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The final round of Afghan talks was not just a question of expatriation of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; it had, in a way, turned out to be a battle of nerves between president General Ziaul Haq and prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo. The general wanted to show his military craftsmanship and bring an accord according to his plan so he could become a Mujahid of Islam, while Junejo wanted to resolve the issue quickly to allow him to concentrate on domestic issues. Obliquely opposed to each other, both stuck to their guns. In fact, political circles expected that the final accord on Afghanistan might be signed on March 15; hence, all involved in the issue wanted to shape it in a way that it would become acceptable to all parties concerned.
Technically, Gen Zia had the upper hand as being president in uniform he had manoeuvred constitutional changes to enable him to act as the master of the show. The condition that Afghans be allowed to choose their own government was supported by both Pakistan and the US, but internationally it could not fetch the required support, although in principle Gorbachev had agreed in a vague manner.
When Gen Zia saw that Junejo was adamant to reach an accord without informing him (Zia), he decided to make his opinion loud and clear. But Junejo also decided to browbeat Zia’s plan.
Zain Noorani was warned that if he did not follow what he was being told he would be lynched on the road
To execute his plan, prime minister Junejo removed Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan and appointed Zain Noorani as the minister of state for foreign affairs which was part of his original scheme to keep foreign and defence affairs in his own hands and to deal with issues of both ministries using different men. Sahibzada’s closeness to Gen Zia was known. Now it became easier for Junejo to defuse Zia’s move. On Feb 25, 1988 Junejo convened a cabinet meeting at which he placed the Afghan issue for open discussion. His point of view was that though Afghanistan was an international issue since it consumed much of Pakistan’s economy and human resources, the Pakistani government had the right to consult its political leaders and people of opinion to evolve a wider consensus. It was a wise and diplomatic move and was approved. It was decided to convene an All Parties Conference (APC).
Gen Zia was not unaware of Junejo’s movements. As the news of the APC became public many names of the expectant participants were disputed. The rightists did not want the leftists to join the talks while the major parties did not agree to all the “non-functional” parties to sit along with them. PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto made it clear that she would not attend the APC if Gen Zia was there, which was agreed on. The APC was scheduled to be held on March 5, 1988, for which Nawabzadah Nasrullah Khan and Pir Sahib Pagara along with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi worked hard. Benazir Bhutto also didn’t want Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, an ‘uncle’ of the Bhutto era, to attend the APC; however, she was told that to create a consensus it was necessary to have him on board.
The holding of the APC was a difficult task, given the backdrop of developments, but Junejo’s team handled it intelligently and all expected participants agreed except Gen Zia, who, because of reservations about the possible outcome, opted otherwise.
The conference was scheduled to continue for two days i.e., March 5 and 6. On the evening of the first day’s session, when the day’s proceedings were being reviewed, Gen Zia unexpectedly arrived there. After a few minutes when he was told that the APC would continue the next day, he satirically said: “It means that another week would be spent on the APC.”
When Gen Zia saw that Junejo was adamant to reach an accord without informing him (Zia), he decided to make his opinion loud and clear. But Junejo also decided to browbeat Zia’s plan.
On the night of March 13, when Zain Noorani was about to fly to Geneva, and a meeting of the cabinet was in progress at the PM House, prime minister Junejo received a phone call from Gen Zia. The general asked Junejo about the meeting to which he replied that the meeting was over and he was about to visit him to brief him about the deliberations, “… but if you want to come, who is going to stop you,” he said. The call ended. A few moments later the door opened with a bang and the general walked in.
After some preliminary discussion Gen Zia began to talk about the possible Afghan solution and the suggestions that the cabinet had prepared for talks at Geneva.
It took him over an hour outlining the Afghan policy Pakistan wanted to follow. At the end, he told Zain Noorani not to sign anything except what he was being told. “Mr Noorani, if you signed the accord with your eyes closed and without undertaking the country’s interest, mind it people would lynch you … Let me tell you clearly that if you signed the accord without considering the future of the Afghan people and the country, people would lynch you on the roads.” At that moment Gen Zia appeared in a serious mood and spoke in a coarse voice.
He asked Noorani to take notes very carefully about what he had to say at Geneva and what to do. He was told that there could be no solution except the formation of a national government in Kabul with the consent of all parties. He was told in clear terms that if they did not agree to accept this, then he should not sign the accord and the talks be postponed. Poor Noorani wound up the notebook, placed it in the briefcase and straightaway drove to the airport.
He left for Geneva a dejected person. He did not attend the meeting; instead the hosts were told that Mr Noorani had fallen ill. After staying in his hotel room he came back the following day. Zia, Junejo and everyone in Pakistan waited for the news which never came.
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, January 10th, 2016
