Over the past five years, thousands of people have been killed and injured in acts of terrorism and violent conflict, particularly in the volatile parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Fata, Balochistan and Karachi. Sections of Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan have also witnessed large-scale violence, particularly in terms of sectarian conflict.

Preventive action is a multi-dimensional approach used to avert the outbreak of conflict by applying the techniques of early warning and early response. Preventive action aims to anticipate conflicts and prevent their escalation by pursing a multi-stakeholder approach involving civil society groups, state actors, and regional and international organisations.

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts, a think tank based in the Hague, has done pioneering work in conflict-ridden parts of the world by helping local stakeholders build a conflict-prevention mechanism. Political will, determination, resources and adequate knowledge about the nature of conflict are essential for a viable preventive action plan.

In Pakistan, it is easy to discern a dearth of basic understanding, expertise and vision to prevent conflicts that cause colossal destruction. Intolerance, extremism, militancy, radicalisation and terrorism have permeated the very fabric of Pakistani society. Yet even more unfortunately, there is indifference and apathy at the state and societal levels in dealing with the chaos and violence.

For quite a long time, now, civil society groups and other stakeholders have been warning that there would be an outbreak of large-scale violence and terrorism related to sectarian, communal and ethnic issues. But the response from major stakeholders has been no more than lukewarm. Early warnings about pre-poll violence were also given but they failed to elicit any serious response from state authorities.

The lack of a preventive action plan to use against groups that openly challenge the writ of the state and force people to conform to their way of life proves the incompetence of those responsible for protecting people’s lives. For instance, for different reasons, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and hard-line Baloch nationalist groups had made it clear that they would try to sabotage the holding of general elections.

The former warned that it would target “secular” political parties because of their alleged pro-American stance, and the latter wanted to compel voters to boycott the elections because of what they see as military operations in their province.

When early warning was given, why did the police, Rangers and the intelligence agencies fail to provide an early response? Why were adequate measures not taken against these groups?

The absence in Pakistan of a culture of tolerance, innovation and a forward-looking approach in terms of critical issues provides space to those who pursue an extremist,
radical and violent agenda. Preventive action can work when there is political will and determination at the state and societal levels to understand the dynamics of conflict and take steps for their prevention. This may be an uphill task but in view of the predictable human casualties that would occur in case a conflict broke out, it is prudent to take preventative steps before it is too late. Without doubt, prevention is better than cure.

Strategies for preventive action in Pakistan could be planned at four levels. First, at the institutional level, conflict-prevention centres need to be established in Pakistan’s conflict zones. These centres, equipped with technical expertise and having knowledge about conflict zones, would play an important role in providing information
and data about the possible outbreak of conflict.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe has one such centre in Vienna and conflict prevention centres are located in the United States, Japan, Jordan, Ethiopia, Senegal and elsewhere. The proposed preventive action centres in Pakistan could focus on early warning and early response so that local conflicts can be prevented to keep them from becoming a major threat to national security later.

Second, preventive action can be taken at the educational level by empowering the young people of Pakistan with knowledge about conflict and how it can be prevented.
There exists enormous scope to introduce courses on conflict prevention, management and resolution in the schools, colleges and universities of Pakistan so that the required interest is created about the issues that cause periodic outbreaks of violent conflict.

Third, at the societal level civil society organisations and political parties could work together to create awareness about the need for an effective preventive action mechanism. Had there been political will and commitment on the part of these groups to understand the causes, nature and dynamics of conflicts at the sectarian, ethnic, communal, economic and political levels, Pakistan would have been better off.

Finally, at the state level, the capacity of the police, Rangers and intelligence agencies needs to be enhanced so that they can sense a potential conflict and work for its timely prevention. If state institutions responsible for maintaining law and order and providing basic security were professional in the discharge of their duties, there would be a marked reduction in violence. The need is to create early warning and early response mechanisms related to the outbreak of violence in Pakistan.

The writer is a professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi and a member of the Preventive Action Group, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo.

amoonis@hotmail.com

It has been rejected by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Nevertheless, the demand and the scale of the emotion and controversy it has stirred up serve to deepen political polarisation in the country. There is little doubt that the end result will be an intensification of the divide between secularists and Islamists.

In a fresh wave of protests launched by the Islamist group Hefajat-i-Islam (‘protecting Islam’) against bloggers that they consider anti-Islam, hundreds of thousands of people held rallies in Dhaka and other cities and towns across the country.

They criticised the Awami League government for not taking severe action against those who, in the recent past, augmented their purportedly anti-Islam activities through online social networks and blogs.

Islamist groups are adamant in their demand and say that they are committed to sustaining their pressure on the government to formulate laws which can award the death penalty to those found guilty of insulting Islam.

But Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has unequivocally rejected these demands. During an interview given recently to the BBC, she said that “the country is a secular democracy, so each and every religion has a right to practise their religion freely”. Where is Bangladesh headed and how is the deepening schism between secular and Islamic groups impacting the country’s political landscape? How can Bangladesh deal with contradictions in its constitution which considers Islam the state religion but also mentions secularism in Article 12 of the constitution?

On June 30, 2011, the Bangladesh parliament passed the 15th Amendment bill which retained Islam as the state religion along with ‘Bismillah’. That augments the predicament: how can it be a secular state when Islam has been declared the state religion?

In a secular state, religion is a private affair and the state pursues a neutral approach on religious matters. Having a state religion would seem to indicate the overturning of the secular nature of the state.

Expressing their dismay over the compromise made by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on retaining Islam as the state religion, two senior ministers in her cabinet — A.M.A. Muhith and A.K. Khandaker — argued that the amendment contradicted the first constitution of Bangladesh, promulgated in November 1972.

This original constitution of Bangladesh focused on the secular identity of the country. In 2010, two verdicts given by the Bangladesh Supreme Court had declared the fifth and eighth amendments, made in the constitution during the regimes of Gen Zia-ur-Rehman and Gen Hussain M. Ershad, unconstitutional, null and void and restored the four pillars of the state mentioned in the 1972 constitution: democracy, nationalism, socialism and secularism.

These amendments had not only made Islam the state religion but also allowed religion-based politics, which enabled the Jamaat-i-Islami and other religious parties to return to the position that had been denied to them under 1972 constitution.

The verdicts had termed the fifth and eighth amendments as having transformed Bangladesh into a “theocratic” state. But the Sheikh Hasina regime failed to completely undo these amendments. Not only has Islam been retained as the state religion but religion-based politics are also allowed.

Secularists in Bangladesh say that the Awami League government has missed the opportunity to secularise the country, particularly with the SC ruling available on the record.

Yet secularising the country by restoring the 1972 constitution to its original pillars of democracy, nationalism, socialism and secularism may open up a Pandora’s box, resulting in violent confrontation between secularists and Islamists.

Already, it is possible to detect polarisation in people’s views over the ‘long march’ from Chittagong to Dhaka under the banner of Hefajat-i-Islam. In order to counter Hefajat-i-Islam, a secular group known as Gono Jagoron Moncho (‘mass-awakening platform’) has been formed, thus escalating the threat of collision between the two groups. The situation will only get more complex over the future.

Bangladesh, which has so far been considered a moderate Muslim country, certainly has meagre scope for religious extremism. But back-to-back events in the recent past, such as the attempts made by the Awami League regime to marginalise religious parties, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami, in politics have been counterproductive.

The issue of bloggers perceived as anti-Islam has been exploited by Islamic groups to reassert their position by holding countrywide protests, many of which have turned violent. But what is obvious from the prevailing confrontation between Islamists and secularists is the country’s identity crisis. Will Bangladesh have an Islamic identity, secular identity or an identity based on Bengali or Bangladeshi nationalism?

When Gen Zia-ur-Rehman became the president of Bangladesh and launched the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, he replaced the slogan of Bengali nationalism propagated by the Awami League with Bangladeshi nationalism.

Bengali nationalism promoted the ethnic identity of Bengalis while undermining the existence of other ethnic groups and religions. Bangladeshi nationalism contained a blend of culture and religion so as to differentiate it from secular Bengali nationalism.

The erosion of the secular character of Bangladesh deepened when Gen Ershad declared Islam as the state religion. However, the promotion of Bangladeshi nationalism and the declaration Islam as the state religion by the martial law regimes of Gen Rehman and Gen Ershad aimed to provide legitimacy to their undemocratic rule.

The use of religion for political purposes, while undermining democracy and secularism, served the purpose of the country’s military dictators but provided enormous space to Islamic forces. The legacy of generals Zia and Ershad still haunts Bangladeshi secularists in terms of promotion of religion and allowing religion-based parties to enter the mainstream political arena of Bangladesh.

The writer is a professor of international relations at the University of Karachi.

amoonis@hotmail.com

The decision by the Dhaka-based International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) to award capital punishment to two key leaders of the Bangladeshi Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) on charges of war crimes during the March-December 1971 civil war in the former East Pakistan has triggered large-scale violent protests and clashes with police killing and injuring a large number of people.

It must be asked why the Awami League (AL) government of Sheikh Hasina decided to establish the ICT and try those whom it accused of “collaborating” with the Pakistan Army in the “genocide” of Bengali people during the military operation.

On Feb 28, the controversial ICT found JI vice-president and former member of parliament Delwar Hossain Sayedee guilty of murder, religious persecution and rape and sentenced him to death. The verdict triggered widespread protests in different parts of Bangladesh and also invited counter-demonstrations by those who supported the court’s verdict.

In Dhaka’s Shahbagh square, thousands of protesters demanded “exemplary punishment” for war criminals and a ban on the Jamaat. The tribunal is trying a total of nine JI leaders and two members of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) for their alleged war crimes.

AL is blamed by its opponents, including the BNP, of transforming Bangladesh into a fascist state by using excessive force against opponents, manipulating the events of 1971 for political consumption and transforming the country’s Islamic identity into a secular one.

Because of three major reasons, Bangladesh is unable to detach itself from the events of 1971. First, anti-Pakistan rhetoric has become an integral part of Bangladesh’s political discourse. It is one thing which has been used by various regimes since 1971 to remind people of the liberation war and the value of freedom. Dec 16 in Bangladesh is celebrated as Victory Day. In fact, most of the national days celebrated in Bangladesh are based on anti-Pakistan rhetoric.

Feb 21 is celebrated as Language Day to mark the struggle launched in East Pakistan to oppose the imposition of Urdu as a national language. March 26 is celebrated as Independence Day to mark the launch of the brutal military operation by the West Pakistan-dominated regime to quell the Awami League-led civil disobedience movement.

Second, some political parties, particularly the Awami League, which fought the liberation war consider it useful to exploit 1971 for political purposes. By diverting people’s attention from ‘real issues’ like corruption, nepotism and bad governance, the AL government is targeting what it calls ‘war criminals’.

Finally, the sufferings caused to the people of Bangladesh in view of the exploitative and unequal relationship with the West Pakistan-dominated regimes have nurtured anti-Pakistan feelings, which persist even after 41 years of independence from Pakistan. The military operation of 1971 alienated the Bengali population of the former eastern wing, and became the source of Bangladesh’s national identity. It is perceived that no government in Bangladesh can detach itself from the events of 1971 and the liberation struggle because the survival of that country rests predominantly on keeping these memories alive.

The BNP and other opposition parties in Bangladesh have alleged that the AL, by pursuing a policy of vendetta, wants to eliminate political opponents before the next elections, due in December 2013. By augmenting the level of political polarisation and targeting religious parties, particularly the Jamaat, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has caused her country to plunge into a serious crisis.

There have been reported attacks on Hindu temples and two Hindu leaders of AL were recently targeted. Islamists in Bangladesh blame India for sponsoring demonstrations supporting the ICT’s verdict against JI leaders. Furthermore, the recent killing of an anti-Islam blogger by five university students and the demand made by Islamic parties to hang other bloggers on charges of blasphemy also indicate a surge of religious extremism in Bangladesh.

Steps taken by the AL government in the last few years to reverse the process of Islamisation by military dictators, generals Ziaur Rehman and Hossein Mohammad Ershad, during the late 1970s and 1980s have also deepened the conflict between Islamists and secularists.

Putting the matter in historical perspective, in 1974, as a result of Pakistan’s recognition of Bangladesh and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s visit to Lahore for the Second Islamic Summit Conference in Feb 1974, Dhaka agreed not to press for the trial of 195 Pakistani prisoners of war — detained in Indian PoW camps — on charges of war crimes.

Pakistan has expressed regret to Bangladesh about the excesses committed during 1971 but has so far refused to tender a full apology. Therefore, one way to keep the issue of 1971 alive was to try the Bengali nationals, termed collaborators, who primarily belonged to the Al Badr and Al Shams wings of Jamaat-i-Islami.

One plausible way to deal with the 1971 syndrome is to start the process of reconciliation by forming an independent commission to thoroughly investigate excesses committed during the military operation of 1971 by the Pakistan Army as well as the killings of non-Bengalis in East Pakistan by armed Bengalis and the Mukti Bahini.

The proposed commission, which can be called the Bangladesh-Pakistan Truth and Reconciliation Commission, will help heal the wounds of 1971 in Bangladesh and in Pakistan and will also help improve relations between the two South Asian countries.

The writer is professor of International Relations, University of Karachi and has authored a study titled Bangladesh and Pakistan: From Conflict to Cooperation.

amoonis@hotmail.com

But the fundamental question which needs to be addressed while considering the demand for new provinces is: should the new provinces be established on an administrative or ethnic basis? The existing four provinces are carved along ethnic lines though the option to redraw provincial boundaries along administrative lines has been presented.

It is not only the rationale behind demanding a change in Pakistan’s federal structure that needs to be addressed; the issue that must also be examined is the potential for violence and conflict if new provinces are created without taking into consideration the interests of ethnic minorities and other stakeholders.

This is especially true when the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, which rules Punjab, is not on board. One can expect the deepening of political polarisation and the consequent impact on the election campaign.

While intolerance, extremism, radicalisation and terrorism shape the political landscape of Pakistan today, those demanding the recognition of their identities have threatened to follow a violent course if their right to a separate provincial identity is not granted.

Three contradictory factors which influenced the issue of creating new provinces in Pakistan were religion, nationalism and centralisation. The argument that the identity of Pakistan rested with Islam as a major unifying force was exploited by the bureaucratic-military establishment which wanted to suppress nationalistic forces and establish a unitary instead of federal state.

It was argued that the existence of Pakistan would be in jeopardy if ethnic and lingual identities were given legitimacy in the shape of new provincial units. The feudal-religious-bureaucratic-military nexus led to the creation of One Unit with the dissolution of the provinces in 1955 in West Pakistan as a counterweight to East Pakistan which had the demographic edge.

Although the provinces of Balochistan, North-West Frontier Province, Punjab and Sindh were restored according to the legal framework order proclaimed in 1970, since then no change in the federal map of Pakistan has taken place.

It was only in 2010 and after that the demand for new provinces gained impetus and became part of a serious political discourse. Renaming the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) in the 18th Amendment was termed a major shift in the political landscape, and it immediately led to a reaction in the Hazara division of KP, with demands being made that a provincial status be granted to the division.

The tabling of the 20th Constitutional Amendment Bill by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement last year in the National Assembly, that sought the creation of new provinces in Punjab and KP, gave impetus to forces seeking recognition of distinct provincial identities.

The question is: why is the redrawing of provincial boundaries limited only to Punjab and KP and why not Sindh and Balochistan?

It is argued by some that when an initiative can be taken in parliament to debate the creation of Bahawalpur, Seraiki and Hazara provinces, a similar debate should be launched for redrawing the boundaries of Balochistan and Sindh. Why is the parliamentary commission only Punjab-specific and how can the constitutional requirements to create new provinces be met when the majority of Punjab Assembly members do not support the division of their province?

Constitutional ambiguity and impediments in the way of creating new provinces in Pakistan aside, perhaps the most important challenge in the process of redrawing the provincial boundaries is the potential for violence and conflict.

Three major demands for the creation of new provinces centre on Seraiki, Bahawalpur and Hazara provinces. But in all three cases, there is the likelihood of stakeholders — whether the ethnic majority or minority — not accepting the borders on historical, lingual, economic, political and ethnic grounds, thus increasing the possibility of conflict.

Even the name given to the new province — Bahawalpur Janoobi Punjab — may not pre-empt resistance from communities, particularly settlers, who may not feel comfortable in a new provincial set-up.

The case of the proposed Hazara province is further complicated because the bureaucracy in that division is Pakhtun-dominated whereas demographically there is an ethnic overlap. There is the threat of resistance on the part of the non-Hindko-speaking population of Hazara if minorities, namely the Pakhtuns, are marginalised in the proposed province.

In May 2012, PML-N members in the KP Assembly submitted a resolution in the provincial assembly secretariat asking the government to amend the constitution to create Hazara province composed of six districts of KP. Can those supporting the creation of a Hazara province get two-thirds majority in the assembly for the fulfilment of their demand?

There are two options to successfully deal with the potential outbreak of conflicts if new provinces are created or the status quo is maintained.

The first is to hold a referendum in areas where there is lack of consensus among the stakeholders — particularly in Hazara, Bahawalpur and Seraiki-speaking areas — to determine what the local people want. Second, instead of being created on an ethnic basis, new provinces could be established along administrative lines so that the threat of ethnic violence is averted.

The future parliament of Pakistan needs to seriously probe the fault lines when it comes to meeting the demand for new provinces.

The writer is a professor of International Relations, University of Karachi.

amoonis@hotmail.com