Negotiated transition

IN the midst of the West’s ‘fight against terrorism and for freedom’, concerns about democracy in Pakistan have clearly been downgraded. This change in the West’s attitude is no reason for Pakistan itself not to address the domestic political process.

Since the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, in the face of almost every national crisis, each government has proceeded unilaterally without proper national consultation or consensus. The result has been failure for the government and disaster for the country. It was for this reason that the Tashkent Treaty led to a virtual state of anarchy, the ouster of President Ayub Khan, and martial law. Similarly, President Yahya Khan proceeded unilaterally to promulgate such important arrangements as the Legal Framework Order,1970, for holding general elections and for framing a constitution, which resulted in civil war and the break-up of Pakistan.

General Zia-ul-Haq disqualified himself from creating any national consensus by executing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the largest political party. Thereafter, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif remained throughout inimical to each other, and never consulted on any national issues. The consequences of this absence of consensus were evident in the 1990s. Now President Pervez Musharraf appears on the whole to act in a unilateral and unaccountable manner.

The only crisis that was successfully overcome on the basis of national consensus was that confronting Z.A.Bhutto at Simla in 1972. He painstakingly and assiduously consulted public opinion before proceeding to Simla, took with him representatives of several political parties, and responded to the people’s call for peace, though not at any price. In 1977, when he failed to respond to public opinion, he was ousted by a military coup.

It is inevitably the function of government to make decisions for the nation, but important decisions should not be divorced from public opinion and support. A good leader must have the ability to mould public opinion, and not merely to follow it. Similarly, he must know how to seize the critical moment for a settlement.

It is axiomatic that the optimum opportunity to seek a negotiated settlement is when one is strongest, though unfortunately Pakistan’s leaders do not see it this way. They consider a willingness to negotiate to be a sign of weakness. In their arrogance, they fail to recognize that situations frequently change and can deteriorate. Arrogance in fact increases isolation and vulnerability, often compelling leaders to negotiate and offer concessions too late.

The time for President Musharraf to pursue a domestic political settlement is now, when he is at his peak as the undisputed ruler. Indeed the West has a stake in his continuity, stability and security. However, while there is little scope for enhancing his position, there is every possibility of it deteriorating.

President Musharraf has accepted the October 2002 deadline for the return of democracy. Let us examine what is involved in this. If the government is genuine in seeking a political settlement, it should enter into negotiations with the politicians about the real issues involved. These are limited, and the problems are not insurmountable. Before discussing some of the political questions, let us touch briefly on the economic front.

So far as economic policy is concerned, there is much common ground between the present government, its two political predecessors, and other political parties. Indeed, there is not much scope to change economic policy. Pakistan is essentially sustained by loans from the international community, and is required to follow its free-market prescription. The focus of any government now appears to be limited to securing debt relief. One distinct advantage in having a political settlement in place, however, is that it would help overcome the prevailing uncertainty that will deter investment, both foreign and domestic, for at least the next 12 months, if not longer.

On the political front, there are three main issues of practical concern that require consideration before the holding of general elections: the voting system; the division of power between the federation and the provinces; and the exercise of the federation’s executive authority.

Regarding the voting system, there are two points for consideration. Firstly, there is the question of separate or joint electorates. Religious-oriented Muslim parties support the former, while other parties and groups prefer joint electorates. It is incongruous to impose a system of separate electorates on religious minorities who do not want them. It is claimed that the call for separate electorates reflects the pre-Independence position of the Muslim League. At that time, however, the Muslim minority demanded this as a form of protection — a safeguard which minorities no longer want in Pakistan.

Then there is the question of whether Pakistan should continue to follow the ‘first past the post’ system for elections, or adopt some form of proportional representation. This is not of critical importance. The manifesto of the Pakistan People’s Party called for a party list system, but eventually the PPP did not adopt this in the 1973 Constitution. One of the main arguments against it is that it leads to weak coalitions which offer opportunities for outside manipulation.

The second issue, relating to the federation and the provinces, is emotive. Pakistan has on the whole been run by a strong central authority, which some favour. There is an opposing small minority that seeks to emasculate this authority and limit the centre’s power to a few subjects, such as foreign affairs, defence and inter-provincial communications. The majority view is somewhere in the middle and recognizes the need for decentralization.

A lurch from the existing to a confederal system would be too extreme and dislocating. A more readily acceptable formula would be to abolish the Concurrent Legislative List, making these subjects part of the residual provincial authority, with provision that this be reviewed after about five or ten years. However, it should be borne in mind that one of the significant achievements of the 1973 Constitution was that it settled the issue of provincial autonomy, and major change should not be undertaken lightly. At the same time, the Council of Common Interests should be strengthened and expanded, giving the provinces a greater say in the affairs of the federation, and safeguarding their position.

The most critical issue relates to the balance of power between the president and prime minister, and the military and civilian authorities. There is much talk of reviving Article 58(2) (b), allowing the president to dismiss the prime minister and the assembly. However, we have seen the futility of such action by the president without military support, and even the subsequent abolition of this provision by Nawaz Sharif did not save him. Unless Pakistan is permanently to have a military man as president, another solution must be found.

Pakistan has been dogged by army intervention, with four military rulers in office for 26 of the past 43 years. The army views political leaders with suspicion, and politicians look on army chiefs with trepidation. For over 43 years, there has been a feeling of ‘us and them’, which has proved disastrous.

The idea of a National Security Council (NSC) has been mooted several times, and found unacceptable by political leaders. I had suggested prior to the framing of the 1973 Constitution that the Council of Common Interests which was to be established for certain subjects dealt with by the federation and the provinces should be extended to cover security and emergency issues, thereby serving the purpose of an NSC. This idea was rejected by Z.A.Bhutto; when he subsequently proposed it to General Zia in mid-1977, it was too late.

The proposed expanded council is preferable to Article 58(2)(b) in that it would not make it necessary for the president to seek the separate support of the army in acting against a prime minister. Nor would it require a military president at all times. This expanded Council of Common Interests is preferable to an NSC, as it takes into account the nature of the federal state by augmenting provincial representation. This council could also, in order to prevent improper use of emergency provisions, decide when the federal government might assume powers in the provinces.

This new reinvigorated council would act to remove either the federal or a provincial government. The composition of the expanded council would be a subject of negotiation, but could consist of the prime minister, some federal ministers, provincial chief ministers and the service chiefs. With the service chiefs as members, their support for any decision would not have to be sought separately by the president.

Negotiations now can also serve the purpose of involving a broad spectrum of political leaders in discussions on how best to meet the present crisis. This is particularly important since three of the main leaders are currently in exile, and the political field is monopolized by the religious parties. However, any political government must follow and not precede general elections. The time is right to negotiate a transition and outline procedures for the general elections and the transfer of power.

From militancy to moderation

THE recent events in Afghanistan and discussions in New York are bound to have a strong bearing on the politics of Pakistan. Prudently handled, it could undo the past damage and also give the economy of the country the boost it badly needs.

Stability and prosperity thus may be the unlikely but welcome result of a warfare and fractious disputes that have long plagued the region. A myth that had cast a spell in Pakistan has also been exploded: the Taliban aided by many Arab and Pakistani volunteers and mercenaries and financed by Osama bin Laden, were not fighting the battle of Islam but were a mere pawn in the power game of the foreign intelligence agents and local warlords. The rout of the Taliban was sudden and humiliating as soon as the key commanders changed sides.

The Northern Alliance replacing them is less cohesive but more brutal. The Taliban militia from its base in Kandahar, as long as it lasts, and later splitting into guerilla bands, and the independent local commanders, like Yunus Khalis in Jalalabad and Ismail Khan in Herat, will continue to dog the Alliance’s tenuous hold on Kabul.

Stability, it seems, will elude Afghanistan for some time to come notwithstanding the UN-backed Brahimi plan for a coalition representing all tribes and sects. The continued American hunt for Osama and his disciples will also keep the Afghan society divided and in a ferment. In this situation of flux with forebodings of sharper divisions and bloodier fighting, the best course for Pakistan would be to keep out of the fray, guard its frontiers against armed infiltrators and asylum-seekers and wait for an administration there to emerge which is endorsed by the UN and obeyed by the provincial commanders.

Intervention in Afghanistan through intelligence agencies has done immense harm to Pakistan without helping the warring Afghans. Now that role should be left to the UN and big powers and Pakistan, instead, should prepare itself for an economic role in Afghanistan’s post-war reconstruction. With a long common border and many lines of communications stretching from the glaciers of Hindukush to the Iranian desert, no other country could act faster and be more helpful than Pakistan in executing an internationally financed and supervised programme for the rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s infrastructure of roads, dams, airports, telecommunications, etc. ruined by neglect or internal conflict and finally by foreign invasion. Through the recent political and economic crises Pakistan has emerged as a force of moderation the world powers and financing institutions have learnt to trust. The Musharraf government staked its popularity in pursuing an austere economic programme which made the poor of the land poorer but staved off bankruptcy, and the country once again became eligible to borrow. Then it risked its very survival by backing the bombing of Afghanistan in the face of opposition even from the people who otherwise loath the Taliban and their harsh and obscurantist rule.

The change in the world attitude has been astounding. Just a few weeks ago, it wouldn’t agree to deal with General Musharraf and barely condescended to see him. Now, the other day when Musharraf declared without an explanation that though elections would be held, he would stay on as president beyond the year 2002, a sigh of relief ran through the New York hall where he spoke and echoed round the world capitals.

The thought now haunting the world politicians and financiers is that the Afghan policy and economic programme pursued by Musharraf may not be reversed by the elected government that comes next on which they were insisting until recently. The strategists and investors alike now prefer certainty to democracy.

Because of the unending crises and inadequacy of political leadership, the people of Pakistan, like the world leaders, may also acquiesce in Musharraf continuing as president provided he remains accountable to the parliament, leaves the provinces alone to manage their own affairs through their own cabinets answerable to their elected assemblies. In other words, he would be the only nominated man in an elected set-up.

To enable General Musharraf to continue as president, the Constitution will have to be amended extensively for the president is now just a figurehead. In doing that he should neither use the local councillors as electoral college, as Ayub Khan did, nor follow Zia-ul-Haq in staging the charade of a referendum. That would finish his newly acquired credibility. A more straightforward reliance on a one-time emergency provision would be more in order.

While at the business of amending the Constitution, he should also purge it of all such provisions that have fostered religious hatred or discriminate against the minorities. Secondly, the concurrent list of subjects should be abolished and all residual subjects not included in the federal list should belong to the provinces.

The aid or debt relief being promised in the current wave of gratitude to Pakistan will be no more than a palliative. The growing unemployment and general economic distress have shaken the confidence of the people in the viability of the country’s economy. Confidence would return only when the investors return and they wouldn’t return as long as extremism and its attendant violence prevail in the country and in its neighbourhood.

The emerging situation in Afghanistan and President Bush’s endorsement of Pakistan’s stand that the Kashmir issue should be resolved through diplomacy and dialogue taking into account the wishes of the people of Kashmir, presages abatement of extremism and violence in the region.

Hope of peace in Kashmir is strengthened by President Bush’s commitment to remain engaged in Pakistan and the entire South Asian subcontinent, as it is also by Hurriyat Conference’s appeal for an end to the armed struggle for the liberation of Kashmir.

Pakistan should endorse the Hurriyat’s appeal. Ten years of mayhem and loss of fifty thousand or more lives have brought the people of Kashmir no nearer to freedom but caused widespread grief and suffering. Now a dialogue between India and Pakistan with the American engagement (whatever it might signify) should be given a chance. Even if it doesn’t succeed, lives will be saved and investors would return.

Peace with India and reconstruction of Afghanistan hold the prospects of an economic boom shedding the image of a reactionary Pakistan. Diplomats and economic managers should wrest control of the policy reins from the intelligence agencies and jihadi forces before Pakistan once again falls out of the sight of the world.

When up is down

HAS anyone else noticed some fairly startling and swift changes in Americans’ collective national thinking recently? The terrorist attacks and ensuing hostilities quickly turned countless givens, assumptions and long-held views upside down. Which may be discomfiting but, when you think about it, isn’t always bad.

The Pakistan government, shunned because it developed nuclear weapons and seized power illegally, is now a close U.S. ally with $900 million in new aid from Washington.

Russia, a former evil empire, now seeks to be involved in NATO. Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, once a KGB spymaster plotting against the United States, now arranges for American military bases in former Soviet republics and passes Afghanistan intelligence to the CIA.

Russian helicopters, once the target of missiles supplied to Afgh an rebels by the CIA, now ferry arms to some of the same rebels who shot at them for 10 years. The American military, which ignored Afghanistan for a decade, now drops bombs on Taliban positions, nutrition packets on cities and feed grains for Northern Alliance packhorses.

Given the unrest of its Afghan neighbour, Iran emits discreet signals of, if not friendship, at least reduced hostility toward Americans. The United States, recently way behind in dues to the United Nations, is now paid up and seeks a greater U.N. nation-building role.

Ten months after President Bush was elected without a popular national vote majority, he wins 90 per cent approval in opinion polls. Once seemingly bent on a unilateral foreign policy, the Texan now skillfully manages a diverse international coalition as if its members were co-owners of some Texas baseball team.

Americans, busily perfecting self-absorption on Labor Day, suddenly start studying foreign cultures and religions and discussing the rules of Ramadan. Workers who couldn’t be bothered to go upstairs for the office blood drive wait hours to bleed into plastic bags for terror victims they will never meet.

Then they collectively donate hundreds of millions of dollars for victims’ families in suddenly beloved New York City and Washington, D.C. and somehow make the Yankees into World Series underdogs. New York’s sometimes loopy leader, Rudy Giuliani, who seemed to be in an end-of-term spiral of self-destructive spats, becomes America’s favorite mayor for his inspired leadership and consoling.—-Los Angeles Times

Anti-Arab campaign in the US media

THE extraordinary turbulence of the present moment during the US military campaign against Afghanistan has crystallized a number of themes and counter themes that deserve some clarification here. I shall list them without too much discussion and qualification as a way of broaching the current stage of development in the long, and terribly unsatisfactory history of relationships between the US and Palestine.

We should start by perhaps re-stating the obvious, that every American I know (including myself I must admit) firmly believes that the terrible events of September 11 inaugurate a rather new stage in world history. Even though numerous Americans know rationally that other atrocities and disasters have occurred in history, there is still something unique and unprecedented in the World Trade Centre and Pentagon bombings. A new reality, therefore, seems to proceed from that day, most of it focused on the United States itself, its sorrow, its anger, its psychic stresses, its ideas about itself.

I would go so far as saying that today almost the least likely argument to be listened to in the United States in the public domain is one that suggests that there are historical reasons why America, as a major world actor, has drawn such animosity to itself by virtue of what it has done; this is considered simply to be an attempt to justify the existence and actions of Bin Laden who has become a vast, over-determined symbol of everything America hates and fears: in any case, such talk is and will not be tolerated in mainstream discourse for the time being, especially not on the mainstream media or in what the government says.

The assumption seems to be that American virtue or honour in some profoundly inviolate way has been wounded by an absolutely evil terrorism, and that any minimizing or explanation of that is an intolerable idea even to contemplate, much less to investigate rationally. That such a state of affairs is exactly what the pathologically crazed world-vision of Ben Laden himself seems to have desired all along—-a division of the universe into his forces and those of the Christians and Jews—-seems not to matter.

As a result of that therefore, the political image that the government and the media—-which has mostly acted without independence from the government—-wish to project is American “unity.” There really is a feeling being manufactured by the media and the government that a collective “we” exists and that “we” all act and feel together, as witnessed by such perhaps unimportant surface phenomena as flag-flying and the use of the collective “we” by journalists in describing events all over the world in which the US is involved. We bombed, we said, we decided, we acted, we feel, we believe, etc., etc.

So, American unity is being projected with such force as to allow very little questioning of US policy, which in many ways is heading towards a series of unexpected events in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Just like bin Laden, Bush tells the world, you are either with us, or you are with terrorism, and hence against us.

In the meantime both George Bush and Tony Blair have realized that indeed something needs to be done about Palestine, even though I believe there is no serious intention of changing US foreign policy to accommodate what is going to be done. In order for that to happen, the US must look at its own history, just as its media flacks like the egregious Thomas Friedman and Fouad Ajami keep preaching at Arab and Muslim societies that that is what they must do, but of course never consider that that is something that everyone, including Americans, needs also to do. Then Bush declares that the US favours a Palestinian state with recognized boundaries next to Israel and adds that this has to be done according to UN Resolutions, without specifying which ones and refusing to meet Yasser Arafat personally.

For the past six weeks there has been an organized media campaign in the US more or less pressing the Israeli vision of the world on the American reading and watching public. Its main themes are that Islam and the Arabs are the true causes of terrorism, Israel has been facing such terrorism all its life, Arafat and bin Laden are basically the same thing, most of the US’s Arab allies (especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia) have played a clear negative role in sponsoring anti-Americanism, supporting terrorism, and maintaining corrupt, undemocratic societies.

Underlying the campaign has been the (at best) dubious thesis that anti-Semitism is on the rise. All of this adds up to a near-promise that anything to do with Palestinian (or Lebanese) resistance to Israeli practices—-never more brutal, never more dehumanizing and illegal than today—-has to be destroyed after (or perhaps while) the Taliban and Bin Laden have been destroyed. That this also happens to mean that Iraq must be attacked next, and indeed all the enemies of Israel in the region along with Iraq must totally be brought low, is lost on no one. So brazenly has the Zionist propaganda apparatus performed in the weeks since September 11, that very little opposition to these views is encountered.

This concentrated pro-Israeli campaign has kept the US administration from anything like a real re-assessment of US policies towards Israel and the Palestinians. Even during the opening rounds of the American counter-propaganda campaign directed to the Muslim and Arab world, there has been a remarkable unwillingness to treat the Arabs as seriously as all other peoples have been treated. Take as an example an Al Jazeera discussion programme a week ago in which bin Laden’s latest video was played in its entirety.

It accused the US of using Israel to bludgeon the Palestinians without respite; bin Laden of course crazily ascribed this to a Christian and Jewish crusade against Islam, but most people in the Arab world are convinced—-because it is patently true—-that America has simply allowed Israel to kill Palestinians at will with US weapons and unconditional political support in the UN and elsewhere. The Doha-based moderator of the programme then called on a US official, Christopher Ross, who was in Washington to respond, and then Ross read a long statement whose message was that the US, far from being against Islam and the Arabs, was really their champion (e.g. in Bosnia and Kosovo).

Then the moderator asked Ross to explain why the US backed Israeli brutality in its military occupation of Palestine. Instead of taking an honest position, Ross chose instead to defend the US as the only power that has brought the two sides to the negotiating table. As an exercise in propaganda, Ross’s performance was poor of course; but as an indication of the possibility of any serious change in US policy, Ross (inadvertently) at least did Arabs the service of indicating that they would have to be fools to believe in any such change.

Whatever else it says, Bush’s America remains a unilateralist power, in the world, in Afghanistan, in the Middle East, everywhere. It shows no sign of having understood what Palestinian resistance is all about, or why Arabs resent its horrendously unjust policies in turning a blind eye to Israel’s maleficent sadism against the Palestinian people as a whole. It still refuses to sign the Kyoto convention, or the War Crimes court agreement, or the anti-landmine conventions, or pay its UN dues.

In short, there is absolutely no reason at all why Yasser Arafat and his ever-present coterie should grovel at American feet. Our only hope as a people is for Palestinians to show the world that we have our principles, we occupy the moral high ground, and we must continue an intelligent and well-organized resistance to a criminal Israeli occupation, which no one seems to mention any more.

My suggestion is that Arafat should stop his world tours and come back to his people (who keep reminding him that they no longer really support what he does: only 17 per cent say they back what he is doing) and respond to their needs as a real leader must. Israel has been destroying the Palestinian infrastructure, destroying towns and schools, killing innocents, invading at will, without Arafat paying enough serious attention. He must lead the non-violent protest marches on a daily, if not hourly basis, and not let a group of foreign volunteers do our work for us.

It is the absence of a self-sacrificing spirit of human and moral solidarity with his people that Arafat’s leadership so fatally lacks. I am afraid that this terrible absence has now almost completely marginalized him and his ill-fated and ineffective Authority. Certainly Sharon’s brutality has played a major role in destroying it too, but we must remember that before the intifada began, most Palestinians had already lost their faith, and for good reason.

What Arafat never seems to have understood is that we are and have always been a movement standing for, symbolizing, getting support as a movement embodying principles of justice and liberation. This alone will enable us to free ourselves from Israeli occupation, not the covert manoeuvring in the halls of western power, where until today Arafat and his people are treated with contempt.

We must not as Palestinians or Arabs fall into an easy rhetorical anti-Americanism. It is not acceptable to sit in Beirut or Cairo meeting halls and denounce American imperialism (or Zionist colonialism, for that matter) without a whit of understanding that these are complex societies not always truly represented by their governments’ stupid or cruel policies. In this respect, we need to make our resistance respected and understood, not hated and feared as it is now by virtue of suicidal ignorance and indiscriminate belligerence. —Copyright Edward W. Said, 2001