may have been set up as a counterweight to Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahamadinejad’s controversial former chief of staff — who is loathed and feared by Khamenei and the conservatives.

“This is a classic divide and rule operation,” argued Ali Ansari of St Andrews University. “Khamenei put two people out there who cancel each other out.”

No one has forgotten how, in the wake of the 2009 repression, Rafsanjani spoke out critically for the opposition, urging the establishment, security forces, parliament and protesters all to act within the law.

Rafsanjani has been isolated for the past four years and his children have fallen foul of the regime. Last September, his son Mehdi Hashemi was detained after returning from self-imposed exile in the UK. He is now out of prison but being tried. Rafsanjani’s daughter, Faezeh, an activist and former MP, was sentenced to six months in prison after being found guilty of “spreading propaganda against the regime”.

Kouhyar Goudarzi, a prominent human rights activist who was jailed in 2009 and now lives in exile in Turkey, said: “If there’s the slightest hope for change, that can only be achieved by Rafsanjani, given the country’s current situation.”

By arrangement with the Guardian

The border between the countries was reinforced on the Jordanian side on Thursday, after Syrian state media warned the western-backed kingdom it was “playing with fire” and poised “on the edge of a volcano” by backing the opposition.

Recent weeks have seen a spate of reports about arms shipments from Jordan to anti-Assad rebels who have been making gains around Deraa, the Syrian city closest to the border. Opposition sources say the military situation reflects enhanced supplies
and training.

Barack Obama discussed the crisis with King Abdullah II in Amman on his Middle East tour last month. Jordan was the only Arab state the president visited — an indication of the pressure the king is under to be more supportive of the effort to weaken Assad and drive him from power.

Diplomats have described the discussion of plans for a buffer zone in southern Syria as well as accelerated training for rebel fighters by the US and Jordan. British and French special forces are also reported to be involved in training.

In an apparent reflection of nervousness about the issue, a government spokesman in Amman insisted on Friday that Jordan was “not part of the conflict” in Syria and maintained its support for a “peaceful solution” — the formal stance of all Arab states.
But the spokesman refused to comment either on the training or the buffer zone, the Al-Ghad newspaper reported.

The Washington Post cited Jordanian security officials this week as saying that a plan to complete the training of 3,000 Free Syrian Army officers by the end of June has been brought forward to the end of April in light of the border victories. The FSA is backed by western and Arab governments as a bulwark against the rise of radical Islamist groups.

Jordanian sources describe a “double discourse” — an official one that reiterates the formal position alongside clandestine training and Saudi-financed arms supplies delivered with the help of the CIA. Jordan’s powerful Mukhabarat secret service enjoys a close relationship with its western partners, including MI6 (Britain’s foreign intelligence service).

“The Jordanians are happy to channel support but they say ‘don’t put us in the front line’,” said a Syrian opposition figure.
“They used to be afraid that Assad’s intelligence system could hit back and hurt Jordan but now he is weak they feel emboldened to be more active.”

Jordanian officials repeatedly speak of the gravity of the Syrian crisis, with concern focusing on the flow of refugees across the border and the risk that extremist elements will come with them.

“Jordan can’t sit idle and watch Al Qaeda and other militants seizing control of its… border with Syria,” Jordan’s information minister, Sameeh Maaytah, was quoted as saying. “It must take proactive steps to arrive at a state of equilibrium in the security structure on the border.”

An estimated 460,000 Syrian refugees are in Jordan. In one 24-hour period this week 1,967 arrivals were recorded. If the influx continues at the current rate Jordan could be hosting more than one million refugees by the end of 2013. Abdullah Ensour, the newly appointed prime minister, has warned publicly of a “catastrophic” situation” and used even stronger language in private, according to sources in Amman.

Domestic strains have also been evident in complaints about the number of Syrian refugees and several MPs urging the closure of the border. Abdul Karim al-Dughmi, a conservative politician, criticised the government’s “timid position” on the crisis and
blamed a “conspiracy by some Arab states” for the unrest.

By arrangement with the Guardian

And now confirmation that the White House vetoed Pentagon plans to arm the anti-Assad rebels has underlined just how hard it has been for them to translate political support from the west into practical assistance to achieve victory.

Khatib said he would negotiate with al-Sharaa if 160,000 prisoners were freed and passports issued for Syrians abroad. But outrage erupted because the SOC’s charter states that it will not talk to the regime — except about its departure. Khatib retorted that he was expressing a personal view — but then met the foreign ministers of Russia and Iran, Assad’s main backers.

Now, after a flurry of tense consultations, Khatib and senior colleagues will meet in Cairo this weekend — with the UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi — for an emergency session to clarify the position.

Others hailed the initiative as reflecting the wishes of ordinary Syrians desperate to end a war that has already killed 60,000 people. Activists of some of the Local Co-ordination Committees have given their qualified support. So has a commander of the Free Syrian Army.

“Khatib’s offer of talks with Assad helped undermine the terrible fear of many that this struggle is existential and will continue until one side has eliminated the other,” wrote Joshua Landis on the Syria Comment blog. “To many Syrians who feel that they are mere pawns caught between two clashing giants. . . (it) provided some hope of a kinder and saner future.”

Khatib, a former imam of the historic Umayyad mosque in Damascus, was supposed to usher in a new era of unity when he became president of the SOC last November. The fractious Syrian National Council (SNC) was subsumed into the new body. Its performance was said by the western governments calling for Assad to go to have become more businesslike.

But the SOC is still divided into camps, like the SNC before it. “This initiative has taken us back to square one after all the efforts we made to convince the international community that the opposition was united,” complained one activist. “It was handled completely unprofessionally. It was a wasted opportunity.”

Kamal Labwani, an independent, warned of “betrayal” and a “fifth column” inside the opposition. “The regime understands only the language of force,” he protested. But George Sabra of the SNC — the largest component of the SOC — was more nuanced: he first rejected the initiative but then softened his position, calling for unity and support for the FSA as fighters made new but probably temporary gains on the outskirts of Damascus this week.

Khatib, described as charismatic but a bad listener, is said to dislike foreign-based activists and intellectuals he considers out of touch — disparagingly known as “hotel warriors”. Based in Cairo with his own loyal team, he has the support of powerful businessmen from Damascus who are alarmed by the rise of Islamist and jihadi groups in the armed opposition.

“People have criticised Khatib for being naive but there are forces telling him that this is the way to go,” said Malik al-Abdeh, a Syrian commentator. “They tell him that if this carries on then everything they have achieved will come crashing down because of these backwoods FSA fighters and the jihadis who will destroy Damascus as they have large parts of Aleppo.”

Others warn that Khatib’s leadership, and that of the SOC, remains far more dependent on external recognition than any internal legitimacy.

The US, Britain and the EU gave Khatib’s initiative a cautious welcome while insisting Assad must be held accountable for his crimes — a position that is unlikely to persuade him to step down voluntarily. Only Turkey publicly rejected it.

“We are positive but it would be useful to tie it into other diplomatic efforts,” said one western official. Hopes are focusing on Khatib’s visit to Moscow next month — and for a shift in Russia’s stubbornly pro-Assad position at the UN.

By arrangement with the Guardian

But the assassination of a leading leftwing politician, Chokri Belaid, a fierce critic of the Ennahda-led government, has turned the spotlight on Tunisia’s serious problems in the most sensational way.

In October 2011 Ennahda won a free election which produced an assembly in which it has a majority with two secular allies.
Rashid Ghannouchi, the party’s veteran leader who was exiled in Britain before the revolution, has had a good press — though
better abroad than at home, where the jasmine revolution has not been smelling too sweet recently.

Belaid represented opposition groups who were unhappy with Ennahda, calling days before his death for a national dialogue to resolve the escalating crisis.

Ennahda condemned his killing but suspicion fell at once on Salafi groups who are unhappy with the social liberalism of what has been the most secular of Arab countries since the days of Habib Bourguiba, its first president after independence from France, in the 1950s.

The statement issued by the British Foreign Office probably got it about right: “This was a cowardly and barbaric act aimed at destabilising Tunisia’s democratic transition,” it said.

The government has been blamed for failing to act against intimidation and violence by mosque preachers and on extremist social networking sites. Assaults against journalists, political activists and artists have not even been investigated, let alone prosecuted.

Salafis attacked the US embassy in Tunis last September after the deadly assault on the US consulate in Benghazi and embassy in Cairo. Last October a leaked video featuring Ghannouchi talking to Salafi leaders was exploited by Ennahda’s opponents to suggest that the two movements agreed on the “re-Islamisation” of institutions such as the army, the police and the media.
Attempts to discredit the video and to defuse the crisis did not dispel growing mistrust.

Ennahda’s problems with radical Islamists are reminiscent of those experienced by Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt.

But unlike in Egypt, Tunisia’s ruling party has not forged a strong relationship with the country’s army and security establishment, which is said to be ill-equipped to deal with violent extremists.

Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Tunisians have reportedly left in recent months to join jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen and Mali.

Beyond the Islamist-liberal divide lie broader issues as the government’s struggles to cope with mounting economic and social pressures over the problems it inherited when Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled to a gilded exile in Saudi Arabia.

In November last year thousands of frustrated young men took to the streets in a desert town called Siliana, where clashes with security forces ended only after the government promised to replace the state governor and provide more jobs and aid.

Not much, it seemed, had changed since Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself to death two years earlier and set in train the uprisings that are still transforming the Middle East and north Africa.

Recent talks had failed to reach agreement over redistributing power after one of Ennahda’s two coalition partners threatened to withdraw from the government unless Islamist officials connected to Ennahda were replaced.

It has become fashionable to decry the transformation of the Arab spring into an “Islamist winter” beset by violence and extremism.

That remains an exaggerated and partial view. The first political murder in post-revolutionary Tunisia does not erase the country’s other achievements. But its reputation as a model for transition from dictatorship to democracy is now looking distinctly tarnished.

By arrangement with the Guardian

In general, Tehran has misrepresented the uprisings as an “Islamic awakening” — a partial and self-serving view even though in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere Islamist parties have played significant roles. Iran (which crushed the opposition Green movement protests in 2009) has also made an important exception for its long-standing ally Syria, backing President Bashar al-Assad against his enemies when key Gulf states have actively opposed him and other Arabs kept their distance. It has reserved its most enthusiastic support for Bahrain, where the Shia majority is demanding that the western-backed monarchy institute genuine democratic reforms.

Syria was the main item on the agenda last week when Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s foreign minister, visited Cairo. The event was trumpeted by Iranian media as the harbinger of a new era in relations, though there is little common ground on Assad and President Mohamed Morsi even called publicly for the Syrian leader to face war crimes charges.

There is a good deal of historical baggage in the way of a rapprochement between the two countries. During Mubarak’s 30 years in power Egypt was firmly in the US camp in the Middle East. Iran severed ties with Egypt when Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 Camp David accords with Israel and then offered asylum to the deposed Shah. Egyptians have long bristled at the infamous Tehran mural which praises the “martyr” Khaled al-Islambouli, who led the 1981 assassination of Sadat.

Part of the change since the revolution is that many Egyptians, including those who dislike the peace treaty with Israel, support a more independent foreign policy that includes normal relations with Iran. Still, links with Tehran remain a sensitive issue.

Over the weekend the Egyptian government flatly denied press reports that Qasem Suleimani, commander of the elite al-Quds force of Iran’s revolutionary guard corps, had visited Cairo in December to advise on security issues. To many observers this sensational claim appeared intended to smear the president, who is on the defensive after opposition protests over the new constitution. It remains unclear whether the story was somehow linked to the dismissal of the interior minister, Ahmad Gamal al-Din. Suleimani also issued a denial.

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has certainly been too quick to blame outsiders for Morsi’s difficulties, but there is no doubt that he faces intense hostility both at home and abroad, especially from the United Arab Emirates, which has arrested 11 Egyptians on suspicion of national security offences.

Dahi Khalfan, Dubai’s outspoken police chief, has said that the threat from Iran and the Brotherhood was similar. “They both want to export the revolution,” he told al-Sharq al-Awsat. “What the Muslim Brothers are aiming for at the moment is to shred and denigrate the reputation of the Gulf rulers.” (The exception is tiny Qatar, which has just given $2.5bn in loans and grants to help Egypt shore up its faltering currency.)

In general though Egypt’s Arab friends are more worried about Tehran. Iran, according to the Saudi columnist Hamad al-Majid is “a virus spreading in a contaminated region. Gulf governments and their media “must build on President Mursi’s policy of spurning Iran’s advances, rather than doubting it,” he advised.

Indeed, while Salehi was seeing Morsi another Cairo event underlined the limits to Egyptian-Iranian detente. That was a conference of Iranians from Ahwaz, capital of Khuzestan province, about what organisers called “the Persian occupation of Arab land.” It had a strong sectarian tinge and enjoyed the backing of a key Morsi aide and al-Azhar, the voice of Egypt’s official religious establishment. Iran complained that it was the work of “radical Salafis” backed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s president, is due in Cairo next month for a summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

That will mirror the newly-elected Morsi’s participation in last summer’s Non-Aligned Conference in Tehran, where, to American and Israeli dismay, he signalled a more independent post-Mubarak foreign policy but then embarrassed his hosts by calling it an “ethical duty” to support the uprising in Syria.

Signs are, all in all, that it will be some time before these two important Middle Eastern powers manage to find a way of rubbing along despite the obvious tensions. Still, it will suit both sides to try to keep them from getting out of hand.

By arrangement with the Guardian

Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, has called for Britain’s backing in part because of its historic responsibility for Palestine. The government has previously refused, citing strong US and Israeli objections and fears of long-term damage to prospects for negotiations.

On Monday night, the government signalled it would change tack and vote yes if the Palestinians modified their application, which is to be debated by the UN general assembly in New York later this week. As a “non-member state”, Palestine would have the same status as the Vatican.

British officials said the Palestinians were now being asked to refrain from applying for membership of the international criminal court or the international court of justice, which could both be used to pursue war crimes charges or other legal claims against Israel.

Abbas is also being asked to commit to an immediate resumption of peace talks “without preconditions” with Israel. The third condition is that the general assembly’s resolution does not require the UN Security Council to follow suit.

The US and Israel have both hinted at possible retaliation if the vote goes ahead. Congress could block payments to the Palestinian Authority and Israel might freeze tax revenues it transfers under the 1993 Oslo agreement or, worse, withdraw from the agreement altogether. It could also annex West Bank settlements. Britain’s position is that it wants to reduce the risk that such threats might be implemented and bolster Palestinian moderates.

France has already signalled that it will vote yes on Thursday, and the long-awaited vote is certain to pass as 132 UN members have recognised the state of Palestine.
Decisions by Germany, Spain and Britain are still pending and Palestinians would clearly prefer a united EU position as counterweight to the US.

Willian Hague, the UK foreign secretary, discussed the issue on Monday with Abbas and the French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, officials said.

Palestinian sources said Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, raised the issue with Abbas at his Ramallah headquarters last week, shortly before a ceasefire was agreed in the Gaza Strip, as had Tony Blair, the Quartet envoy.

Abbas has been widely seen to have been sidelined by his rivals in the Islamist movement Hamas, as well by his failure to win any concessions from Israel. Abbas, whose remit does not extend beyond the West Bank, hopes a strong yes vote will persuade Israel to return to talks after more than two years.Officials in Ramallah have opposed surrendering on the ICC issue so it can be used as a bargaining chip in future, but views are thought to be divided. Abbas said at the weekend: “We are going to the UN fully confident in our steps. We will have our rights because you are with us.”

Leila Shaid, Palestine’s representative to the EU, said: “After everything that has happened in the Arab spring, Britain can’t pretend it is in favour of democracy in Libya, Syria and Egypt but accept the Palestinians continuing to live under occupation.

As the former colonial power, Britain has a historic responsibility to Palestine. Britain is a very important country in the Middle East, it has extensive trade relations, and David Cameron should know he risks a popular backlash from Arab public opinion if he does not support us.”

Palestinians have rejected the claim that they are acting unilaterally, calling the UN path “the ultimate expression of multilateralism”. Israel’s apparent opposition to unilateralism has not stopped it acting without agreement to build and expand settlements, they say.

By arrangement with the Guardian

The significance of the sudden move is that he is the first of the younger generation of the Al Saud to be given one of the top jobs in the kingdom — which is being taken as a good indicator of the likely future succession.

King Abdullah is 89 and in poor health, Crown Prince Salman 76 and frail. Bin Nayef is well known and respected in the West, especially by its security and intelligence agencies, from his years as deputy minister of the interior, coordinating counterterrorist efforts and running a successful ‘de-radicalisation’ programme for repentant jihadis.

He had an extraordinarily lucky escape in August 2009 when an Al Qaeda suicide bomber from Yemen blew himself up in the minister’s palace but left his target only lightly injured. Panegyrics in the Saudi press predictably focus on his vision, humanity and peerless security record.

MBN, as he is known in leaked US diplomatic cables, is just 53 and thus counts as a youngster in the Saudi system. He is the son of the late crown prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, who died last June after serving as interior minister for three decades.

The US-educated Mohammed replaces his uncle, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, who took on the role after his brother Nayef died. There has been speculation that he was replaced because the king was angry over recent incidents in the restive Eastern Provinces and other security lapses.

On Monday, 10 recently released Saudi militants were arrested after a clash with border guards as they attempted to infiltrate into Yemen. Two soldiers were killed.

If the immediate motives for the appointment are unclear the longer-term significance of the family background seems obvious. The bottom line is that MBN is the first grandson of the kingdom’s founder Abdulaziz Ibn Saud to be appointed to one of the main leadership positions in the country in recent years.

It certainly puts him in the running to be crown prince-in-waiting — and a future king. Change at the top in Saudi Arabia still takes place at a glacial pace — despite (or perhaps because of) the winds of change elsewhere in the region. This therefore counts, most observers agree, as a highly significant move.

Back in 2009 MBN was marked as a favourite by Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi, the Emirati commentator, who pointed to another factor which seems to put the new minister in line for the very top job: “MBN’s claims to the throne are unrivalled in one aspect: out of some thousands of Al-Saud royals, including the top 100 or so involved in security affairs, MBN is one of the very few to be able to claim that he has ‘paid in blood’ for his country — and that is a tough claim to beat.”
— The Guardian, London

Billions of pounds worth of exports and thousands of jobs could be at risk in rows with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over a British parliamentary investigation and the role of Islamists in a changing political landscape.

In a report on human rights by the Commons foreign affairs committee (FAC) published yesterday, MPs criticise the government for failing to boycott the Formula One Grand Prix in Bahrain earlier this year.

They express concern that “political and strategic factors” coloured the decision not to list the kingdom alongside other states held responsible for abuses. “We find it difficult to discern any consistency of logic behind the government’s policy in not taking a public stance on the Bahrain Grand Prix but implementing at least a partial boycott of the 2012 Uefa Football Championship matches played in Ukraine,” the FAC said.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which together accounted for some £8bn of UK exports in 2011, have both voiced criticism of British policy and hinted at reviewing their relations. UK trade with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is worth over £17bn.

On Monday, Saudi officials told the BBC that their country was “insulted” by a separate FAC decision to investigate UK relations with their country and Bahrain. The Saudi ambassador, Prince Mohammed Bin Nawaf Al Saud, warned that Riyadh would “not tolerate or accept any foreign interference in the workings” of the GCC, which comprises Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman.

In the UAE, a campaign is under way to boycott British trade on the grounds of alleged support for an opposition group linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Victories for the Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia and its rising influence elsewhere have jangled nerves all over the Gulf.

Britain has softened its hostility to Islamist parties and welcomed the new governments in Cairo and Tunis.

In London, the Foreign Office minister, Alistair Burt, told an Abu Dhabi conference that the UK valued investment opportunities in the UAE but he made no mention of the call for a boycott.

In Whitehall, the Saudi statement was seen as “a shot across the bows” to ensure that the government takes Saudi concerns seriously. “We are not naive or starry-eyed,” said an FCO spokesman. “We are realistic and we will judge people by their actions and not their words.”

Mike Gapes, a member of the FAC, said: “I am very surprised by this prickly Saudi reaction. I don’t know whether this is a misunderstanding or there is some other agenda.”

On Bahrain the FAC said it was hard to find any “consistency of logic” in ministers’ approach. Bahrain should have been included by the FCO on its list of “countries of concern” in the wake of the “brutal” suppression of anti-government protests last year.

Saudi Arabia led a GCC force that intervened to help end them.

Bahrain complains that it is facing Iranian-backed subversion, while the opposition accuses it of human rights abuses. Britain came under pressure to support calls for a boycott of the Formula One in April amid fears that it could be a catalyst for a renewed crackdown. Cameron refused, arguing “Bahrain is not Syria” and that reforms were under way. — The Guardian, London

Bashar al Assad’s regime, which had seemed to be one of the most stable of Arab dictatorships, has certainly been profoundly shaken — and not only because an estimated 25,000 people have already died. But is it possible that the still-defiant Assad will follow in the footsteps of his father Hafez, who killed as many or more in Hama in 1982, in the pre-YouTube age, but lived for another 17 years before dying peacefully in his bed?

Author Stephen Starr supplies a partial answer in his vivid account of the first months of the uprising. His book — Revolt in Syria: Eye-witness to the Uprising — is also fascinating on how a young Damascus-based journalist, who had previously struggled to interest editors and now found himself in the right place at the right time, managed to operate in hazardous circumstances. He was lucky that the Irish business paper he was accredited to erected a paywall so that the ministry of information didn’t read his stories online.

In significant ways Syria was a different case from Egypt and Tunisia, where the army quickly sided with the revolution, and Libya, where a united opposition consolidated its base in Benghazi and won the western support that led to Nato’s intervention and finally Qadhafi’s violent death.

But Syria did have one crucial thing in common with other Arab countries touched by the spring fever of 2011: that was a sense — de Tocqueville identified it as “a revolution of rising expectations” — that living under an authoritarian system with brutal instincts was no longer tolerable.

The spark ignited in the southern town of Deraa, where schoolchildren who daubed anti-regime graffiti on walls were arrested and beaten and had their fingernails pulled out by the Mukhabarat secret police. That abuse triggered a defiant response. Within days al-Jazeera, a key player in this drama, was broadcasting pictures of a statue of Hafez being pulled down — Saddam-style — as dozens lay dead on the streets. State media, of course, didn’t report it. But Starr started getting calls from horrified contacts urging him to cover the story. It was, he writes, “hardly believable”.

These origins are worth recalling because memories have faded. These days debates about Syria focus on western intervention, opposition divisions, the role played by jihadis and the motives of the Saudis and Qataris in arming the rebels. All too often, ordinary Syrians are robbed of any agency, portrayed as pawns in a geopolitical game.

Culture of fear

Starr’s strength was as a resident correspondent who had the time to get to know the man on the Damascus microbus. He describes the “culture of fear” pervading Syrian society and how it faded in the face of the repression and violence — “a massive miscalculation” — that followed Assad’s belated and unconvincing promises of reform. But he criticises those who fail to understand why the president has retained support, from his own minority Alawite community, from Christians, as well as substantial sections of the Sunni middle classes and those who depend on the state — a “silent majority seeking a better life”. This still seems pertinent even after the regime has used artillery, air strikes and Shabiha thugs to commit sectarian massacres. On a highly contentious point, Starr also believes that the government, known for manipulating extremists in Lebanon and Iraq, staged several suicide bombings that it blamed on Al Qaeda.Assad and those who surround him, Starr predicts, “will not negotiate because the concept is alien to them in their everyday lives … The regime set a path to run both itself and the country into the ground. It would not give up an inch of Syrian soil.”

Assad’s journey to this point is surveyed by the American academic David Lesch, whose blunt conclusion is spelled out in his book’s title. By his own admission he was one of those Syria-watchers who, in the early noughties, thought that the western-trained ophthalmologist and computer geek with the attractive, London-born wife and a taste for the music of Phil Collins was a genuine reformer, who was held back by Hafez-era hardliners. (Lesch’s previous book was flatteringly called The New Lion of Damascus.) Others never believed in the novelty or the promise in the first place.

Lesch argues now that Bashar raised expectations he could not meet, that he remained a child of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the cold war, keeper of the Alawite flame — and above all his father’s son. The brief “Damascus Spring” of 2002 was followed by a wave of repression that the regime liked to blame on the US invasion of neighbouring Iraq, but which in truth ended because it challenged the status quo. Syria needed a Gorbachev figure who would break out and embrace a genuinely transformational role. “But he was not up to the task,” Lesch concludes. “He failed miserably.” That failure continues to be written in Syrian blood.

By arrangement with Guardian

Attacks like these are multiplying as criticism mounts over the mismanagement of Iran’s economic plight. With the rial plummeting against the dollar, accusations that the president is manipulating Iran’s foreign currency reserves — hence the watering can — reflect discontent among ordinary people.

Ahmadinejad has been mired in controversy from his election in 2005, a populist figure who has been both publicly backed and privately vilified by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Islamic republic’s hardline clerical establishment.

Only last week, as Ahmadinejad was addressing the UN general assembly, his own media adviser was arrested.

He also faced angry criticism over the 140-strong entourage that accompanied him to the UN. But his speech in New York lacked the familiar fireworks, and an interview with one US newspaper sounded almost conciliatory on the burning question of Iran’s nuclear programme — the reason for some of the toughest international sanctions ever imposed.

Economists agree that the currency crisis has been triggered by financial sanctions which, on top of a huge reduction in oil revenues from the EU, make it harder for Iran to carry on injecting petrodollars into markets to keep exchange rates down.

“What is making it worse is that the country is plagued by a power struggle between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei,” says one Iranian analyst, “so instead of handling the crisis the president is preoccupied by the arrest of his press adviser and the central bank seems completely undecided and shifts from one policy to another.”

Ahmadinejad, banned from standing for a third term, is widely seen as yesterday’s man. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who claimed victory in 2009, remains under house arrest. In March’s majlis elections, Khamenei loyalists swept the board.

The president has severe image problems in the West, but he has been more pragmatic than Khamenei on the need to ease tensions. No surprise that he is at loggerheads with the Revolutionary Guards, who seem to welcome an attack by Israel or the US.

Western governments appear to be hoping that the sanctions will encourage popular unrest and a policy shift. But repression has been successful and there seems little appetite for mass protests. Media outlets have been officially ordered to avoid “bleak” reporting about the economy.

“What is happening now is that anyone who resorts to protests can be easily labelled as damaging national security,” warns a veteran Tehran-watcher. “So this tactic by the big powers of encouraging a popular uprising effectively forces Iranians to shut up.”

Ali Ansari of the University of St Andrews argues that the Iranian government has now lost all credibility on economic management with its people, not least because there are no independent means of accounting and auditing.

“Iranian politicians have been quite lucky — especially Ahmadinejad,” he says. “But all of a sudden there are no more miracles around the corner.”
— The Guardian, London