Security at the polling stations in Nowshera, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank and Hangu, which have been notified for internally displaced persons, will present another challenge.

Apart from the candidates of the three political parties — the PPP, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Awami National Party — that have been threatened by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the militants are targeting candidates from the tribal areas.

The offices of some such hopefuls were attacked in Peshawar and Kohat; in Bajaur Agency, a female suicide bomber targeted the entrance of a hospital (this was the second such attack in the area carried out by a woman).

In this phase of pre-poll violence, officials of the Election Commission of Pakistan have also been targeted. In Quetta, a district election officer was killed and in Kharan district, militants threw a hand grenade at the residence of an ECP officer.

Providing security for the 15,629 candidates contesting for national and provincial seats is a massive task. What needs to be understood is that the mere deployment of a few more policemen is not the solution. This may raise the visibility of the police, but it cannot guarantee security.

And, further, it must be kept in mind that policemen must be deployed according to a plan based on intelligence. A candidate from Bannu who was recently targeted was accompanied by policemen, and a few of them were killed as a result while the attack could not be prevented.

The militants are increasingly turning to technology. During the pre-election period in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an escalation in violence has been witnessed in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Karak, Charsadda, Mardan, Nowshera and Swabi. Apart from carrying out suicide bombings, the militants also lob grenades, plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs), carry out targeted killings and deliver threatening letters.

In the run-up to the 2008 elections, militants used the tactic of going after a few selected personalities in selected areas such as Peshawar, Charsadda and Swat. Currently, however, they are also attacking ‘soft’ targets.

This seemingly endless cycle of violence was already well under way before the countdown to the elections began. The militants have merely found more of an opportunity now to target politicians and their supporters. The media coverage of the violence has also played a role in the escalation of the general fear and confusion among the public.

In Sindh, Karachi has remained the prime focus of those bent upon sowing the seeds of terror. Apart from the killing of election candidates, workers of selected parties have been targeted. Lobbing IEDs at candidates’ offices is a favourite tactic of the militants. That a candidate’s convoy was attacked by a suicide bomber near Shikarpur sends an alarming signal about the penetration of extremists in areas that had hitherto been seen as largely peaceful.

In Balochistan, the areas that have seen attacks include Pishin, Quetta, Jafferabad, Turbat, Kech and Jhal Magsi. The violence has been of such severity that a 15-day ‘targeted operation’ was launched to ensure the peaceful conduct of the elections.

The unfortunate reality is that the militants have successfully managed to shift their focus from the macro to the micro level. This is evident from their shift in focus from public meetings to corner meetings and candidates’ offices.

The public has so far not shown too much enthusiasm about the coming elections, but as political activities accelerate in the last days before polling, so might the actions of the extremists.

Law enforcement authorities must carry out threat assessments, issue security advice — this is important as at present there is virtually no free flow of such information between the police and politicians — and provide protection to candidates, the public and to the offices and staff of the ECP. Police staff needs to be trained to transport the polling material safely.

The extremists are doing their best to spread fear and anxiety. They have gone on the offensive, trying to demonstrate their capacity to hit at will. Law enforcement agencies, too, must keep pace with their will and tactics. But, at the same time, the political leadership must recognise that there are limits to the security agencies’ capacities.

Pakistan has seen no systemic efforts to assess the image of the police. On polling day, when policemen facilitate the administration — for example by commandeering vehicles — they hurt their image. To prevent this, it is imperative that standard procedure be formulated and adhered to in such matters.

Given the adverse situation in KP, the police department took the innovative step of starting to issue security advice and carry out threat assessments. Police deployment has been increased to the maximum level. Across the country, though, it is difficult for law enforcement agencies to muster the manpower required to hold elections in peace.

In this connection, there was news that the Karachi police department is considering hiring a buttressing force of some 15,000 private security guards. Bringing retired policemen back on duty has also been considered but difficulties were posed by the lack of updated data verifying their credentials; such information should have been collected at the provincial and district levels.

May 11 will be a real test for the law enforcement authorities, requiring coordinated effort and patience.

It remains to be seen how far their efforts will go in deterring attacks.

The writer is a deputy inspector- general of police.

alibabakhel@hotmail.com

Without mammoth public meetings, election campaigns cannot gain momentum. To mobilise the masses political parties are dependent on huge public meetings.

Public meetings, corner meetings, processions, filing of nomination papers and transportation of election material need foolproof security. Election security can be defined as “the process of protecting electoral stakeholders, information, facilities, and events”.

Grim realities from our history have given rise to a bleak scenario. The first major incident was the assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. Much later, former prime minister Shaukat Aziz survived an assassination attempt while campaigning in Attock district in July 2004.

Upon her arrival in Pakistan on Oct 18, 2007, the convoy of PPP leader Benazir Bhutto was hit by two explosions; she remained unhurt but more than 140 people lost their lives. Two months later, Ms Bhutto herself was assassinated in Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi.

During the last general elections unsuccessful attempts were made on the lives of politicians Aftab Sherpao, Sikandar Sherpao, Amir Muqam and Afrasiab Khattak.

In 1997 during by-elections in Peshawar, the only son of Ghulam Ahmed Bilour was shot dead. Last year after returning from a corner meeting Bashir Bilour was assassinated in a suicide bombing. Between 2008 and 2012 abortive attempts were made on the lives of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the late Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Asfandyar Wali and Amir Haider Hoti.

Elsewhere in South Asia there is a history of violence during the electoral process. On May 21, 1991 during an election rally Indias former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a suicide bomber. In 1999, former Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga was injured in a powerful bomb explosion at an election rally in Colombo.

Given such examples, it is imperative that a proactive approach be adopted by the law enforcement agencies. In the past, issues of transparency and credibility dominated the elections but now everyone asks how elections will be held in such a hostile situation. The prevention of pre-poll violence will be a significant factor in motivating people to cast their votes.

Traditionally, in certain parts of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa elders, religious groups and local political parties bar women from exercising their right to vote. Such situations can give rise to clashes between contesting candidates.

Violence during the campaign phase communicates signals of fear and insecurity, hence affecting the turnout on election day. In 2008, a suicide attack on a polling station in Buner killed 35 voters. Therefore providing security cover to 72,000 polling stations needs synchronised efforts.

The probability of violence at polling stations during the tabulation of results is another important issue which needs special attention.

The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) recently published a code of conduct. In case of violations, legal action to the extent of disqualification can be taken. According to the code, the candidates shall communicate the schedules of public meetings three days in advance. To ensure personal security each candidate will be allowed five security guards during the campaign.

Potentially dangerous venues should be identified by carrying out threat assessments. Classification according to the threat level must be made, which will help police chalk out preventive and reactive strategies.

The threat assessment needs to identify the likely victims, perpetrators and motives. Yet threat assessments in Pakistan lack a professional, scientific approach and objectivity. In fact, police should frequently issue security advice to those who are on the hit list of militant organisations. The likely victims of election-related violence can be candidates, voters, security personnel, observers or members of the media.

During campaigns, public meetings of political stalwarts get security cover but often corner meetings and other political activities fail to achieve the required security cover. Therefore, the free flow of communication between political parties and police authorities is imperative.

To ensure the neutrality of police, while transporting ballot papers from election offices to polling stations, ballot papers should not be placed in police vehicles.

Also, during elections conflicts can occur due to identity issues. For example, the presence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in certain parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi affects the local ethno-political dynamics as the IDPs assert themselves; this can trigger violence during elections.

Soon after the announcement of unofficial results at polling stations supporters opt for violent means to celebrate the victory of their candidate, for example through aerial firing. Such incidents, including the recent indiscriminate aerial firing during a corner meeting in Multan, call the effectiveness of the code of conduct into question.

To educate police officers about their responsibilities during election duties coordinated efforts between the ECP and police are needed. Indeed the poll campaign will be a major test for the law enforcement agencies.

From best international practices one learns that election security is not an isolated venture but rather the collective responsibility of election management bodies. These bodies include law enforcement agencies, political parties, the media, civil society organisations and judicial officials.

Democracy and policing are interlinked. Neutrality of the police ensures the strengthening of democracy while true democracies are instrumental in creating a service-oriented professional police force.

The writer is deputy inspector general of police.

alibabakhel@hotmail.com

Radicalisation is not a quick process; rather, it is the product of historical events, ideological conflict, and social and economic deprivation. The mistreatment of the masses by the mighty has been a reality throughout history; it is this injustice that propels people towards radicalisation and extreme actions.

De-radicalisation is an endeavour directed at changing an individual’s value system and helping him reject the extremist ideology and embrace mainstream values. This is a constructive approach. The prevailing impression that the elimination of terrorism and other forms of violent extremism can only be tackled by the law-enforcement and security agencies is erroneous.

De-radicalisation equally requires the involvement of academics, researchers, sociologists, anthropologists, the media and clergy. Those who think that the law-enforcement agencies will be able to eliminate this menace in isolation are living in a fool’s paradise.

The hard approach to countering terrorism is primarily based on the use of force. In the post 9/11 scenario, few countries opted for soft counterterrorism approaches. In fact, de-radicalisation needs to be understood in the context of radicalisation itself. People who may be spiritually curious but have only a limited knowledge of their religion and are in dire need of money are most susceptible to radicalisation. In their search for potential extremists and terrorists, the hunters focus on a person’s psychological, financial and social needs, and then proceed to assess his capabilities.

De-radicalisation helps reduce the number of terrorists, increases the government’s writ and constitutes a cost-effective option for dealing with militancy. Various strategies of the method have been tried over the past decade by countries including Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco and Jordan.

Bangladesh’s de-radicalisation programme is based on incarceration, intelligence and intellectual intervention. The strategy was created primarily focusing on the Jamaatul Mujahideen and Harkatul Jihad-al-Islami, and the programme chiefly targets religious educational institutions.

On the other hand, the overriding feature of Morocco’s de-radicalisation initiative is a human rights-centric approach. The programme is a joint initiative by the government and civil society organisations. By encouraging the investigation of past grave human rights violations such as kidnappings and enforced disappearances, the government tried to win the people over.

Further, human rights bodies such as a committee for justice and reconciliation and a centre for the rights of the people were established. These forums actively engaged with communities for the protection of human rights, while investment in the training of imams yielded positive dividends. The electronic media has also been effectively used in the de-radicalisation process.

The Jordanian model revolves around the perception that extremism increases due to misguided youth buying into perverse views of religion. Their de-radicalisation programme is based on military measures and educational inventiveness. Moreover, through the enactment of an anti-terrorism law and a fatwa in 2006, the state defined the procedure of issuing religious decrees.

Jail reform is another method that has been incorporated in the Jordanian programme, since prisons are a breeding ground for extremism. During the de-radicalisation process, it was also learnt that apart from other reasons, weak parental control plays a significant factor in radicalisation.

The Saudi programme, launched in 2005, is rooted in a psychological, cultural and religious basis. The programme appears to be a benevolent one as beneficiaries are entitled to pursue an education and marry with financial help. The programme brought 4,000 former extremists back into the mainstream. There is increasing realisation regarding education and the capacity-building of imams. The Saudi model believes in the segregation of radical and ordinary criminals.

In Pakistan, we should give prison reforms serious thought as our jails are places where ordinary criminals can be transformed into extremists. An estimated 63 per cent of the population is under the age of 25 years. Owing to illiteracy, abject poverty and poor parental control, young people are likely to fall prey to extremism.

A de-radicalisation initiative in Swat was introduced in 2009. The programme has three components, focusing on juveniles, adult prisoners and family members of detained persons. The Swat model can be studied for its impact and replicated in other parts of the country.

In Punjab, counterterrorism authorities, with the collaboration of a technical and vocational training institute authority, initiated a pilot project to de-radicalise former extremists. More than 300 former members of banned organisations belonging to 15 districts of the province benefited from the programme. The joint venture intends to enrol another 1,300 people.

The pilot programme was allocated Rs9.33 million, and former extremists aged between 16 and 35 years have been inducted. Trainees get Rs500 a month as pocket money, and upon the successful completion of training, are entitled to a maximum of Rs30,000 as an interest-free loan.

It is imperative that it is understood that incarceration alone will not counter the spread of radicalisation. The police and prison departments should be closely associated with de-radicalisation programmes. Our prisons push prisoners towards more isolation, making them vulnerable to radical thoughts. If we deny them access to positive information, we will be the losers.

In a few countries, an education-based approach has successfully been introduced in jails. Under such initiatives prisoners are in jails close to their homes. They are encouraged to study and access newspapers and television. Further, they have frequent meetings with family members. Such a humane approach has yielded positive dividends in terms of de-radicalisation.

This is a cost effective option. The United States spends $150 billion annually on its fight against militancy while Saudi Arabia runs a de-radicalisation programme at the cost of only $12m per year.

De-radicalisation is a soft approach to combating terrorism within the orbit of respect for fundamental human rights. Therefore, Pakistan will have to invest more in such initiatives.

The writer is a deputy inspector general of the police.

alibabakhel@hotmail.com

Targeted killings aren’t isolated acts; they are organised, well-coordinated acts undertaken with the sanction of a militant, or political, organisation.

The prime reason for the upward trend in sectarian targeted killing is the strengthened nexus between banned sectarian organisations and terrorist organisations.

According to statistics of the Islamabad-based Centre for Research and Security Studies, more innocent people fall prey to targeted killings as compared to those who die in suicide or other blasts. In 2012, 839 were killed as a result of 389 incidents of bomb blasts and suicide bombings, while 1,784 were killed in 1,324 incidents of targeted killings.

Karachi is the worst affected. Ethno-political, sectarian and land-mafia rivalries have intensified the incidence of such killings. Since 1994, Karachi alone has lost over 9,500 people to targeted killings, the majority belonging to various political parties, particular sects and sectarian groups.

According to CRSS statistics, last year a 30 per cent increase was observed in targeted killings in the city. From the statistics one can discern that the majority of the victims were from certain political parties.

Although for the last two decades Karachi has been the preferred hunting ground for killers, now Quetta, Gilgit-Baltistan and Peshawar are also in the crosshairs.

During the last four years around 283 pro-government community elders have been killed. This has rendered it difficult for law-enforcement personnel to win the public’s cooperation. People’s faith in the criminal justice system has also been badly eroded, and no one, even from affected communities, is prepared to stand witness in court.

The majority of such cases are registered against unknown accused. Without the cooperation of the people and in the absence of even circumstantial evidence, it becomes difficult for investigators to trace the killers. The blind nature of these cases means that most are submitted in courts as untraced.

Illiteracy, unemployment, abject poverty and exposure to hate-mongering are responsible for the creation of such killers. Recruitment agents exploit their psychological and financial needs and the enrolled ‘talent’ is trained in skills such as motorcycle riding, throwing grenades while driving motorbikes and shooting. They are kept motivated by propaganda and hate material.

Target identification is an exclusive job usually carried out by the mastermind. Before striking the targets the killers shadow them. Generally, small arms are used in such killings. In recent incidents, reportedly, pistols fitted with silencers were used.

Before shooting the target, the communication between the handler and shooter takes place primarily via cellphone. During such communication, code words are used while illegal mobile subscriber identity modules (SIMs) facilitate the killers. We direly need a crackdown against the illegal sale of such SIMs.

The network actually consists of very few individuals; if one is arrested, the whole gang can be busted. However, the conviction rate in cases of targeted killing is very low and therefore, the majority of the accused are acquitted. The complainants are usually unaware of the killers’ identities, so they do not charge anyone in the first information report lodged with the police.

Furthermore, adequate protection has not been made available to judges, investigators and witnesses. Article 21 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, provides protection to the judges and prosecutors.

Compensation is an obligation of the state. Justice (retd) Zahid Qurban Alvi presided over a commission set up by the Sindh government to determine the number of victims and the compensation that was to be paid to the heirs. The government gave Rs0.2 million to the heirs of each victim killed in a targeted attack. The commission also recommended providing free education (from the zakat funds) to two children of each such victim.

The higher judiciary has also taken suo motu notice of targeted killings. To encourage citizens to share information, the Peshawar High Court has directed the police to introduce a universal access number so that information can be volunteered anonymously. The systemic surveillance of banned organisations and their supporters needs immediate attention, though.

Hate literature propels otherwise innocent people towards crime and aids terror funding and the recruitment of terrorists. The administration needs to clamp down on such distribution and printing presses.

Pakistan’s policing model depends primarily on eyewitness accounts. To deal with new challenges, technology-led policing coupled with the cooperation of vulnerable communities is the need of the hour. Merely increasing the human resource base will not be enough; we need to build the capacity of law-enforcement agencies.

Recently, the police along with several communities worked out a plan to install 9,000 closed-circuit cameras in Karachi. Such technological help will facilitate the police in nabbing target shooters. But the police need to adapt to technology.

CCTV cameras were installed in a few important areas but due to poor monitoring, maintenance and a lack of coordination between the police and the monitoring room, these cameras effectively remained decoration pieces. When the residence of a police officer in Karachi was attacked in 2011, the CCTV cameras were not working.

Without credible intelligence, policing is a wild goose chase. Intelligence-led policing will strengthen the law-enforcement agencies. Meanwhile, the “special branches” of all provincial police departments need revamping.

In Karachi, especially, the proliferation of small arms is another important factor. Civilians are estimated to hold some 18 million guns. Obviously, de-weaponisation of the city is one of the most daunting tasks yet to be undertaken.

By adopting a proactive strategy, improved and coordinated endeavours and the sharing of timely intelligence, the law-enforcement agencies can control targeted killing.

The writer is deputy inspector general of the police.

alibabakhel@hotmail.com

In Pakistan, the origin of women policing can be traced to the 1970s. In the Police Act 1861 and Police Rules 1934 there is no reference to women policing. However the Police Order 2002 recognises the need and importance of women policing.

During Benazir Bhutto’s first stint as prime minister, her government expressed keen interest in women’s participation in policing. As a result, women’s police stations were established in a few urban centres. Yet there was no real change in attitudes. Issues regarding recruitment, training, the work environment, promotions and women’s role in operations were not addressed in an organised manner.

There are 1,544 police stations in the four provinces while there are 12 women’s police stations in the country, including three in Punjab, six in Sindh, two in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and one in Islamabad. Most women’s police stations merely operate as holding or detention areas.

The 4,000 women police personnel in the country constitute less than one per cent of the total police strength.

According to a survey conducted by the UN, amongst Asian countries Singapore has 19.1, Malaysia 9.5, and Sri Lanka 5.3 per cent women’s representation in the police force.

To increase women’s participation in law-enforcement agencies the UN determined a goal of 20 per cent. Therefore instead of gender equality the priority should be gender mainstreaming.

Owing to social taboos women are reluctant to join the police. To attract women to the force it is imperative to carry out workplace environmental assessments. In the first phase, information should be collected on areas in which female officers have traditionally faced barriers, such as in recruitment and selection, sexual harassment, non-acceptance by peers and supervisors, pregnancy, childcare, etc.

In the recruitment process fair representation and effective say of female police officers is also required. Additionally, reluctance on the part of female officers to accept the challenge of field assignments is another issue confronted by supervisors.

Training centres primarily cater to the needs of male police officers. In 14 police colleges and schools, women police personnel try to adapt themselves to the harsh training environment. Due to an unattractive training environment, a fair proportion of women recruits either drop out or opt for non-policing assignments.
Non-availability of women trainers is another issue.

In Pakistan, cases of suicide, murder and ‘honour’ killings are primarily dealt with by male police investigators. The presence of male police officers provides excuses to the heirs of the victims to create hindrances in the investigation. Thus it almost becomes impossible for investigators to collect, preserve and exhibit circumstantial evidence in court.

In cases of ‘honour’ killings and other forms of violence against women, the role of female doctors, investigators and relatives is of vital importance. During the initial stage either due to hindrances in access or the poor professionalism of investigators, it becomes difficult for the courts to convict the accused. Such situations are being successfully exploited by the perpetrators; as a result the majority goes unpunished.

Investigation by women officers can enhance the comfort level of female victims, reduce human rights violations and enhance the image of the police.

From the successful experience of the developed world, one learns that integration of women in the police force is a phased process. In the initial phase the roles to be assigned to women police personnel are to be defined.

Induction of more women in the police force will not only improve police-community relations but also enhance human rights standards. Increased women participation in policing will also earn a ‘soft’ image for the police.

Constable Shazia Gul of the Nowshera police was the first policewoman of the country to lay down her life in the line of duty. Her sacrifice dispelled the myth that women are incapable of handling the hazards of policing.

Also, Pakistani woman peacekeeper DSP Shahzadi Gulfam received the prestigious International Female Police Peacekeeper Award. The achievements of such female police officers need to be highlighted.

In Pakistan during the last few years violence against women has indicated an upward trend. Pakistan ranked 134 out of a total 135 countries in the Gender Gap Index 2012.

The index was introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006. It is a measure to assess the scope and magnitude of gender disparities.

According to a report compiled by the Aurat Foundation 8,539 women fell prey to violence in 2011. During this period, a 6.74 per cent increase in reported cases of violence against women in the country was recorded.

To prevent such violence the state has introduced the Criminal law (Amendment) Act 2004 and Provisions of Qisas and Diyat in the Pakistan Penal Code.

Further, to document violence against women, the National Police Bureau has established the Gender Crimes Cell (GCC). The GCC is primarily dependent on data provided by provincial police. Still, in rural areas, cases of violence targeting women are not reported therefore the GCC needs to depend on other reporting methods too.

From best international practices it is clear that recruitment, retention and integration of women in policing are achievable goals. Integration of women in policing is the best method to improve human rights indicators.

The writer is a deputy inspector-general of police.

alibabakhel@hotmail.com

One of the main challenges faced is that those who perpetuate violence, whether terrorists or militants, keep changing their tactics. This requires the police and other law enforcement agencies to also keep changing tack. Further, these agencies and departments also face legal, financial and capacity-related issues. Terrorist and militant organisations, on the other hand, appear to have ample resources at their disposal.

After the operation undertaken by the security forces in Malakand, radical changes were evident in the strategy adopted by the militants and the targets they chose. In the earlier phase, they had targeted mainly law enforcement and security agencies but after that operation, their sphere of operations widened. Similarly, the battleground has also expanded from just the tribal areas earlier to now the settled areas.

Despite the efforts on part of the country’s law enforcement and security, the havoc wreaked by these groups and organisations has not been brought under control. Yet success has been seen from time to time. For instance, last year saw a 27 per cent decline in suicide attacks as compared to 2011; according to a recent report by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, there were 33 suicide attacks in 2012 as compared to 45 the year before.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa faced the brunt of the violence with 54 per cent of the attacks. Even so, last year’s statistics show an 11 per cent decline in incidents there.

Nevertheless, there have been a series of attacks, including those on Bannu Jail, the Mehran airbase and others, that indicate that the perpetrators are moving from micro to macro targets. At such attacks, they have tried to create hostage situations and in response, the law enforcement personnel have had little choice but to kill the perpetrators. Making arrests is a remote possibility in such situations, which adds another challenge: it becomes doubly difficult for investigators to trace the planners, facilitators and handlers involved in the attack.

Another change in the militants’ strategy has been to turn to technology such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). During the last four years, IEDs and hand-grenades were used in 782 attacks. The police leadership will have to build up the technical capacity of the force, despite the dangers involved. Such personnel can serve as the shield between innocent civilians and a planted bomb; bomb-defusing expert Hukam Khan saved hundreds of lives over the course of his career before he laid down his life in the line of duty.

In another nefarious move, militants and terrorists have taken to causing a first explosion that is low intensity with time-fitted or remote controlled devices, which is then followed by a second, high-intensity, blast. Such a tactic results in higher casualties, and it is what recently caused carnage at Quetta’s Alamdar Road.

After an incident has occurred, the challenge faced by law enforcement personnel is not just to secure circumstantial evidence but also ensure safety for themselves and everyone else at the scene. Such management is not possible without the cooperation of the public and media personnel, who need to be better sensitised in this regard. Journalists need to understand that in their blind competition for breaking news, safety procedures and protocols must not be set aside.

An increase in targeted killings and sectarian violence adds another layer to the complex security situation. Last year saw significant sectarian attacks in Karachi, Quetta, Gilgit and Kurram Agency, and preventing these is a real challenge for the country’s police. This requires intelligence-led policing and better coordination with other security agencies. Meanwhile, the police chiefs of the areas in which targeted killings are common should employ the preventative and detecting strategies once employed by the Punjab police in the mid-1990s.

The onslaught will have to be resisted in the education and women’s development sectors, too, where infrastructure continues to be destroyed and fear has spread. Over the last four years 839 schools have been destroyed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata. According to the Education for All Global Monitoring Report, 2012, Pakistan already has 5.1 million children out of school, making it second from the bottom in the world’s rankings. While the law enforcement departments must work to counter the situation, the communities and education departments also have a part to play. The same goes for turning around the situation on the polio front, where workers have been attacked and harassed.

To finance their operations, the terrorist-militant network  has found bank robberies and kidnapping for ransom to be  attractive avenues. They have used the proceeds for weapons purchases and other expenses; during 2010, a 50 per cent surge in bank robberies was recorded in Karachi alone. In the current environment of insecurity, criminals have also found lucrative opportunities in militant or terrorist organisations, where they often prove very helpful during acts of sabotage.

The National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta), which was passed by the Cabinet last year, may prove a valuable institutional mechanism in Pakistan’s struggle. With these patterns of violence having been in evidence for over a decade, it has been realised that an institutional network and coordination are missing links in our counterterrorism strategy. Fire-fighting is effective immediately after an incident but what is needed is a long-term, research-based vision. Nacta could provide an intellectual forum to develop a systemic and sustained response, while the recently passed ‘fair trial’ legislation may also prove useful. Meanwhile, our security and law enforcement agencies face a gigantic task.

The writer is a deputy inspector general of the police.

alibabakhel@hotmail.com

The term thana culture is used in Pakistan to refer to a general mindset on the part of the police which sees nothing wrong with abuses such as illegal detention, death in custody, corruption and the extraction of confessions through third-degree methods, all regular occurrences.

This is partly because when the police force was first set up by our colonial masters it was designed as a force to fight the public. It was not meant as a people-friendly agency.

Since independence, more than 20 commissions and committees have prepared reports about the ways to counter the thana culture, but we have yet to see any real change. These recommendations have tended to be general in nature, but hardly any effort has gone into translating even these into reality.

And yet, while the reality is that the thana culture is universally hated in this country, the police station remains the first step towards justice. Despite its flaws, it is still regarded as a symbol of the state that provides a sense of security.

There are some 325,000 male and female police personnel working in 1,544 police stations across the country. In more developed societies, policing is regarded as a service but here, it is regarded as an instrument of force. Are the police an isolated entity or a by-product of society?

Policing cannot be achieved in isolation from the public; the latter should expect service and security, while the police ought to be able to command cooperation, non-interference and respect.

The ideals of human rights cannot be achieved without communication between the police and the public. In much of the developing world, unfortunately, policing continues to be regarded as a non-developmental activity. On the other hand, developed countries have allocated resources to modernise their police forces.

Pakistan needs to give its police management some breathing space to present a realistic picture of the challenges and requirements of their profession. Where applicable, security of tenure, incorporated in the original text of the Police Order 2002, needs to be extended to the heads of police units, for this will result in the implementation of long-term projects.

In recent years the political and police leadership have realised that overall development in society is linked also to the capacity, development and image of the police force. Further, an autonomous police force should be fully accountable to democratic public bodies, not to individuals.

Nevertheless, in Pakistan policing remains a profession under stress and attacks are often carried out on police stations or personnel. When these are flashed across the media, the authority of the state is further eroded.

Here, unfortunately, setting up a police station is understood as erecting a building and providing it with a few men and a vehicle, when the force should be viewed as a specialised professional entity.

There are problems with the attitude of the public, too. Recently, crimes against certain high-profile people have put the police under tremendous pressure, but the public is reluctant to cooperate in the investigations, not realising that this might help the police to achieve success — and that success for the police translates to safety for the public.

Cooperation between the police and the public is essential for achieving arrests and conviction.

What are the other reasons the thana culture doesn’t change? One is that at the local level, police stations are used for political lobbying, thus becoming a source for strengthening already powerful individuals.

The stakes are high and for these individuals, status quo is the preferred option. They cannot afford a situation in which there is no room for nepotism, torture, inefficiency and so on — that is from where they draw their strength.

Change is possible, but only with cooperation between the police and the public. Policing needs to be made more adaptable, in line with changing technological and other developments.

Further, the police need persistent motivation from the public and the patronage of the government to stay committed to their task of combating crime; policemen need to feel themselves owned by and part of the public.

In this regard, the media can also play a role by focusing on those policemen killed in the line of duty, rather than constantly showing the force in a poor light.

An organised effort needs to be made to pay tribute to policemen such as Malik Saad, Safwat Ghayur, Iqbal Marwat, Sattar Khattak, Khan Raziq and Abid Ali. One of the ways to do this is by observing a special day of homage.

Policemen are expected to sacrifice their lives for society, but if society resists considering them a part of itself, how can a policeman maintain his dedication? In Pakistan, policemen are even assaulted in the streets.

As stated earlier, part of the problem is that provincial police departments have retained shades of imperialism. But the Motorway Police was conceived differently, with a service-oriented essence. Its success is proof that Pakistan can establish service-oriented and corruption-free police organisations.

Amendments to the law and the simplification of procedures cannot be achieved by the police; elected representatives need to do this. A policeman should be a symbol of security, and the police station of safety. With sufficient commitment, this can be achieved in Pakistan.

The writer is a deputy inspector general of the police.

alibabakhel@hotmail.com