THE distance between Pakistan’s three principal allies can be better measured by the gulfs between their ideologies than by miles alone.
Indeed, one wouldn’t be able to find three such disparate states as the United States, China and Saudi Arabia if one looked. The one common element in their policies seems to be a shared desire to somehow keep Pakistan afloat, despite its best efforts to go under.
From Islamabad’s perspective, each of these crucial relationships is transactional as there are no cultural, historical or ethnic ties that bind us. While Pakistan shares a religion with Saudi Arabia, there are no other common elements to underpin our so-called brotherly bonds.
####What binds Pakistan and China is an old adage.
Alliances, while based on national interest, are seldom permanent unless layered in shared values. Thus, the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are referred to as the ‘five eyes’ in security circles. Sensitive intelligence that is not shared with other allies is exchanged among themselves because hostilities between them are inconceivable.
Although the US has given and lent more money to Pakistan than China and Saudi Arabia combined, and transferred billions of dollars worth of arms, it currently has less influence in Islamabad than our other two allies. The reason is that our military, despite being dependent on Washington for much of its modern weaponry, is suspicious of it for a number of reasons.
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For one, Washington has always tried to curtail and limit our nuclear programme, imposing sanctions from time to time. Then, it has objected to our frequent bouts of martial law, as well as voicing concerns over our poor human rights record. Finally, its constant refrain that Pakistan should ‘do more’ against our snake pit of jihadis jangles in the ears of the very people who unleashed these monsters to start with.
China and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, are no shining examples of democracy, and treat their citizens appallingly. So, neither objects to our violation of democratic norms. The strings to their assistance are not as embarrassingly public as are American conditions.
Pakistan harps constantly about its friendship with China being ‘stronger than steel and higher than the Himalayas’, or some such cringe-making rubbish. And yet China is an atheist state, and has cracked down on its own fractious Muslims. The Uighurs of Western China are forbidden from many outward displays of faith.
What binds the two is the old adage ‘my enemy’s enemy is my best friend’. Thus, China finds a militarily strong Pakistan to its strategic advantage as it forces India to guard two borders, and Pakistan’s location allows it to access the Indian Ocean through Gwadar, a port it has largely financed.
Saudi Arabia’s interest in Pakistan is based largely on its military needs: lacking a fighting force that is fit for purpose despite the hundreds of billions it spends on brand new weapons, it looks on Pakistanis to train their soldiers. And it also counts on our army as a defence force of last resort for the time the Americans withdraw their protective umbrella. The Saudis also view our nuclear arsenal as a big plus.
Our geostrategic position has motivated the large economic and military programme Washington has financed with billions of dollars over the years. Unsurprisingly, Pakistani leaders have milked our geographic location for all it’s worth.
Many blame Pakistan’s early leadership for dragging us into America’s network of anti-communist alliances. They overlook the fact that, back then, we were hopelessly outgunned by the Indian military’s firepower. The Soviet Union was too weak in the aftermath of WWII to be a significant supplier of arms.
After the Korean War ended, we received many surplus arms from the US and, soon thereafter, we joined the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organisation, or Cento), and Seato, the Southeast Asian alliance. We continued receiving American arms until the 1965 war, when we used weapons against India that had been supplied specifically for deployment against communist aggression.
Since then, our relationship with the US has veered from bad to worse. It took the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for a resumption of aid that ended after the Red Army’s retreat, and we were back in the doghouse because of our nuclear programme. 9/11 provided the next chapter in Pak-US relations.
Now, with Trump in charge, how this touchy alliance will evolve is anybody’s guess. But with his stated intent of improving ties with India, and taking a tough stance against China, it is clear that a realignment of forces can be expected.
China’s deepening economic ties with Pakistan via CPEC increases its stakes. Hopefully, Beijing will use its growing clout to force our generals to rein in the extremists they supported for years. If it does, it will have been more successful than Washington has been.
Published in Dawn, February 11th, 2017