12
A PREVAILING sense of déjà vu across Islamabad’s ruling circles following the US threat of withdrawing funds for eight new F-16 fighters may well suggest that Pakistan is missing the point. It’s easy to say ‘we have seen it all before’. But it’s much harder to figure out the lessons learnt from the past that could be usefully applied to shape future policies in Pakistan’s best interest.
Beyond another chapter in a history of ups and downs surrounding Pakistan’s relations with the world’s lone superpower lies a failure by Pakistan to carve out the road to preserve and protect its interests. And beyond matters linked to just foreign policy lies a series of internal trends that have weakened Pakistan and enhanced its vulnerability to outside pressures.
The jury may still be out on the final outcome of this saga, given the noise from parts of the US administration seeking close ties with Islamabad. The bottom line is indeed a familiar one. Now that US interests in the Pak-Afghan region have shrunk following the December 2014 withdrawal of the bulk of US troops from Afghanistan, Washington’s need for a ‘tight’ alliance with next-door Pakistan has been diluted.
One key lesson from a bird’s eye view of the history of US-Pakistan relations suggests a key gap. In seeking to pursue close ties with the US, Pakistan has historically relied on a personality-driven approach between key decision-makers on both sides rather than a sustainable relationship based on broad-based and long-term interests.
Pakistan has failed to carve out the road to preserve its interests.
The ‘personal’ relationship between former president Gen Pervez Musharraf and former US president George W. Bush presents a telling case in point. The former, Pakistan’s military ruler, and the latter, the post 9/11 US president, found it mutually convenient to embrace one another in the battle against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
For Musharraf, valuable US military and economic aid helped to bolster a regime that lacked global legitimacy, while Bush found it convenient to embrace Pakistan as a key ally for the US war in Afghanistan.
From Pakistan’s vantage point, little appears to have been achieved by way of either organising the country’s migrant community in the US to work in the interest of their motherland, or indeed a diversification of ties beyond the military dimension.
Though US officials point towards a series of past economic interventions to Pakistan’s benefit, the point becomes debatable on the streets of Pakistan. For ordinary Pakistanis, US assistance has helped more to bolster one regime after another in spite of credibility gaps, rather than to benefit ordinary folk.
Arguably, past US assistance in fact took Pakistan away from the ideal of self-reliance in key areas that would allow the country to fend for itself. Going forward, the cause of national security needs to be built as much with new weapon systems including fighter planes as the matter of fixing Pakistan’s out-of-sync bookkeeping.
In contrast to its status as the newest member of the world’s exclusive nuclear club, Pakistan suffers from continued lethargy surrounding its ability to begin paying its own bills. The failure to fix national tax revenues which have chronically remained behind target is indeed directly linked to such national choices as the purchase of modern military hardware.
The opponents of Pakistan in Washington who have stalled the deal and tied a resolution to matters like the release of Dr Shakil Afridi, realised the tool of Pakistan’s economic vulnerability working to their advantage. With the country’s national revenues lagging behind target, it’s difficult to imagine exactly how Pakistan can comfortably afford to ditch one fighter aircraft option with a subsidy in place, in favour of another at the full market price. Dependence on precious foreign assistance rather than national resources lies at the heart of the challenge.
Going forward, the issue is not necessarily one of a lack of choices. Noises in recent months from the community of global arms dealers have suggested that Russia may be ready to sell a batch of its SU-35 fighter planes to Pakistan, following a well-publicised deal of the same between Moscow and Beijing.
And the strides made by China’s own fighter aircraft production facilities in recent years along with the close collaboration with Pakistan, offers yet another opportunity to be pursued if needed. Though US technology may be more advanced by comparison to some of the other systems available to Pakistan, that must not necessarily work as a disincentive.
The set of US sanctions under the much-publicised Pressler Amendment in 1990 worked to withhold a batch of F-16s signed by Washington for sale to Pakistan. Though the F-16 supply line was resumed more than a decade later, Pakistan in partnership with China successfully began manufacturing the JF-17. The ultimate question is just one: can Pakistan learn to stand on its feet with or without resolving the latest F-16 riddle with the US.
The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist.
Published in Dawn, May 13th, 2016
