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WITH civil-military relations in a state of free fall, the PML-N can’t afford to play the role of a disinterested bystander. Knee-jerk reactions don’t generally produce healthy outcomes. But neither does letting the rot fester. In a country like ours where a big chunk of power-wielders and opinion-makers are either not convinced that democracy is a suitable system of governance for us or are sitting on the fence unburdened by scruples ready to join the winning side, the impression that a civilian government is irrelevant can be crippling.
The military-media conflict has morphed into a civil-military conflict, whether or not it has been articulated as such by those holding top positions across the divide. The reason for the lack of a resolution of the issue is not the inability of the khakis to accept an apology when the tenderer is willing to grovel. The lack of resolution is due to concern about the future and not the past. The average khaki wishes to see redlines in stone and put on display the fate of those who transgress sacred boundaries and wander into khaki territory.
But hawks see this as an opportunity to reclaim lost space. They have felt sand slip through the fist. They have sulked at the sight of their domain being usurped by the civilian executive, the Supreme Court and media. They are done being apologists for their ‘well-meaning’ dictators. For them it isn’t about conserving power presently enjoyed, but about recapturing territory lost since Musharraf’s fall. They are fine with Pakistan’s civilian façade so long as their ability to exercise veto from behind the curtain remains intact like in the ’90s.
The civil-military conflict isn’t just about an errant two-day transmission by a media channel. That a channel could even conceive the idea of doing something so outrageous is seen as the culmination of a trend that gathered pace since Musharraf’s ouster. Under Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Supreme Court started flexing its muscle, dragging serving generals into courts and passing strictures. Taking their cue, high courts started issuing summons for ISI officials and the media started asking awkward questions about Balochistan and the missing persons.
It is disconcerting for the khakis that even after key players from the post-Musharraf era (Gen Kayani and chief justice Chaudhry) have walked into the sunset, the ‘mischief’ of trying to hold the khakis to account hasn’t died down: the PML-N has initiated the treason trial; judges have indicted Musharraf and given him the run around over the ECL matter; an FIR has been registered against a soldier over missing persons; the Supreme Court is considering if the khakis should be tried in civilian courts; and the media thinks it can treat generals just like ordinary prime ministers.
If the PML-N thinks this crisis will blow over with a slap on Geo’s wrist (ie public apology with fine and/or limited-time suspension) and life will be back to normal, it’s wrong. Geo’s insolent transmission has only brought to a boil tensions over the respective domains of the civvies and khakis that have been simmering since democracy’s restoration in 2008 and the emergence of the media and judiciary as powerful actors. The Geo transmission has only determined the timing of this conversation that the government and khakis needed to have in any event.
The timing isn’t bad for the Sharif government. While the honeymoon period is over, the country hasn’t started itching for a change of the façade just yet. Our on-demand revolutionaries have been stirred and brought out of the woods, but there’s no meaningful political alliance vying to bring the government down. Only a few months into the job, the personal relationship between Gen Sharif and Prime Minister Sharif has probably not turned septic. But do nothing and the prophecies of doom will become self-implementing.
Other than Geo’s fate there are three sets of issues that will brew tensions if left unaddressed: internal security; external security; and the extent of the military’s autonomy and immunity. Khakis consider themselves the last word on all three. The PPP regime attempted to change the equation (by changing the ISI’s reporting line and encouraging mention of civilian supremacy in Kerry-Lugar), but beat a quick retreat when checked. Now if Prime Minister Sharif wishes to change the equation, he needs to do so slowly and walk the extra mile to forge a consensus over issues.
Whether the policy is to talk and fight simultaneously or one after another, there must be no differences over what the policy is and what the government’s posturing is meant to accomplish. On the external front, Pakistan finds itself in tense regional environment. With Abdullah on the west and Modi on the east, the civilian and military leadership can’t afford to posture with each other over the shaping of our security and foreign policy. They can reach the principled agreement that status quo will prevail unless there is consensus over change.
Musharraf’s trial will remain a sticking point. The longer it drags out, just like the Geo crisis, the more damage it’ll do. Here too candidly conveying the government’s intent as opposed to communicating through signals that can be misunderstood is the way forward. The leadership challenge for Prime Minister Sharif is not to exhibit the resolve to go down fighting, but to pre-empt a street brawl. Insolent responses to khaki muscle flexing at the moment will only feed the hawks on both sides and thwart the otherwise inevitable transition towards civilian control of the military.
The writer is a lawyer.
Twitter: @babar_sattar
Published in Dawn, May 26th, 2014
