While the Pakistan Muslim League — Nawaz has been extremely successful in coming up with winning alignments in the more urbanised and industrialised regions of the Punjab, the Pakistan Peoples Party has lost a significant vote share in these areas

Punjab is a fairly heterogeneous province not only in terms of the economy and society of its different regions, but also in its electoral politics. For the purposes of analysis the province can be divided into four regions: North, Centre, West and South (see Figure 1).

North Punjab is one of the two most urbanised regions of the province. It has the highest level of literacy and a high reliance on migrant labour, service sector and state employment. Central Punjab is the most populated, industrialised and urbanised region of the province with high rates of urban and rural literacy. It also enjoys higher levels of agrarian fertility and surplus generation than the barani Northern Punjab.

South Punjab is the second most populated region. It is more reliant on agrarian employment and has low levels of literacy. It differs from Central Punjab: industrialisation levels are much lower and land concentration levels much higher in the South. West Punjab, like the South, is the domain of large landowning families. Its urbanisation and literacy rates are the lowest in the province — half that of the North, according to the 1997 population census. Low levels of industrialisation and limited access to irrigation make it the poorest region of the province.

Indeed there is a stark difference in social attainment between the highly-urbanised North and Central Punjab and the less-urbanised and more feudal South and West Punjab. This can be judged from Figure 2. (Based on the 1997 population census data, Figure 2 is an index of regional social attainment that is based on percentage of literate population, percentage of pucca houses, and percentage of houses with electricity.)

Given its large share of the population, the Central Punjab region contains half the National Assembly seats of the province according to the 2002 delimitation (Figure 3), which is more or less in line with the distribution according to the earlier delimitation. A quarter of the seats are in South Punjab and the remaining quarter in West and North Punjab. Clearly, a strong performance in the Centre and the South is a necessary prerequisite for any party trying to win the province.

However, what are the electoral features of the different regions and how is the support for different parties distributed across the four regions? The first big difference in the electoral geography of the four regions lies in the nature of political competition (see Table 1). The Centre, North and South are dominated by competition between the main political parties. From 1988 to 1997, this meant the existence of two-party competition between the PPP and PMLN with the Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid-e-Azam (PMLQ) converting it into a three-party competition in 2002. This is not the case in West Punjab, where the main political parties play a less significant role.

This region is, instead, dominated by powerful independent politicians and this pattern is evident even in 2002 (see Table 2). In fact, the increase in the vote and seat share of “other parties” in 2002 simply reflects the gains of the National Alliance, which was no more than a grouping of the Leghari family. Indeed, powerful families’ members continue to remain electable in Punjab’s poorest and least urbanised region, even when they compete as individuals or as family groupings outside the umbrella of political parties.

Given this history, alliances between influential families, such as the Khars, Tiwanas, Dareshaks, Legharis, Mazaris and Bharwanas and the main political parties will determine the outcome of the National Assembly elections in West Punjab. The recent alignment and realignment of influentials from the region with the PPP and the PMLQ is likely to give these parties an edge over the PMLN.

The second big difference is related to the performance of different parties across the regions. Data shows that the PPP’s vote share has been declining since 1988 across the four regions (see Table 3). The party has lost a significant vote share in the North and Centre, suggesting that it has not come up with an appealing agenda for an increasingly urbanising Punjab. Fairly large concentrations of the PPP vote in the South, however, sustain its continued importance in the province.

The increasing dominance of the PMLN from 1988 to 1993 is more evident in the Centre and North (see Table 3. The 1997 election was ignored as it represents an atypical sweep for one party and may not be a useful predictor for the coming elections). Even in 1990, when the PMLN swept the Punjab, the difference between its vote share and that of the PPP was most pronounced in the Centre and North than in the other regions, especially the South. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 2002 the PMLN attained its highest vote share in these very regions and its performance was quite healthy in spite of the exile of its leader and the creation of the breakaway PMLQ. This suggests that the PMLN has been extremely successful in coming up with winning alignments in the more urbanised and industrialised regions of the Punjab.

PMLQ’s dominance in 2002 is obvious in all regions. However, it is weakest in the North, Centre and South and strongest in the West. This can be inferred by comparing the combined vote share of the PPP and PMLN with the PMLQ’s. The PPP-PMLN share far outweighs the PMLQ’s in the North and South as well as in the Centre. The regional dominance of the PMLQ in 2002 in terms of seat share follows a similar trend. It appears that General (retd) Pervez Musharraf’s strategy of breaking up the PMLN and creating the PMLQ in 2002 did not yield all the desired dividends. In the urbanised North and Centre the PMLN and the PPP were able to remain competitive and in the South the PPP remained competitive despite the absence of its national leadership.

Another outcome of Musharraf’s divide and rule policy vis-à-vis the PMLN is the increase in the number of marginal seats held by each party across different regions. (Marginal seats are those where the runners-up require less than a 10 per cent increase over their existing vote share to win.) These seats will help decide the fortunes of the main parties in the February elections, particularly the PPP.

In fact, the seats take on particular significance in the aftermath of the PPP chairperson, Benazir Bhutto’s death, as the PPP is expected to make gains because of a sympathy vote in its favour. It seems that the party will make the most gains in the South of the Punjab where it is the most secure (see Figure 4). The division of the vote between the two Muslim Leagues, which together hold a large proportion of marginal seats in the South, will also work to the advantage of the PPP in the region. On the other hand, nearly 60 per cent of the seats held by the PPP in the West are marginal. This indicates competition between influentials from the area and it appears that in 2002 the PPP was aligned with less secure influentials than the PMLQ. Similarly, more than a third of the seats won by the PPP in the Centre and North in 2002 are susceptible to a small swing. Clearly the PPP gained a larger proportion of seats in the Centre and North in 2002 because of the division of the vote between the PMLN and PMLQ.

As far as the two Muslim Leagues are concerned, it appears that the Centre and North will be the main battleground between these two parties, given the historic dominance of these regions by the PMLN. A divided verdict between the two and a sympathy vote for the PPP will work to the advantage of the latter and may allow it to retain or even increase its existing seat share, while a clear verdict in favour of either PML will unequivocally determine the party that will end up dominating the Punjab.