![]() Highlights of the November 2007 issue
Between the Lines Years ago, while I was interviewing General (retd) Hameed Gul in Rawalpindi, an elderly man wearing, what youngsters call, Bermuda shorts walked into the drawing room. General Gul and I were discussing the role of the chiefs of army staff in removing governments and at that particular moment, the conversation was focused on General (retd) Aslam Beg, said to be instrumental in the dismissal of BB’s first government. As the conversation moved to the role of the corps commanders and the Inter-Services Intelligence chief, the person in the Bermuda shorts made some interesting disclosures to the effect that the corps commanders did not oppose the sacking of Bhutto’s government. But that’s not the point I am making.
The elderly person, I soon learnt, was a former corps commander of
Lahore, Lieutenant-General (retd) Mehsud, and a great
conversationalist. The discussion moved on to the attitude of the
then corps commanders, in general, and the one posted in Karachi, in
particular. The latter commander had an impressive cavalcade, which
escorted him from his house in Bath Island to his office, driving in
the wrong direction on a one-way road with impunity for “security
reasons”. Expressing indignation, Mehsud claimed that he did not
resort to such measures during his tenure as the corps commander
Lahore. Both Gul and I were impressed.
In an interview to a news channel last month, General Pervez Musharraf did not mince his words when he said that the surrender of over 240 Pakistani troops in Waziristan reflected the men’s lack of professionalism. The details of that surrender illustrate the point better: apparently the officer in charge had sought help from civilians to clear a roadblock. Taliban men in reality, these ‘helpers’ were soon joined by more of their ilk and they surrounded the Pakistani troops, forcing them to surrender.
Counter-insurgency is a tough war to fight that has been made even more
difficult by the easy availability of modern technology to insurgents. And
undoubtedly, the local Taliban enjoy the use of heavy artillery and infantry
equipment.
By Massoud Ansari
The military seems to have distanced itself from the latest adventure of its
chief. While it is difficult to gauge how General Pervez Musharraf’s latest
move is being viewed by the top army brass, there are signs that other
generals do not want to be too closely associated with it. Already soldiers
are conspicuous by their absence from the scene in the events following the
November 3 proclamation of emergency. Not a single serviceman was visible on
the streets of Islamabad or any provincial capital on the day of the
emergency. Even the task of securing vital installations – a purely military
reflex – was left to policemen.
This is the first time in Pakistan’s chequered history that an incumbent
president has held the Constitution in abeyance – a euphemism for abrogation
– while invoking the powers of the chief of army staff. Legal experts say
that the action, introduced by General Pervez Musharraf through the
promulgation of a state of emergency on November 3, will not stand up to
judicial examination: the Constitution allows a president but not an army
chief to declare an emergency. However, that has not deterred the military’s
top brass which has a habit of overthrowing elected governments. Since
General Ayub Khan’s time, there have been no fewer than four military
interventions. In the first three instances, the entire government was sent
packing by the army.
Secret within the Secret Text & Photography by
Salman Rashid
“An LSA award is for the credit on billboards” By Nadia Jajja
A. Even two years back I had said that I’ll quit but I never got around to doing it. But now I am really tired. However, this is not to say that I won’t accept any new projects. I’ll do maybe one or two in a year but not more. I exited once before in 1997, when I did the “Khudi” video that flopped. Ironically my second exit comes after exactly 10 years.
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